JUDGMENT BELA M TRIVEDI, J. 1. The present application was dismissed by this Court along with the Election Application No.2 of 2017 and No.6 of 2017 filed in Election Petition No.1 of 2017, by the applicant the returned candidate (respondent No.1 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017) vide the common order dated 20.4.2018. The applicant having challenged the said order before the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petitions being SLP(C) Nos.13040 to 13042 of 2018, the Supreme Court had passed the following order on 26.9.2018:- "19. Accordingly, we allow this appeal in the following terms: (I) The judgment and order dated 20th April, 2018 passed by the High Court of Gujarat in Election Application No.2 of 2017 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017, is upheld and as a result thereof, the appeal against that decision is dismissed. (II) The judgment and order dated 20th April, 2018 passed by the High Court of Gujarat in Election Application No.3 of 2017 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017 is set aside and the parties are relegated before the High Court for de novo consideration of the said application which is restored to the file of the High Court to its original number in terms of this order. The High Court is requested to decide the remanded application expeditiously, preferably within one month. Hence, the appeal against the decision on the Election Application No.3 of 2017 is partly allowed. (III) The appeal against the judgment and order dated 20th April, 2018 passed by the High Court of Gujarat in Election Application No.6 of 2017 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017 is disposed of with liberty to the appellant to challenge the selfsame decision afresh in the event his remanded Election Application No.3 of 2017 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017 is rejected. That special leave petition be heard analogously with the special leave petition against the order to be passed on Election Application No.3 of 2017, should the need arise." 2. The observations made by the Supreme Court as regards the Election Application No.3 of 2017 being relevant, the same are reproduced as under:- "13. Reverting to the second application filed by the appellant, being Election Application No.3 of 2017, the thrust of the grievance was that the copy of the election petition served on the appellant was not a true copy. Reverting to the second application filed by the appellant, being Election Application No.3 of 2017, the thrust of the grievance was that the copy of the election petition served on the appellant was not a true copy. It was not a copy attested by the election petitioner under his own signature, much less to be a "true copy" of the petition. Further, there were blanks in the verification clause of the petition and the affidavit in Form No.25 was not in conformity with the requirement of law. Additionally, it was also urged that the election petitioner had not filed as many copies of the election petition as there are respondents mentioned in the election petition. The last point raised by the counsel for the appellant came to be rejected by the High Court on the finding that the same was not taken up in the application filed by the appellant. In other words, it was canvassed across the Bar for the first time. That being the position, the High Court justly disallowed the said contention. 14. However, with regard to the other aspects raised in the application, the High Court noted that the appellant did not file the original copy of the election petition served on him, but produced only a photocopy of the allegedly served copy of the election petition along with the application filed for that purpose, bearing Election Application No.3 of 2018. The High Court noted that the only grievance of the appellant was that the copy of the election petition served on him did not contain the words: "True Copy". That contention was rejected by placing reliance on the exposition of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore, Ch. Subbarao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal and in T.M. Jacob Vs. C. Poulose and Ors., wherein it has been held that the real test of whether the copy served is a "true one" is to find out whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person and if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 81(3) of the Act, the election petition cannot be dismissed at the threshold. 15. 15. We must agree with the High Court that to test the arguments of the appellant as to whether the copy served on him was a true copy of the original election petition or otherwise, it was imperative for him to produce the copy of the petition actually served on him and not the photocopy thereof. The grievance of the appellant that some blanks had been kept in the verification clause or there were material discrepancies, could be examined only if the copy of the petition actually served on the appellant was produced before the Court. The High Court could have non-suited the appellant on this sole ground instead of examining the matter any further. 16. However, the grievance made before us by the appellant is that the factual position recorded by the High Court in paragraph 35 of the impugned judgment that the appellant had not produced the copy actually served on him in the Court is incorrect. In that, the appellant had submitted the photocopy of the actually served copy along with Election Application No.3 of 2018 and had also undertaken to produce the original of the actually served copy at the time of hearing and that the same was so produced at the time of hearing and handed over to the High Court. This specific plea has been taken in ground (u) of the special leave petition. In other words, the High Court committed manifest error in that regard. If that is so, it would be appropriate to relegate the parties before the High Court for consideration of grievance that the copy actually served on the appellant is not the true copy within the meaning of Section 81(3) of the Act. We are inclined to say so also because the plea taken by the appellant before us is that the appellant had pointed out 20 discrepancies in the copy of the election petition served on him and a chart whereof has been appended at Pages 855-867 of Volume IV of the Special Leave Petition, which according to the appellant, were material discrepancies warranting a finding that the copy of the petition served on him was not a "True Copy" within the meaning of Section 81(3) of the Act. We find that the High Court has not dealt with this contention in the impugned judgment at all. We find that the High Court has not dealt with this contention in the impugned judgment at all. Even for this reason, the decision of the High Court on the application under consideration, being Election Application No.3 of 2017, will have to be set aside and the parties will have to be relegated before the High Court for its consideration afresh on its own merits in accordance with law. In this view of the matter, we have consciously avoided to advert to the rival pleadings and submissions on the merits of this issue so that no prejudice is caused to either party and the remanded Election Application No.3 of 2017 can be decided de novo in accordance with law. All contentions available to the respective parties in that regard are kept open. 17. We may hasten to add that the question to be decided in Election Application No.3 of 2017 for dismissal of the election petition, will be limited to non-compliance of Section 81(3) and the consequences flowing therefrom including under Section 86(1) of the Act. For, the dismissal of the election petition under the latter provision is envisaged only on that count and not in reference to some non-compliance of requirement under Section 83 of the Act. This is the settled legal position. 18. As we are inclined to relegate the parties before the High Court for consideration of Election Application No.3 of 2017 afresh in accordance with law, and in the event the appellant is in a position to persuade the High Court to allow the said application, the election petition will have to be dismissed at the threshold under Section 86(1) read with Section 81(3) of the Act. However, if that application fails, the appellant can be permitted to reopen or revive the challenge to the issues raised in Election Application No.6 of 2017 for dismissal of the election petition under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) of the CPC, on the ground that the election petition does not disclose a cause of action or that it is barred by law. In that eventuality, the appellant may challenge the judgment rendered in the remanded Election Application No.3 of 2017 and also have the liberty to file fresh special leave petition against the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in Election Application No.6 of 2017. Further, both such special leave petitions can be heard together. In that eventuality, the appellant may challenge the judgment rendered in the remanded Election Application No.3 of 2017 and also have the liberty to file fresh special leave petition against the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in Election Application No.6 of 2017. Further, both such special leave petitions can be heard together. All questions in that regard are kept open, to be decided appropriately if and when occasion arises. For the time being, we do not wish to burden this judgment with the said issues and leave it open." 3. In view of the above, the Election Application No.3 of 2017 has been heard afresh. The learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Dushyant Dave made his submissions on behalf of the applicant (original respondent No.1) and the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.N. D. Nanavati along with the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Satyapal Jain made their submissions on behalf of the respondent No.1 (original petitioner). Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Kapil Sibal made his submissions in rejoinder to the submissions made by the learned Sr. Advocates for the respondent No.1 (original petitioner). 4. As transpiring from the paragraph 16 of the order passed by the Supreme Court, the main grievance raised by the applicant in the SLPs was that the factual position recorded by the High Court in paragraph 35 of the impugned judgment that the appellant had not produced the copy actually served on him in the Court, was incorrect. It appears from the said order that the applicant i.e. the appellant before the Supreme Court, had raised the contention that he had produced the photocopy of the actually served copy along with the Election Application No.3 of 2018 and had undertaken to produce the original of the actually served copy at the time of hearing, and that the same was so produced at the time of hearing and handed over to the High Court. The said contention being contrary to the record of the case, in the opinion of this Court, it would be appropriate to place on record the correct facts chronologically as transpiring from the record of the Election Petition as well as the Election Applications filed therein. Dates Events 18/08/2017 Election Petition No.1 of 2017 was filed by the respondent (the Election Petitioner). 04/10/2017 The applicant (original respondent No.1) filed written statement to the Election Petition. Dates Events 18/08/2017 Election Petition No.1 of 2017 was filed by the respondent (the Election Petitioner). 04/10/2017 The applicant (original respondent No.1) filed written statement to the Election Petition. 04/10/2017 The applicant also filed three applications being Election Application No.2 of 2017, No.3 of 2017 and No.6 of 2017 seeking dismissal of Election Petition No.1 of 2017 on various grounds, however, the applicant had not produced any document much less the copy of the Election Petition actually served on the applicant, or even the photocopy of the said copy, either along with written statement or with the Election Application No.3 of 2017. 20/03/2018 During the course of hearing of Election Application No.3 of 2017, the applicant filed an application being Election Application No.3/2018 seeking permission to bring on record the photocopy of the copy of the Election Petition No.1 of 2017, which according to the applicant was served upon him, and to take the same into consideration for determination of the Election Application No.2 of 2017, No.3 of 2017 and No.6 of 2017. 06/04/2018 The arguments of learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Sibal for the applicants in Election Application Nos.2 of 2017, 3 of 2017 and 6 of 2017 and 3 of 2018 were completed. During the course of arguments on 6.4.2018, Mr.Sibal had sought to produce across the Bar a copy of the petition stated to have been served on the applicant, however, the said copy having not been produced on record with the affidavit of the applicant, the learned Advocates for the respondent No.1 (original petitioner) had raised an objection against such production. The Court, therefore, returned the same to the learned Advocate for the applicant. The said fact has been recorded in the orders passed on 6.4.2018, as well as on 20.4.2018. 20/04/2018 The Court disposed of the Election Application No.3 of 2018 by passing the following order:­ "1. The application has been filed by the applicant (original respondent No.1) seeking permission to bring on record the photocopy of the Election Petition No.1 of 2017 stated to have been served on the applicant, for the purpose of consideration of Election Applications No.2 of 2017, 3 of 2017 and 6 of 2017 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017. 2. The application has been filed by the applicant (original respondent No.1) seeking permission to bring on record the photocopy of the Election Petition No.1 of 2017 stated to have been served on the applicant, for the purpose of consideration of Election Applications No.2 of 2017, 3 of 2017 and 6 of 2017 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017. 2. At the outset, it may be stated that the present application has been filed by the applicant during the course of hearing of the applications filed by the applicant, more particularly the Application No.3 of 2017, in view of the query put by the Court as to whether the applicant had produced on record the copy of the petition served on him, in support of the allegations made by the applicant in the said application with regard to the "blanks" contained in the verification made by the petitioner in the Election Petition. 3. The learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Sibal at the relevant point of time had submitted that the applicant shall file the said copy of petition served on him. However, the present application has been filed by the applicant (respondent No.1) seeking permission to place on record the photocopy of the copy of the petition allegedly served on him. Of course, during the course of arguments, Mr.Sibal had sought to submit, for the perusal of the Court, the copy of the petition allegedly served on the applicant. However, the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Satyapal Jain for the petitioner had objected to the said production on the ground that such copy should be produced on record with the affidavit of the applicant. The Court having found substance in the said submission of Mr.Jain, had returned to Mr.Sibal, the said copy of the petition allegedly served on the applicant. 4. So far as the present application for production of photocopy of the copy of the petition served on the applicant is concerned, the same is permitted to be produced for limited purpose of appreciating the contentions raised by the applicant in the Election Applications No.2 of 2017, 3 of 2017 and 6 of 2017, without the same being construed as the evidence of the actual copy of the petition served on the applicant. 5. The present Election Application stands disposed of accordingly." 20/04/2018 The Court by a common order dismissed the Election Application No.2 of 2017, No.3 of 2017 and No.6 of 2017. 5. The present Election Application stands disposed of accordingly." 20/04/2018 The Court by a common order dismissed the Election Application No.2 of 2017, No.3 of 2017 and No.6 of 2017. 13/06/2018 Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Satyapal Jain for the respondent No.1 (original petitioner) sought permission to produce on record the "proposed issues" to which the learned Advocate Mr.Champaneri for the applicant original respondent No.1 objected by stating that the applicant had already moved petitions before the Supreme Court, challenging the order dated 20.4.2018 passed by the Court. Since sufficient time was already granted to challenge the said order, the Court directed the parties to produce the documentary evidence in original, where the copies thereof were filed along with the plaint or the written statement, on or before 26.6.2018. 26/06/2018 Learned Advocate Mr.Champaneri for the applicant sought time to consider whether any document should be produced by the applicant respondent No.1 in the Election Petition or not. The matter was thereafter kept on 3.7.2018, to enable the applicant (original respondent No.1) to produce the documents if he desired to do so before framing of the issues. 02/07/18 A list of documents dated 30.6.2018 along with certain documents was produced by the applicant/respondent No.1 in the Registry for being taken on record. The said documents contained the copy of the Election Petition No.1 of 2017 as received along with the summons issued by the Court in its origin as received along with the service of summons. 03/07/18 Mr.Champaneri for the applicant sought time on the ground that the Supreme Court had permitted to circulate the Special Leave Petitions, challenging the order dated 20.4.2018. The matter was adjourned thereafter from time to time as the SLPs were pending before the Supreme Court. 26/09/2018 The Supreme Court passed the afore­stated order in SLP (C) Nos.10340­10342 of 2018. 5. From the afore-stated facts and the orders passed by the Court it clearly emerges that the applicant had not produced the copy of the Election Petition actually served on him, nor the photocopy of the said copy along with the Election Application No.3 of 2017 or with the written statement filed by the applicant on 4.10.2017. 5. From the afore-stated facts and the orders passed by the Court it clearly emerges that the applicant had not produced the copy of the Election Petition actually served on him, nor the photocopy of the said copy along with the Election Application No.3 of 2017 or with the written statement filed by the applicant on 4.10.2017. The photocopy of the copy of the Election Petition, which according to the applicant, was served on the applicant was sought to be produced for the first time by filing the Election Application No.3 of 2018 on 20.3.2018 during the course of the hearing of the Election Application No.3 of 2017, however, at that time also the copy of the Election Petition actually served on the applicant was not produced. It was only during the course of the arguments of Election Application No.3 of 2017 on 6.4.2018, the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Sibal for the applicant had sought to tender across the Bar, a copy of the Election Petition stating that the said copy was served on the applicant. However, the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Jain for the respondent (election petitioner) having taken objection to the effect that the said copy was not produced on affidavit, the same was not taken on record and returned by the Court to the learned Advocate for the applicant. The said fact has been recorded in the order dated 6.4.2018 as well as in the order dated 20.4.2018 passed by the Court. As stated herein above, the applicant thereafter produced the copy of the Election Petition actually served on the applicant vide the list of documents dated 30.6.2018 produced in the Court on 2.7.2018. 6. The afore-stated facts clearly falsify the stand taken by the applicant before the Supreme Court that though the applicant had produced the copy of the Election Petition actually served on him in the Court, the Court had recorded in paragraph 35 of the order dated 20.4.2018 that the same was not produced. If the applicant had already produced on record the said copy actually served on him before passing of the order dated 20.4.2018, dismissing the Election Application No.3 of 2017, the Court is at loss to understand as to how the said copy was sought to be produced along with the list of documents on 2.7.2018 after the dismissal of the said application. It may be clarified that the copy of the petition stated to have been served on the applicant, though was sought to be tendered across the Bar, it was not taken on record by the Court as it was not being produced on affidavit by the applicant. It is needless to say that the authenticity of such copy could be tested only if the same was produced on oath. When the photocopy of the copy of the petition served on the applicant was sought to be produced by filing a separate application being Election Application No.3 of 2018 supported by an affidavit of the applicant, the same course was required to be followed by the applicant if he wanted to produce on record the actual copy served on him, for the purpose of consideration by the Court while deciding Election Application No.3 of 2017. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the copy of petition sought to be tendered across the Bar by the learned Advocate Mr.Sibal for the applicant was not taken on record on the objection raised by the other side and was returned by the Court at the very hearing. The said facts do not appear to have been correctly disclosed before the Supreme Court. It cannot be gainsaid that suppressio veri is suggestio falsi. Suppression of facts is suggestion of falsehood. Suffice is to say that it was absolutely improper on the part of the applicant in not placing the correct facts on record before the Supreme Court. Having said that, let us examine the question as to whether the election petition is required to be dismissed for non-compliance of Section 81(3) and the consequences following therefrom, including under Section 86(1) of the Act, as directed by the Supreme Court in the order dated 26.9.2018. 7. The learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Dushyant Dave for the applicant at the first instance relying upon the decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of Bhikhabhai Vs. Lalshanker and Others. reported in, (1978) AIR Raj. 193 vehemently submitted that the provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act being mandatory in nature, the noncompliance thereof would entail dismissal of Election Petition under Section 86(1) of the said Act. Lalshanker and Others. reported in, (1978) AIR Raj. 193 vehemently submitted that the provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act being mandatory in nature, the noncompliance thereof would entail dismissal of Election Petition under Section 86(1) of the said Act. He also relied upon the various decisions of Supreme Court to submit that the statutory provisions must be strictly complied with, and that when the Act provides a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner only and in no other manner. According to him, the Election Petitioner had failed to attest the copy of Election Petition to be served on the applicant i.e. respondent No.1 in the petition, under his own signature, and that what was sought to be served on the applicant was the photocopy of the Election Petition only, which did not bear the original signatures of the petitioner. The learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Sibal for the applicant further elaborated the said contentions by submitting that the photocopy of the petition served on the applicant did not contain any attestation under the petitioner's signature certifying that what was certified was the true copy of the petition, and therefore, there was non-compliance of Section 81(3) of the said Act entailing dismissal of election petition in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Sharif-ud-din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone reported in, (1980) 1 SCC 403 . According to him, in the reply dated 18.2.2018 filed by the respondent - election petitioner to the said Election Application No.3 of 2017, the allegation made with regard to non-compliance of Section 81(3) has not been denied, therefore, the same must be presumed to have been admitted by the respondent in view of the Order VIII Rule 3 and Rule 5 of CPC. 8. Distinguishing the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Ch. Subbrao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad and Ors. reported in, (1964) AIR SC 1027, Mr.Sibal submitted that in the said case the Election Petitioner had signed each page of the copy served on the successful candidate by his own hand and had merely omitted to write the words "true copy", whereas in the instant case, the election petitioner had not attested the copy served on the applicant under his own signature. He further submitted that the copy served on the applicant was not consistent with the duly completed affidavit filed in the Court, and therefore, was not the "true copy" of the petition filed in the Court. There were blanks, runs the submission of Mr.Sibal, in the affidavits/verifications in the copy of the petition served on the applicant, however, the same were filled up in the petition filed in the Court, which ex facie would show that the copy served on the applicant was not the true copy of the election petition as required by Section 81(3) of the said Act. Mr.Sibal also distinguished the decision of the Constitution Bench in case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors, (1964) AIR SC 1545 by submitting that in the said case the election petitioner had signed each page with his own hand and had merely omitted to sign below the word "petitioner" on the verification page, and therefore, the Supreme Court had treated it to be substantial compliance of Section 81(3), which is not the position in the instant case. He further submitted that the duly signed copy subsequently supplied by the Election Petitioner to the applicant on 4.4.2018 can not cure the factual defect and that the statutory requirements of the election law must be strictly observed. In short, Mr.Sibal urged that the compliance of Section 81(3) of the said Act being mandatory, the non-compliance thereof would entail dismissal of the election petition under Section 86(1) of the said Act. 9. Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.N.D. Nanavati for the respondent election petitioner, however, taking the Court to the chronology of events submitted that the applicant having failed to produce the copy of the election petition actually served on him either along with the Election Application No.3 of 2017, or with the written statement or even along with the Election Application No.3 of 2018, the Election Application No.3 of 2017 was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as observed by the Supreme Court in the order dated 26.9.2018. In any case, since now it has been produced along with the list of documents on 2.7.2018, it could be seen that the election petitioner had put his signature on each page of the said copy of the petition and thus, had attested the same with his own signature. In any case, since now it has been produced along with the list of documents on 2.7.2018, it could be seen that the election petitioner had put his signature on each page of the said copy of the petition and thus, had attested the same with his own signature. He also drew the attention of the Court to paragraph 7 of the election petition and submitted that the statement made in the said paragraph with regard to the attachment of sufficient number of copies to be served on the respondents duly attested to be true copies of the election petition under his own signatures, has not been specifically denied by the applicant in the written statement filed by him, nor any specific plea has been taken in the written statement with regard to non-attestation by the election petitioner under his own signatures. According to Mr.N.D. Nanavati, the photocopy of the petition on white paper, with original signatures of the election petitioner on each page thereof was served upon the applicant, however, only the words "true copy" were not written in the said copy. The aspect of the original signatures having been made on the copy served to the applicant could be verified by comparing the signatures on the original memo of election petition with the signatures on the copy served on the applicant, and it clearly emerges that each page of the copy served on the applicant was duly signed by the election petitioner with black ink, and that the said copy was not the photocopy of the memo of the election petition. He, therefore, submitted that there being substantial compliance of Section 81(3) in view of the ratio of decision laid down by the Constitution Bench in case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors (supra) and other decisions in case of T. M. Jacob Vs. C. Poulose and Ors. reported in, (1999) AIR SC 1359 and in case of Chandrakant Uttam Chodankar Vs. Dayanand Rayu Mandrakar reported in, (2005) 2 SCC 188 , the application of the applicant alleging noncompliance of Section 81(3) of the Act deserves to be dismissed. C. Poulose and Ors. reported in, (1999) AIR SC 1359 and in case of Chandrakant Uttam Chodankar Vs. Dayanand Rayu Mandrakar reported in, (2005) 2 SCC 188 , the application of the applicant alleging noncompliance of Section 81(3) of the Act deserves to be dismissed. He also submitted that the blanks found in the verification/affidavits filed along with the copy served upon the applicant have been cured by the election petitioner by supplying fresh set of petition duly attested on 4.4.2018 i.e. prior to hearing of Election Application No.3 of 2017 and the same was accepted by the learned Advocate for the applicant without raising any objection. According to him, even otherwise, it has not been alleged by the applicant that such blanks or discrepancies found in the verification part and the prescribed forms annexed to the petition had misled the applicant returned candidate in any manner; on the contrary the applicant has filed the written statement without raising any such grievances. 10. Now, it is well settled legal position that an election petition is not an action at common law, nor a suit in equity. It is purely a statutory proceeding unknown to the concepts of common law and equity, and therefore, the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed. The philosophy of election law has been very aptly summarized by the Supreme Court in case of Jagan Nath Vs. Jaswant Singh and Ors. reported in, (1954) AIR SC 210, which is reproduced as under:- "7. The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possesses no common law power. It is also well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law. None of these propositions, however, have any application if the special law itself confers authority on a tribunal to proceed with a petition in accordance with certain procedure and when it does not state the consequences of noncompliance with certain procedural requirements laid down by it. None of these propositions, however, have any application if the special law itself confers authority on a tribunal to proceed with a petition in accordance with certain procedure and when it does not state the consequences of noncompliance with certain procedural requirements laid down by it. It is always to be borne in mind that though the election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly interfered with, one of the essentials of that law is also to safeguard the purity of the election process and also to see that people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices. In cases where the election law does not prescribe the consequence or does not lay down penalty for non-compliance with certain procedural requirements of that law, the jurisdiction of the tribunal entrusted with the trial of the case is not affected." 11. As stated earlier, the non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 would entail dismissal of an election petition under Section 86(1) of the said Act. The present application has been filed seeking dismissal of the election petition alleging non-compliance of the provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the said Act. The said provision reads as under:- "81. Presentation of petitions.- (1) xxx (2) xxx (3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition, and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition." 12. On the bare reading of the said provision, it appears that the said Sub-section (3) is in two parts. First part requires that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and the second part requires that every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. There is no controversy with regard to the first part of the said provision, the controversy centres around the second part. Learned Sr. There is no controversy with regard to the first part of the said provision, the controversy centres around the second part. Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Sibal had tried to dissect the second part into further two parts by submitting that every copy of the petition to be served on the respondents has to be attested by the petitioner under his own signature, and that such copy should be a true copy of the petition. The main thrust of the arguments of Mr.Sibal was that the copy of the election petition served on the applicant i.e. the returned candidate was not attested by the petitioner under his own signature, and was not the true copy of the petition as it contained many blanks in the verifications and affidavits appended to the petition and its annexures. 13. In the opinion of the Court, the ratios laid down in three judgments of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court clinch the said issue. In case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors (supra), the Constitution Bench was dealing with the issues with regard to non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 81(3) of the Act in two election petitions being No.269 of 1962 and no.295 of 1962. In Election Petition No.269 of 1962, the appellant before the Supreme Court had raised the objection with regard to noncompliance with the Section 81(3) on the ground that the copy of the election petition served on the appellant was not a true copy of the original filed before the Election Commission, nor was it properly attested to be the true copy under the signature of the petitioner, who filed the Election Petition. Another objection was with regard to the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act on the ground that the affidavit in respect of corrupt practices which accompanied the election petition was neither properly made, nor in the prescribed form. In the Election Petition No.295 of 1962, the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act was raised on the ground that there was a reference to four enclosures at the foot of the schedule of the original petition, but in the copy served on the appellant the enclosures were not reproduced. In the Election Petition No.295 of 1962, the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act was raised on the ground that there was a reference to four enclosures at the foot of the schedule of the original petition, but in the copy served on the appellant the enclosures were not reproduced. The other objection was that the election petition was not duly verified inasmuch as the date and place of verification were not stated at the foot of the verification clause. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court dealing with each of the preliminary objections held as under:- "8. We now go to the second point. But before we do so, it may perhaps be stated that certain defects in the verification of Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 have been brought to our notice, as they were brought to the notice of the Election Tribunal. One of these defects was that though the verification stated that the averments made in some of the paragraphs of the petition were true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner and the averments in some other paragraphs were verified to be true on the basis of advice and information received by the petitioner from legal and other sources, the petitioner did not state in so many words that the advice and information received was believed by him to be true. The Election Tribunal took the view that this defect in verification was a matter which came within cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of Section 83 and the defect could be removed in accordance With the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Election Tribunal further held that such, a defect did not attract sub-s. (3) of Section 90 inasmuch as that sub-section does not refer to non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 as a ground for dismissing an election petition. We agree with the view expressed by the Election Tribunal. We have pointed out that sub-s. (4) of s. 90 originally referred to three sections, namely, Sections 81, 83 and 117. It said that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 85 the Tribunal might dismiss an election petition which did not comply with the provisions of Section 81, Section 83 or Section 117. Section 90 was amended by Act 27 of 1956. It said that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 85 the Tribunal might dismiss an election petition which did not comply with the provisions of Section 81, Section 83 or Section 117. Section 90 was amended by Act 27 of 1956. Sub-s. (3) then said that the Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81, Section 82 or Section 117 notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under Section 85. There was a further amendment by Act 40 of 1961 and sub-s. (3) of Section 90 as it now stands has already been quoted by us in an earlier part of this judgment. It seems clear to us that reading the relevant sections in Part VI of the Act, it is impossible to accept the contention that a defect in verification which is to be made in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings as required by cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of Section 83 is fatal to the maintainability of the petition. 9. On behalf of the appellant it has been further contended that the copy of the petition which was served on the appellant was not a true copy within the meaning of the mandatory provisions of sub-s. (3) of S. 81 of the Act. The argument is that a failure to comply with the provisions of sub-s. (3) of S. 81 attracts sub-s. (3) of S. 90 and it is obligatory on the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the requirements of sub-s. (3) of S. 81. On the basis of the decision of this court in Sri Baru Ram v. Smt. Prasanni, it is contended that the principles in such cases is that whenever the statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to accept the argument that the failure to comply with the said requirement should lead to any other consequence. It is argued that no question of substantial compliance arises in such cases, and the mandatory requirement must be strictly complied with. 10. Let us first see what are the defects found in the copy of the petition served on the appellant. It is argued that no question of substantial compliance arises in such cases, and the mandatory requirement must be strictly complied with. 10. Let us first see what are the defects found in the copy of the petition served on the appellant. It is admitted that the first part of sub-s. (3) of S. 81 has been complied with and the election petition was accompanied by as many copies thereof as there were respondents mentioned in the petition. It is also admitted that one more copy for the use of the Election Commission was also given with the petition. The last part of the sub-section says that "every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition." The grievance of the appellant is that this part of the subsection was not complied with inasmuch as (1) the copy which was served on the appellant did not contain the signature of the petitioner at the foot of the petition, though the original contained such signature, and (2) the verification in the copy served on the appellant omitted to mention paragraph 14-g (ii) in that part of the verification which related to averments stated to be true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner. As to the first of these defects the Election Tribunal pointed out that every page of the copy served on the appellant was attested to be a true copy under the signature of the petitioner and furthermore it was not necessary to append a fresh signature to the copy of the petition. With regard to the second defect the Election Tribunal apparently took the view, though it did not say so in so many words, that the omission of a reference to paragraph 14g(ii) in the verification in the copy served on the appellant was a case of mere oversight which did not mislead anybody because in the body of the petition full details of the averments were made. The High Court took the view that the defect was not of such a nature as to amount to a noncompliance with the provisions of sub-s. (3) of S. 81. 11. We agree with the High Court and the Election Tribunal that the first defect is not a defect at all. The High Court took the view that the defect was not of such a nature as to amount to a noncompliance with the provisions of sub-s. (3) of S. 81. 11. We agree with the High Court and the Election Tribunal that the first defect is not a defect at all. When every page of the copy served on the appellant was attested to be a true copy under the signature of the petitioner, a fresh signature below the word "petitioner" was not necessary. Subsection (3) of S. 81 requires that the copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature and this was done. As to the second defect the question really turns on the true scope and effect of the word "copy" occurring in sub-sec. (3) of S. 81. On behalf of the appellant the argument is that sub-s. (3) of S. 81 being mandatory in nature all the requirements of the subsection must be strictly complied with and the word "copy" must be taken to be an absolutely exact transcript of the original. On behalf of the respondents the contention is that the word "copy" means that which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original. Alternatively, the argument is that the last part of sub-s. (3) dealing with a copy is merely directive, and for this reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar. We are of the view that the word "copy" in sub-s. (3) of S. 81 does not mean an absolutely exact copy, but means that the copy shall be so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it (see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary third edition, Volume 4, page 3098). In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to go into the further question whether any part of sub-s. (3) of S. 81 is merely directory. ... ... Having regard to the provisions of Part VI of the Act, we are of the view that the word "copy" does not mean an absolutely exact copy. It means a copy so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. The test whether the copy is a true one is whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person. It means a copy so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. The test whether the copy is a true one is whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person. Applying that test we have come to the conclusion that the defects complained of with regard to Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 were not such as to mislead the appellant; therefore there was no failure to comply with the last part of sub-s. (3) of S. 81. In that view of the matter sub-s. (3) of S. 90 was not attracted and there was no question of dismissing the election petition under that sub-section by reason of any failure to comply with the provisions of S. 81. This disposes of the second preliminary objection raised before us. 14. Yet another Constitution Bench in case of Ch. Subbrao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad and Ors. (supra), referring the decision in case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors (supra) held in paragraph 27 as under:- 27. If the signature of the petitioner whose name is set out in the body of the petition is appended at the end, surely it authenticates the contents of the document. Now in regard to this the learned Judges of the High Court themselves observed after referring to the terms of Section 81(3): "No doubt, what is necessary is a substantial compliance with the requirement of attestation. For instance, if it is proved that the election petitioner has signed animo attestendi, and omitted the words 'true copy' by mistake or inadvertently, there is a substantial requirement of the compliance of Section 81(3). The same may be said if the relative positions of the words 'true copy' and of the signature one below the other are not correct." They however held that as there was no evidence of the signature having been appended animo attestendi, there was noncompliance with Section 81(3). The learned Solicitor General while not disputing the correctness of the observations of the learned Judges just extracted pressed upon us that the signature at the end of the copy was meant only as a copy of that in the original petition and could not satisfy the requirement as to attestation of the copy. The learned Solicitor General while not disputing the correctness of the observations of the learned Judges just extracted pressed upon us that the signature at the end of the copy was meant only as a copy of that in the original petition and could not satisfy the requirement as to attestation of the copy. He also submitted that the position would have been different if there were two signatures instead of one at the end of the copy, even if the words 'true copy' were omitted to be put down. In that case, he said, one signature could be treated as representing the copy of the signature on the original and the other might be taken to have been made animo attestendi. We do not however consider that there is really need for so much refinement when one has to look at whether there is a substantial compliance with the requirement of this provision. If the signatures now found on the copies were intended to authenticate the document to which it is appended, viz., the copy, it would only mean that the copy did not reproduce the signature in the original. There is no compelling necessity to hold that the signatures were merely intended to be a copy of those on the original in order to spell out a noncompliance with Section 81(3), seeing that a signature in original was not needed on the copy and a writing copying out the name of the signatory would suffice. The decision of this Court in Murarka's case is authority for the position that the absence of a writing in the copy indicating the signature in the original would not detract the copy from being a true copy. In the circumstances, we consider that there has been substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3) in the petition that was filed by the appellant and the learned Judges were in error in directing the dismissal of the petition." 15. In T. M. Jacob Vs. In the circumstances, we consider that there has been substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3) in the petition that was filed by the appellant and the learned Judges were in error in directing the dismissal of the petition." 15. In T. M. Jacob Vs. C. Poulose and Ors.(supra) the Constitution Bench while dealing with the issue as to whether the election petition could be dismissed at the threshold under Section 86(1) for non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 81(3) of the said Act, on the allegation that the copy of the affidavit supplied to the respondent returned candidate together with the notice of election petition was not a true copy as it did not indicate the name and designation of the notary and also did not bear the seal and stamp of the notary. The Constitution Bench in the said case, following the decisions of the earlier Constitution Benches in case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors (supra) and in case of Ch. Subbrao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad and Ors. (supra) and distinguishing the observations made in Dr.Shipra Vs. Shanti Lal Khoiwal reported in, (1996) 5 SCC 181 held as under:- "35. The object of serving a true copy of an Election Petition and the affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practice on the respondent in Election Petition is to enable the respondent to understand the charge against him so that he can effectively meet the same in the written statement and prepare his defence. The requirement is, thus, of substance and not of form. 36. The expression copy in section 81(3) of the Act, in our opinion, means a copy which is substantially so and which does not contain any material or substantial variation of a vital nature as could possibly mislead a reasonable person to understand and meet the charges/allegations made against him in the election petition. Indeed a copy which differs in material particulars from the original cannot be treated as a true copy of the original within the meaning of section 81(3) of the Act and the vital defect cannot be permitted to be cured after the expiry of the period of limitation. 37. xxx 38. We are unable to agree with Mr. Indeed a copy which differs in material particulars from the original cannot be treated as a true copy of the original within the meaning of section 81(3) of the Act and the vital defect cannot be permitted to be cured after the expiry of the period of limitation. 37. xxx 38. We are unable to agree with Mr. Salve that since proceedings in election petitions are purely statutory proceedings and not "civil proceedings" as commonly understood, there is no room for invoking and importing the doctrine of substantial compliance into section 86(1) read with section 81(3) of the Act. It is too late in the day to so urge. The law as settled by the two Constitution Bench decisions of this Court referred to above is by itself sufficient to repel the argument of Mr. Salve. That apart, to our mind, the Legislative intent appears to be quite clear, since it divides violations into two classes those violations which would entail dismissal of the election petition under section 86(1) of the Act like non compliance with section 81(3) and those violations which attract section 83(1) of the Act i.e. non-compliance with the provisions of section 83. It is only the violation of Section 81 of the Act which can attract the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance as expounded in Murarka Radhey Shyam and Ch. Subbarao's cases. The defect of the type provided in Section 83 of the Act, on the other hand, can be dealt with under the doctrine of curability, on the principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. This position clearly emerges from the provisions of Section 83(1) and 86(5) of the Act, which read thus: "83. Contents of petition. (1) An election petition (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings. 86. Trial of election petition. 86. Trial of election petition. (5) The High Court may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. 39. Applying the test as laid down in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar's case (supra), to the fact situation of the present case, we come to the conclusion that the defects complained of in the present case were not such as could have misled the appellant at all. The non-mention of the name of the notary or the absence of the stamp and seal of the notary in the otherwise true copy supplied to the appellant could not be construed to be an omission or variation of a vital nature and, thus, the defect, if at all it could be construed as a defect was not a defect of any vital nature attracting the consequences of Section 86(1) of the Act. Under the circumstances, it must be held that there was no failure on the part of the election petitioner to comply with the last part of sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act and, under the circumstances, Section 86(1) of the Act was not attracted and the election petition could not have been dismissed by reason of the alleged failure to comply with the provisions of Section 81 of the Act. In this connection, it is also relevant to note that the appellant, neither in the memo of objections nor in the written objections or in C.M.P.No.2903 of 1996 has alleged that he had been misled by the absence of the name, rubber stamp and seal of the notary on the copy of the affidavit supplied to him or that he had been prejudiced to formulate his defence. Even during the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out as to how the appellant could have been prejudiced by the alleged omissions on the copy of the affidavit served on him. 40. Even during the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out as to how the appellant could have been prejudiced by the alleged omissions on the copy of the affidavit served on him. 40. In our opinion it is not every minor variation in form but only a vital defect in substance which can lead to a finding of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act with the consequences under Section 86(1) to follow. The weight of authority clearly indicates that a certain amount of flexibility is envisaged. While an impermissible deviation from the original may entail the dismissal of an election petition under Section 86(1) of the Act, an insignificant variation in the true copy cannot be construed as a fatal defect. It is, however, neither desirable nor possible to catalogue the defects which may be classified as of a vital nature or those which are not so. It would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast formula can be prescribed. The tests suggested in Murarka Radhey Shyams case (supra) are sound tests and are now well settled. We agree with the same and need not repeat those tests. Considered in this background, we are of the opinion that the alleged defect in the true copy of the affidavit in the present case did not attract the provisions of Section 86 (1) of the Act for alleged non-compliance with the last part of Section 81(3) of the Act and that there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 81(3) of the Act in supplying true copy of the affidavit to the appellant by the respondent." 16. In case of F. A. Sapa Vs. Singora reported in, (1991) 3 SCC 375 , a three Judge Bench while dealing with the objection that the copy of the petition served on the respondent returned candidate was not attested to be a true copy of the original petition as required by Section 81(3) of the Act, held as under:- "32. The next objection raised by the appellants is that the copy of the petition served on each one of them is not attested to be a true copy of the original petition as required by section 81(3) of the R.P. Act and Rule 1 of the Rules. The next objection raised by the appellants is that the copy of the petition served on each one of them is not attested to be a true copy of the original petition as required by section 81(3) of the R.P. Act and Rule 1 of the Rules. Each copy is attested as 'certified true copy' and the petitioner has put his signature thereunder. This, contend the appellants, is not in conformity with section 81(3) and, therefore, it is obvious that the mandatory requirement of section 81(3) read with section 86(1) is not satisfied. On a plain reading of section 81(3) it become clear that the requirement of that provision is (i) the election petition should be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and (ii) every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. There is no dispute in regard to the compliance of the first part. So far as the second part is concerned, all that the section requires is that the copy should be attested by the petitioner to be a true copy of the petition under his own signature. The requirement of this part of the provision is met by each copy having been signed at the foot thereof by the concerned petitioner. What is essential is that the petitioner must take the responsibility of the copy being a true copy of the original petition and sign in token thereof. No particular form of attestation is prescribed; all that the sub-section enjoins is that the petitioner must attest the copy under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. By certifying the same as true copy and by putting his signature at the foot thereof, the petitioner of each election petition had clearly complied with the letter and spirit of section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. In fact in Ch. Subba Rao v. Member. E.T. Hyderabad, which was followed in Kamalam's case (supra) this Court had accepted the mere signature without the words like true copy, sufficient attestation under section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. We are, therefore, in agreement with the finding recorded in this behalf by the High Court." 17. The Supreme Court in case of M. Kamalam Vs. Dr. E.T. Hyderabad, which was followed in Kamalam's case (supra) this Court had accepted the mere signature without the words like true copy, sufficient attestation under section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. We are, therefore, in agreement with the finding recorded in this behalf by the High Court." 17. The Supreme Court in case of M. Kamalam Vs. Dr. V. A. Syed Mohammed reported in, (1978) 2 SCC 659 , while dealing with the question as to what constitutes an election petition for the purpose of Sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act and whether it is confined only to the election petition proper or it has to be included any schedule or annexure as contemplated in Sub-section (2) of Section 83 or else supporting affidavit referred to in the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 83, it was held inter alia that the copy of the election petition required to be filed under the first part of Sub-section (3) of Section 81 would include copy of the affidavit referred to in the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act. It was further held that the copy of the affidavit being part of the copy of the election petition, when the election petitioner puts his signature at the foot of the copy of the affidavit, it is tantamount to appending signature on the copy of the election petition. When original signature is made by the petitioner on the copy of the election petition, it can safely presumed that the signature is made by the petitioner by way of authenticating the document to be a "true copy" of the election petition. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in the said case are reproduced as under:- "6. Now, it is true that no signature was appended by the appellant on the copy of the election petition proper and the signature was placed only at the foot of the copy of the affidavit, but that, in our opinion, was sufficient compliance with the requirement of the last part of sub-section (3) of section 81. The copy of the affidavit was, for reasons already discussed, part of the copy of the election petition and when the appellant put his signature at the foot of the copy of the affidavit, it was tantamount to appending signature on the copy of the election petition. The copy of the affidavit was, for reasons already discussed, part of the copy of the election petition and when the appellant put his signature at the foot of the copy of the affidavit, it was tantamount to appending signature on the copy of the election petition. The law does not require that the authenticating signature must be made by the petitioner at any particular place in the copy of the election petition. It may be at the top of the copy or in the middle or at the end. The place of the signature is immaterial so long as it appears that it is intended to authenticate the copy. When original signature is made by the petitioner on the copy of the election petition, it can safely be presumed, as pointed out by this Court in Ch. Subbarao case (supra), that the signature is made by the petitioner by way of authenticating the document to be a true copy of the election petition. Now, here the appellant placed her signature in original at the foot of the copy of the affidavit and the copy of the affidavit was part of a composite document, namely, copy of the election petition, and hence the signature of the appellant must be regarded as having been appended on the copy of the election petition. In fact, the copy of the affidavit constituted the end-portion of the copy of the election petition and the signature placed by the appellant at the foot of the copy of the affidavit was, therefore, clearly referable to the entire copy preceding it and it authenticated the whole of the copy of the election petition to be a true copy. We cannot, in the circumstances, accept the contention of the respondent that the copy of the election petition was not attested by the appellant under her own signature to be a true copy of the petition. The requirement of the last part of sub-section (3) of section 81 was complied with by the appellant inasmuch as the copy of the election petition was authenticated to be a true copy 'by the appellant by placing her signature at the foot of the copy of the affidavit which formed part of the copy of the election petition. The High Court was clearly in error dismissing the election petition under sub-s. (1) of sec. 86." 18. The High Court was clearly in error dismissing the election petition under sub-s. (1) of sec. 86." 18. In case of Chandrakant Uttam Chodankar Vs. Dayanand Rayu Mandrakar (supra) also three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held inter alia that the burden to prove that the election petition was not maintainable or the same should be dismissed at the threshold lay on the respondent and that the High Court had committed an error in dismissing the election petition for noncompliance with the provisions contained in Section 81(3) of the Act, on the ground that the copies alleged to have been supplied to the returned candidate were not the true copies of the petition. Following the ratio laid down in case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors (supra) and in case of T.M. Jacob Vs. C. Poulose (supra), it was held as under:- "35. The difference of opinion was settled by the Constitution Bench in Jacob's case by enunciating the principles as noted herein above. We have carefully examined the defects as noted herein earlier and on a careful examination of the defects we cannot be persuaded to the view that the defects in the present case also are material or it was vital in nature or the absence of stamp of attestation could be treated to be a ground for rejection of the Election Petitions under Section 81(3) of the Act. It may be mentioned herein that the decision of this Court in Anil R.Deshmukh case was approved by the Constitution Bench and in which it already distinguished the case of Dr.Shipra. It must not be forgotten that in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court, it was evident that "(a) the expression 'copy' in Section 81(3) of the Act means a copy which is substantially the same as the original, variation if any from the original should not be vital in nature or should not be such that can possibly mislead a reasonable person in meeting the allegation; (b) if the copy differs in material particulars from the original the same cannot be cured after the period of limitation." The same principle was enunciated following the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in T.Phunyzatha Vs. H.K. and Others. H.K. and Others. In this decision also it was held that the defects indicated in these cases for which dismissal of the election petition was sought for did not attract Section 86(1) of the Act for dismissal of the election petitions for non-compliance with Section 81(3) of the Act. For the reasons aforesaid and applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions of this Court, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have rejected the election petitions for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act as the defects shown by the Respondent No.1 cannot be said to be fatal and the copies which were alleged to have been served or supplied to the Respondent No.1 were wholly and substantially the same as the original. That apart, it is an admitted position, as noted herein earlier, true copies of the election petitions were duly served or supplied to the Respondent No.1. The question that was raised by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 before us was whether subsequent supply of such true copies on Respondent No.1 could be treated to be a sufficient compliance of Section 81(3) of the Act. Apart from the conclusions made herein before, we are also of the view that in view of the decision of this Court in Anil R.Deshmukh Vs. Onkar N.Wagh this question needs to be decided in favour of the appellant and against the Respondent No.1. In paragraph 17 of the aforesaid decision this Court observed as follows: "We have already referred to the fact that even before arguments were heard on the preliminary objection by the High Court in this case, the true copies of the affidavits had been served on the first respondent and his counsel. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we have no doubt that there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) read with Section 83(1)(c) of the Act even if it could be said that the copies served in the first instance on the first respondent were not in conformity with the provisions of the Act" 36. Such being the position, we hold that the High Court was not justified in rejecting the election petitions for noncompliance with Section 81(3) of the Act." 19. Since much reliance has been placed by the learned Sr. Such being the position, we hold that the High Court was not justified in rejecting the election petitions for noncompliance with Section 81(3) of the Act." 19. Since much reliance has been placed by the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Sibal on the observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Sharif-ud-din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone (supra), it would be relevant to reproduce the observations made in the said judgment also. In the said case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions contained in Section 89(3) and Section 94(1) of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957, which correspond to Section 81(3) and Section 86(1) of the RPA, 1951. In the said case, the copies of the election petition filed along with it were not signed by the election petitioner. The said copies contained identical endorsement at the foot which read: "Attested true copy. Piare Lal Handoo, Advocate", meaning thereby the copies of election petition to be served on the respondents were not attested by the election petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition as required under Section 89(3) of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957. The Supreme Court, after considering the decisions in case of Ch. Subbrao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad and Ors.(supra), in case of Jagat Kishore Prasad Narain Singh Vs. Rajendra Kumar Poddar, (1971) AIR SC 342, in case of Satya Narain Vs. Dhuja Ram reported in, (1974) AIR SC 1185 and in case of M. Kamalam Vs. Dr. V. A. Syed Mohammed (supra), held in paragraph 17 and 19 as under:- "17. It is seen from the above decision that this Court held that the second part of section 81(3) of the Central Act had been complied with after holding that the copy of the petition and the affidavit filed along with it as required by law constituted one single document and the signature in original of the petitioner at the foot of the affidavit satisfied the requirements of section 81(3) of the Central Act. In none of the decisions of this Court referred to above it has been held that the absence of the signature of the election petitioner on the copies of the petition was not a material defect. 18. xxx 19. In none of the decisions of this Court referred to above it has been held that the absence of the signature of the election petitioner on the copies of the petition was not a material defect. 18. xxx 19. An election to a Legislative Assembly can be called in question only by filing an election petition and not otherwise. The right to challenge the election by filing an election petition is a statutory right and not a common law right. A successful candidate is entitled to enjoy the privileges attached to the membership of the Legislative Assembly unless his right to do so is successfully challenged in an election petition filed within the prescribed period and in accordance with law. Section 89(3) of the Act consists of two parts. The first part requires that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and the second part requires that every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. The first part of section 89(3) of the Act has been held to be a mandatory requirement by this Court in the case of Satya Narain (supra) as this Court was of the view that the copies of the election petition should be filed along with it in order to prevent the delay in the disposal of the election petitions. The question whether a provision of law is mandatory or not, as observed already, depends upon its language, the context in which it is enacted and its object. Subsection (3) of section 89 of the Act provides that a copy of the petition shall be attested by the petitioner "under his own signature" to be a true copy of the petition. The emphasis in the above provision appears to be on the words "under his own signature". We do not find the same expression used in section 91(1)(c) of the Act which provides that an election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Jammu and Kashmir Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1977), for the verification of pleadings. Sub-section (3) of section 89 of the Act was inserted by Jammu and Kashmir Act I of 1962. Sub-section (3) of section 89 of the Act was inserted by Jammu and Kashmir Act I of 1962. Section 94 of the Act which requires the High Court to dismiss an election petition when the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of section 89 was enacted in the place of the former section 94 of the Act by Jammu and Kashmir Act XI of 1967 by the Legislature with the full knowledge of the requirements of section 89(3) of the Act. The object of requiring the copy of an election petition to be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition appears to be that the petitioner should take full responsibility for its contents and that the respondent or respondents should have in their possession a copy of the petition duly attested under the signature of the petitioner to be the true copy of the petition at the earliest possible opportunity to prevent any unauthorised alteration or tampering of the contents of the original petition after it is filed into court. We have no doubt that the records and documents in the custody of courts are taken due care of by the courts and the courts would not by themselves give any scope for tampering with them. But still experience shows that allegations are sometimes made that records in the court have been tampered with notwithstanding the care and caution taken by courts. Such allegations may not always be without basis. It is probably to obviate any scope for such an allegation being made or to protect the interest of the respondent, the Legislature thought of enacting sub-section (3) of section 89 of the Act so that the respondent may rely on the copy served on him when he finds that the original document in the court contains allegations different from those in the copy in his custody. A respondent would not have the same degree of assurance if a copy served on him is one attested by any person other than the petitioner himself. The attestation by the advocate for the petitioner cannot be treated as the equivalent of attestation by the petitioner under his own signature. A respondent would not have the same degree of assurance if a copy served on him is one attested by any person other than the petitioner himself. The attestation by the advocate for the petitioner cannot be treated as the equivalent of attestation by the petitioner under his own signature. If the requirement of the second part of section 89(3) that copy of the petition should contain the signature of the petitioner himself is not one of substance, there was no need to enact it as the first part of sub-section (3) of section 89 of the Act would have been sufficient for it provides that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and the word "copies" mentioned therein can only mean "true copies". The importance of the provision contained in section 94 of the Act which makes it obligatory on the part of the High Court to dismiss a petition when it is established that section 89 of the Act had not been complied with also cannot be over-looked in this context. " 20. Now, so far as the present application being Election Application No.3 of 2017 is concerned, the Court is required to consider as to whether the Election Petition is liable to be dismissed for non-compliance of Section 81(3) of the said Act and the consequences flowing therefrom, including under Section 86(1) of the said Act, as directed by the Supreme Court. It has been held in the said order that the dismissal of the election petition under the latter provision i.e. under Section 86(1) is envisaged only on that count and not in reference to some noncompliance of the requirement under Section 83 of the Act. As stated earlier, the applicant returned candidate had failed to produce the copy of the election petition actually served on him along with the Election Application No.3 of 2017 or with the written statement filed on the same day i.e. on 4.10.2017. Therefore, the Election Application No.3 of 2017 was liable to be rejected on that ground alone without examining the matter any further, as observed by the Supreme Court in the said order dated 26.9.2018. Therefore, the Election Application No.3 of 2017 was liable to be rejected on that ground alone without examining the matter any further, as observed by the Supreme Court in the said order dated 26.9.2018. However, this Court had permitted the applicant to produce the photocopy of the copy of the election petition served on the applicant for the purpose of appreciating his submissions with regard to non-compliance of the provisions contained in Section 81(3) of the said Act. It was about two-and-a-half months after the dismissal of the Election Application No.3 of 2017 and during the pendency of the SLPs before the Supreme Court, the applicant had produced on 2.7.2018, the said copy actually served on the applicant along with the list of documents dated 30.6.2018. Hence, the application is being considered afresh in the light of the said copy of the election petition produced along with the said list dated 30.6.2018. 21. It has been sought to be argued by the learned Advocates for the applicant that what was served on the applicant was the photocopy of the election petition, and there was noncompliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act as the said copy served on the applicant was not attested by the petitioner under his signature to be a true copy of the petition. In the opinion of the Court, there is basic fallacy in the said submission made by the learned Advocates for the applicant. From the bare look of the said copy of the petition produced along with the list dated 30.6.2018, it appears that the signature of the petitioner is not only found at the end of the copy of the petition, but also on each page of the said copy of the petition. Each page of the said copy of the petition and of the affidavits and of the annexures annexed to the said copy appears to have been signed by the petitioner with original signature, of course, the words "true copy" are not found at the place of such signatures, however, it has been categorically held by the Supreme Court in case of Ch. Subbrao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad and Ors.(supra) and in case of M. Kamalam Vs. Dr. Subbrao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad and Ors.(supra) and in case of M. Kamalam Vs. Dr. V. A. Syed Mohammed (supra), inter alia that mere signature without the words like "true copy" would be sufficient compliance of Section 81(3) of the said Act, as no particular form of attestation is prescribed under the Act. The three Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court in cases of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors(supra), Ch. Subbrao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad and Ors. (supra) and T. M. Jacob Vs. C. Poulose and Ors. (supra) have held inter alia that if the signature of the petitioner, whose name is set out in the body of the petition, is appended at the end, it certainly authenticates the contents of the documents. In case of F. A. Sapa Vs. Singora (supra) also the three Judge Bench has observed that the requirement of second part of Section 81(3) is met by each copy having been signed at the foot there of by the concerned petitioner. What is essential is that the petitioner must take the responsibility of the copy being a true copy of the original petition and sign in token thereof. No particular form of attestation is prescribed. The reliance placed by the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Sibal on the observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Sharif-ud-din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone (supra) is absolutely misplaced, as in the said case, the copies of the election petition sought to be served on the respondents bore the signature of the advocate of the election petitioner and did not bear the signature of the petitioner himself, and therefore, it was held that the same was not attested by the petitioner under his own signature, which was the mandatory requirement of Section 89(3) of the J & K Representation of People Act. That is not the position in the instant case. 22. A doubt was sought to be created by the learned Advocates for the applicant that the signatures found on each page of the copy of the petition and its annexures served on the applicant were not in original and that the photocopy of the signed petition was sought to be served on the applicant. However, the Court does not find any substance in the said submission. However, the Court does not find any substance in the said submission. Pertinently, no such contention has been specifically raised in the Election Application No.3 of 2017, and such contention was also not raised in the first round of hearing of the applicant. It was sought to be raised for the first time by Mr.Dave for the applicant after the remand of the matter. In any case, apart from the fact that from the bare look of the said signatures, they appear to be the original signatures signed with black ink, the very fact that the said signatures are not found at the same place where the signatures in the original petition are found, proves that the copy sought to be served on the applicant was not the photocopy of the election petition, but was the photocopy of the petition signed with the original signatures of the petitioner on each page of the said copy. 23. So far as the non-mentioning of the words "true copy" at the place of such signatures and at the end of the copy of the petition is concerned, the Court is of the opinion that as per the legal position stated herein above, such omission could not be said to be material omission amounting to noncompliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the said Act entailing dismissal under Section 86(1) of the said Act. As held by the Constitution Bench in case of Ch. Subbrao Vs. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad and Ors. (supra), if the signature of the petitioner, whose name is set out in the body of the petition is appended at the end, surely it authenticates the contents of the document. It has also been held therein inter alia that if the signatures found on the copies were intended to authenticate the document, to which it was appended i.e. the copy, it would only mean that the copy did not reproduce the signature in the original. If the election petitioner has signed animo attestendi, and omitted the words 'true copy' by mistake or inadvertently, there was substantial compliance of the requirement of Section 81(3). As held in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors(supra), the absence of writing in the copy indicating the signature in the original would not detract the copy from being the true copy. 24. As held in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors(supra), the absence of writing in the copy indicating the signature in the original would not detract the copy from being the true copy. 24. It is also held in case of T.M. Jacob Vs. C. Poulose (supra) that the object of serving true copy of an election petition and the affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practice on the respondent in the election petition is to enable the respondent to understand the charge against him, so that he can effectively meet the same in written statement and prepare his defence. The requirement is, thus, of substance and not of form. It has been further held inter alia that the expression "copy" in Section 81(3) of the Act means a copy which is substantially same and which does not contain any material or substantial variation of vital nature as could possibly mislead a reasonable person to understand and meet the charges/allegations made against him in the election petition. The Constitution Bench importing the doctrine of substantial compliance into Section 86(1) read with Section 81(3) of the said Act, held that the legislative intent appears to be quite clear, since it divides violations into two classes those violations which would entail dismissal of the election petition under Section 86(1) of the Act like non-compliance with Section 81(3) and those violations which attract Section 83(1) of the Act i.e. noncompliance with the provisions of Section 83. It is only the violation of Section 81 of the Act, which can attract the application of "doctrine of substantial compliance" as expounded in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar's case (supra). The defect of the type provided in Section 83 of the Act, on the other hand can be dealt with under the "doctrine of curability" on the principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not every minor variation in form but only a vital defect in substance, which can lead to a finding of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act with the consequences under Section 86(1) to follow. An insignificant variation in the true copy can not be construed as a fatal defect. It is not every minor variation in form but only a vital defect in substance, which can lead to a finding of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act with the consequences under Section 86(1) to follow. An insignificant variation in the true copy can not be construed as a fatal defect. In the said case, the Bench, while completely agreeing with the tests suggested in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar's case (supra) held that the alleged defect in the true copy of the affidavit did not attract the provisions of Section 86(1) of the Act for the alleged noncompliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act, as there was substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3) of the Act. 25. In the instant case also merely because there was omission to write the words "true copy" below the signature of the election petitioner put on each page and at the end of the copy of the petition served on the applicant, could not be said to be a vital defect or noncompliance of the provisions contained in Section 81(3) of the said Act. It is also pertinent to note that when the photocopy of the copy of the petition served on the applicant was sought to be produced along with Election Application No.3 of 2018, the respondent election petitioner without prejudice to his contentions had supplied a fresh set of the copy duly attested under the signature of the petitioner to the applicant and the same was accepted by the applicant. It is also required to be noted that the applicant returned candidate at the time of filing Election Application No.3 of 2017 and other applications, had already filed the written statement dealing with the averments and allegations made in the petition, without raising the grievance that the omission to mention the words "true copy" below the signatures of the election petitioner in the copy served to him had, in any manner, misled the applicant or had caused any prejudice to the applicant. 26. The so-called discrepancies in the nature of "blanks" contained in the verification/affidavits appended to the petition, as highlighted by Mr.Sibal by preparing a chart, have also no bearing on the alleged noncompliance of Section 81(3) of the said Act. 26. The so-called discrepancies in the nature of "blanks" contained in the verification/affidavits appended to the petition, as highlighted by Mr.Sibal by preparing a chart, have also no bearing on the alleged noncompliance of Section 81(3) of the said Act. It has been sought to be shown that there were blanks at Page No.40 in the verification to Annexure-P1 stated to be affirmed at Sr. No.9726, as also blanks in the affidavit below notification stated to be affirmed at Sr. No.9727, as also blanks in the affidavit allegedly affirmed at Sr. No.9728.. etc. All these blanks are at the place where the petitioner was supposed to mention the paragraph numbers or Annexure numbers in the verifications or affidavits, as the case may be, in the copy of the petition, which otherwise were found filled up in the verifications/affidavits appended to the original petition. Mr.Sibal had pointed out around 30 of such blanks of identical nature found in the verifications/affidavits appended to the copy of the petition and its annexures served on the applicant. It is significant to note that no such omission or variation has been alleged in the contents of the petition and the copy thereof served to the applicant. In this regard, again the observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar's case (supra) would be relevant. While agreeing with the findings recorded by the Election Tribunal in the said case with regard to the defects allegedly found in the verification of election petition, the Constitution Bench held in paragraph 8 thereof that it is impossible to accept the contention that a defect in verification which is to be made in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Produce, 1908 for the verification of pleadings as required by Clause (c) of Subsection (1) of Section 83 is vital to the maintainability of the petition. While elaborating the scope and effect of the word "copy" occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 81, the Supreme Court held that the word "copy" in the said provision does not mean absolutely exact copy, but means that the copy shall be so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. While elaborating the scope and effect of the word "copy" occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 81, the Supreme Court held that the word "copy" in the said provision does not mean absolutely exact copy, but means that the copy shall be so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. In view of the said settled legal position, mere non-mentioning of the paragraph numbers in the verification or affidavit appended to the copy of the petition signed by the petitioner under his own signature, could by no stretch of imagination be said to be noncompliance of Section 81(3) of the Act, more particularly when it is not alleged that such omission had misled the applicant or had caused any prejudice in defending his case, while preparing the written statement, and also when no such omission or variation in the contents of the main election petition and the copy thereof served on the applicant has been alleged by the applicant. As stated earlier, the said defects or omissions found in the verifications/affidavits appended to the copy of the petition served on the applicant were cured by the election petitioner by furnishing fresh set of petition with annexures containing original signatures of the petitioner, before the hearing of the Election Application No.3 of 2017. 27. In the aforesaid premises, the Court has no hesitation in holding that the copy of Election Petition served on the applicant (original respondent No.1) was attested by the Election Petitioner under his own signature and was the true copy of the said petition, in compliance with the provisions contained in Section 81(3), and therefore, the Election Petition could not be dismissed under Section 86(1) of the said Act. 28. In that view of the matter, the Election Application No.3 of 2017 is dismissed. 29. The main Election Petition No.1 of 2017 be listed for hearing on 19.11.2018.