JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the letter no. S&C-13/Reg.HTC/RH-MADHUPUR-PEG GIRIDIH/2018-20 dated 26.04.2018 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) whereby the contract for handling and transport work from RH Madhupur to PEG Giridih and vice versa and at inside PEG Giridih awarded to the petitioner pursuant to the NIT dated 11.01.2018 has been terminated and further he has been debarred from participating in future tenders for a period of five years. A further prayer has been made for quashing the Tender Notice no. 03/2018 dated 23.04.2018 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) issued by the respondents inter alia for regular HTC for handling and transport work from RH Madhupur to PEG Giridih and vice versa and at inside PEG Giridih, which refers to the same work as was awarded to the petitioner under Tender No. 01/2018. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the respondent-Food Corporation of India (in short ‘FCI') had issued the Tender Notice No. 01/2018 on 11.01.2018 for appointment of HTC contractor for handling and transport work from RH Madhupur to PEG Giridih and vice versa and handling work at RH Madhupur and at inside PEG Giridih. The petitioner participated in the tender and his bid was accepted by the FCI vide its letter dated 28.02.2018 and he was directed to arrange payment of security deposit of Rs.61,60,000/- on or before 15 working days from issuance of the Letter of Acceptance which was issued to the petitioner on 28.02.2018 and the time frame of 15 working days was to expire on 22.03.2018. On 20.03.2018, the petitioner submitted a request to the Union Bank, Samastipur (Bihar) for RTGS in favour of the FCI for security deposit, however the Bank vide letter dated 21.03.2018 informed the petitioner that the same could not be transferred due to some technical problem. On the next day i.e on 22.03.2018, the petitioner made representation to the FCI stating that the security deposit could not be transferred on 21.03.2018 due to some technical failure in the Bank and 22.03.2018 was a public holiday, thus one day opportunity might be given to him for transfer of the security deposit. Thereafter, the petitioner deposited the security deposit on 23.03.2018. On 26.04.2018, he was served an e-mail with an order contained in letter no. Thereafter, the petitioner deposited the security deposit on 23.03.2018. On 26.04.2018, he was served an e-mail with an order contained in letter no. S&C-13/Reg.HTC/RH-MADHUPUR-PEG GIRIDIH/2018-20 dated 26.04.2018 whereby the contract of handling and transport work from RH Madhupur to PEG Giridih and vice versa and at inside PEG Giridih awarded to the petitioner pursuant to the NIT dated 11.01.2018 was terminated and was further debarred from participating in future tenders for a period of five years. 3. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 26.04.2018 has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice as no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. It is further submitted that the impugned order has been passed for no fault of the petitioner as the delay caused in depositing the security deposit was beyond his control, rather it was caused due to some technical failure in the Bank as well as the last day i.e. 22.03.2018 being a public holiday. While referring to Annexures-3 to the writ petition, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner’s banker namely Union Bank of India, vide a certificate dated 23.03.2018 supported the factual stand of the petitioner that the request for RTGS transfer was made to it on 20.03.2018, however due to some technical reason, the same could not be transferred. The petitioner had also taken steps for furnishing the bank guarantee which was to be furnished after the remittance of the security deposit and for this, the petitioner also sought guidance from the respondents vide his letter dated 19.04.2018. It is further submitted that the petitioner also filed representation dated 30.04.2018 before the respondents but of no avail. The malafide action on the part of the respondents is apparent from the fact that on 23.04.2018, the respondents floated a fresh tender being Tender Notice no. 03/2018 for the same work without cancelling the earlier tender awarded to the petitioner. It is also submitted that the calculation of the time frame of 15 working days made by the respondents is itself erroneous. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument, puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of M/s Poddar Steel Corporation Vs. M/s Ganesh Engineering Work & Ors. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 273 . 5. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument, puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of M/s Poddar Steel Corporation Vs. M/s Ganesh Engineering Work & Ors. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 273 . 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the action of the respondents is strictly in accordance with law and also in conformity with the terms and conditions of the NIT. All the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the tender and since the petitioner has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the NIT, he is not entitled to any relief. In a private contract between the parties where the consequence of each default is defined in the contact itself, the question of additional opportunity of hearing does not arise. Admittedly, the petitioner has defaulted in depositing the security deposit in time and as such, he has to face the consequence. It is further submitted that the petitioner had to furnish at least 50% of the Security Deposit specified in clause 7(i)(a) within 15 working days from 28.02.2018 i.e., by 22.03.2018, but he could not arrange the same till 22.03.2018, and in the late evening hours, sent a request letter scanned through e-mail for being allowed an additional day for remitting the security deposit amount. It is also submitted that the certificate issued by the petitioner’s Bank, annexed by him as Annexure-3 to the writ petition, does not appear to be authentic as there is no reason mentioned in the said certificate as to why the payment was not made on 21.03.2018 which was also a working day. The office of the General Manager, F.C.I., Jharkhand had sent a written communication dated 16.05.2018 to the Branch Manager, Union Bank of India, Samastipur, Bihar requiring confirmation regarding authenticity of the certificate and the same was confirmed vide its letter dated 22.05.2018. However, the respondents also sent another letter dated 24.05.2018 to the Bank requiring RTGS details during the period from 20.03.2018 to 23.03.2018 which was followed by a string of reminders through e-mails sent on 25.05.2018, 29.05.2018 and 05.06.2018. The Bank responded the same vide its letter dated 08.06.2018 wherefrom it transpired that there was insufficient fund in the account of the petitioner and only on the availability of fund on 23.03.2018, the transfer was made. The Bank responded the same vide its letter dated 08.06.2018 wherefrom it transpired that there was insufficient fund in the account of the petitioner and only on the availability of fund on 23.03.2018, the transfer was made. It is further submitted that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and has wilfully suppressed that funds were not available in his bank account for transfer on 20.03.2018. There is no provision in the tender documents for extending the period for providing Security Deposit through Electronic Clearance System (ECS). The extension of time is limited to clause 7(b) and 7(c) only of Model Tender Form (MTF). The respondents were bound to strictly abide by the terms and conditions of the tender and were compelled to take action by terminating the contract and also by debarring the petitioner from participating in future tenders of the Corporation for a period of five years as per clause 7(iv) of the MTF. It is also submitted that considering the urgency of work and the fact that there are more than 20 lakhs beneficiaries likely to be affected, an appropriate arrangement was required to be made well within time and as such, a decision was taken to float a fresh tender for the work in question. The plea of the petitioner that 22.03.2018 was a Bank holiday due to ‘Bihar Diwas’, is wholly untenable as 15 working days necessarily and obviously refers to working days observed in the FCI. The work order was floated by the Jharkhand Regional Office and was to be carried out exclusively in the State of Jharkhand, and therefore, 15 working days had to be calculated excluding weekly holidays and other holidays that are allowed in the Jharkhand region of Food Corporation of India. In Jharkhand State, there was no holiday for ‘Sarhul’ or for ‘Bihar Diwas’. It is further submitted that in view of the order of this Court dated 14.05.2018, the respondents have not finalized the subsequent tender notice no. 03/2018, however bids were opened and the rate received from the lowest bidder of 38.97% ASOR is 5.38% lower than the rate quoted by the petitioner. The net result is saving of Rupees Seventy five lakhs. 03/2018, however bids were opened and the rate received from the lowest bidder of 38.97% ASOR is 5.38% lower than the rate quoted by the petitioner. The net result is saving of Rupees Seventy five lakhs. It is further submitted that in view of clause XVII(b) of MTC, an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner through Dispute/Grievance Redressal Committee constituted and functioning at Zonal Office of the Corporation. The floating of new tender was imperative considering the fact that the exiting contract would lapse on 21.06.2018. It is also clarified that the decision to terminate the contract and to debar the petitioner was not taken in haste, rather a reasoned and informed decision was duly taken after seeking clarifications. It is further submitted that the respondent no.4 vide letter dated 04.05.2018 has also disposed of the representation filed by the petitioner in relation to the delay in payment of security deposit by giving cogent reasons and by referring to the relevant and applicable clauses in the MTF and also Circular no. F.1(21)/CVC/2011/Cont dated 30.01.2013 which specifies that in case of failure of the tenderer to deposit the Security Deposit within the time limit, no relaxation will be allowed in view of clause 7(i)(a) and IX(a)(i) of the MTF. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bakshi Security and Personnel Services Private Limited Vs. Devkishan Computed Private Limited and Ors. reported in (2016) 8 SCC 446 . 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner was awarded the aforesaid contract by the respondents. As per the condition of tender, the petitioner had to deposit the security money within 15 working days from the date of issuance of the Letter of Acceptance. Thus, as per the respondent-FCI, the petitioner had to deposit the security money till 22.03.2018. The petitioner deposited the security money only on 23.03.2018 i.e., after a delay of one day from the due date of depositing the security money. The respondent-FCI, vide letter dated 26.04.2018 sent through e-mail cancelled the contract awarded to the petitioner and debarred him from participating in future tenders of the FCI for a period of five years. The petitioner deposited the security money only on 23.03.2018 i.e., after a delay of one day from the due date of depositing the security money. The respondent-FCI, vide letter dated 26.04.2018 sent through e-mail cancelled the contract awarded to the petitioner and debarred him from participating in future tenders of the FCI for a period of five years. The petitioner has challenged the impugned order mainly on the ground that the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and also on the ground that whatever delay has occasioned in depositing the security deposit was not intentional, rather the same was caused due to technical fault of the bank for which the petitioner should not be penalized. On the contrary, the stand of the respondents is that one of the specific conditions of the tender was that the petitioner was required to deposit the security deposit within 15 working days from the date of the issuance of the Letter of Acceptance and since the same was admittedly deposited after the prescribed period, the concerned authority has cancelled the contract awarded to the petitioner and has also blacklisted him for a period of five years. 8. From the aforesaid factual context, it appears that the present issue concerns a contractual dispute involving alleged violation of the terms and conditions of the contract which resulted into the termination of the contract along with the debarment of the petitioner for a period of five years. 9. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition, it would be appropriate to discuss the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the said issue. In the case of “ABL International Limited & Anr. Vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited & Ors.”, reported in (2004)3 SCC 553 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any disputed question of fact, availability of alternative forum is not a bar to invoke an extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. In the case of “Global Energy Ltd. & Anr. Vs. 10. In the case of “Global Energy Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Ors.” reported in (2005) 4 SCC 435 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the terms of the NIT are not amenable to judicial scrutiny and the courts cannot whittle down the terms of the tender as these are in the realm of contract unless the same are wholly arbitrary, discriminatory or actuated by malice. 11. In the case of “Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Limited & Ors. Vs. Vardan Linkers & Ors.” reported in (2008) 12 SCC 500 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the remedy for a party complaining breach of contract is before the Civil Court and in such cases, public law remedy by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked. 12. In the case of Noble Resources Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa and others reported in (2006) 10 SCC 236 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “18. It may, however, be true that where serious disputed questions of fact are raised requiring appreciation of evidence, and, thus, for determination thereof, examination of witnesses would be necessary; it may not be convenient to decide the dispute in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. On a conspectus of several decisions, a Division Bench of this Court in ABL International Ltd. opined that such a writ petition would be maintainable even if it involves some disputed questions of fact. It was stated that no decision lays down an absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed questions of fact, the party should be relegated to a civil court. 20. In Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corpn. this Court observed: (SCC p. 761, para 12) “It appears to us that rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one. this Court observed: (SCC p. 761, para 12) “It appears to us that rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one. Even though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination in the type of the transactions and nature of the dealing as in the present case.” 21. In State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh a Division Bench of this Court held that the Government cannot be denied to exercise its discretionary power provided the same is not arbitrary. 22. Interplay between writ jurisdiction and contractual disputes has given rise to a plethora of decisions by this Court. See, for example, Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay and Mahabir Auto Stores. 23. In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai this Court stated: (SCC p. 235, paras 16-17) “16. The position of law is settled that the State and its authorities including instrumentalities of States have to be just, fair and reasonable in all their activities including those in the field of contracts. Even while playing the role of a landlord or a tenant, the State and its authorities remain so and cannot be heard or seen causing displeasure or discomfort to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 17. It is common knowledge that several rent control legislations exist spread around the country, the emergence whereof was witnessed by the post-World War scarcity of accommodation. Often these legislations exempt from their applicability the properties owned by the Government, semi-government or public bodies, government-owned corporations, trusts and other instrumentalities of State.” 24. Non-statutory contracts have, however, been treated differently. (See Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh.) 25. A distinction is also made between performance of a statutory duty and/or dealing of a public matter by a State and its commercial activities. (See Indian Oil Corpn.Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Services and LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd.) 26. Non-statutory contracts have, however, been treated differently. (See Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh.) 25. A distinction is also made between performance of a statutory duty and/or dealing of a public matter by a State and its commercial activities. (See Indian Oil Corpn.Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Services and LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd.) 26. In ABL International Ltd. this Court opined that on a given set of facts, if a State acts in an arbitrary manner even in a matter of contract, a writ petition would be maintainable. It was opined: (SCC p. 570, para 23) “23. It is clear from the above observations of this Court, once the State or an instrumentality of the State is a party to the contract, it has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if by the impugned repudiation of the claim of the appellants the first respondent as an instrumentality of the State has acted in contravention of the abovesaid requirement of Article 14, then we have no hesitation in holding that a writ court can issue suitable directions to set right the arbitrary actions of the first respondent.” 27. Contractual matters are, thus, not beyond the realm of judicial review. Its application may, however, be limited. 13. Further, In the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728 , it is held as under :- 69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. 70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under: 70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness. 70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some discrimination. 70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. 70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary. 70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness. 70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. 71. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles and after considering the arguments of the respective parties, we are of the view that on the facts of the present case, it is not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. First, the matter is in the realm of pure contract. It is not a case where any statutory contract is awarded. 14. Having gone through the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it may be construed that there is no absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition in a contractual matter where some disputed questions of facts are involved. However, if the dispute involved in a matter is so complex that it can only be determined after a thorough long-drawn adjudicatory process by leading evidences, the writ petition should not be entertained. However, if the dispute involved in a matter is so complex that it can only be determined after a thorough long-drawn adjudicatory process by leading evidences, the writ petition should not be entertained. Each and every case is to be dealt with on its own facts. If the materials on record are clearly evincible, the writ court may exercise the power of judicial review. 15. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is plenary in nature. The High Court has discretion to exercise or not to exercise such discretion having regard to the facts of each case. However, the High Courts have imposed self-restraints in such exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs, and thus, the same are not normally issued to the exclusion of other available remedies, unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the High Courts think it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction. 16. It is true that by way of judicial review, the High Court is not expected to act as a court of appeal while examining an administrative decision and to record a finding as to whether any different decision could have been taken in the facts and circumstances of the case. By way of judicial review, the Writ Court should ordinarily refrain from examining the details of the terms and conditions of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. The Writ Court has inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. However, the Writ Court can certainly examine whether “decision making process” is unreasonable, irrational, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Once the procedure adopted by an authority in the matter of a contract is found to be against the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Writ Court cannot ignore such action on the pretext that the authorities concerned must have some latitude or liberty in contractual matters and any interference by the Writ Court would amount to encroachment on the exclusive right of the authority to take such decision. 17. In the case of Bakshi Security & Personnel Services (P) Ltd. Vs. 17. In the case of Bakshi Security & Personnel Services (P) Ltd. Vs. Devkishan Computed (P) Ltd. and others, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 446 as has been cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 19 has held as under :- “19. It is also well to remember the admonition given by this Court in Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka in cases like the present, as under: (SCC p. 228, para 21) “21. In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, the following conclusion is relevant: (SCC p. 531, para 22) ‘22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”; (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 18. In the aforesaid case also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the court will exercise the power of judicial review if the decision making process is found malafide or intended to favour someone or the same is arbitrary and irrational and/or public interest is affected. 19. On perusal of the impugned order dated 26.04.2018, it appears that the same has been passed solely on the ground that the successful bidder (the petitioner herein) has furnished the security deposit on 23.03.2018, though, the last date for furnishing the same was 22.03.2018 which, according to the respondents, attracts Clause 7(iv) and IX(f) of the MTF. 20. There appears to be two parts of the impugned order. First is the termination of contract and the second is the order of blacklisting/debarment where such power is additionally reserved with the respondent-FCI in case of such failure of the successful bidder. Order of blacklisting 21. The petitioner has challenged the order of blacklisting on the ground that the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The respondents have also not stated as to whether before passing the order of blacklisting, any show-cause notice was served upon the petitioner. 22. In the case of Kulja Industries Ltd. Vs. Western Telecom Project BSNL, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 731 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under :- “17. The respondents have also not stated as to whether before passing the order of blacklisting, any show-cause notice was served upon the petitioner. 22. In the case of Kulja Industries Ltd. Vs. Western Telecom Project BSNL, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 731 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under :- “17. That apart, the power to blacklist a contractor whether the contract be for supply of material or equipment or for the execution of any other work whatsoever is in our opinion inherent in the party allotting the contract. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor. That is because “blacklisting” simply signifies a business decision by which the party affected by the breach decides not to enter into any contractual relationship with the party committing the breach. Between two private parties the right to take any such decision is absolute and untrammelled by any constraints whatsoever. The freedom to contract or not to contract is unqualified in the case of private parties. But any such decision is subject to judicial review when the same is taken by the State or any of its instrumentalities. This implies that any such decision will be open to scrutiny not only on the touchstone of the principles of natural justice but also on the doctrine of proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being blacklisted thus becomes an essential precondition for a proper exercise of the power and a valid order of blacklisting made pursuant thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair and proportionate to the gravity of the offence is similarly examinable by a writ court.” 23. In the case of Gorkha Security Services Vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) and others, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “16. It is a common case of the parties that the blacklisting has to be preceded by a show-cause notice. Law in this regard is firmly grounded and does not even demand much amplification. The necessity of compliance with the principles of natural justice by giving the opportunity to the person against whom action of blacklisting is sought to be taken has a valid and solid rationale behind it. With blacklisting, many civil and/or evil consequences follow. It is described as “civil death” of a person who is foisted with the order of blacklisting. The necessity of compliance with the principles of natural justice by giving the opportunity to the person against whom action of blacklisting is sought to be taken has a valid and solid rationale behind it. With blacklisting, many civil and/or evil consequences follow. It is described as “civil death” of a person who is foisted with the order of blacklisting. Such an order is stigmatic in nature and debars such a person from participating in government tenders which means precluding him from the award of government contracts. 17. Way back in the year 1975, this Court in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., highlighted the necessity of giving an opportunity to such a person by serving a show-cause notice thereby giving him opportunity to meet the allegations which were in the mind of the authority contemplating blacklisting of such a person. This is clear from the reading of paras 12 and 20 of the said judgment. Necessitating this requirement, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 74-75) “12. Under Article 298 of the Constitution the executive power of the Union and the State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose. The State can carry on executive function by making a law or without making a law. The exercise of such powers and functions in trade by the State is subject to Part III of the Constitution. Article 14 speaks of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Equality of opportunity should apply to matters of public contracts. The State has the right to trade. The State has there the duty to observe equality. An ordinary individual can choose not to deal with any person. The Government cannot choose to exclude persons by discrimination. The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. A person who is on the approved list is unable to enter into advantageous relations with the Government because of the order of blacklisting. A person who has been dealing with the Government in the matter of sale and purchase of materials has a legitimate interest or expectation. When the State acts to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality.” * * * 20. A person who has been dealing with the Government in the matter of sale and purchase of materials has a legitimate interest or expectation. When the State acts to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality.” * * * 20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” 18. Again, in Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar the aforesaid principle was reiterated in the following manner: (SCC p. 230, para 4) “4. Indisputably, no notice had been given to the appellant of the proposal of blacklisting the appellant. It was contended on behalf of the State Government that there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior notice before blacklisting any person. Insofar as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right. But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice. It has to be realised that blacklisting any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event. Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order. In that view of the matter, the last portion of the order insofar as it directs blacklisting of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law. In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the blacklist in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside. So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected. In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the blacklist in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside. So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected. This order will, however, not prevent the State Government or the appropriate authorities from taking any future steps for blacklisting the appellant if the Government is so entitled to do in accordance with law i.e. after giving the appellant due notice and an opportunity of making representation. After hearing the appellant, the State Government will be at liberty to pass any order in accordance with law indicating the reasons therefor. We, however, make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made against the appellant. The appeal is thus disposed of.” 19. Recently, in Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India speaking through one of us (Justice Chelameswar, J.) this Court emphatically reiterated the principle by explaining the same in the following manner: (SCC pp. 262-63, paras 13-15) “13. The concept of ‘blacklisting’ is explained by this Court in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. as under: (SCC p. 75, para 20) ‘20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains.’ 14. The nature of the authority of the State to blacklist the persons was considered by this Court in the abovementioned case and took note of the constitutional provision (Article 298), which authorises both the Union of India and the States to make contracts for any purpose and to carry on any trade or business. It also authorises the acquisition, holding and disposal of property. This Court also took note of the fact that the right to make a contract includes the right not to make a contract. By definition, the said right is inherent in every person capable of entering into a contract. However, such a right either to enter or not to enter into a contract with any person is subject to a constitutional obligation to obey the command of Article 14. Though nobody has any right to compel the State to enter into a contract, everybody has a right to be treated equally when the State seeks to establish contractual relationships. However, such a right either to enter or not to enter into a contract with any person is subject to a constitutional obligation to obey the command of Article 14. Though nobody has any right to compel the State to enter into a contract, everybody has a right to be treated equally when the State seeks to establish contractual relationships. The effect of excluding a person from entering into a contractual relationship with the State would be to deprive such person to be treated equally with those, who are also engaged in similar activity. 15. It follows from the above judgment in Erusian Equipment case that the decision of the State or its instrumentalities not to deal with certain persons or class of persons on account of the undesirability of entering into the contractual relationship with such persons is called blacklisting. The State can decline to enter into a contractual relationship with a person or a class of persons for a legitimate purpose. The authority of the State to blacklist a person is a necessary concomitant to the executive power of the State to carry on the trade or the business and making of contracts for any purpose, etc. There need not be any statutory grant of such power. The only legal limitation upon the exercise of such an authority is that the State is to act fairly and rationally without in any way being arbitrary—thereby such a decision can be taken for some legitimate purpose. What is the legitimate purpose that is sought to be achieved by the State in a given case can vary depending upon various factors.” 20. Thus, there is no dispute about the requirement of serving show-cause notice. We may also hasten to add that once the show-cause notice is given and opportunity to reply to the show-cause notice is afforded, it is not even necessary to give an oral hearing. The High Court has rightly repudiated the appellant’s attempt in finding foul with the impugned order on this ground. Such a contention was specifically repelled in Patel Engg.” 24. In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a contract is entered between two private parties, in case of any breach of contract by one party, the other party has every right to blacklist the defaulter and such right is unqualified. Such a contention was specifically repelled in Patel Engg.” 24. In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a contract is entered between two private parties, in case of any breach of contract by one party, the other party has every right to blacklist the defaulter and such right is unqualified. However, in a situation where an order of blacklisting has been passed by the State or its instrumentalities, such order is within the realm of power of judicial review of the Writ Court and the same has to be tested in the touchstone of the principle of natural justice, doctrine of proportionality, reasonableness and fairness. The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the government/government agencies for the purposes of gains. Thus, prior to taking such a harsh decision, the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist. The show cause must not be a mere formality, rather the same should specifically mention the grounds which necessitates the action and also the proposed action by the department so that the person aggrieved may explain the circumstances properly. 25. On perusal of the impugned order dated 26.04.2018, it appears that the order of termination of contract coupled with the debarment of the petitioner has been passed without describing any cogent or strong reason for the same. The order cancelling the awarded work is one aspect while the order of blacklisting is another. The order of termination of contract is passed merely for violation of any mandatory terms and conditions of the contract, however, the order of blacklisting debars any person from dealing with the government instrumentality within the time frame mentioned in the order. Thus, before passing the order of blacklisting, it is a sine-qua-non to hear the alleged delinquent to make sure so as to satisfy as to whether the default is intentional or has been caused under the situation beyond one’s control. In the present case, the respondent-FCI has not called upon the petitioner to explain the circumstances under which the delay was caused before passing the order of debarment. In the present case, the respondent-FCI has not called upon the petitioner to explain the circumstances under which the delay was caused before passing the order of debarment. The impugned order has been passed merely on the ground that in case of default, the respondent-FCI has the discretion to pass any such order. It is a settled position of law that the State or its instrumentality while dealing with any private individual has to exercise the said discretion in a fair and equitable manner. 26. For the aforesaid reason, I am of the view that the decision making process of the respondent-FCI in blacklisting the petitioner is vitiated as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice i.e., without affording any opportunity to the petitioner to explain the reasons of alleged default. Termination of Contract 27. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the condition of furnishing the security deposit within a fixed period of 15 working days of issuance of Letter of Acceptance is not a mandatory condition and as such, the delay could have been condoned taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. It has further been contended that the petitioner had explained sufficient ground for condonation of the delay of one day in furnishing the security deposit, however, the respondents completely ignored the same. 28. On perusal of the record, it appears that the petitioner has committed a delay of only one day in furnishing the security deposit. Now, the question is as to whether the delay of one day on the part of the petitioner was required to be condoned by the respondents in view of the present facts and circumstances of the case. 29. I have perused the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of M/s Poddar Steel Corporation (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:- “6. It is true that in submitting its tender accompanied by a cheque of the Union Bank of India and not of the State Bank clause 6 of the tender notice was not obeyed literally, but the question is as to whether the said non-compliance deprived the Diesel Locomotive Works of the authority to accept the bid. It is true that in submitting its tender accompanied by a cheque of the Union Bank of India and not of the State Bank clause 6 of the tender notice was not obeyed literally, but the question is as to whether the said non-compliance deprived the Diesel Locomotive Works of the authority to accept the bid. As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that an authority inviting tenders is bound to give effect to every term mentioned in the notice in meticulous detail, and is not entitled to waive even a technical irregularity of little or no significance. The requirements in a tender notice can be classified into two categories — those which lay down the essential conditions of eligibility and the others which are merely ancillary or subsidiary with the main object to be achieved by the condition. In the first case the authority issuing the tender may be required to enforce them rigidly. In the other cases it must be open to the authority to deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance of the condition in appropriate cases. This aspect was examined by this Court in C.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka a case dealing with tenders. Although not in an entirely identical situation as the present one, the observations in the judgment support our view. The High Court has, in the impugned decision, relied upon Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India but has failed to appreciate that the reported case belonged to the first category where the strict compliance of the condition could be insisted upon. The authority in that case, by not insisting upon the requirement in the tender notice which was an essential condition of eligibility, bestowed a favour on one of the bidders, which amounted to illegal discrimination. The judgment indicates that the court closely examined the nature of the condition which had been relaxed and its impact before answering the question whether it could have validly condoned the shortcoming in the tender in question. This part of the judgment demonstrates the difference between the two categories of the conditions discussed above. However it remains to be seen as to which of the two clauses, the present case belongs. 8. This part of the judgment demonstrates the difference between the two categories of the conditions discussed above. However it remains to be seen as to which of the two clauses, the present case belongs. 8. In the present case the certified cheque of the Union Bank of India drawn on its own branch must be treated as sufficient for the purpose of achieving the object of the condition and the Tender Committee took the abundant caution by a further verification from the bank. In this situation it is not correct to hold that the Diesel Locomotive Works had no authority to waive the technical literal compliance of clause 6, specially when it was in its interest not to reject the said bid which was the highest. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and dismiss the writ petition of respondent 1 filed before the High Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout.” 30. In every contract, the terms and conditions are invariably mentioned, however all those conditions are not mandatory in nature. Though some conditions of the tender are mandatory and violations of the same cannot be condoned, however, there are some conditions which are ancillary to the main conditions whose violations are not fatal in nature. It is to be kept in mind that in any contract where the State or its instrumentality is dealing with a private party, the former stands in upper pedestal and the conditions are fixed by it and the other party has no option but to accept the same. Under such a situation, it is the bounden duty of a State/its instrumentality to act fairly and in equitable manner. 31. Before coming to the merit of the case, it would be appropriate to go through the relevant provisions of the MTF being part of the NIT, which deals with the security deposit and also the consequence of failure to deposit the same within the time as stipulated. The relevant provisions of the MTF are quoted as under : IX. Security Deposit (a) The successful Tenderer shall furnish within fifteen working days of acceptance of his tender, a Security Deposit for the due, proper and complete discharge of all their obligations under the Contract. The relevant provisions of the MTF are quoted as under : IX. Security Deposit (a) The successful Tenderer shall furnish within fifteen working days of acceptance of his tender, a Security Deposit for the due, proper and complete discharge of all their obligations under the Contract. The Security Deposit will comprise of the total of the amounts specified in following clauses (i) (ii) and (iii) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- (b) In case of failure of tenderer to deposit the Bank Guarantee as stipulated in clause 7(i)(b)(c) within fifteen working days of acceptance of his tender, further extenstio of 15 working days be given subject to levy of penalty @ 1% of the whole amount of the security deposit and another 15 working days with levy of penalty @ 2% on the whole amount of the Security Deposit by GM(R). (c)---- (d) ----- (e) ----- (f) In the event of the Tenderer failure, after the communication of acceptance of the tender by the Corporation, to furnish the requisite Security Deposit by the due date including extension period, his contract shall summarily terminated besides forfeiture of the Earnest Money and the Corporation shall proceed for appointment of another contractor. Any losses or damages arising out of and incurred by the corporation by such conduct of the contractor will be received from the contractor, without prejudice to any other rights and remedies of the Corporation under the Contract and Law. The contractor will also be debarred from participating in any future tenders of the Corporation for a period of five years. After the completion of prescribed period of five years, the party may be allowed to participate in the future tenders of FCI provided all the recoveries/dues have been effected by the Corporation and there is no dispute pending with the contractor/party. 32. The aforesaid conditions of the tender provide that the security deposit should be furnished within 15 days of issuance of the Letter of Acceptance or within the extended period. In case the successful bidder fails to comply with the said requirement, it will be a sufficient ground for the respondent-FCI to cancel the awarded work. Apart from the termination of contract, additional right is reserved with the respondent-FCI to blacklist/debar the bidder in future tenders for a period of five years. 33. In case the successful bidder fails to comply with the said requirement, it will be a sufficient ground for the respondent-FCI to cancel the awarded work. Apart from the termination of contract, additional right is reserved with the respondent-FCI to blacklist/debar the bidder in future tenders for a period of five years. 33. Since the condition of the contract itself provides for furnishing security deposit within fifteen days of issuance of the Letter of Acceptance or within extended period, in my considered view, the same referred herein above is not a mandatory condition and as such, the respondent-FCI should not have terminated the contract awarded to the petitioner for delay of merely one day, in exercise of its discretionary power. Moreover, admittedly, even after the lapse of the said period of 15 days, the respondents enquired from the bank about the true fact with regard to the explanation made by the petitioner for non-furnishing the security deposit and thus, it reflects that the respondents had not treated the said time frame for furnishing the security deposit as a mandatory condition. 34. It has been submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the action of the respondent was malafide, arbitrary and unreasonable. It has also been pointed out that the respondents floated a fresh tender on 23.03.2018 even before the cancellation of the work awarded to the petitioner. On perusal of the record, it appears that the order of termination of the contract was passed on 26.04.2018. Clause 7(iv) of the MTF provides for the consequence of failure of the tenderer to deposit the security money by the due date. It provides that the contract would be summarily terminated besides forfeiture of the earnest money and the Corporation would proceed for appointment of another contractor. It is thus explicitly provided therein that before proceeding with the appointment of a new contractor, the respondents are required to terminate the existing contract. Otherwise also, it was not logical that during the subsistence of an old contract, steps should be taken to enter into a new contract. This action of the respondents indicates that they were predetermined to pass the impugned order of termination and blacklisting. 35. The respondents have tried to impress upon this Court that the said action was necessary as more than 20 lakhs beneficiaries were likely to be affected by the project. This action of the respondents indicates that they were predetermined to pass the impugned order of termination and blacklisting. 35. The respondents have tried to impress upon this Court that the said action was necessary as more than 20 lakhs beneficiaries were likely to be affected by the project. However, on perusal of the facts of the present case, it appears that the Letter of Acceptance was issued to the petitioner on 28.02.2018 with a condition to furnish the security deposit within 15 days from the date of issuance of Letter of Acceptance. The petitioner applied to his banker for transfer of the security deposit through RTGS in favour of the respondents, however the Bank failed to do the same. By way of Annexure-3, it has been certified by the Bank that due to some technical problem, the security deposit could not be transferred. The contention of the petitioner is that on 22.03.2018, the Bank was closed due to public holiday and the said fact has not been denied by the respondent-FCI. The petitioner, by way of a representation dated 22.03.2018, had shown his inability to furnish the security deposit within the stipulated time and asked for extension of time, however on the next day i.e 23.03.2018, the security deposit was transferred to the respondent-FCI. 36. From the aforesaid facts, it appears that before the expiry of the stipulated time of deposit of the security deposit, the petitioner had made representation to the respondent-FCI to extend the time for furnishing the security deposit, however, the respondent-FCI neither allowed nor rejected the said request of the petitioner. In the meantime, before issuance of the impugned order, the petitioner furnished the security deposit just on the next day of the time limit. The entire chain of events suggest that the petitioner was vigilant enough to furnish the security deposit but the same could not be furnished due to some technical failure in the bank as well as the last day i.e., 22.03.2018 being a Bank holiday. The contention of the respondent-FCI is that when there is a specific time frame mentioned in the tender document, no deviation whatsoever is permissible and the petitioner having delayed in submitting the security deposit is, thus, liable to face the consequences as provided under the terms and conditions of the contract. The contention of the respondent-FCI is that when there is a specific time frame mentioned in the tender document, no deviation whatsoever is permissible and the petitioner having delayed in submitting the security deposit is, thus, liable to face the consequences as provided under the terms and conditions of the contract. However, it appears from the record that the time frame for furnishing the security deposit is directive in nature and thus, its extension should have been considered by the respondent-FCI keeping in view the aforesaid circumstances. Since the delay in furnishing the security deposit was only of one day, the same was required to be condoned in view of the fact that the circumstance was beyond the control of the petitioner as supported by the certificate (annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition) issued by the bank in favour of the petitioner. 37. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-FCI is that the FCI Headquarters vide Circular No. F.1(21)/CVC/2011/Cont dated 30.01.2013 resolved that in case of failure of the tenderer to deposit the Security Deposit within the time limit, there will be no relaxation in the time frame as provided in clause 7(i)(a) and IX (a)(i) of the MTF. 38. However, in the present case, the petitioner was vigilant enough to furnish the security deposit in time but the same could not be furnished within the stipulated period of 15 days from the date of issuance of Letter of Acceptance due to the situation discussed hereinabove. There was some procedural delay by the Bank due to which the security deposit could not be furnished in time and the intimation to that effect was also given by the petitioner, vide letter dated 22.03.2018 to the respondent-FCI. Finally, on the following day of the prescribed period, Security Deposit was furnished. Since the petitioner, who was allotted the work, was found eligible in all respects for being awarded the contract, the delay of one day in furnishing the security deposit was required to be condoned in the interest of justice. Even if, it is assumed that the petitioner had insufficient balance in his account, the said fact was brought to his notice by the Bank only on 21.03.2018 when the technical error of the Bank was rectified and as the next day was a the Bank holiday and therefore the fund could not be transferred on 22.03.2018. Even if, it is assumed that the petitioner had insufficient balance in his account, the said fact was brought to his notice by the Bank only on 21.03.2018 when the technical error of the Bank was rectified and as the next day was a the Bank holiday and therefore the fund could not be transferred on 22.03.2018. Moreover, on the same day, the petitioner had intimated the respondents about his inability to transfer the security deposit on that day i.e. 22.03.2018 and had assured that the same would be transferred on the very next date and accordingly he deposited the security deposit on 23.03.2018. The respondent-FCI, which is an instrumentality of the State, is required to act in a fair and proper manner while taking such decision. 39. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, letter no. S&C-13/Reg.HTC/RH-MADHUPUR-PEG GIRIDIH/2018-20 dated 26.04.2018 is quashed with a direction to the respondents to proceed with the petitioner for the work allotted to him. The present writ petition is accordingly allowed. 40. I.A No. 4855 of 2018 also stands disposed of.