JUDGMENT : A.C. RAO, J. 1. This appeal under Sec. 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is preferred by the appellant herein-original accused No. 1-Mukeshbhai Arjanbhai Maru against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed in Sessions Case No. 190 of 2011 by the Court of Sessions, Bhavnagar dated 15-3-2014 whereby the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 came to be tried along with other two accused for the offences punishable under Secs. 302, 323 read with Sec. 34 of Indian Penal Code and under Sec. 135 of Bombay Police Act and at the end of trial, after recording evidence of 22 prosecution-witnesses and documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge concluded that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt against the present appellant-original accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 135 of Bombay Police Act. The appellant herein-original accused No. 1 was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 2,000 and in default thereof, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under Sec. 302 of Indian Penal Code and for the offence under Sec. 135 of Bombay Police Act, was ordered to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months with fine of Rs. 1,000 and in default thereof, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Other two co-accused-original accused Nos. 2 and 3 came to be acquitted for the offences punishable under Secs. 302, 323 read with Sec. 34 of Indian Penal Code and also under Sec. 135 of Bombay Police Act. 2. Before proceeding further it is necessary to give brief facts about the case of prosecution which has genesis in the instance which took place on 2-9-2011 around 9.00 a.m. wherein all the accused in furtherance of their common intention, intercepted Jesingbhai Rathod (deceased) near Piparvala Chowk on Nari Road, Bhavnagar. The accused No. 1 inflicted blows by knife on the deceased at three places of body of the deceased and accused Nos. 2 and 3 gave kick and fist blows. After inflicting knife blows, the accused ran away and the deceased fell down and gave a missed call to complainant-P.W. No. 13, who was an employee of factory of the deceased. 2 and 3 gave kick and fist blows. After inflicting knife blows, the accused ran away and the deceased fell down and gave a missed call to complainant-P.W. No. 13, who was an employee of factory of the deceased. Having seen the missed call, the complainant - Pravinbhai called upon the deceased on his mobile which remained unattended. Subsequently, when the complainant reached near the shop of Vithhalbhai on Nari road, he found the deceased lying on the ground and he also had seen three injuries on the body of the deceased and further the deceased disclosed name of three accused persons. Immediately one Girish Bechar-P.W. No. 19 was informed and another person - Naresh @ Jitubha-P.W. No. 16 was passing from the place of incident and they both took the deceased on the motorcycle to the hospital. Before the concerned Medical Officer, In-charge-P.W. No. 11 - Dr. Nayanaben Gayekwad, the deceased who was conscious, had given three names of assailants. In view of worsening situation, operation was performed and later on the injured succumbed to injuries on the next date i.e. on 3-9-2011. 2.1. At the same time, previous instance about some quarrel on account of throwing of garbage had taken place before a few days namely on 27-8-2011 for which A-3 Pankaj had filed a complaint which was registered under Secs. 504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code. Reference of above fact is mentioned since the wife of the deceased - Kantaben-P.W. No. 18 was cross-examined on this aspect by the defence at length. 2.2. At the end of investigation and filing of the charge-sheet and upon committal of case to Sessions Court, trial Court examined oral as well as documentary evidence to which reference is already mad in earlier Paragraph. Submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant-original accused No. 1: 3. In the backdrop of above, the case of the prosecution and findings, reasoning and conclusion drawn by the learned trial Judge convicting A-1 and acquitting A-2 and A-3 of the charges, Mr. Submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant-original accused No. 1: 3. In the backdrop of above, the case of the prosecution and findings, reasoning and conclusion drawn by the learned trial Judge convicting A-1 and acquitting A-2 and A-3 of the charges, Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 at the threshold contended that the case of the prosecution is based on oral dying declaration and other evidence do not corroborate or no any cogent material is brought on record so as to prove that the guilt of A-1 would be proved beyond reasonable doubt, since it is an established principle of criminal jurisprudence that conviction cannot be secured solely based on such oral evidence. He further submitted that in the facts of this case, witnesses particularly P.W. No. 18-Kantaben wife of deceased and P.W. No. 13-Complainant and other two witnesses namely P.W. Nos. 16 and 17 namely Naresh @ Jitubhai and Naresh Becharbhai Rathod in their testimonies do not come out with any supporting evidence and their testimonies suffer from vice of material contradictions, major discrepancies and improvement of such a nature that name of accused persons so given initially by the injured/deceased before P.W. No. 11-Dr. Nayanaben is replaced or changed and although all the accused were charged for the offence under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34 of Indian Penal Code, the learned trial Judge has not believed common intention and furtherance of such common intention and any criminal act on the part of the accused together make out a case that the appellant was innocent since he was falsely implicated. He has further submitted that the versions of all the above witnesses do not inspire any confidence and are wholly unreliable. 3.1. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that evidence of Kantaben-P.W. No. 18-Wife of the applicant has given a complete different account of the incident than what was stated by Jesingbhai-deceased who informed the complainant-P.W. No. 13 and disclosed the name etc. 3.2. Mr. 3.1. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that evidence of Kantaben-P.W. No. 18-Wife of the applicant has given a complete different account of the incident than what was stated by Jesingbhai-deceased who informed the complainant-P.W. No. 13 and disclosed the name etc. 3.2. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that according to P.W. No. 18, the deceased was standing near Pipal Chawk around 9.00 a.m. and at that time, accused Arjan inflicted one blow, and thereafter, another person Haresh Arjan inflicted one blow from back and then Mukesh - present appellant accused inflicted one blow. This narration reflects about her witness in the incidents but in her cross-examination the said witness has stated about receiving such information when she reached to the hospital and her husband had given the name of the assailants. The subsequent events so described by other witnesses namely P.W. Nos. 16, 17 and 19, who admittedly had not seen the incidents, since they reached after the crime was over. 3.3. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that if the above versions of witnesses seen in juxtaposition to documentary evidence inducing injuries reflected in Column No. 17 of the post-mortem report and cause of death, ruled out the possibility of inflicting injuries by knife by different persons. 3.4. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that the first oral dying declaration made by the deceased while he was conscious and taken to the hospital appears from the testimonies of the complainant-Pravinbhai P.W. No. 13, wherein the deceased told him that "you come here. I have been injured by knife blows". The above P.W. No. 13 had seen three injuries while the injured was lying on the ground and disclosed the names of three assailants and as per said witness, the injured/deceased had given the name of assailants and he had given names of Mukesh Arjan Maru, his son Pankaj Mukesh Maru and his brother Haresh Arjan Maru. 3.5. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that F.I.R. Exh. 3.5. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that F.I.R. Exh. 48 whereby information was given about the incident that the deceased was assaulted with knife. 3.6. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that in the second oral dying declaration before Dr. Nayanaben-P.W. No. 11, upon inquiry about the incident, the injured stated that "assaulted injuries with Chhari (knife) today 1/2 hour back at Pipar Chowk, Nari Road, Kumbharwada by Arjan Nanji Maru, Mukesh Arjan Maru and Pankaj Mukesh Maru. He has further submitted that so is the case before the P.W. Nos. 16 and 17 and it was emphasized by the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused that when P.W. No. 16 parked his motorcycle and reached to the place of incident, he noticed that his uncle Jesingbhai was lying in bleeding condition and then he noticed P.W. No. 13-Complainant, and thereafter, Jesingbhai informed him that "Mukeshbhai Arjanbhai Maru - appellant accused has given knife blows and his brother Hareshbhai and son Pankaj has given fist and kick blows. 3.7. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that again before P.W. No. 17-Nareshbhai Rathod, who deposed to the incident that he was at his residence on the date and time of incident and upon hearing about the present appellant inflicting knife blows, he reached at the scene of offence and on inquiry, the injured/deceased told him about the three knife blows by the present appellant accused Mukeshbhai and kick and fist blows by his son Pankajbhai and younger brother Hareshbhai. 3.8. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has assailed testimonies of P.W. No. 18 by contending that she has improved a lot in her testimonies before the Court and admittedly she had not seen the incident. 3.9. Mr. 3.8. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has assailed testimonies of P.W. No. 18 by contending that she has improved a lot in her testimonies before the Court and admittedly she had not seen the incident. 3.9. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended about the mobile call record and submitted that there was no call on the mobile of 2-9-2011 from the mobile of deceased Jesingbhai Mohanbhai or from the mobile of complainant Pravinbhai to Jesingbhai Mohanbhai and otherwise also such evidence is of no help to the prosecution as nothing further is brought on record to prove electronic evidence. 3.10. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has further contended that overall consideration of prosecution evidence reveal that oral dying declaration of deceased are before different persons but they are not consistent and the same cannot be said to be conclusive proof and guilt of the accused. 3.11. In support of his above submission, Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 has relied upon two decisions, reported in 1995 (Suppl.) (4) SCC 126, in the case of Darshana Devi v. State of Punjab and Haryana, wherein oral declaration was to the extent that the death of appellant's husband was due to burn injury and the question that arose before the Apex Court whether conviction could be based on oral dying declaration, and ultimately, it was answered that if the accused is convicted on sole evidence of dying declaration, exact words spoken by the deceased must be reproduced and any variance in it would affect the acceptability of the oral dying declaration. The next decision on the life was reported in AIR 2011 SC (Suppl.) 783 in the case of Waikhom Yqima Singh v. State of Manipur, wherein the Apex Court reiterated that the oral dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence where exact words uttered by the deceased are not available, particularly because of failure of memory of witness who have stated to have heard it and when Doctor is not examined about the mental condition of the deceased as to whether he was in a fit condition to make statement, although witness claimed to have reported to informant about the dying declaration and name of assailant and in absence of such names in F.I.R., dying declaration was not to be relied on. Our attention is drawn to Paragraph Nos. 14, 15 and 16 of the above judgment. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused No. 1 has collectively submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed by quashing and setting aside the conviction and sentence and the appellant-accused be ordered to be set at liberty. Submissions of learned A.P.P. for State: 4. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has vehemently opposed the present appeal by submitting that the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is just, legal and proper and no error has been committed by the learned trial Judge while convicting the appellant-accused and imposing the sentence of life imprisonment, and therefore, no interference of this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction is warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. 4.1. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has further submitted that the offence under Sec. 302 of Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act, is established and proved against the appellant-accused beyond reasonable doubt by leading oral as well as documentary evidence and the learned trial Judge has rightly imposed the punishment of life imprisonment and no error or illegality has been committed by the learned trial Judge, and hence, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence is not required to be interfered with. 4.2. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has relied on the evidence of complainant namely Pravinbhai Dayalbhai Rathod-P.W. No. 13 who is examined at Exh. 47. 4.2. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has relied on the evidence of complainant namely Pravinbhai Dayalbhai Rathod-P.W. No. 13 who is examined at Exh. 47. The said witness has deposed that as there was a missed call from the mobile of the deceased, when he returned the call to the deceased he was informed about the incident and after reaching to the place of incident, deceased had informed the said witness that present appellant and other two have assaulted him and also informed the said witness that the present appellant has caused injuries by inflicting three blows by knife. The said witness has also deposed that on the motorbike of P.W. No. 16 deceased was taken to the Hospital. Thus, the said witness has supported the case of the prosecution. 4.3. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has further submitted that witness - Naresh @ Jitubhai Shamjibhai Rathod, P.W. No. 16, who is examined at Exh. 51, has implicated the appellant-accused. The said witness has also deposed that the deceased had informed him that the present appellant-accused has inflicted three blows by knife. He also deposed that he dialed 108 for Ambulance, but as the ambulance had not come, he had taken the deceased to the Hospital on his motorbike with P.W. No. 13. Therefore, the learned A.P.P. has further submitted that there is oral dying declaration of the deceased and the deceased has named the appellant-accused and the deceased has stated that the appellant-accused has inflicted three blows by knife. Learned A.P.P. has further submitted that the oral dying declaration is corroborated by the evidence of the independent witnesses as well as Medical evidence. 4.4. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has further submitted that the P.W. No. 17-Nareshbhai Becharbhai who is examined at Exh. 57, has also deposed that at the time of incident, when he reached the place of incident and inquired from his brother-deceased, the deceased informed him that the appellant herein-accused has inflicted three blows by knife. 4.5. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has further submitted that even P.W. No. 19-Girishbhai Becharbhai Rathod who is examined at Exh. 57, has also deposed that at the time of incident, when he reached the place of incident and inquired from his brother-deceased, the deceased informed him that the appellant herein-accused has inflicted three blows by knife. 4.5. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has further submitted that even P.W. No. 19-Girishbhai Becharbhai Rathod who is examined at Exh. 61 has also supported the case of the prosecution and said witness has also deposed that the deceased had informed him that the appellant herein-accused has inflicted three blows by knife and he has also corroborated the oral dying declaration of the deceased. Learned A.P.P. submitted that the evidence of P.W. Nos. 17 and 19 is corroborated by the evidence of P.W. Nos. 13 and 16. 4.6. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has further submitted that the learned Advocate for the appellant-accused has strongly relied upon the deposition of Kantaben Jesingbhai Rathod, wife of the deceased, P.W. No. 18, who is examined at Exh. 16, but she has not reached to the place of incident, and she had reached to the Hospital directly when the deceased was under treatment, whereas the aforesaid four witnesses - P.W. Nos. 13, 16, 17 and 19, reached at the place of incident after the appellant-accused caused injuries by knife and the deceased himself has informed to the aforesaid four witnesses P.W. Nos. 13, 16, 17 and 19 that the appellant herein has caused injuries to the deceased by inflicting three blows with knife. The wife of the deceased has also implicated the present appellant-accused and has clearly deposed in her deposition that the present appellant-accused has also inflicted knife blow to the deceased. 4.7. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has further submitted that it is true that there are some discrepancy in the dying declarations but the same is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Learned A.P.P. has further submitted that it is true that there are discrepancy in disclosing the name of the accused persons, however, there is consistency so far as the present appellant-accused is concerned and all the witnesses are consistent so far as the present appellant-accused is concerned and all the witnesses have named and implicated the present appellant-accused, and therefore, the appellant-accused cannot claim benefit of inconsistency in the statement of the witnesses and oral dying declarations made before them, as all the witnesses have implicated the present appellant-accused. 4.8. 4.8. Mr. Rutvij Gza, learned A.P.P. has also drawn our attention towards the call details of the mobile of the complainant. It is submitted that the complainant received call from the deceased on his mobile on 2-9-2018 at 8-20 a.m., which also corroborates the facts stated in the complaint. 4.9. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has also drawn our attention to the call details of the mobile of the deceased and on perusal of the same, it is clear that there was a conversion between the deceased and the complainant by their respective mobiles on the date of incident at about 8-20 a.m. and the victim has also called the witness Girish at about 9-06 a.m. which corroborates the case of the prosecution. 4.10. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has further submitted that the Dr. Naynaben Madhukar Gayakwad, P.W. No. 11, who is examined at Exh. 39, who is an independent witness has fully supported the case of the prosecution. It is submitted that the said witness has treated the deceased and she in her deposition clearly stated that the deceased in the history before her has disclosed the name of the present appellant-accused and has deposed that the deceased in the history before her has stated that the present appellant-accused has caused injuries by knife. It is submitted that the medical certificate also disclose the name of the appellant-accused which is in corroboration of the medical certificate issued by the Doctor. 4.11. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has further submitted that thus, there is oral dying declaration of the victim, which is supported by the aforesaid witnesses, and thus, there are ample evidence on record, oral so also oral, against the appellant-accused which prove and establish that the appellant has committed the alleged offence, and hence, discretion is not required to be exercised in favour of the present appellant-accused. 4.12. Mr. Rutvij Oza, learned A.P.P. has further submitted that the learned trial Judge, on appreciating the material on record, oral so also oral, in its proper perspective, has rightly convicted the appellant-accused No. 1 by passing a well-reasoned order, which by no stretch of imagination can be said to be illegal, as no illegality or error has been committed by the learned trial Judge while convicting the present appellant-accused, and hence, no interference is called for. Hence, he submitted to dismiss the present Criminal Appeal and confirm the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Judge, and consequently, dismiss the application for suspension of sentence and bail. Findings of the Court: 5. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant-defence and learned A.P.P. and a careful perusal of evidence on record vis-à-vis judgment and order of conviction and sentence under challenge, we found that case of the prosecution though based on oral dying declaration, but it is not exclusive and the conclusion so secured by the prosecution is not solely based on oral dying declaration. 5.1. Before we go to the nature and extent of injuries on vital parts of the body of the deceased by weapon - knife and testimonies of concerned Medical Officer, we would like to address on involvement of the present appellant-accused in the crime and consistency throughout appearing in testimonies of P.W. Nos. 13, 16, 17, 18 and 19. The above witnesses may be relative and known to the deceased, but testimonies of P.W. No. 11-Dr. Nayanaben Gayakwad, Medical Officer, who treated the injured admittedly within 1/2 hour of incident on 9-30 a.m. on 2-9-2011 and the Medical Certificate Exh. 40 reveals that three injuries were on vital part of the body. Column No. 17 of post-mortem report reveals : (1) stitches wound "T" shape present on middle 1/3rd of right flank region and its horizontal end is 9 c.m. and vertical end is 7.5 c.m. and situated 18 cm. above from right anterior superior iliae spine (2) stitch wound obliquely inverted "L" shape (4 c.m. x 5 cm.) present on right side of lower back, situated 44 cm. below from the top of right shoulder, 106 cm. above from right heel and (3) stitch wound (6 cm. x 9 c.m.) present on middle 1/3rd of left flank region, its horizontal oblique end is 6 cm. and vertical oblique end is 9 cm., situated 17 cm. above from the left anterior superior iliac spine, 36 cm. below from the top of left shoulder, 24 cm. left lateral to mid-line of front aspect and 21 cm. anterior to mid-line of back side. 5.2. Medical Certificate issued by Dr. and vertical oblique end is 9 cm., situated 17 cm. above from the left anterior superior iliac spine, 36 cm. below from the top of left shoulder, 24 cm. left lateral to mid-line of front aspect and 21 cm. anterior to mid-line of back side. 5.2. Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Nayanaben Gayakwad clearly reveals the history given by the deceased before the Doctor and name of the appellant-accused as one of the assailants along with two others - co-accused and also reveals the three injuries by sharp weapon, namely : (1) longitudinal spindle shaped cut incised stab of 7 x 3 cavity deep at lower 3rd chest, (2) lumber back side spindle shaped cut incised stab of 3 x 5 cavity deep, and (3) Rt. Chest at post H.Z. spindle shaped cut incised stab 6 x 2 cavity deep at middle 3rd of Rt. chest. The Certificate also reveals that there are other injuries whereby internal bleeding was noticed pursuant to haemoperitonial, leading to injuries on abdominal wall. As per Column No. 23 of the post-mortem report, the cause of death of the deceased was due to shock and haemorrhage due to injuries mentioned in Column No. 17 with its corresponding internal injuries. 5.3. So far as the involvement of the present appellant-original accused No. 1 is concerned, all the witnesses throughout are consistent, and therefore, the state of mind of the injured at initial stage in giving incorrect name of one of the assailants itself is no ground to disbelieve the oral dying declaration. The case on hand, namely, involvement of the applicant-accused in heinous crime for the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of Indian Penal Code is not solely based on oral declaration but duly and ably corroborated by the medico-legal evidence, which we have referred earlier and a careful consideration of injuries by knife do not even cast an iota of doubt. 5.4. The nature of oral declaration made by injured before the relatives and known persons is again to be considered by testimonies of Dr. Nayanaben P.W. No. 11, who is an independent witness and Medical Officer, who treated the injured/deceased and before whom, the injured/deceased disclosed the name of three assailants including the present appellant-accused. 5.4. The nature of oral declaration made by injured before the relatives and known persons is again to be considered by testimonies of Dr. Nayanaben P.W. No. 11, who is an independent witness and Medical Officer, who treated the injured/deceased and before whom, the injured/deceased disclosed the name of three assailants including the present appellant-accused. Couple of such kind of evidence if evidence and reasonings of the learned trial Judge are seen, on the contrary reveal that the learned trial Judge has conceptually misapplied the interpretation of Sec. 34 by concluding that no conspiracy was hatched by the accused persons, common intention was to be gathered from the circumstances preceding the incidents. We are not agree with the submission of Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Counsel for the appellant-accused that the learned trial Judge has not believed common intention and other two co-accused are acquitted by the learned trial Judge, and therefore, the appellant herein-original accused No. 1 is required to be acquitted. It appears that the learned trial Judge has concluded that as the conspiracy is not proved, there cannot be any common intention, and therefore, Sec. 34 do not have any application. The same has no substance and we are not agree with the same. The issue is no more res-integra in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, reported in AIR 1955 SC 216 , wherein the Apex Court has observed and held as under: "The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time required. It could arise and be formed suddenly, as for example when one man calls on bystanders to help him kill a given individual and they, either by their words or their acts, indicate their absent to him and join him in the assault. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds. There is a pre-arranged plan, however, hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre-arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds. There is a pre-arranged plan, however, hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre-arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in the latter Privy Council case, to have the same intention independently of each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another, and if necessary, to kill those who oppose." The manner in which the assault has taken place by deadly weapon -knife and inflicting three blows of knife on vital parts of body of the deceased and for which ample evidence are available, as reflected from the testimonies of P.W. Nos. 11 and 12, Doctor and post-mortem report and such injuries were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death, but acquittal of other two co-accused and reasons weighed with the learned trial Judge, for which no benefit can be extended to the appellant herein-original accused No. 1, who is consistently and categorically named by all the aforesaid prosecution witnesses and in the backdrop of such cogent and convincing evidence, the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Judge is well within four corners of law and warrants no interference in exercise of appellate power read with Secs. 374 and 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5.5. Much reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused on the variance in the deposition of P.W. No. 18-Kantaben, however, it is required to be noted that though she has implicated other two accused, but there is consistency so far as the present appellant-accused is concerned and there is no consistency in her deposition so far as the present appellant is concerned. Even absence of clear confirmation from F.S.L. or weapon seized or clothes of deceased, is also no ground for not believing the testimonies of the witnesses, which are duly supported by Medical evidence. 5.6. It is trite that the maxim 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' has no application in India. It is merely a rule of caution. It does not have the status of rule of law. The evidence of eye-witnesses is not discrepant on the material aspect of the prosecution case. Reliance can, therefore, be placed on them. 5.6. It is trite that the maxim 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' has no application in India. It is merely a rule of caution. It does not have the status of rule of law. The evidence of eye-witnesses is not discrepant on the material aspect of the prosecution case. Reliance can, therefore, be placed on them. We may quote the relevant Paragraph from Rizan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2003 (2) SCC 661 : "Even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where the chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence". (See : Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366 .)" 5.7. So far as decision in the case of Waikhom Yaima Singh (supra) relied upon by Mr. A.D. Shah learned Counsel for the appellant- accused is concerned, the same would not be of any assistance to the appellant, as the facts of the case on hand and the facts of the said case are quite different. So far as decision in the case of Waikhom Yaima Singh (supra) relied upon by Mr. A.D. Shah learned Counsel for the appellant- accused is concerned, the same would not be of any assistance to the appellant, as the facts of the case on hand and the facts of the said case are quite different. In the said decision the victim died immediately after allegedly making the alleged dying declaration, the time of which was not fixed by the prosecution and in the said case there was no medical evidence suggesting that the deceased was in a fit medical condition to make such a declaration. The same is not the case here. Under the circumstances and in the facts of the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court discarded the oral dying declaration. 5.8. So far as decision in the case of Darshana Devi (supra) relied upon by Mr. A.D. Shah learned Counsel for the appellant-accused is concerned, the same would also not be helpful to the appellant, as the facts of the case on hand and the facts of the said case are quite different. In the said decision Doctor had given certificate that the injured/deceased was not in a fit condition to make a statement after the police had arrived at the hospital and even in the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even without burn injuries, because of the alcohol, concentration found in the body of the deceased, he would not be making a coherent statement. The aforesaid are not the facts in the case on hand. Thus, in the facts of the said case, the Apex Court did not believe the oral dying declaration. 5.9. So far as the oral dying declaration is concerned, the Apex Court has considered time and again, the relevance/probative value of dying declarations recorded under different situations and also in cases where more than one dying declaration has been recorded. The law is that if the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and made voluntarily by the deceased, conviction can be based solely on it, without any further corroboration. It is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. It is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased must be in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and must identify the assailants. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details of the occurrence, it cannot be rejected and in case there is merely a brief statement, it is more reliable for the reason that the shortness of the statement is itself a guarantee of its veracity. If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution's version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon, (vide : Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 ; Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 332 ; K.R. Reddy v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994 ; State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617 ; Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 (5) SCC 254 : AIR 2001 SC 1814 : 2001 AIR SCW 1478; Babulal v. State of M.P., 2003 (12) SCC 490 : AIR 2004 SC 846 : 2003 AIR SCW 7074; Muthu Kutty v. State, 2005 (9) SCC 113 : AIR 2005 SC 1473 : 2004 AIR SCW 7396; State of Rajasthan v. Wakteng, AIR 2007 SC 2020 : 2007 AIR SCW 3802; and Sharda v. State of Rajasthan, 2010 (2) SCC 85 : AIR 2010 SC 408 : 2010 AIR SCW 1]. 5.10. In the case of Munnawar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2010 (5) SCC 451 : 2010 AIR SCW 3296, Apex Court held that a dying declaration can be relied upon if the deceased remained alive for a long period of time after the incident and died after recording of the dying declaration. That may be evidence to show that his condition was not overtly critical or precarious when the dying declaration was recorded. Conclusion: 6. In the result, present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. That may be evidence to show that his condition was not overtly critical or precarious when the dying declaration was recorded. Conclusion: 6. In the result, present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the main Criminal Appeal, Misc. Criminal Application No. 1 of 2018 preferred by the accused for suspension of sentence and bail does not survive and the same also stands dismissed.