JUDGMENT A.Y. Kogje, J. Rule. Learned Additional waives service of rule on behalf of respondent-State. This group of matters are arising out of the same Crime Register being FIR C.R.No.I-1 of 2016 registered with CID Crime, Vadodara Rural. The petitioner is an accused of aforesaid offence which came to be registered for offence under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Price Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act and Sections 3,4 and 7 of the Gujarat Protection of Interest of Depositors Act. 2. In all the three proceedings, the subject matter is pertaining to bail/default bail of the petitioner. 3. The facts in brief are that the petitioner is an accused in connection with this offence for which the petitioner filed Criminal Misc. Application No.13724 of 2016 before this Court for regular bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Cr.P.C.). This Court by an order dated 26.07.2016 was pleased to enlarge the petitioner on regular bail by imposing several conditions for bail. The conditions relevant for the purpose of this case are as under:- 5(g) deposit an amount of Rs. 1,25,03,000/- in following manner: Rs.25,00,000/- within two weeks; Rs.25,00,000/- on or before 31.08.2016; Rs.25,00,000/- on or before 30.09.2016; Rs.25,00,000/- on or before 31.10.2016; Rs.25,03,000/- on or before 30.11.2016 The accounts as well as receipts of amounts shall be furnished to the concerned I.O. as well as concerned Trial Court. Once the entire amount is deposited before the concerned Trial Court, the concerned Trial Court shall distribute the same amongst the victims in proportion to the amount deposited or distributed after proper verification; [h] make payment to the depositors/investors whose names are included/shown in the list provided by the Investigating Officer to his satisfaction within a period of one week from the date of his release. He shall also pay to the depositors who may come forward before the Investigating Officer or before the concerned Court on or before filing of the supplementary charge-sheet.” 3.1 It appears that as the petitioner was unable to fulfill the condition No.5(g), an application was moved by the State under section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 for cancellation of bail. The learned 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara by an order dated 08.05.2017 ordered cancellation of bail and directed issuance of arrest warrant. The learned 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara by an order dated 08.05.2017 ordered cancellation of bail and directed issuance of arrest warrant. The petitioner also filed Special Criminal Application No.3563 of 2017 on 12.05.2017, challenging the order dated 08.05.2017, whereby the bail of the petitioner was cancelled and arrest warrant was issued. 3.2 The petitioner therefore, moved Criminal Misc. Application No.01 of 2017 in Criminal Misc. Application No.13724 of 2016 on 04.08.2017, inter alia, praying for deletion of condition No.5(g) of the bail order dated 26.07.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.13724 of 2016. 3.3 Pursuant to the arrest warrant, the petitioner came to be arrested on 22.09.2017. The petitioner was thereafter, in judicial custody. The petitioner filed an application under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 26.12.2017, which was ordered to fix for hearing on 27.12.2017. By an order dated 27.12.2017, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara rejected the application under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 for default bail on the ground that on 27.12.2017 at 13:40 hours, charge-sheet was filed. After filing of the charge-sheet, at the request of learned advocate for the petitioner, the learned Magistrate took up the hearing of 167(2) application and rejected the same. The petitioner thereafter, preferred Revision Application being Criminal Revision Application No.310 of 2017 before the Court of Sessions Judge at Vadodara. By an order dated 04.01.2018, the Sessions Judge, Vadodara remanded the matter back to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara for afresh hearing on merits. The Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara upon remand and as per the directions of the Sessions Court, passed a detailed order dated 06.01.2018, dismissing the application for default bail under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 Against this order, the petitioner filed Criminal Revision Application No. 7 of 2018. This application by an order dated 09.02.2018 came to be rejected and thereby confirming the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara dated 06.01.2018, rejecting the bail application of the petitioner. 4. This application by an order dated 09.02.2018 came to be rejected and thereby confirming the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara dated 06.01.2018, rejecting the bail application of the petitioner. 4. At the outset, learned advocate for the petitioner confined his arguments only to the case of default bail i.e. Special Criminal Application No.2167 of 2018 on the ground that the petitioner is now entitled to default bail in view of provisions of section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C, 1973 and both the Courts below have committed an error in rejecting the bail application. 5. Learned advocate Mr. I.H. Saiyed with learned advocate Mr. Chirag Upadhya, for the petitioner submitted that only provisions of law under which an accused can be detained in custody is section 309 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 and section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 It is submitted that section 309 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 pertains to custody post-cognizance, whereas section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 pertains to custody at pre-cognizance stage. It is submitted that in the instance case, as the charge-sheet was not filed at the relevant time, there was no question of custody of the petitioner under section 309 of the Cr.P.C, 1973 but would be only under section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 5.1 It is submitted that the provisions of law insofar as Section 167 of the Code operates within the period prescribed under the provision. It is submitted that in the instant case, the Investigating Agency was required to file charge-sheet within a period of 90 days of the petitioner being in judicial custody. Upon failure to file charge-sheet, an indefeasible right was created in favour of the petitioner for default bail. It is submitted that the petitioner was re-arrested on 22.09.2017 after his bail was cancelled by an order dated 08.05.2017. The period of 90 days was over on 23.12.2017 and on 23.12.2017, as no charge-sheet came to be filed, the petitioner filed default bail application on 26.12.2017 and therefore, the petitioner was entitled to default bail on his application. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that there is no provision to detain the petitioner beyond period of 90 days and there being no other provision of law except for section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that there is no provision to detain the petitioner beyond period of 90 days and there being no other provision of law except for section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. continuing detention of the petitioner is illegal and therefore, he is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of default in filing of the charge-sheet. 5.2 Learned advocate for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Uday Mohanlal Acharya vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2001 (2) GLH 493 to contend that the right of an accused under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 is indefeasible right which occurs immediately upon the failure on the part of Investigating Agency to file charge-sheet within prescribed time and such Right remains unaffected even upon subsequent development like filing of charge-sheet thereafter. 6. As against this, learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Mitesh Amin submits that the re-arrest of the petitioner cannot be considered to be an arrest for the purpose of investigation as insofar as the petitioner is concerned, upon completion of 15 days, after his first arrest, investigation qua him would be concluded. The re-arrest of the petitioner was on account of non-compliance of the conditions of bail imposed by this Court and re-arrest was on the strength of the arrest warrant. This situation cannot be mixed up with the requirement of section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973.The arrest warrant issued being on account of breach of conditions of bail can be set right only after the petitioner complies with the condition of such bail. In any case, in the given fact situation, where the petitioner has proceeded to file application for regular bail under section 439 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 granted conditional bail by exercising powers under section 439 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. Thereafter, on account of breach of condition of bail, his bail came to be cancelled while exercising power under section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973. Thereafter, on account of breach of condition of bail, his bail came to be cancelled while exercising power under section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973. It is not open for the petitioner to change the track from right to bail under section 439 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 to right to default bail under section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 6.1 It is vehemently submitted by learned Public Prosecutor that the petitioner had invited condition of depositing the amount as contemplated under Clause 5(g) of the bail order passed by this Court and on the basis of such voluntary nature, this Court was inclined to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner. The attempt on the part of the petitioner to now go back on such assurance given and thereafter, claimed default bail under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 is nothing but an attempt to hoodwink the Court and therefore, the Court ought not to consider the case of the petitioner. 7. Heard learned advocates for the rival parties and perused the documents placed on record. As the learned advocate for the petitioner has restricted his arguments to claim default bail under section 167(2) of Cr.P.C., 1973 the Court is not required to deal with other two matters namely Criminal Misc. Application No.01 of 2017 in Criminal Misc. Application No.13724 of 2016, which is for deletion of condition No.5(g) of order dated 26.07.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 13724 of 2016 and Special Criminal Application No.3563 of 2017, challenging the order of cancellation of bail by the Sessions Court in exercise of powers under section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C, 1973and issuing of arrest warrant. 8. The date relevant for the purpose of this case is that the FIR came to be registered on 25.04.2016, in connection of which the petitioner came to be arrested on 03.05.2016. The petitioner was remanded to police custody till 11.05.2016 and thereafter, by an order dated 26.07.2016, this Court enlarged the petitioner on conditional bail, the two relevant conditions are reproduced in the preceding paras. As per the condition of bail, the petitioner was required to deposit an amount of Rs. 1,25,03000/- in periodic installments as specified in the order. The petitioner was in breach of condition of bail, as a result of which the State filed an application being Criminal Misc. As per the condition of bail, the petitioner was required to deposit an amount of Rs. 1,25,03000/- in periodic installments as specified in the order. The petitioner was in breach of condition of bail, as a result of which the State filed an application being Criminal Misc. Application No.621 of 2017 before the learned 8th Additional Sessions Judge at Vadodara and the Court vide order dated 08.05.2017 was pleased to cancel the bail and issued arrest warrant. Pursuant to cancellation of bail and issuance of arrest warrant, the petitioner came to be arrested on 22.09.2017, The petitioner filed an application for default bail under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 on 26.12.2017 before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Notice came to be issued and the application was fixed for hearing on 27.12.2017 and on 27.12.2017, the Investigating Agency filed charge-sheet before the Court of learned Magistrate. Thereafter, the hearing of the application was taken up which was finally rejected by the learned Magistrate on 27.12.2017 itself. Against which revision was preferred before the Sessions Court, the Sessions Court which remanded the matter before the learned Magistrate and the learned Magistrate by an order a detailed order, rejected the default bail application by an order dated 06.01.2018 which became the subject matter of challenge before the Sessions Court by filing Criminal Revision Application No.7 of 2018, which came to be rejected by an order dated 09.02.2018. 9. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner's custody is required to be treated only under section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 and that upon the period prescribed under this provision default being committed in filing of the chargesheet, the petitioner cannot be continued to be in custody under section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 In the instant case, it is found that on the application being made for default bail on 26.12.2017, charge-sheet came to be filed on 27.12.2017 and therefore, his continuous detention is illegal and petitioner is required to be released on bail and after the filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner is not treated to be in custody under section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 and his detention has to be treated under section 309 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 and therefore, it cannot be said that continuous detention of the petitioner is illegal detention. 10. 10. The second contention of the petitioner that upon his application for default bail on 26.12.2017, charge-sheet after the period expired on 90 days of his custody, which is to be treated on 22.09.2017, an indefeasible right is created in favour of the petitioner to be enlarged on default bail. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Uday Mohanlal (Supra), wherein, in para-6 of the conclusion, the Apex Court has held as under:- “6. There cannot be any dispute that on expiry of the period indicated in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the accused has to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish the bail. Even though a Magistrate does not possess any jurisdiction to refuse bail when no charge-sheet is filed after expiry of the period stipulated under the proviso to Subsection (2) of Section 167 and even though the accused may be prepared to furnish the bail required, but such furnishing of bail has to be in accordance with the order passed by the Magistrate. In other words, without an order of the Magistrate the legislative mandate engrafted in the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 cannot be given effect to and there lies the rub. The grievance of the accused is that for a variety of reasons the Magistrate or even the superior court would refuse to pass an order releasing the accused on bail, notwithstanding the pre-conditions required under the proviso are satisfied and then when the accused moves the High Court or the Supreme Court during the interregnum the police files a challan. It was also contended by Mr. Tulsi that a Public Prosecutor may take adjournment from the court when the bail application was being moved and then would persuade the investigating agency to file a challan and then contend that the Court would not bail under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167, and in that situation not only the positive command of the Legislature is flouted but also an unauthorised period of custody is being legalized and this would be an infraction of the constitutional provision within the meaning of Article 22. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (supra), two learned Judges of this Court construe the provisions of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with sub-section 4 of Section 20 of TADA. After examining in detail the object behind the enactment of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the object of the Parliament introducing the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 prescribing the outer limit within which the investigation must be completed the court expressed that the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 read with Section 20(4)(b) of TADA creates an indefeasible right in an accused person on account of the default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the maximum period prescribed or extended, as the case may be, to seek an order for his release on bail and such order is generally termed as an “order on default”. The court also held that an obligation is cast upon the court to inform the accused of his right of being released on bail and enable him to make an application in that the accused would be entitled to move an application for being admitted on bail and the designated court shall release him on bail if the accused seeks to be so released and furnishes the requisite bail. The court declined to agree with the contention of the accused that the Magistrate must release the accused on bail on its own motion even without any application from an accused person on his offering to furnish bail.” 11. In the same judgment, the desenting Judge has concluded as under:- 28. It is true that the right of an accused to be released on bail for default in submission of challan is a valuable and indefeasible right, but by the time the court is considering the exercise of the said right if a challan is filed then the question of grant of bail has to be considered only with reference to merits of the case under the provisions of the Code relating to grant of bail after filing of the challan which view is consistent with the view expressed by different Constitution Benches of this Court in several decades in connection with the issuance of writ of habeas corpus as well as for grant of bail. 29. 29. My learned Brother has referred to the expression 'if not already availed of' referred to in the judgment in Sanjay Dutt's case for arriving at conclusion no. 6. According to me, the expression 'availed of does not mean mere filing of application for bail expressing therein willingness of the accused to furnish bail bond. What will happen if on the 61st day an application for bail is filed for being released on bail on the ground of default by not filing the challan by the 60th day and on the 61st day the challan is also filed by the time the Magistrate is called upon to apply his mind to the challan as well as the petition for grant of bail? In view of the several decisions referred to above and the requirements prescribed by clause (a)(ii) of proviso read with Explanation 1 to Section 167(2) of the Code, as no bail bond has been furnished, such an application for bail has to be dismissed because the stage of proviso to Section 167(2) is over, as such right is extinguished the moment challan is filed. 30. In this background, the expression availed of does not mean mere filing of the application for bail expressing thereunder willingness to furnish bail bond, but the stage for actual furnishing of bail bond must reach. If challan is filed before that, then there is no question of enforcing the right, howsoever valuable or indefeasible it may be, after filing of the challan because thereafter the right under default clause cannot be exercised.” 12. The Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt vs. State through CBI, reported in 1994 (2) GLH 257 in conclusion has recorded as under:- “52. We have no doubt that the common stance before us of the nature of indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail by virtue of Section 20(4) (bb) is based on a correct reading of the principle indicated in that decision. The indefeasible right accruing to the accused in such a situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not availed of. The indefeasible right accruing to the accused in such a situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not availed of. Once the challan has been filed, the question of grant of bail has to be considered and decided only with reference to the merits of the case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after the filing of the challan. The custody of the accused after the challan has been filed is not governed by Section 167 but different provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that right had accrud to the accused but it remained unenforced till the filing of the challan, then there is no question of its enforcement thereafter since it is extinguished the moment challan is filled because Section 167 Cr. P.C., 1973 ceases to apply. The Division Bench also indicated that if there be such an application of the accused for release on bail and also a prayer for extension of time to complete the investigation according to the proviso in section 20(4) (bb), both of them should be considered together. It is obvious that no bail can be given of the even in such a case unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In short, the grant of bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the prayer for extension of time, if such a prayer is made. If the accused applies for bail under this provisions on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of return of the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order. “57. It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of return of the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order. “57. As a result of the above discussion, our answers to the three question of law referred for our decision are as under :- (1) In the prosecution for an offence punishable under Section 5 of the TADA Act, the prosecution is required to prove that the accused was in conscious 'possession', 'unauthorisedly', in a 'a notified area' of any arms and ammunition specified in columns 2 and 3 of Category I or Category in (a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962 or bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances. No further nexus with terrorist or disruptive activity is required to be proved by the prosecution in view of the statutory presumption indicated earlier. The accused in his defence is entitled to prove the non existence of a fact constituting any of these ingredients. As apart of his defence, he can prove by adducing evidence, the non-existence of facts constituting the third ingredient as indicated earlier to rebut the statutory presumption. The accused is entitled to prove by adducing evidence, that the purpose of his unauthorised possession of any such arms and ammunition etc. was wholly unrelated to any terrorist or disruptive activity. If the accused succeeds in proving the absence of the said third ingredient, then his mere unauthorised possession of any such arms and ammunition etc. is punishable only under the general law by virtue of Section 12 of the TADA Act and not under Section 5 of the TADA Act. (2) (a) Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires production of the accused before the court in accordance with section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and this is how the requirement of notice to the accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period of 180 days in accordance with the further proviso to clause (bb) of subsection (4) of Section 20 of the TADA Act has to be understood in the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur. The requirement of such notice to the accused before granting the extension for completing the investigation is not a written notice to the accused giving reasons therein. Production of the accused at that time in the court informing him that the question of extension of the period for completing the investigation is being considered, is alone sufficient for the purpose. (2) (b) The 'indefeasible right' of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which ensures to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to-the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing on the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, as governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at the stage. (3) In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh on the meaning and scope of sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the TADA Act as extracted earlier, this question does not require any further elucidation by us. 13. Thereafter, the Apex Court in the case of Dinesh Dalmiya vs. CBI reported in (2007) 8 SCC 770 has held as under:- “37. We had noticed the dicta of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court. 13. Thereafter, the Apex Court in the case of Dinesh Dalmiya vs. CBI reported in (2007) 8 SCC 770 has held as under:- “37. We had noticed the dicta of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court. At this juncture, we may notice the dicta laid down by this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State (II) wherein it was held [SCC page 444, para 53(2)(b)] 53(2)(b) The 'indefeasible right' of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with section 167(2) of the CrPC, 1973 in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which ensures to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the CrPC. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage.” 38. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that it is to be read in its entirety. Construction of a statute should be made in a manner so as to give effect to all the provisions thereof. Remand of an accused is contemplated by the Parliament at two stages; pre-cognizance and post cognizance. Even in the same case depending upon the nature of charge sheet filed by the investigating officer in terms of Section 173 of the Code, a cognizance may be taken as against the person against whom an offence is said to have been made out and against whom no such offence has been made out even when investigation is pending. So long a charge sheet is not filed within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, investigation remains pending. So long a charge sheet is not filed within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, investigation remains pending. It, however, does not preclude an investigating officer, as noticed hereinbefore, to carry on further investigation despite filing of a police report, in terms of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. 39. The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 and further investigation contemplated under Sub-section (8) thereof. Whereas only when a charge sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso appended to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to an offender; once, however, a charge sheet is filed, the said right ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.” 14. The Apex Court in the case of Pragyna Singh Thaku vs. State of Maharastra, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 445 , has held as under:- “49. As far as section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is concerned this Court is of the firm opinion that no case for grant of bail has been made out under the said provision as charge sheet was filed before the expiry of 90 days from 36 the date of first remand. In any event, right in this regard of default bail is lost once charge sheet is filed. This Court finds that there is no violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution, because on being arrested on October 23, 2008, the appellant was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nasik on October 24, 2008 and subsequent detention in custody is pursuant to order of remand by the Court, which orders are not being challenged, apart from the fact that Article 22(2) is not available against a Court i.e. detention pursuant to an order passed by the Court. 54. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The right under section 467(2) of Cr.P.C., 1973 to be released on bail on default if charge sheet is not filed within 90 days from the date of first remand is not an absolute or indefeasible right. 54. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The right under section 467(2) of Cr.P.C., 1973 to be released on bail on default if charge sheet is not filed within 90 days from the date of first remand is not an absolute or indefeasible right. The said right would be lost if charge sheet is filed and would not survive after the filing of the charge sheet. In other words, even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that charge sheet was not filed within 90 days, but before the consideration of the same and before being released on bail, if charge sheet is filed, if the accused is to be released on bail, it can be only on merits. This is quite evident from Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sanjay Dut v. State [paras 48 and 53(2)(b)]. The reasoning is to be found in paras 33 to 49. 55. This principle has been reiterated in the following decisions of this Court : (1) State of M.P. v. Rustam, SCC para 4; (2) Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat, SCC para 4. It may be mentioned that this judgment was delivered by a three Judge Bench of this Court; (3) Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI, SCC para 39; and (4) Mustaq Ahmed Mohammed Isak v. State of Maharashtra, SCC para 12 58. From the discussion made above, it is quite clear that even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that charge sheet was not filed within 90 days, before the consideration of the same and before being released on bail if charge sheet is filed, the said right to be released on bail, can be only on merits. So far as merits are concerned the learned counsel for the appellant has not addressed this Court at all and in fact bail is not claimed on merits in the present appeal at all. “ 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view that the right to default bail crystallized on 26.12.2017 was extinguished upon the filing of charge-sheet on 27.12.2017 and therefore, the petitioner is held not to be entitled to default bail under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C, 1973 and the bail of the petitioner can only be considered on merits. 16. 16. The other reason why the Court is not inclined to consider the case in the facts of this case is that the petitioner had voluntarily invited condition 5(g) on the basis of which discretion was exercised in favour of the petitioner. Nothing is shown on record about the bona-fide attempts made by the petitioner to full-fill such condition nor was an application preferred at relevant point of time to seek extension of period to full-fill the condition nor modified such condition while the petitioner continued to enjoy bail in default. Thereafter, when application for cancellation of bail was filed, the petitioner came out with application to delete condition. It is also pertinent to note that even after the cancellation of bail of the petitioner by an order dated 08.05.2017, the petitioner was not available and came to be re-arrested on the arrest warrant only on 22.09.2017. Therefore, it appears that the petitioner by his conduct dis-entitled himself to get his case considered by the Court for bail till he is able to either comply with the conditions of bail or is able to convince the Court on the basis of situation prevalent to modify such condition. 17. The Court also finds some strength in the argument of the Public Prosecutor that once the Court had enlarged the petitioner on bail by exercising power under section 439 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 and subsequent cancellation of bail in exercise of powers under section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 the petitioner being re-arrested and thereafter, changed his track to claim default bail and upon his release on bail, the period prescribed under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 would become irrelevant and accept the argument of the public prosecutor that upon re-arrest of the petitioner, the time period prescribed under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973 would mean that the petitioner is arrested twice for one offence. This situation is not contemplated under any provisions of Cr.P.C. and therefore, arrest of the petitioner will have to be held as an arrest pursuant to the issuance of arrest warrant and not in connection with investigation of the offence. 18. In the present fact situation, it may amount that the petitioner would be taking advantage of his own wrong, whereby on one hand, condition for bail is invited on the basis of which discretion is exercised and petitioner is enlarged on bail on 26.07.2016. 18. In the present fact situation, it may amount that the petitioner would be taking advantage of his own wrong, whereby on one hand, condition for bail is invited on the basis of which discretion is exercised and petitioner is enlarged on bail on 26.07.2016. Thereafter, noncompliance and breach of such condition and on the face of such noncompliance, claim default bail which is evident from the time period which has lapsed arrest on 08.05.2017, re-arrest on 22.09.2017 and application for default bail filed on 26.12.2017. 19. With the aforesaid reasons, Special Criminal Application No.2176 of 2018 stands rejected. Rule is discharged. 20. In view of the aforesaid, Special Criminal Application No.3563 of 2017 stand disposed of.