JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally, at the stage of admission itself, by consent of Mr. Godbole, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners, and Mr. Sale, learned counsel for the Respondents. 2. By this Petition, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioners are challenging the order dated 19th September 2016 passed by the Ad-Hoc District Judge-1, Sangli, thereby allowing the Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.139 of 2015, filed by the Respondents herein against the order of interim injunction passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli, on 28th August 2015 below “Exhibit-5” in Special Civil Suit No.102 of 2012. 3. The gist of the facts, giving rise to the present Writ Petition, can be stated, in brief, as follows :- Petitioners herein are the Original Defendants and cousin brothers of the Respondents. One 'Sadashiv' was the common ancestor, who had two sons by name 'Vishnu' and 'Venkatesh'. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are the legal heirs of 'Vishnu'; whereas, Respondents are the legal heirs of 'Venkatesh'. The suit properties, bearing Survey No.504, admeasuring 3 H 78 R and Survey No.503, admeasuring 4 H 5 R, situate at Village and Taluka Jat, District Sangli, were owned by Sadashiv. 4. Respondents herein filed a Suit claiming inter alia that, since the death of Sadashiv, they are in possession and cultivation of the suit land since the year 1965, to the knowledge of all other legal heirs, including Respondents. Their names were also mutated in the 'Record of Rights' of the said lands. As the land owned by the 'Friends' Association, Jath' is adjacent to the suit lands, this 'Friends' Association, Jath' started claiming 'right of way' from the suit lands and, therefore, the Respondents filed Regular Civil Suit No.57 of 1988 against the said Association. In that Suit, the evidence of Petitioner No.2-Govind was recorded and in his evidence, he has also accepted the fact that, the suit lands are in cultivation and possession of the Respondents herein and he is not cultivating the same. Thus, according to the Respondents, to the knowledge of the Petitioners, they were and are in possession and cultivation of the suit lands. Thus, according to the Respondents, to the knowledge of the Petitioners, they were and are in possession and cultivation of the suit lands. Despite that, when Respondent No.1 started converting the said land to the 'non-agricultural' purpose, the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 filed a Suit for injunction, bearing Special Civil Suit No.120 of 1995 against the Respondents and in that Suit, the 'Compromise Decree' was arrived at on 12th June 1997. 5. In the said 'Compromise Decree', it was accepted by the parties that, the suit lands are the joint family properties and yet to be partitioned by metes and bounds. It was further admitted in the said 'Compromise Decree' that, Survey No.504, with the entire area of 3 H 78 R, is in possession of the Petitioners and is given to their separate share; whereas, Survey No.503 was given to the share of the Respondents. Accordingly, the mutation entries were also made in the 'Record of Rights'. 6. According to the Petitioners, based on this 'Compromise Decree', Respondent No.1 got the land bearing Survey No.503 converted from 'agricultural' to 'non-agricultural' use, under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, by applying to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Miraj Division. As per the said compromise, since Survey No.504 came to the share of Petitioner Nos.1 and 2, they executed a registered Sale Deed of the said land in favour of Petitioner Nos.3 to 9 for valuable consideration on 30th August 2010, after issuing a public notice on 28th July 2010. On the basis of this Sale Deed, the names of Petitioner Nos.3 to 9 came to be entered into 'Record of Rights' of the said land. As Respondent Nos.1 to 3 objected to the said mutation entry, the Disputed Case bearing No.120 of 2011 was registered before the Circle Officer, Jath, which came to be decided in favour of the Petitioners on 22nd March 2011. Aggrieved by the said order, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 preferred R.T.S. Appeal No.150 of 2011, which came to be dismissed on 9th January 2012, thereby confirming the order passed by the Circle Officer, Jath. 7. Aggrieved by the said order, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 preferred R.T.S. Appeal No.150 of 2011, which came to be dismissed on 9th January 2012, thereby confirming the order passed by the Circle Officer, Jath. 7. In spite of all these facts, as per the case of the Petitioners, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 filed Special Civil Suit No.102 of 2012 against them for a declaration that, they are the exclusive owners and in possession of the suit land bearing Survey No.504 and for further declaration that the Sale Deed dated 30th August 2010 executed by Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 in favour of Petitioner Nos.3 to 9 is illegal and not binding on their share. Further, by relying on certain Agreement of Sale dated 20th October 2003, allegedly executed by Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the Respondents, the Respondents have also claimed specific performance of the said Agreement and for further declaration that, they have become owners of the suit land by adverse possession and for permanent injunction. Along with the Suit, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 have filed an application for interim injunction at “Exhibit-5”, restraining Petitioner Nos.3 to 9 from disturbing their alleged possession over the suit land. 8. This Suit and application for interim injunction came to be resisted by the Petitioners herein contending, inter alia, that, they are in lawful possession of the suit land since prior to the 'Compromise Decree' passed on 12th June 1997 and Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were never in possession thereof. It was also contended that, the alleged Agreement of Sale, on which the Respondents have placed reliance, was never executed, nor the original Agreement was produced by the Respondents before the Trial Court. Further it was submitted that, on the date of the alleged Agreement, Respondent No.1 was in the hospital and Respondent No.2 was on duty; hence, there is no question of executing such an Agreement of Sale. 9. The Trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for both the parties, was pleased to reject the Respondents' application for interim injunction holding that, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 have failed to prove their possession over the suit land, in view of the 'Compromise Decree' arrived at between the parties earlier and the execution of alleged Agreement of Sale dated 20th October 2003 is yet to be proved on record as legal and valid. 10. 10. Against this order, when the Respondents approached the Appellate Court by filing Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.139 of 2015, the Appellate Court reversed the order of the Trial Court and by relying on the alleged 'Agreement of Sale', held that, the Respondents are in lawful possession of the suit land and the 'Compromise Decree' was never acted upon, nor it was executed or engrossed on the requisite stamp-paper. The Appellate Court, thus, allowed the Respondents' application for interim injunction and thereby restrained the present Petitioner Nos.3 to 9 from causing obstruction to the possession of the Respondents over the suit property. 11. While challenging this order of the Appellate Court, the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners is that, the Appellate Court has clearly exceeded the scope of the jurisdiction vested in it. It is urged that, the order passed by the Trial Court below “Exhibit-5” was a discretionary order of interim injunction and it was supported with valid reasons and the material on record. In such circumstances, it was not at all proper or legal on the part of the Appellate Court to substitute its own discretion in the place of the discretion exercised by the Trial Court and, that too, on some untenable pleas, like the 'pre-emtion right'. Such right of pre-emtion was not at all averred, pleaded or claimed by any of the parties. It is submitted thus that, the order of the Appellate Court cannot be sustainable in law, as it is against the material on record and hence, it needs to be quashed and set aside. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondents have supported the said order by submitting that, when the Trial Court has not exercised the discretion vested in it properly, the Appellate Court was justified in setting aside the impugned order of the Trial Court. It is pointed out that, the order of the Appellate Court is also well reasoned and hence, in writ jurisdiction, this Court should restrain itself from interfering with the impugned order passed by the Appellate Court. 13. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and on perusal of material on record, this Court finds that, there is much substance in the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the Respondents. 13. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and on perusal of material on record, this Court finds that, there is much substance in the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the Respondents. Admittedly, the suit properties were the ancestral joint family properties of the grand-father of Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 and Respondents viz. 'Sadashiv'. In the Suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No.120 of 1995, which was filed by Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 against Respondent No.1-Shashikant, the compromise was arrived at between the parties and as per the said 'Compromise Decree', Survey No.503 was allotted to the share of the Respondents, as Respondent No.1-Shashikant was already intending to convert the said land to 'non-agricultural' use; whereas, Survey No.504 was allotted to the share of Petitioner Nos.1 and 2. The written statement filed by the Respondents therein is of importance as it was stated therein that, the partition has already been effected between the Petitioners and the Respondents long back and since the partition, for about last 20 years, both of them are cultivating the lands allotted to their share separately. However, the names of the Original Plaintiff - Shashikant and Original Defendant - Vinayak remained in the 'Record of Rights' and it was corrected by Mutation Entry No.2419. Accordingly, Survey No.503 was allotted exclusively to the share of the Original Plaintiff - Shashikant; whereas, entire Survey No.504 was allotted to the share of the Original Defendant-Vinayak. Thus, in that Suit, it is apparent that the Respondents herein had accepted the exclusive ownership and possession of the Petitioners' in the land bearing Survey No.504 and hence, now the Respondents cannot say that they are in possession of the said land. 14. As regards the contention of the Respondents that, the 'Compromise Decree' passed in Regular Civil Suit No.120 of 1995 was never acted upon, the Trial Court has rightly dealt with this aspect also, by referring to the 'Release Deed', which was executed in pursuance of the 'Compromise Decree' in respect of 13 R portion of the land, out of Survey No.503, in favour of the Respondents. The affidavit to that effect is also filed on 12th April 1999 in that Suit. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the said 'Compromise Decree' was never executed or acted upon. 15. The affidavit to that effect is also filed on 12th April 1999 in that Suit. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the said 'Compromise Decree' was never executed or acted upon. 15. The Appellate Court has, however, unnecessarily entered into the aspect as to whether the final decree application was filed and whether the decree was executed on the proper stamp-paper. For the purpose of deciding the application for interim injunction, the Court has to see prima facie case only, that too, on the aspect of possession only. In view of the averments made by the Respondents in the written statement filed to the Regular Civil Suit No.120 of 1995 and in view of the 'Compromise Decree', which was arrived at between the parties; as a result of which, Survey No.504 was allotted to the share of the present Petitioners, Respondents had failed to prove their possession over the suit land. Prima facie, this 'Compromise Decree' was more than sufficient, as held by the Trial Court, to hold that the Respondents-Plaintiffs have failed to prove their possession over the suit land. 16. Respondents have then relied upon one alleged Agreement dated 20th October 2003, under which the Petitioners gave up their possession over the suit land bearing Survey No.504. However, the very execution of the Agreement is challenged by the Petitioners, mainly on the ground that, on the date of the Agreement dated 20th October 2003, Petitioner No.1-Vinayak was admitted in the hospital at Belgaon for heart surgery. He was discharged from the hospital only on 21st October 2003. It is also shown that, on 20th October 2003, Petitioner No.2-Govind Vishnu Khasnis was on duty as 'Clerk' in the Office of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. Documents to that effect are also produced on record. Moreover, Original Agreement dated 20th October 2003 is not produced on record. It is also not explained in which circumstances, such Agreement came to be executed. The Agreement is also not executed on proper stamp-paper. In such situation, the execution of the said Agreement needs to be proved and till then, the Respondents cannot rely thereupon to substantiate their case that the possession of Survey No.504 was handed over to them by Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 in the year 2003 on the basis of the said Agreement. 17. In such situation, the execution of the said Agreement needs to be proved and till then, the Respondents cannot rely thereupon to substantiate their case that the possession of Survey No.504 was handed over to them by Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 in the year 2003 on the basis of the said Agreement. 17. It is pertinent to note that, the 'Compromise Deed' passed in Regular Civil Suit No.120 of 1995 is not challenged by the Respondents. On the basis of the said 'Compromise Deed', the names of the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were also entered into the 'Record of Rights' by Mutation Entry No.9419. Thereafter, they have executed the registered Sale Deed on 30th August 2010 in favour of Petitioner Nos.3 to 9. In view of that Sale Deed, the Mutation Entry No.16496 is also carried out. The Respondents have challenged the said mutation entry by preferring Complaint Application No.120 of 2011. However, the said application was rejected and that mutation entry was confirmed on 20th March 2011. Respondents have preferred R.T.S. Appeal No.150 of 2011 against the said order, but it was also dismissed. Thereafter, they had preferred R.T.S. Appeal No.53 of 2012 and it also came to be dismissed, confirming the Mutation Entry No.16496. 18. Thus, the documentary evidence produced on record in this case clearly goes to show that, since beginning, it is the Petitioners who were in possession of the land bearing Survey No.504. Their possession was confirmed by virtue of the 'Compromise Decree' arrived at between the parties in Regular Civil Suit No.120 of 1995. Accordingly, the mutation entries were made in the Revenue Record and in such situation, there is no substance in the contention of the Respondents that, the 'Compromise Decree' was not acted upon, or, subsequently, any Agreement was executed by the Petitioners giving up their possession in respect of Survey No.504, execution of such Agreement is yet to be proved. 19. It is also pertinent to note that, the Respondents themselves have, by acting upon the 'Compromise Decree', got the land, bearing Survey No.503 allotted to their share, converted to 'non-agricultural' use. They have made plots therein and sold those plots. The construction is also carried out thereon by the purchasers. Hence, absolutely no case is made out by the Respondents to contend that the 'Compromise Decree' was not acted upon. 20. They have made plots therein and sold those plots. The construction is also carried out thereon by the purchasers. Hence, absolutely no case is made out by the Respondents to contend that the 'Compromise Decree' was not acted upon. 20. Significantly, the Trial Court has considered all these factual aspects in their proper perspective and then rejected the Respondents' application for interim injunction. The Appellate Court has, however, reversed the said order and, that too, adverting to some new case like 'pre-emtion right', which was never advanced either before the Trial Court or before the Appellate Court and for that matter even before this Court also. The Appellate Court has, thus, unnecessarily disturbed and set aside the well reasoned order passed by the Trial Court, which was also based on the material on record and acted beyond its jurisdiction. 21. Thus, when the view taken by the Trial Court was the possible view of the matter, based on the material produced before it, the Appellate Court has committed a jurisdictional error in substituting its own discretion in the place of the discretion exercised by the Trial Court. The law is fairly well settled that, the Appellate Court should not interfere in the discretionary order passed by the Trial Court in respect of interim injunction, unless it comes to the conclusion that the order is vitiated by the error apparent or there is perversity and it can result into manifest injustice. 22. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited Vs. S.L. Vaswani & Anr., 2010 (2) ALL MR 427, “The Appellate Court should be loath to interfere in the discretionary order of the Trial Court, simply because, on a de novo consideration of the matter, it is possible for the Appellate Court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity”. 23. One can also place reliance on the landmark decision of the Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (supp.) SCC 727, wherein the Apex Court has reiterated that, this Court should restrain itself from interfering in the discretion exercised by the Trial Court, merely because the Appellate Court may arrive at a different view. For ready reference, paragraph No.14 of the said Judgment can be reproduced as follows :- "14. vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (supp.) SCC 727, wherein the Apex Court has reiterated that, this Court should restrain itself from interfering in the discretion exercised by the Trial Court, merely because the Appellate Court may arrive at a different view. For ready reference, paragraph No.14 of the said Judgment can be reproduced as follows :- "14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely, or, where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not re-assess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below, if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. The Appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage, it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view, may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion." 24. In the instant case, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Court substituting its own view, which is also not supported by the material on record, in place of the view taken by the Trial Court, which appears to be the reasonable and most possible view of the matter, needs to be quashed and set aside. 25. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order passed by the Appellate Court is set aside and the order passed by the Trial Court below “Exhibit-5” is restored. 26. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. 27. It is made clear that, whatever observations made here-in-above are only for the purpose of deciding this Petition and the Trial Court is not to be influenced by them at the time of final hearing of the Suit. 28. 26. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. 27. It is made clear that, whatever observations made here-in-above are only for the purpose of deciding this Petition and the Trial Court is not to be influenced by them at the time of final hearing of the Suit. 28. At this stage, learned counsel for the Respondents, requests this Court to stay the order passed by this Court for a period of eight weeks. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that, he has no objection to stay the order for a period of three weeks. However, in order to enable the Respondents to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the order of this Court is stayed for a period of six weeks from today.