JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. The primary and unexpendable elements of any procedure, for dealing with grievance and disciplinary issues in any organisation, private or public, are that they be rational and certain, that the basis of any such action is rooted in equity and fair play, that the range of penalties that can be imposed is well defined and that an internal appeal mechanism is available. 2. The guiding fundamentals for any employer, while initiating and pursuing disciplinary process for misconduct by an employee, are fairness and good faith, though there is no precise definition for these. The two components of fairness, that courts generally judge such a process by, are substantive and procedural fairness. The substantive fairness criterion is essentially that the outcome of the disciplinary process must be dispassionate and reasonable, while weighed against the misconduct charged and the requirement of procedural fairness would mandate that such proceedings should comply with the inviolable imperatives of natural justice. 3. The facts narrated in this writ petition call upon us to consider whether the process employed by the employer/management, against a delinquent officer, adheres to the above requisites of substantive and procedural fairness. 4. The particular facts involved in this case require a look in some detail and we, therefore, cull out the most essential of them, from the large amount of pleadings available on record, as below. 5. Shri Manuel, the respondent in this Original Petition, while working as Section Officer (which post was later redesignated as Asst. Audit Officer), under the services of the Accountant General (Audit) Kerala, was dismissed from service on the allegation that he had participated in an unlawful demonstration/strike and that he had assaulted and attacked a person by name Shri Praveen, a Group D staff of the office of the Accountant General (A&E). 6. The respondent challenged the order terminating him by filing O.A. 157 of 2010 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal” in short) and the learned Tribunal found in his favour. He was directed to be reinstated in service, after the proceedings against him were quashed by the Tribunal. The petitioners herein, who are the Union of India and its functionaries, including the Comptroller and Audit General of India, has filed this Original Petition calling into question the correctness and validity of the order of the learned Tribunal. 7. He was directed to be reinstated in service, after the proceedings against him were quashed by the Tribunal. The petitioners herein, who are the Union of India and its functionaries, including the Comptroller and Audit General of India, has filed this Original Petition calling into question the correctness and validity of the order of the learned Tribunal. 7. While the first respondent was working as a Section Officer, as stated above, he was served with a Memo dated 21.03.2007 to offer an explanation as to why he attacked and manhandled the aforementioned Shri Praveen on 30.11.2006 at about 6.15 p.m. To this Memo, the respondent gave Annexure A2 reply dated 27.03.2007 denying the same. This was followed by Annexure A3 memo dated 27.04.2007, wherein it was alleged that the respondent had committed serious misconduct in violation of Rule 31, Sub Clauses 2 and 3 and Rule 7 of the CCS (Conduct )Rules 1964. The cause, which led to this imputation, appears to be that he had participated in a demonstration/strike in his office during the period from 19.12.2006 to 22.12.2006 in connection with the suspension of a certain Shri Santhosh Kumar, who was the Sr. Accountant of the office of the Accountant General (A&E) Thiruvananthapuram. The respondent submitted a reply to this Memo through Annexure A4 dated 07.05.2007 again denying all the allegations. This was followed by a charge memo, dated 30.07.2007, being issued by the competent Authority against the respondent informing him about the enquiry proposed against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The said Memo has been appended to the proceedings as AnnexureA5, which also contained a statement of imputations. 8. The Statement of imputations against the respondent had five charges; all of them pertaining to the allegations the respondent had participated in the demonstration illegally and that he had attacked the aforementioned Shri Praveen on 30.11.2006. The respondent, on receiving this charge memo, made his explication dated 29.09.2008 denying all charges. It transpires that after the respondent had made his explanation denying the charges, the Authorities had conducted a preliminary inquiry wherein the statements of three persons were recorded. On the basis of the report of the preliminary inquiry, the competent disciplinary Authority initiated disciplinary enquiry, under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, by appointing an Enquiry officer. It transpires that after the respondent had made his explanation denying the charges, the Authorities had conducted a preliminary inquiry wherein the statements of three persons were recorded. On the basis of the report of the preliminary inquiry, the competent disciplinary Authority initiated disciplinary enquiry, under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, by appointing an Enquiry officer. The Enquiry officer, after examining the persons who had given statements in the preliminary inquiry, made his report dated 29.09.2008 before the Disciplinary Authority. The said Authority thereafter, issued Annexure A9 order, dated 05.03.2009, imposing the punishment of dismissal from service against the respondent. The respondent thereupon filed a statutory appeal under Rule 27 of the CCS(Conduct)Rules, which led to the appellate order being issued by the Appellate Authority, dated 23.10.2009. This order has been produced on record as Annexure A11. 9. The respondent challenged Annexures-A9 and A11 orders, whereby he was terminated from the service, on various grounds by filing the O.A. before the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal found that the action initiated by the Disciplinary Authority and finally concluded through the orders of the Appellate Authority was lacking in forensic support and that it violated the principles of natural justice and, therefore quashed the proceedings, consequentially directing the petitioners herein to re-instate the respondent with all applicable benefits. It is this order which is impugned by the petitioners before us. 10. We have heard the learned Sr. Counsel Shri V.V. Asokan, assisted by Shri Abhilash Vishnu, appearing for the petitioners and the learned Sr. Counsel, Shri T.A. Shaji, assisted by Shri Vincent Diadose, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 11. On a reading of the order of the learned Tribunal, we find that it had entered in to the conclusions against the validity of the enquiry proceedings essentially because it found that the petitioners herein and the competent Disciplinary Authority had not let in the best evidence available to implicate the respondent. Even though the graver allegation against the respondent is that he had assaulted and kicked a certain Shri Praveen, the Tribunal found that the Authorities had refused or failed to offer the said Praveen as a witness in the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer. The learned Tribunal, therefore, concluded that in the absence of the best evidence, the allegations of assault could not have been found to have been proved against the respondent. 12. The learned Tribunal, therefore, concluded that in the absence of the best evidence, the allegations of assault could not have been found to have been proved against the respondent. 12. The Tribunal also observed that even though the complaint of Praveen, alleging assault at the hands of the respondent was dated 01.12.2006, the said complaint had reached the office of the Accountant General only on 09.03.2007 and inferentially concluded that this delay, which had not been properly explained, would invite serious suspicion regarding its legitimacy. To add to this, the learned Tribunal noticed that the three witnesses, who were examined before the Enquiry Officer as P.W.Nos.1, 2 and 3 were persons who had no direct information about the allegations or events stated against the respondent and, therefore, that their evidence can only be, at the best, seen to be hearsay and untested. One of the reasons why the Tribunal found in favour of the respondent was that the original report of P.W.1, who is the Assistant Care Taker in the office of the Accountant General, who had initially reported about the alleged demonstrations in which the respondent had participated, had not been properly marked through a witness, but that it was presented before the Enquiry Officer by the Presenting Officer directly. The learned Tribunal, on such mentation, concluded that there was no evidence of the participation of the respondent in the demonstration from 19th to 22nd December 2006. 13. To add support to this conclusion, the learned Tribunal also relied on Exts.D2 and D3 documents, produced on the side of the respondent. As per Ext.D2, which were bills of Travelling allowance claimed by the respondent, he alleged that he was not in his office on 21.12.2006 but that he had gone to the District Police Office, Thiruvananthapuram, enroute to Kannur, on 21.12.2006. He showed the learned Tribunal that these bills were sanctioned by the competent Authority, thus indicating that he had actually so travelled. As far as the document marked as Ext.D3 is concerned, that is a tour diary ending 23.12.2006, counter signed by the Supervising Officer of the Audit Party, it was produced by the respondent to demonstrate that he was, in fact, travelling along with the Audit party from Thiruvananthapuram to Kannur. As far as the document marked as Ext.D3 is concerned, that is a tour diary ending 23.12.2006, counter signed by the Supervising Officer of the Audit Party, it was produced by the respondent to demonstrate that he was, in fact, travelling along with the Audit party from Thiruvananthapuram to Kannur. Finally, the learned Tribunal concluded accusation ally that even though 22 grounds were raised in the appeal filed by the respondent, the Appellate Authority did not care to consider them in detail and that this was in violation of Rule 27 of the CCS(CCA)Rules. The learned Tribunal incidentally also entered into a finding that the participation in a demonstration/strike per se will not amount to an act of misconduct on the side of the delinquent. 14. Before the Tribunal, the petitioners herein, sought to counter each of the allegations, made by the respondent and found in his favour by the learned Tribunal as stated above, by explaining that P.W1, 2 and 3 were all persons who had participated in the preliminary inquiry and whose statements were, in fact, were recorded in such proceedings and that they had direct knowledge of the allegations made against the respondent. 15. Shri V.V. Asokan, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioners, began his submissions contending that, as per the Govt. of India decisions relating to Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, it is not necessary that every witness presented before the Enquiry Authority in a disciplinary proceedings be examined in chief but that their statements recorded in the preliminary inquiry can be put forth in lieu of such chief examination. The learned Sr. Counsel refers particularly to the decision No.23(2) taken by the Govt. of India under the aegis of Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, to which we will advert to in greater detail later, and contends that it is legally permissible and is in accordance with the principles of natural justice to take and accept on record the statements made by witnesses during the preliminary inquiry/investigation, if such statements are admitted by the witness on it being read out to him. The learned Sr. The learned Sr. counsel submits that once such statement, recorded by a witness in a preliminary enquiry, is placed on record through such witness, it is always available to the delinquent to cross examine such witness to test the validity and credibility of the statement given by him in the preliminary inquiry. The learned Sr. Counsel further asserts that the respondent had not effectively cross examined any of these witnesses presumably because he had also nothing against the statements that were recorded from them in the preliminary inquiry. He further contends that strict rules of evidence cannot be applied and called in, as far as disciplinary enquiry and proceedings are concerned and he relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Railway Board, New Delhi vs. Niranjan Singh [ AIR 1969 SC 966 ] and Radhey Shyam Sharma vs. Post Master General, Central Circle, Nagpur [ AIR 1965 SC 311 ]. 16. Presumably by way of abundant caution, Shri Asokan also relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL vs. B. Karunakar [ 1993(4) SCC 727 = AIR 1994 SC 1074 ]to make an alternate contention that even assuming that there were defects noticed in the enquiry proceedings, the courts or Tribunal are not justified in setting aside the same but in only remitting or remanding the matter to the lower Authority for fresh proceedings and consideration. 17. As regards the contention of the respondent that the Disciplinary Authority had not offered sufficient reason in Annexure. A11 order, the learned Sr. Counsel submits that such a course is warranted only when the said Authority defers with the findings of the Enquiry Authority and that since in this case the report of the Enquiry Authority was completely accepted by the Disciplinary Authority, it was immaterial whether detailed reasons are stated in Annexure A9 order, since it has to be taken that every reason that went through the mind of the Enquiry officer was given an imprimatur by the Disciplinary Authority. 18. Shri T.A.Shaji, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the respondent submits in tune with the contentions of the respondent that we have already recorded above in the earlier paragraphs and supports the impugned order of the learned Tribunal as being validly given and supported by cogent reasons. 18. Shri T.A.Shaji, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the respondent submits in tune with the contentions of the respondent that we have already recorded above in the earlier paragraphs and supports the impugned order of the learned Tribunal as being validly given and supported by cogent reasons. According to him, the proceedings on record would make it ineludable that none of the allegations made against the respondent has been proved in any manner whatsoever and he says that this is a case where there is no evidence at all, thus justifying the order of the learned Tribunal in setting aside the disciplinary action and ordering reinstatement of the respondent. 19. We have intently considered the submissions made by both the learned Sr. Counsel as above. We are afraid that we are not in a position to completely confirm to the holdings and conclusions of the learned Tribunal or to find that the respondent should be seen to be completely exonerated of the charges levelled against him. We are, for the reasons, as we will state presently, guided to think that, at best, the respondent may have a case warranting benefit of doubt and nothing more and nothing less. 20. As we have already seen above, there are two primary allegations against the respondent; that he participated in an illegal Dharna during the period from 19.12.2006 to 22.12.2006 and that on 30.11.2006 he had assaulted and attacked the aforementioned Shri Praveen. 21. As regards the first charge, the evidence on record are the statements of P.W 1 and P.W.3, who are the Assistant Care taker of the Accountant General's Office and the Senior Accountant of the said section. Though these witnesses are seen to be asserting that there was a demonstration/strike in the office on those days and that the respondent had participated in the same, we have to take cognizance of the fact that the defence has brought on record two documents, namely D2 and D3, to show and demonstrate that he was not in the office at the relevant time and that he was, in fact, in the office of the District Police Chief, at least on 21.11.2006, enroute from Thiruvananthapuram to Kannur along with the audit party. Inspite of this, the enquiry officer, as we can see from Annexure A6, has concluded rather peremptorily that even though the respondent may have signed the attendance register in the District Police Chief's office, there is no guarantee that he was not present in his office at the time when the demonstration took place. We must say that this line of reasoning is founded on surmises and conjectures rather than on a logical explication. We are therefore, not in a position to completely accede to the finding of the learned Tribunal, that the respondent had participated in an illegal Dharna/Demonstration/strike in the office of the Accountant General on the days mentioned in the charge sheet, as having been proved completely beyond doubt. We are even guided to go to the extent of thinking that these charges have perhaps not been proved cogently. 22. That being said, however, when it comes to the question of the charge relating to the assault and attack on Sri Praveen, it is relevant that at least one of the witnesses among the three, namely, P.W.2, who is Group D employee in the office, had given a statement in the preliminary enquiry that he actually saw the respondent lunging on to Shri Praveen and kicking him. This statement was placed in the enquiry by the presenting officer and put to P.W.2 for his validation. The statement was, as per the proceedings recorded, read over in full and the witness confirmed in the enquiry that it was indeed his statement and that it was accurately recorded. This procedure was adopted by the Enquiry Officer, as is confirmed by the learned Senior Counsel Sri.V.V.Asokan, in terms of the decision No.(23)2 of the Government of India recorded under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, which reads as under: “2. On considering the observations made by the Supreme Court in certain cases, it may be legally permissible and in accord with the principles of natural justice to take on record the statements made by witnesses during the preliminary inquiry/investigation at oral inquiries, if the statement is admitted by the witness on its being read out to him. It is felt that by adopting this procedure, it should be possible to reduce the time taken in conducting departmental inquiries. It is felt that by adopting this procedure, it should be possible to reduce the time taken in conducting departmental inquiries. It has, therefore, been decided that in future, instead of recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses de novo, wherever it is possible, the statement of a witness already recorded at the preliminary inquiry/investigation may be read out to him at the oral inquiry and if it is admitted by him, the cross examination of the witness may commence thereafter straightaway. A copy of the said statement should, however, be made available to the delinquent officer sufficiently in advance, i.e., at least three days before the date on which it is to come up at the inquiry.” 23. The procedural stipulation in the afore-extracted Rule is explicit that the statement of a witness, already recorded in the preliminary inquiry/investigation, can be accepted in the disciplinary proceedings, if, on such statement being read out to the witness, he admits its contents, thus paving way for his cross-examination immediately thereafter. In the present case, we notice that this is what exactly the Enquiry Officer has done, since the statement of PW2 is recorded in the proceedings to have been read over to him in its full text and the said witness has affirmed the truth of its contents, even during the disciplinary enquiry. Once that was done, it was only proper that the respondent cross examined the witness to disprove the contents of the said document. 24. However, what the respondent did during the disciplinary enquiry is slightly baffling. He chose not to effectively cross examine P.W.2 with respect to the contents of the statement given by him in the preliminary inquiry, which was marked as Exhibit A8 in the disciplinary enquiry, and the only question that was put to him was to the effect that after more than seven months had elapsed from the time he gave such a statement in the preliminary inquiry, would it be possible for the witness to say that what he earlier said in the preliminary inquiry was true. To this specific question, P.W.2 answered affirmatively that what was recorded in the said statement was what he had said in the preliminary inquiry. Pertinently, after such an answer was invited and recorded in the proceedings, the respondent chose not to make any further question on the contents of the said exhibit. To this specific question, P.W.2 answered affirmatively that what was recorded in the said statement was what he had said in the preliminary inquiry. Pertinently, after such an answer was invited and recorded in the proceedings, the respondent chose not to make any further question on the contents of the said exhibit. Since P.W.2 had stated in the preliminary inquiry that he actually saw the respondent attacking Shri Praveen and since the respondent did not chose to cross examine him on the validity or credibility of that statement, it can only lead to an inference that the statement of P.W.2 remains unchallenged and unimpeached even after the cross examination. 25. We are aware that Shri T.A. Shaji, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent has a specific submission that it was not necessary for his client to attempt to impeach the statement of P.W2 because, according to him, that statement had not been properly marked in evidence. He says that if the presenting officer wanted that statement to be part of evidence, he should have asked P.W.2 specifically whether the contents of the same were true or otherwise. As per him, since no such question was asked or recorded in the proceedings, it was impermissible for the statement of P.W.2 in the preliminary inquiry to have been accepted or relied upon by the Enquiry Authority or by the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities to find guilt against his client. Even though we notice this submission, we must say straightway that it does not find favour with us because the said statement of P.W.2, produced on record as Ext.R(b) along with the counter affidavit filed by the respondent, expressly records that the said statement was read over to P.W.2 and “accepted fully by him”. This can only lead to the conclusion that P.W. 2 affirmed the contents of Ext.R(b) as being true. That being so, the said statement would construe the character of a chief examination and going by the decision of the Govt. of India under Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA)Rules afore extracted, we cannot find fault with the Enquiry Officer for having accepted it as the testimony of the witness in chief examination. Once that statement was accepted as the chief examination, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have cross examined the witness sufficiently with respect to the contents of the said statement. Once that statement was accepted as the chief examination, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have cross examined the witness sufficiently with respect to the contents of the said statement. In the absence of such an examination, we can only hold and conclude that the respondent also admits the credibility and truth of the statements contained in exhibit R(b) statement. 26. Shri T.A. Shaji, the learned Senior counsel vehemently impels a further contention, in justification of the order of the Learned Tribunal impugned herein, that since Shri Praveen was not examined even though he was admittedly available in service, the whole proceedings should be seen to have been vitiated. He relies, for this contention, on the judgment of this Court in Cochin Port Trust vs. R. Krishnamoorthy [ 2017 (3) KHC 446 ]. We are certainly in acceptance of the holdings and findings in the judgment referred to and we respectfully are in affirmation of the same. However, in the facts of this case, the respondent would not obtain any benefit, even if reliance is placed on this judgment because even though shri Praveen was not examined, the fact remains that the evidence of P.W.2, who is an eye witness to the incident, was available. This statement of P.W.2 and his evidence remained unchallenged and unimpeached by the respondent, even though sufficient opportunity was given to him. The refusal to do so can, in our opinion, only mean and compel an inference that he had subscribed to the contents of the statement of P.W2, without there being anything to be cross examined upon. In effect, this becomes a case where the respondent himself admits to the said incident and therefore, the presence or absence of Shri Praveen as a witness in this case would be of no consequence what so ever. 27. The compendium of our observatios as above would lead us to the inescapable conclusion that, as regards the charge that the respondent had participated in a Dharna/Demonstration/Strike on the days mentioned in the charge sheet, he would certainly be entitled to the benefit of doubt. However, as regards the charge of assault on Praveen, he would have to be found guilty as alleged against him. 28. However, as regards the charge of assault on Praveen, he would have to be found guilty as alleged against him. 28. Once we so conclude, the only remaining and surviving issue before us would be as to whether the punishment now imposed against the respondent through Annexure A9 and confirmed through Annexure A11 orders would pass muster on judicial scrutiny. We are certainly aware that while we act in judicial review of administrative action, we are constrained not to act like an appellate jurisdiction and that our endeavor should be limited to assess whether the punishment, which is imposed, is so outrageous in its defiance of logic, that no sensible person would have made that decision (borrowing the famous words of Lord Diplock). 29. We notice that the punishment imposed against the respondent in this case is the maximum that could have been imposed against him. He has been sent out of service and, as has been stated by his learned counsel, he has remained outside for all these years. Even assuming that the allegations have been proved against the respondent, should it have invited a different punishment rather than what is imposed now is the sole surviving question before us, since the punishment now imposed, as we have already said, is of the highest level. We are not saying that the assault by the respondent on Shri Praveen is something that can be taken lightly. It is a matter of grave concern and it goes against the imperatives of discipline, which is warranted to be maintained in an office, especially of the nature of the Accountant General. We cannot think that the overt act, which is now alleged and proved against the respondent, would merit a punishment which is not severe. He certainly is deserving of a major punishment, one which is exemplary, so that it will act as a deterrent to others who would think twice before indulging in such actions in future. The punishment of dismissal was imposed upon the respondent w.e.f. 05.03.2009 and we are told that he has continued to be out of service as of now. He certainly is deserving of a major punishment, one which is exemplary, so that it will act as a deterrent to others who would think twice before indulging in such actions in future. The punishment of dismissal was imposed upon the respondent w.e.f. 05.03.2009 and we are told that he has continued to be out of service as of now. We are of the view, taking into account of the totality of all the facts and circumstances, as we have noticed above, that the period during which he has remained outside the service would be sufficient punishment for him and that we can show him some lenity and latitude by ordering reinstatement, but without any backwages. According to us, this would serve the purpose of sufficiently imposing a punishment upon him, while at the same time giving him the benefit of doubt, at least, with respect to the first charge; even though we are certain that the second charge viz., that of assault, stands proved against him. 30. Once we thus direct reinstatement of the respondent without any backwages, we are enjoined to say why we have ordered so and why we have denied him all the benefits of backwages. This is because, we are of the view that he should be given a punishment that would serve the requirements of discipline and deterrence, but giving him the benefit of returning back to service, thus redeeming his prestige and his reputation to some extent. Further we are choosing not to grant any backwages also because we are told by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that immediately after he was sent out of service, the respondent has been employed as an Addl. Private Secretary to various political functionaries, including Ministers and Opposition Leaders. Shri V.V. Asokan, the learned Sr. Counsel submits with vehemence that the respondent may have earned much more that what he would have earned if he had been in service and he says that he should not be given any backwages for this period for this singular reason. 31. Though Shri T.A. Shaji, the learned Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent submits that he is not aware whether his client was engaged in such an employment since his date of dismissal, he concedes that he is presently engaged in the personal staff of the Minister for Electricity. 31. Though Shri T.A. Shaji, the learned Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent submits that he is not aware whether his client was engaged in such an employment since his date of dismissal, he concedes that he is presently engaged in the personal staff of the Minister for Electricity. These factors would be sufficient for us to deny the backwages to the respondent, apart from that itself being a part of the punishment, which according to us, would be sufficient and commensurate to the acts alleged and proved against him. 32. For such reasons, we order this Original Petition modifying the judgment impugned before us to the extent of directing the respondent to be reinstated in service, but without any backwages and other monetary benefits and confirming the charge of assault of Shri Praveen against him, as has been correctly found by the learned Tribunal.