Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1239 (KAR)

H. B. Prakash Kumar @ Prakash S/o Late Boregowda v. State of Karnataka

2018-12-21

P.S.DINESH KUMAR

body2018
ORDER : 1. These three petitions have been filed by accused No.1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 25, and 27 challenging order dated 21.04.2018, passed by the Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Mandya, in C.C.No.380/2009, whereby the learned Magistrate has committed the said criminal case to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Mandya. 2. Heard Shri B.T. Ventakesh, learned advocate for the petitioners, Shri S. Rachaiah, learned HCGP for the State and Ms. B.V. Vidyulatha, learned advocate for respondent No.2. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are, respondent No.2, Basavaraju filed a complaint in Mandya West Police Station, stating inter alia that a furious mob which was protesting against Congress leader Shri G. Madegowda, on an assumption that he was responsible for the defeat of a rival candidate Shri D.C. Thammanna, hurled stones and manhandled Shri G. Madegowda. Police registered FIR No.255/2008 alleging commission of offences punishable under various Sections of Indian Penal Code. After investigation, charge sheet was filed in C.C.No.380/2009 against 24 accused persons out of 34, for offences punishable under Sections 143, 145, 146, 147, 188, 323, 427, 448, r/w 149 of IPC and Section 2(b) of Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981. Thus, ten persons named in the FIR were dropped. Complainant filed a protest petition before the trial Court seeking addition of remaining ten persons also as accused; and to include Section 307 of IPC in the charge sheet. On 12.03.2010, the learned Magistrate ordered to include the proposed accused and Section 307 of IPC in the charge sheet. 4. Accused No.23, 25 to 33 challenged the order passed by the learned Magistrate before this Court in Criminal Petitions No.1610/2010, 1777/2011 and Misc.Crl.No.1879/2011. This Court, by common order dated 12.09.2011, set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate and remitted the matter to the trial Court for fresh consideration from the stage of filing of protest petition. 5. After recording the sworn statement of witnesses, by his order dated 21.03.2012, the learned Magistrate took cognizance and included five additional accused as accused No.25 to 29 and framed charges on 30.08.2016 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 145, 146, 147, 188, 323, 427, 448, r/w 149 of IPC and Section 2(b) of Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981. 6. 6. Thereafter, on 22.03.2017, complainant filed an application under Section 323 Cr.P.C. with a prayer to commit the case to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, by contending that accused had committed offence under Section 307 IPC also. All accused contested the said application contending that there were no ingredients of Section 307 IPC. After hearing, the learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order holding that there was prima facie material attracting ingredients of Section 307 IPC and committed the case to the Sessions Court. 7. Assailing the aforesaid order passed by the learned Magistrate, Shri B.T. Venkatesh, learned advocate for the petitioners urged following contentions: that an application seeking committal of proceedings by any person other than a Public Prosecutor is not maintainable; that inclusion of any further offences could be considered only after recording of evidence; and that the learned Magistrate has no power to review his order. 8. In support of his contentions, learned Advocate for the petitioners placed reliance on the following authorities: 1. (2001)8 SCC 394 (Harijinder Kaur Vs. State of Jharkhand and another) 2. (2014)3 SCC 92 (Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others) 9. Ms. B.V. Vidyulatha learned Advocate for complainant-respondent No.2, opposing the petitions argued that the petitioners did not urge the aforesaid grounds before the learned Magistrate. In support of her submission, she placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Ananda Shetty And Another Vs. Aithu Poojary and Others(ILR 1998 KAR 3829). 10. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Advocates for the parties and learned HCGP for the State; and perused the records. 11. The order dated 21.03.2012 reads as follows: “Office is directed to register (sic) the case under Register No.III against the accused persons for the offence punishable U/s 143, 145, 146, 147, 323, 427, 448, 114, 188 r/wSec.149 of IPC and Sec.2(b) Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981 and issue summons to the Basavaraju, Muthaiah @ Doddathammaiah, Shivaraju and Dayananda and D.C.Thammanna.” 12. By the above order, the learned Magistrate has directed to register the case against the five additional accused for the offences mentioned above. 13. While considering the application under Section 323 Cr.P.C. filed by the complainant, the learned trial Judge has revisited the statement of witnesses all over again and held that there is prima facie material attracting ingredients of Section 307 IPC. 13. While considering the application under Section 323 Cr.P.C. filed by the complainant, the learned trial Judge has revisited the statement of witnesses all over again and held that there is prima facie material attracting ingredients of Section 307 IPC. In substance, learned trial Judge has held that complainant has made out sufficient ground to commit the case to the Court of Sessions. 14. Shri Venkatesh strenuously urged to draw a distinction between ‘enquiry’ and ‘trial’ by placing reliance on Hardeep Singh(supra). 15. In the conspectus of facts and rival contentions, the point that arises for consideration is, whether the learned Magistrate could have entertained an application filed by the complainant under Section 323 Cr.P.C.? 16. Indisputably, the instant application is filed by the complainant stating that though the complaint averments disclosed offence under Section 307 IPC, charge has not been framed for the said offence and accordingly, he has prayed for adding Section 307 IPC and committing the case to the Sessions Court which is competent to try offence under Section 307 IPC. 17. In these petitions, petitioners have pleaded that the Supreme Court of India in Harihar Chakravarty Vs. State of W.B., AIR 1954 SC 266 has held that addition of charges could be done only on the basis of evidence. 18. The Supreme Court of India in Anant Prakash Sinha alias Anant Sinha Vs. State of Haryana and another, (2016) 6 SCC 105 has considered and explained the earlier judgment in Harihar Chakravarthy. Further, all contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners have been answered in Anant Prakash Sinha. 19. With regard to the contention that the application ought to have been moved by the Public Prosecutor, the Supreme Court of India has held as follows: “22………….. As is evident, an application was filed by the informant to add a charge under Section 406 IPC as there were allegations against the husband about the criminal breach of trust as far as her Stridhan is concerned. It was, in a way, bringing to the notice of the learned Magistrate about the defect in framing of the charge. The Court could have done it suo motu. In such a situation, we do not find any fault on the part of the learned Magistrate in entertaining the said application. It may be stated that the learned Magistrate has referred to the materials and recorded his prima facie satisfaction. The Court could have done it suo motu. In such a situation, we do not find any fault on the part of the learned Magistrate in entertaining the said application. It may be stated that the learned Magistrate has referred to the materials and recorded his prima facie satisfaction. There is no error in the said prima facie view. ….………” (emphasis supplied) 20. With regard to the contention that charges could not be added without recording the evidence, it is held as follows: “17. In Thakur Shah v. King Emperor [Thakur Shah v. King Emperor, 1943 SCC OnLine PC 26 : (1942-43) 70 IA 196 : (1943) 56 LW 706 : AIR 1943 PC 192 ] , what the Court has held is that alteration or addition of a charge must be for an offence made out by the evidence recorded during the course of trial before the court. It does not necessarily mean that the alteration can be done only in a case where evidence is adduced. We may hasten to clarify that there has been a reference to the decision rendered in Harihar Chakravarty [Harihar Chakravarty v. State of W.B., AIR 1954 SC 266 : 1954 Cri LJ 724] but the said reference has to be understood in the context. Section 216 CrPC, as is evincible, does not lay down that the court cannot alter the charge solely because it has framed the charge. In Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi [Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1603 : (2004) 2 RCR (Cri) 463] , it has been stated there is scope for alteration of the charge during trial on the basis of material brought on record. In Jasvinder Saini [Jasvinder Saini v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 256 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 295] , it has been held that circumstances in which addition or alteration of charge can be made have been stipulated in Section 216 Cr.P.C. and sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 216 Cr.P.C. deal with the procedure to be followed once the court decides to alter or add any charge. It has been laid down therein that the question of any such addition or alteration generally arise either because the court finds the charge already framed to be defective for any reason or because such addition is considered necessary after the commencement of the trial having regard to the evidence that may come before the court. If the said decision is appositely understood, it clearly lays down the principle which is in consonance with Harihar Chakravarty[Harihar Chakravarty v. State of W.B., AIR 1954 SC 266 : 1954 Cri LJ 724].” (emphasis supplied) 21. Thus it emerges that it is not necessary that alteration of charges can be done only in a case where evidence is adduced. If this ratio is applied to the facts of the case on hand, the ground urged on behalf of the petitioners that impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate amounts to reviewing his earlier order is merit less. 22. Therefore, all three contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners namely, that the application ought to have been moved by the public prosecutor, that alteration of charges can be considered only after recording of evidence and that learned Magistrate’s order amounts to reviewing his earlier order are untenable. 23. Now on facts, the complaint reveals that there was an attempt to strangulate the victim. It could have been fatal particularly in a situation where attack is by an unruly mob. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the order passed by the learned Magistrate adding Section 307 IPC. The said offence is triable by a Court of Sessions. Therefore, once the learned Magistrate was satisfied that the ingredients of Section 307 IPC were found, the case ought to have been, and rightly committed to the Court of Sessions. 24. Resultantly, these petitions must fail and they are accordingly dismissed. No costs.