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2018 DIGILAW 124 (KER)

Vidya v. Vijayamma

2018-02-06

ALEXANDER THOMAS

body2018
ORDER : Alexander Thomas, J. 1. The main prayer in this Transfer Petition (Civil) is as follows: "(i) Issue an order or direction, Transferring O.S. 4/2016 of the Mavalikkara Sub Court to Family Court, Mavelikkara." Heard Mr. Jayapradeep, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Nidhi Balachandran, learned Counsel for R-1 and Mr. Rinni Stephen Chamaparambil, learned Counsel for R-2. 2. The petitioner herein is the wife of the 2nd respondent herein. The 1st petitioner herein is the mother of the 2nd respondent herein. Difference of opinion between the spouses have led to matrimonial disputes between the parties which led to the respondent instituting Anx. A-1 O.P.(HMA)1182/2015 before the Family Court, Mavelikkara, seeking divorce. It is the case of the petitioner that she was sent away from her matrimonial home by the respondents and later she has come back to live in her matrimonial home and that later in view of the interim order passed by this Court dated 12.4.2017 on I.A. No. 1040/2017 in this petition whereby the respondents were restrained from sending away the petitioner from the matrimonial home and produced the interim order passed in this petition and that she is once again residing in her marital home, etc. It is pointed out that the 1st respondent/mother-in-law, has filed Anx. A-3 Original Suit, O.S. No. 4/2016 before the Sub-Court, Mavelikkara, wherein the 2nd respondent-husband and the petitioner-wife have been arrayed as defendants therein and the prayers in Anx. A-3 Original Suit are as follows: "(a) Partition and separate possession of 3/4th share of plaint schedule property in favour of plaintiff by separating its metes and bounds. (b) Restraining the defendants from trespassing into the plaint schedule property and building, committing any waste on it or from doing any act which endangers the peaceful residence of plaintiff in the plaint item by a permanent prohibitory injunction. (c) Cost of the suit, (d) Such other relief’s as prayed for by the plaintiff." 3. The petitioner would contend that going by the plaint averments in Anx. A-3 Original Suit, it would squarely come within the purview, ambit and scope of Clause (d) of the explanation appended to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and that Anx. (c) Cost of the suit, (d) Such other relief’s as prayed for by the plaintiff." 3. The petitioner would contend that going by the plaint averments in Anx. A-3 Original Suit, it would squarely come within the purview, ambit and scope of Clause (d) of the explanation appended to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and that Anx. A-3 Original Suit has been filed on 20.2.2016, which is much after coming into force of the establishment of the Family Courts Act and the establishment of the Family Courts in the area concerned and that therefore the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate Anx. A-3 Original Suit in view of the prohibition contained in Section 8 of the Family Courts Act/Section 7 of the Family Courts Act reads as follows: "Section 7: Jurisdiction--(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall,-- (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a District Court or, as the case may be, such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation--The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely-- (a) suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage: (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise-- (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as my be conferred on it by any other enactment." Section 8 of the Family Courts Act dealing with Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings reads as follows: "Section 8. Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings---Where a Family Court has been established for any area,- (a) no District Court or any subordinate Civil Court referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 7 shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to that sub-section; (b) no Magistrate shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction or powers under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); (c) every suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 7 and every proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)-- (i) which is pending immediately before the establishment of such Family Court before any District Court or subordinate Court referred to in that sub-section or, as the case may be, before any Magistrate under the said Code; and (ii) which would have been required to be instituted or taken before or by such Family Court if, before the date on which such suit or proceeding was instituted or taken, this Act had come into force and such Family Court had been established, shall stand transferred to such Family Court on the date on which it is established." 4. Before dealing with the facts of the case, it would be relevant to note some of the rulings of this Court and Apex Court on the matters connected with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. In the judgment in Leby Issac v. Leena M. Ninon, reported in 2005 (3) KLT 665 , a Division Bench of this Court has dealt with a case where the suit was filed by the husband for recovery of money as compensation and damages from his wife and father-in-law and the Division Bench expressed that 'in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship' as occurring in Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act and held that the word 'circumstances' include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship. It was held therein that if a 'petition' is filed before a Family Court for an 'order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship', such petition will be maintainable before a Family Court and the Court has to firstly confirm from pleadings and other materials available in a case that a marital relationship is involved in the case. Secondly, the Court has to consider whether the petition discloses existence of any circumstances arising out of marital relationship based on which relief in the petition is moulded and it has then to confirm whether relief sought for in the petition is either 'injunction' or other 'order'. That on consideration of the above facts, if the Court is satisfied that the case instituted before the Court is a petition or "proceeding is for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship", the Court can exercise jurisdiction to entertain such petition. So, 'circumstances' in relation to a marital relationship will be those particulars which closely precedes, surrounds, accompanies and follows a marital relationship. That means, primarily those can be the marriage itself and the surrounding occurrences in connection with marriage and the main requirement is that such 'circumstances' must have a direct bearing on marriage, since the marriage precedes, the existence or origin of a 'marital relationship' and the 'circumstances' arising out of a marital relationship are therefore, 'occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event' of a marriage or marital relationship. The expression 'in circumstances arising out of marital relationship' thus means not only those occurrences which transpired during marital life, but those also include such circumstances which led to the marriage, which developed thereafter, which took place during marital life, which resulted in breaking down of marriage and also those which 'closely' followed as a consequence of all these. If the intention of Legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'marital relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if Explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. If the intention of Legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'marital relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if Explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. So, the inclusion of word 'circumstances' in the relevant provision is quite significant and it must have been done to include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship i.e., the principal event of marriage and the eventualities surrounding the same. It would be profitable to refer to paras 10, 13 and 14 at pages 669-670, which read as follows: '10. Therefore, it follows that if Court finds that a 'petition' is filed before a Family Court for an 'order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship', such petition will be maintainable before a Family Court. The Court has to firstly confirm from pleadings and other materials available in a case that a marital relationship is involved in the case. Secondly, Court has to consider whether the petition discloses existence of any circumstances arising out of marital relationship based on which relief in the petition is moulded. It has then to confirm whether relief sought for in the petition is either 'injunction' or other 'order'. On consideration of the above facts, if the Court is satisfied that the case instituted before the Court is a petition or "proceeding is for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship", the Court can exercise jurisdiction to entertain such petition. xxx xxx xxx 13. So, 'circumstances' in relation to a marital relationship will be those particulars which closely precedes, surrounds, accompanies and follows a marital relationship. That means, primarily those can be the marriage itself and the surrounding occurrences in connection with marriage. The main requirement is that such 'circumstances' must have a direct bearing on marriage, since the marriage precedes, the existence or origin of a 'marital relationship'. 'Circumstances' arising out of a marital relationship are therefore, 'occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event' of a marriage or marital relationship. 14. 'Circumstances' arising out of a marital relationship are therefore, 'occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event' of a marriage or marital relationship. 14. The expression 'in circumstances arising out of marital relationship' thus means not only those occurrences which transpired during marital life, but those also include such circumstances which led to the marriage, which developed thereafter, which took place during marital life, which resulted in breaking down of marriage and also those which 'closely' followed as a consequence of all these. If the intention of Legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'marital relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. So, the inclusion of word 'circumstances' in the relevant provision is quite significant and it must have been done to include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship i.e., the principal event of marriage and the eventualities surrounding the same.' The above judgment of the Division Bench judgment in Leby Issue's case (supra) was followed by in the case Krishna Moorthy v. Soumya Krishnan, reported in 2015 (4) KLT 471 in para 4 thereof. It is also contended by the appellants therein that only those matters which are circumstances closely related to the marriage alone would be attracted under Clause (d) of Section 7(1) and according to the appellant the expenses with relation to the marriage of the daughter and the education expenses of the son are not closely related to the marriage or marital relationship. The Division Bench repelled such contention in view of the liberal interpretation given by a Bench of this Court to the expression 'circumstances arising out of a matrimonial relationship' in the decision in Leby Issac's case (supra), which was followed by another Division Bench of this Court in Thomas v. Ponnama Thomas, reported in 2013 (4) KLT 43 , etc. It will be profitable to refer to para 7 of the Krishna Moorthy v. Soumya Krishnan (supra), which reads as follows: "7. It will be profitable to refer to para 7 of the Krishna Moorthy v. Soumya Krishnan (supra), which reads as follows: "7. But learned Counsel for the appellant placed heavy reliance on the observations contained in the decision in Kamalasanan's case (supra). In the said case, a learned Judge of this Court while deciding the question of maintainability of a suit filed seeking for declaration that the defendant/father is bound to conduct marriage of his daughter and seeking mandatory injunction for directing him to provide sufficient funds for the marriage, held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted. There it is held that, matters enumerated under the Explanation to Section 7(1) cannot be tried before any Civil Court. It is held that a suit for a declaration that the revision petitioner is bound to conduct marriage of the daughter and also for a mandatory injunction to provide her with necessary funds for the marriage, would not come under any of the Explanations contained in (a) to (g) of Section 7(1). Learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that, in Suprabha's case 2006 (1) KLT 712 ) it is held that the decision in Kamalasanan's case (cited supra) to the effect that all matters not covered by Section 7 of the Act would come with the Civil Courts jurisdiction, is upheld. The discussions in Suprabha's case (cited supra) on this aspect is to the effect that the learned Judge in Kamalasanan's case (cited supra) found that, a suit for declaration to the effect that the father is bound to conduct marriage of the daughter and also for a mandatory injunction to provide her with necessary funds for the marriage, would not come under any of the provisions of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. But at the same time in Suprabha's case (cited supra) it is held that the claim raised in the said case which is for recovery of value of gold ornaments, cash paid and other movables given at the time of marriage of Suprabha with Santhosh S/o. Sivaraman is clearly associated with the marital relationship. Therefore learned Counsel for the appellants contended that only those matters which are circumstances closely related to the marriage alone would be attracted under Clause (d) of Section 7(1). Therefore learned Counsel for the appellants contended that only those matters which are circumstances closely related to the marriage alone would be attracted under Clause (d) of Section 7(1). According to him the expenses with relation to the marriage of the daughter and the education expenses of the son are not closely related to the marriage or marital relationship. But this Court cannot accept such a contention in view of the liberal interpretation given by a Bench of this Court to the expression 'circumstances arising out of a matrimonial relationship' in the decision in Leby Issac's case (supra) which is followed by another Bench of this Court in Thomas v. Ponnama Thomas 2013 (4) KLT 43 )." Similar view was reiterated by the Division Bench of this in the judgment in the decision in Janaki Amma v. Renuka Sadanandan, reported in 2016 (1) KLT 563 , wherein it was held that in order to attract Clause (c) of Section 7(1), it should be a suit or a proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or the property of either of them. But that, in order to come under Clause (d) it need to be only a suit or a proceedings for an order or injunction instituted under the circumstances arising out of the matrimonial relationship and therefore it is evident that in order bring a suit or a proceedings within the ambit and scope of Clause (d) of Explanation to Section 7(1) there is no necessity that the parties to the marriage should be there in the party array (see para 12). It was further held in para 12 thereof that the suit/proceedings will be exclusively cognizable by the Family Court, if the dispute in such suit or proceedings is in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship and the words "for an order or injunction" together cover all relief’s that can be claimed in such suit or proceedings. It was further held in para 12 thereof that the suit/proceedings will be exclusively cognizable by the Family Court, if the dispute in such suit or proceedings is in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship and the words "for an order or injunction" together cover all relief’s that can be claimed in such suit or proceedings. That the non-specification of the nature of the "order or injunction" in Clause(d) must convey that the relief claimed in such suit or proceedings can be anything i.e. "any order or injunction" and the expression "for an order or injunction" cannot obviously be read as an "order of injunction" and therefore there is no specific reference with respect to any decree in Clause (d) and hence the wording "as an order or injunction" must certainly be held to cover all possible relief’s that may be claimed in such suit, or proceedings, including any decree. In Janaki Amma's case (supra), Their Lordships were of the considered opinion that the crucial aspect to be considered while deciding the question as to whether it is a suit or a proceedings instituted seeking an order or injunction in the circumstances arising out of the marital relationship, is the cause of the lis itself and not the parties to the lis and the prime consideration should be as to whether the cause of the lis has got any bearing with the marital relationship. That an objective assessment should be made as to whether the cause has got any stem from the circumstances arising out of the marital relationship. In other words, whether the cause should have been existed but for the marital relationship, shall be the basis of the assessment and if the answer is on the positive, definitely the lis can be categorized as one not coming within the scope of Clause (d) of Explanation. But if the cause of action is emerging out of any circumstances related to the matrimonial relationship and the same could not have existed independently, then the suit can be maintained before the Family Court, and it will fall under Clause (d) of Explanation to Section 7(1) of the Act. It will be profitable to refer to paras 11, 12 and 16 of Janaki Amma's case (supra), which read as follows: "11. It will be profitable to refer to paras 11, 12 and 16 of Janaki Amma's case (supra), which read as follows: "11. Leby Issue's case (supra) was taken note of in a subsequent Division Bench decision of this Court in Suprabha v. Sivaraman 2006 (1) KLT 712 ). It was observed that, meaning of the word 'circumstances' as found in Law Lexicon and Black's Law Dictionary include those particulars which closely precedes, surrounds, accompanies or follows a marital relationship. It is found that in order to attract Clause (c) it should be a suit or a proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or the property of either of them. But to come under Clause (d) it need to be only a suit or a proceedings for an order or injunction instituted under the circumstances arising out of the matrimonial relationship. Therefore it is evident that in order to bring a suit or a proceedings within the ambit and scope of Clause (d) of Explanation to Section 7(1) there is no necessity that the parties to the marriage should be there in the party array. 12. In a later decision of this Court in Vasumathi v. Valsan, 2011 (3) KLT 638 , a Division Benchhad distinctly considered the scope of both the Clauses (c) and (d) of Explanation. It is observed that Clauses (b) and (d) to (g) of Explanation do not make specific reference to the parties to the suit or proceedings. They refer only to the nature of the dispute that are brought before Court. In that view of the matter, Clause (d) of Explanation refers only to the nature of the suit or proceedings and it does not refer to the parties to the litigation. The emphasis under Clause (d), as we perceive it, is on the fact that the suit or proceedings must have a stem from the circumstances arising out of a marital relationship. Anyone can be parties to the suit or proceedings. The suit/proceedings will be exclusively cognizable by the Family Court, if the dispute in such suit or proceedings is in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship. The words "for an order or injunction" together cover all relief’s that can be claimed in such suit or proceedings. Anyone can be parties to the suit or proceedings. The suit/proceedings will be exclusively cognizable by the Family Court, if the dispute in such suit or proceedings is in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship. The words "for an order or injunction" together cover all relief’s that can be claimed in such suit or proceedings. The non-specification of the nature of the "order or injunction" in Clause (d) must convey that the relief claimed in such suit or proceedings can be anything i.e., "any order or injunction". The expression "for an order or injunction" cannot obviously be read as an "order of injunction". Therefore there is no specific reference with respect to any decree in Clause (d) and hence the wording "as an order or injunction" must certainly be held to cover all possible relief’s that may be claimed in such suit or proceedings, including any decree. xxx xxx xxx 16. We are of the considered opinion that the crucial aspect to be considered while deciding the question as to whether it is a suit or a proceedings instituted seeking an order or injunction in the circumstances arising out of the marital relationship, is the cause of the lis itself and not the parties to the lis. Prime consideration should be as to whether the cause of the lis has got any bearing with the marital relationship. An objective assessment should be made as to whether the cause has got any stem from the circumstances arising out of the marital relationship. In other words, whether the cause should have been existed but for the marital relationship, shall be the basis of the assessment. If the answer is on the positive, definitely the lis can be categorized as one not coming within the scope of Clause (d) of Explanation. But if the cause of action is emerging out of any circumstances related to the matrimonial relationship and the same could not have existed independently, then the suit can be maintained before the Family Court, and it will fall under Clause (d) of Explanation to Section 7(1) of the Act." The Division Bench of this Court in Leby Issue's case (supra) has referred to the statement of objects and reasons in the Family Courts Act as well as the judgment of the Apex Court in Abdul Jaleel v. Shahida, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 166 . In this context, it will be apposite to refer to paras 19 and 20 of the above said judgment in Leby Issac's case (supra) at pages 671 and 672, which read as follows: '19. In this context, it is also worthy to bear in mind, objects for enacting the Act. The relevant portion from Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act reads as follows: "......The Law Commission in its 59th report (1974) had also stressed that in dealing with disputes concerning the family the Court ought to adopt an approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings and that it should make reasonable efforts at settlement before the commencement of the trial. The Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 1976 to provide for a special procedure to be adopted in suits or proceedings relating to matters concerning the family. However, not much use has been made by the Courts in adopting this conciliatory procedure and the Courts continue to deal with family disputes in the same manner as other civil matters and the same adversary approach prevails. The need was, therefore, felt, in the public interest, to establish Family Courts for speedy settlement of family disputes." 20. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner also cited a decision reported in Abdul Jaleel v. Shahida 2003 (2) KLT 403 (SC) emphasising object of the Act. The relevant portion from the judgment can be extracted as hereunder: "The Statement of Objects and Reasons, as referred to hereinbefore, would clearly go to show that the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends, inter alia, in relation to properties of spouses or of either of them which would clearly mean that the properties claimed by the parties thereto as a spouse of other; irrespective of the claim whether property is claimed during the subsistence of a marriage or otherwise....It is now well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a Court created specially for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally. The restricted meaning if ascribed to Explanation (c) appended to Section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, would frustrate the object wherefore the Family Courts were set up.' 5. Now coming to the facts of this case it can be seen that that Anx. The restricted meaning if ascribed to Explanation (c) appended to Section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, would frustrate the object wherefore the Family Courts were set up.' 5. Now coming to the facts of this case it can be seen that that Anx. A-3OS No. 4/2016 has been filed by the 1st respondent herein [mother-in-law], in which the petitioner herein [wife in the marriage in question] and the 2nd respondent herein [husband] have been respectively arrayed as defendants 1 and 2. The averments of the 1st respondent herein in Anx. A-3 plaint is to the effect that she [plaintiff] is the wife of late Balakrishnan and that the plaint schedule property jointly belongs to the plaintiff and the deceased husband by virtue of a sale deed dated 25.5.1971 and that the defendants herein are the daughter-in-law and son of the plaintiff and that they had resided along with the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property since their marriage dated 16.7.2006 and that a child [daughter] was born to them, who was stated to be at the age of 5 at the time of filing of the suit on 20.2.2016. That the defendants are not in good terms and that they are living separately and further that the defendants 1 and 2 are having such a nature that they are having their own life style and that they are taking law on their own hands and that they are denying the right and interest of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property and in the building and that they are continuously trespassing into the plaint schedule property and committing continuous waste on it and that defendants 1 and 2 have no manner of right over the plaint item or the building or any of the utensils or valuables kept in the plaint schedule building. Further, it is stated in paragraph 6 of Anx. A-3 plaint that the cause of action for the suit arose on each and every date of cruelty, annoyance and committing of waste by the defendants 1 and 2, especially on 16.2.2016 and 17.2.2016 and the plaint item situated at Krishnapuram Village, which is within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Mavelikkara. It is in the light of these plaint averments that the aforementioned prayers have been raised in the suit. Of course the petitioner has a case that Anx. It is in the light of these plaint averments that the aforementioned prayers have been raised in the suit. Of course the petitioner has a case that Anx. A-3 suit has been instituted by the 1st respondent [mother-in-law], in collusion with the 2nd respondent [husband of the petitioner] and that their agenda is to ensure ouster of the petitioner from her marital home and that it is with this ulterior purpose that the suit has been filed and that an interim injunction was also granted by the Court below in Anx. A-3 suit, which was interfered by this Court in interim order dated 12.4.2017 rendered on I.A. No. 1040/2017 in this transfer petition, therein this Court had passed an order to restrain the respondents herein from sending away the petitioner from her marital home. 6. This Court would not examine the above said submission made by the petitioner that this suit has been filed in collusion between the respondents herein having been totally denied by both the respondents. This Court need not get into the intricacies of adjudicating on the correctness of the rival claim that whether or not the suit has been filed on such collusion, as the prime consideration of this Court is as to whether the cause of action, which led to the institution of this suit would arose out of "would come within the scope of ambit of expression ", circumstances arising from the marital relationship, as seen occurring in Clause (b) of the Explanation appended to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act and for that purpose the focus of the Court should be that whether such parameters of Section 7(1) explanation (d) is borne out even if the plaint averments are assumed to be correct. In that regard the matter will have to be examined within the frame work of the legal principles in the aforecited judgments of this Court and the Apex Court. The plaint averments are to the effect that the 1st defendant [petitioner herein] started living in the plaint schedule property consequent to the marriage and that his spouse also living there and subsequently due to the difference of opinion between them, they have created lot of problems in the house and that they are interfering with the rights and interests of the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property. If the admitted case of the 1st respondent/plaintiff that the petitioner herein/1st respondent is the legally wedded wife of the 2nd respondent, who is none other than the son of the 1st respondent/plaintiff. Therefore, the entire allegations borne out from Anx. A-3 suit are all emanating from circumstances arising out a marital relationship as envisaged in that provision and the suit is for seeking necessary orders and injunction in such circumstances arising out the marital relationship between the two defendants. Therefore, this Court had no hesitation to hold that going by the admitted averments in Anx. A-3 plaint, the cause of action in respect of the said suit would certainly come within the scope and ambit of Clause (d) of the Explanation appended to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act. The said suit has been filed on 20.2.2016. This is long after the coming into force of the Family Courts Act as well as the notification for establishment of the Family Court in the area concerned. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in view of the provisions contained in Section 8 of the Family Courts Act. Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure regulates the powers of the High Court and District Court in relation to matters concerning transfer of cases and Sub-section (5) of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly provides as follows: "Section 24. General power of transfer and withdrawal-- xxx xxx xxx (5) A suit or proceeding may be transferred under this section from a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it." 7. In the instant case this Court has no hesitation to hold that the Sub-Court, Mavelikkara has no jurisdiction to entertain and try Anx. A-3 suit and the powers conferred under Section 24, more particularly, Sub-section (5) thereof could be invoked in the facts and circumstances of the case to ensure that Anx. A-3 suit is transferred from the Civil Court concerned to the Family Court concerned. 8. In this view of the matter it is ordered that Anx. A-3 O.S. No. 4/2016 now pending on the file of the Sub Court, Mavelikkara will stand transferred to the Family Court, Mavelikkara. A-3 suit is transferred from the Civil Court concerned to the Family Court concerned. 8. In this view of the matter it is ordered that Anx. A-3 O.S. No. 4/2016 now pending on the file of the Sub Court, Mavelikkara will stand transferred to the Family Court, Mavelikkara. The petitioner will produce certified copy of this judgment before the Sub-Court, Mavelikkara, upon which the said Court shall transfer and transmit the entire case papers and case records in relation to O.S. No. 4/2016 to the Family Court, Mavelikkara. After receipt of the case papers and case records, the Family Court, Mavelikkara will renumber the case and issue necessary notices to all the parties concerned and will thereafter proceed further with the matter in accordance with law. Mr. Nidhi Balachandran, the learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, submits that the 1st respondent is in her seventies and that any of the prolongation of the litigation will seriously prejudice to her, etc. It is made clear that it will be open to the 1st respondent to make an appropriate application before the Family Court, Mavelikkara for early disposal of the matter, keeping in view the fact that the O.S. No. 4/2016 was instituted as early as on 20.2.2016 and the said Court may appropriately take a decision on such a plea taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. Taking into account the difficulties expressed by all parties concerned, it is ordered that all parties concerned will be at liberty to file appropriate applications for exemption from personal appearance before the Family Court, upon which, the said request may be considered favourably, provided the parties are represented through Advocates. However, it is made clear that the parties will have to appear before the Family Court at the time of counselling and mediation process, etc., and as and when specifically so directed by the Family Court concerned. With these observations and directions, the afore captioned Transfer Petition (Civil) stands finally disposed of.