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2018 DIGILAW 124 (UTT)

Manoharlal Sahu v. Kunwar Sarang Bhushan Singh

2018-03-21

MANOJ K.TIWARI

body2018
JUDGMENT : MANOJ K. TIWARI, J. 1. This is the tenant’s petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 24.02.2018. By the said order, learned 4th Additional District Judge, Haridwar rejected two applications moved by the tenant/petitioner, namely 84C and 85C respectively, one for local inspection and second for summoning two persons as witness namely Sri Rajendra Karanwal & Sri Shashishekhar Karanwal. 2. Brief facts of the case are as follows: Kunwar Sarang Bhushan (landlord) moved an application under Section 21(i)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act) for release of two shops and one hall on the ground of his bonafide need, in which Manohar Lal Sahu (predecessor in interest of the petitioner) was a tenant. The said application was registered as P.A. Case No. 2 of 2013, which was allowed by learned Prescribed Authority, Haridwar vide judgment and order dated 25.09.2014. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, the tenant (Sri Manohar Lal Sahu) filed an appeal, which was registered as Rent Control Appeal No. 60 of 2014. During pendency of the appeal, Sri Manohar Lal Sahu passed away and his legal representatives were substituted in his place. The legal representatives of Late Sri Manohar Lal Sahu moved two separate applications on 25.01.2018 before the Appellate Court, which were numbered as 84C and 85C. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that by the first application, namely 84C, the tenant prayed for spot inspection of the building in which the shops in question are situate and by the second application, namely, 85C, prayer was made to the Appellate Court to summon Sri Rajendra Karanwal and also his Son Sri Sashishekhar Karanwal as witnesses. He further submits that these applications were referable to Section 34 of the Act, which enables all authorities under the Rent Control Act to exercise the same powers, as are vested in a Civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the landlord had got fours shops released from other tenants on the ground that the said shops are needed for establishing his son in business, however, the said shops have not been put to the use for which they were released. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the landlord had got fours shops released from other tenants on the ground that the said shops are needed for establishing his son in business, however, the said shops have not been put to the use for which they were released. Thus it was the allegation in the said application that petitioner has setup an artificial need for getting the shop in question released. The second application numbered as 85C was moved with the allegation that tenants have recently learnt about the fact that landlord has entered into settlement with one Sri Rajendra Karanwal for selling off the entire building. The reason indicated for such apprehension was that landlord had entered into a compromise with another tenant (Sri O.P. Madan) in P.A. Case No. 9 of 2013 and compromise deed was filed in Court by Sri Shashishekhar Karanwal S/o Sri Rajendra Karanwal, as power of attorney holder of Sri O.P. Mandan (tenant), although Sri Shashishkar Karanwal had no link with Sri O.P. Madan. He further submits that learned Appellate Court has erroneously rejected both the applications by means of common order dated 24.02.2018. 5. Mr. B.P. Nautiyal, Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the compromise, which has been made basis for filing the application was entered into between the landlord and O.P. Madan (through his power of attorney holder) on 22.10.2013 much before the date on which the release application was allowed, and this aspect, if relevant, could have been brought to the notice of learned trial court. Thus, he submits that these applications were moved with the sole objective of delaying the disposal of appeal so that the petitioner may continue as tenant. He further submits that the appeal was filed before the Appellate Court on 15.10.2014 and these applications were moved after four years on 25.01.2018 and during the interregnum, hearing in the appeal was adjourned as many as fifty times. 6. Learned senior counsel for the respondent further submits that the applications moved by the petitioner are absolutely misconceived, as in the present proceedings, the validity of release order passed in respect of other shops cannot be questioned. He very fairly concedes that under Section 34 of the Act, the Appellate Court has certain powers which can be exercised in appropriate case. He very fairly concedes that under Section 34 of the Act, the Appellate Court has certain powers which can be exercised in appropriate case. However, according to him, this is not a fit case where those powers could have been exercised, therefore the appellate court was justified in rejecting the applications made by the tenant. 7. Perusal of the impugned order dated 24.02.2018 indicates that the learned Appellate court has given cogent reasons for rejecting the applications. Learned Appellate Court has held and rightly so, that bonafide need of the landlord as disclosed in P.A. Case No. 2 of 2013, can not be mixed up with the bonafide need setup in P.A. Case No. 08 of 2013 and 09 of 2013 which were filed to establish landlord’s son and daughter in business and further that the need of Son and Daughter of the landlord cannot be questioned in the appeal. Learned Appellate Court has further observed that tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord that he should run business from a particular portion of his building. Learned appellate court has further held that in the absence of any material to show that the building in question is going to be sold to Rajendra Karanwal and Shashi Shekhar Karanwal, there is no justification for summoning them as witness. This Court is in agreement with the reasons given by the learned Appellate Court for rejecting the applications. 8. In such view of the matter, any interference with the order dated 24.02.2018 passed by learned Appellate Court would be unwarranted. The writ petition lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. However, dismissal of the writ petition will not prejudice the rights of the petitioner and it shall be open to him to raise all legal contention, available to him at the final hearing of the appeal. 9. No order as to costs.