ORDER : MANOJ MISRA, J. 1. Heard Sri M.M. Sahai for the petitioner; learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3; and Sri S.N. Dubey for the respondent no.1 and perused the record. 2. The present petition has been filed for quashing the orders dated 09.10.2017 and 13.03.2018 passed by the Labour Court (4), U.P., Kanpur in Misc. Case No.113 of 2014 by which, exercising power under Section 6-H(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an amount of Rs.6,52,223/- has been found payable by the petitioner-employer to the respondent workman (Anawar Khan) for the period starting from 17.03.2001 to 31.10.2014 and, thereafter, the application to review that order has been rejected. 3. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that the respondent workman (respondent no.1) was a bus driver with the petitioner. He was removed from service, as a result, an industrial dispute was raised, which was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court, by its award dated 20.04.2006, declared the removal illegal and held the workman to be entitled to reinstatement with all consequential benefits. The award passed by the Labour Court was challenged by filing Writ-C No.61911 of 2006 which was dismissed by order dated 19.03.2015 against which a Special Leave to Appeal No.31615 of 2015 was filed which was disposed of by order dated 12.07.2016, which reads as follows:- “Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. It has been submitted that the back-wages have already been paid by the petitioner. It has also been submitted that as another departmental proceedings have been initiated against the respondent and he has been put under suspension, he has not been reinstated. In the circumstances, if it is so, the respondent has no right to reinstatement. Back-wages have been paid to him and therefore, nothing survives. If there is another inquiry pending against the respondent, the same shall be concluded as soon as possible. We are sure that the respondent shall extend his cooperation so that the departmental proceedings can be concluded expeditiously. The special leave petition stands disposed of. Pending application, if any, shall also stand disposed of.” 4. An application was filed by the respondent workman for review of the order dated 12.07.2016, which was rejected on 28.09.2016 by the following order:- “Application for hearing in open court is rejected. The special leave petition stands disposed of. Pending application, if any, shall also stand disposed of.” 4. An application was filed by the respondent workman for review of the order dated 12.07.2016, which was rejected on 28.09.2016 by the following order:- “Application for hearing in open court is rejected. Having perused the Review Petition and the connected papers with meticulous care, we do not find any justifiable reason to entertain this review petition. The review petition is, accordingly, dismissed.” 5. It appears that the respondent workman filed a contempt application as well as misc. application before the Apex Court on which, on 24.11.2017, the following order was passed:- “Contempt Petition (Criminal) No.12/2017 In Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31615 OF 2015 Learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this petition. Permission sought for is granted. The contempt petition is dismissed as withdrawn. M.A. No.861 Of 2017 (I.A. No.89770/2017) In Special Leave Petition (C) No.31615 Of 2015 Heard learned counsel for the parties. We direct that the second inquiry pending against the respondent, be completed as expeditiously as possible. The application stands disposed of accordingly. All contentions in respect of the inquiry are left open.” 6. In between, the respondent workman had filed an application under Section 6-H(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act for computation and payment of the amount payable to him for the period starting from 17.03.2001 to 31.10.2014. According to the claim of the respondent 3 workman, he was entitled to a sum of Rs.18,02,079/- for the period starting from 17.03.2001 to 31.10.2014 but only a sum of Rs.11,49,856/- had been paid. The respondent workman therefore claimed that he was entitled to payment of the balance amount of Rs.6,52,223/-. In reply, the petitioner employer claimed that the respondent workman had already been paid Rs.11,49,856/- even though only Rs.10,59,341/- was payable therefore the respondent workman had actually received Rs.90,519/- in excess as such no further amount was due and payable for the said period. 7. The Labour Court by the impugned order dated 09.10.2017 found that the workman had computed the amount payable to him by taking all the consequential benefits of continuity in service such as wage increments, etc. 7. The Labour Court by the impugned order dated 09.10.2017 found that the workman had computed the amount payable to him by taking all the consequential benefits of continuity in service such as wage increments, etc. that were available to him under the award, whereas the computation made by the employer was without such benefits and, since the award had provided the benefit of continuity in service to the workman along with all consequential benefits, therefore the computation chart provided by the workman was acceptable. Accordingly, it found it appropriate to direct payment of Rs.6,52,223/- as claimed by the workman. 8. For review/recall of the order dated 09.10.2017, an application was filed by the petitioner employer. In the review application, the stand taken by the petitioner was that as there was another inquiry initiated against the respondent workman, the respondent workman was not entitled to reinstatement, in view of the order dated 12.07.2016 passed by the Apex Court, and, in absence of reinstatement, the benefits available to the respondent workman of continuity in service were therefore not admissible. 9. The Labour Court, by the impugned order dated 13.03.2018, rejected the application for recall not only as not maintainable but also upon finding that prior to the order dated 12.07.2016 there was nothing to indicate that any departmental proceeding had been initiated by the 4 petitioner against the respondent workman and, in fact, the respondent workman had misled the Apex Court as regards initiation and pendency of another departmental proceeding. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the orders dated 13.03.2018 and 09.10.2017 by placing reliance on the observation of the Apex Court in its order dated 12.07.2016 passed in Special Leave to Appeal No.31615 of 2015. 11. However, the petitioner’s counsel has not been able to produce any document to show that another departmental proceeding had been initiated against the respondent workman prior to 31.10.2014, that is during the period in respect of which the respondent-workman had raised a claim in proceedings under Section 6-H(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 12. By means of supplementary affidavit, which has been filed today, copy of the recall application, which has been filed by the petitioner employer for review/recall/ modification of the order dated 09.10.2017 has been brought on record. 13. 12. By means of supplementary affidavit, which has been filed today, copy of the recall application, which has been filed by the petitioner employer for review/recall/ modification of the order dated 09.10.2017 has been brought on record. 13. Neither in the said recall application nor in the earlier reply submitted by the petitioner to the application submitted by the respondent workman under Section 6-H(2), there is a specific statement of initiation of departmental proceeding against the respondent workman prior to 31.10.2014, which might have been pending up to 31.10.2014. The learned counsel for the petitioner also could not point out any document to show that any proceeding initiated against the respondent workman had been pending up to 31.10.2014. Under the circumstances, the finding returned by the Labour Court, in its impugned order dated 13.03.2018, that the employer had failed to prove that any suspension or departmental proceeding was initiated against the respondent workman prior to 12.07.2016 does not call for any interference. 14. The observation of the Apex Court in its order dated 12.07.2016 that the respondent has no right to reinstatement is qualified by the existence of those circumstances that were stated before it on behalf of the petitioner employer. The Apex Court in its order had not recorded any finding that a departmental inquiry had been initiated against the respondent workman and therefore he had no right to seek reinstatement. The Apex Court had only noticed the statement made on behalf of the petitioner employer that another departmental proceeding had been initiated against the respondent workman and that he has been put under suspension therefore has not been reinstated. After noticing the submission made on behalf of the petitioner employer, the Apex Court had observed that “in the circumstances, if it is so, the respondent has no right to reinstatement”. The use of phrase “if it is so” clearly qualifies the observation that the respondent has no right to reinstatement. Meaning thereby that the respondent would have no right to reinstatement, if the fact of initiation of departmental proceeding and consequent suspension as stated is correct. 15. The use of phrase “if it is so” clearly qualifies the observation that the respondent has no right to reinstatement. Meaning thereby that the respondent would have no right to reinstatement, if the fact of initiation of departmental proceeding and consequent suspension as stated is correct. 15. Since the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate by any document that the respondent workman had been placed under suspension or that any other charge sheet / memo, prior to 31.10.2014, had been served, the benefit of continuity of service, which was otherwise admissible to the respondent workman under the award passed by the Labour Court, was rightly found payable to him, therefore the impugned order does not call for any interference. The petition is dismissed.