JUDGMENT : INDERJEET SINGH, J. 1. Under challenge in the instant writ petition is the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur dated 17.8.2010 dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner (to be referred as “landlady”) against the judgment and decree passed by the Rent Tribunal dated 7.7.2008 whereby the eviction application filed by the landlady was dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the shop in dispute (“suit shop”) was given to the respondent no. 1 (to be referred as the “tenant”) on monthly rent of Rs. 525/-. On 30.6.2000 husband of the landlady namely Sh. Nathu Lal stood retired from service from the Central Cooperative Bank. The landlay filed eviction application in the year 2003 before the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (to be referred as the “Act of 2001”) for eviction of the tenant from the suit shop on the grounds of reasonable & bona-fide necessity for husband’s business to run photostat and typing shop to take care of their livelihood as they are not having any source of income since her husband after retirement was not receiving any pension and the amount of PF & gratuity & leave encashment was incurred from time to time in solemnizing/performing marriage of their four daughters & now they have finally exhausted and want the suit shop for the said purpose. 3. The tenant filed reply to the eviction application wherein while admitting the tenancy and also the amount of rent, denied the personal need & bona-fide necessity of the suit shop by the landlady for her husband. 4. 3. The tenant filed reply to the eviction application wherein while admitting the tenancy and also the amount of rent, denied the personal need & bona-fide necessity of the suit shop by the landlady for her husband. 4. The learned Rent Tribunal on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed followings issues:- ^^mijksDr vfHkopuksa ds vk/kkj ij Ádj.k esa fuEufyf[kr okn fcUnq fojfpr fd;s x;s %& 1- vk;k vthZnkj dks ewy vthZ ds iSjk uaŒ 3 esa of.kZr nqdku dh Lo;a ,oa dqVqEc ds mi;ksx ;k vf/kHkksx ds fy, ;qfDr;qDr :i ls vkSj lnHkkfod :i ls visf{kr gSa \ 2- vk;k ÁR;FkhZ dh vksj ls fooknxzLr nqdku fdjk;s ij ysrs le; 6 ekg dk fdjk;k 3150 :i;s vfxze :i ls ÁkIr fd;k] tks vthZnkj ds ikl vekur ds :i esa gSa \ 3- vk;k ÁR;FkhZ dh vksj ls twu&2003 rd dh fdjk;k jkf'k /kkjk&19 **,** ,oa /kkjk&19 ^^lh** jktLFkku js.V d.Vksy ,DV ds rgr tek djkbZ] mlds i'pkr vkxkeh ekg dk fdjk;k vthZnkj dks euhvksMZj }kjk Hkstus ds mijkar vthZnkj }kjk ugha ysus ,oa cSad [kkrk lwfpr djus ds uksfVl nsus ds ckotwn cSad dk fooj.k ugha lwfpr djus dk vthZ ij D;k vlj gSa \ 4- vuqrks"kA** 5. The landlady in support of her case examined herself as PW-1 & also got examined her husband Sh. Nathu Lal Sharma PW-2 and produced the affidavits of Sh. Shambhu Lal Sharma PW-3 Radhey Shyam PW-4. She also produced documents Ex.1 to Ex.3 and got the same exhibited. The tenant in support of his case examined himself as DW-1 and produced the affidavits of Om Prakash Agrawal DW-2, Kailash Chandra DW-3, Kunj Bihari Lal Agrawal DW-4, Suresh Kumar Agrawal DW-5, Sanwar Mal Agrawal DW-6, Dayaram DW-7. He also produced documents Ex.A-1 to A-119 and got the same exhibited. 6. The learned Rent Tribunal after recording the evidence of both the parties dismissed the eviction application filed by the landlady vide judgment & decree dated 7.7.2008. 7. The landlady being aggrieved by the judgment & decree passed by the Rent Tribunal dated 7.7.2008 preferred appeal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur which was also dismissed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal vide judgment & decree dated 17.8.2010. Hence the present writ petition came to be filed by the landlady under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. Hence the present writ petition came to be filed by the landlady under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. During pendency of the present writ petition the landlady expired and her husband Nathu Lal Sharma was permitted to be taken on record as her legal representative by this Court vide order dated 25.5.2016. 9. Counsel for the landlady submitted that the finding recorded by both the courts below on issue no.1 is perverse as the landlady proved by leading evidence before the Rent Tribunal that husband of the landlady retired from the bank’s job and there is reasonable and bona-fide need of the suit shop for her husband but despite that both the courts below have not considered this fact in right perspective. Counsel further submits that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has given perverse finding on the issue no. 1 as it has wrongly held that it is not possible for a person of 70 years of age to start a new business and the ground is not bona-fide. Counsel further submits that the finding given by both the courts below is perverse on this count also as the courts below have held that eviction application was not filed by the landlady just after retirement of her husband for whom the suit shop was required. 10. Counsel further submits that finding given by the courts below on the issue no.1 on the pretext that the husband of the landlady was not having experience to run the business of photostat and typing, is perverse as for starting new business as pleaded by the landlady, is not technical in nature & no experience is required. 11. Counsel further submits that the concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the courts below can be looked into by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India if the same are perverse. In support of contentions the counsel relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) by LRs. vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. (1999) 8 SCC 1 where in para-11 it has been held as under:- “11. It will be seen that the trial court and the appellate court had clearly erred in law. vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. (1999) 8 SCC 1 where in para-11 it has been held as under:- “11. It will be seen that the trial court and the appellate court had clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of “need” or requirement” to be equivalent to “dire or absolute or compelling necessity.” According to them, if the plaintiff had not permanently lost his job on account of the lockout or if he had not resigned his job, he could not be treated as a person without any means of livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to an order for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the proper test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business. The manner in which the courts have gone into the meaning of “lockout” in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 appears to us to be nothing but a perverse approach to the problem. One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job and wait for the unknown and uncertain result of a long-drawn litigation. If he resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one’s premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long-drawn litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain himself, that would not be an indication that the need for establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable requirement or that it was motivated or was a mere design to evict the tenant. It is not necessary for the landlord to adduce evidence that he had money in deposit in a bank nor produce proof of funds to prove his readiness and willingness as in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property. So far as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery business was one which required extraordinary expertise. It is, therefore, clear that the entire approach of both the courts below was absolutely wrong in law and perverse on fact. So far as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery business was one which required extraordinary expertise. It is, therefore, clear that the entire approach of both the courts below was absolutely wrong in law and perverse on fact. Unfortunately the High Court simply dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 227 stating that the findings were one of fact. That is why we think that this is an exceptional case calling for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” 12. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Vishwanath and Another vs. Hidayatt Ullah, (1999) 2 SCC 535 where in para-4 it has been held as under:- “4. There appears to be a complete misreading of the pleadings by the High Court. Even a cursory look at para 10 of the petition (supra) shows that the landlord had unequivocally pleaded that the premises were required for starting a business for himself as well as for the benefit of his son. There was therefore, no warrant to say that pleadings in that behalf were lacking. Besides the pleadings, the High Court also failed to appreciate the evidence on the record which clearly established that the landlord bona fide required the premises for starting his own business. The opinion of the High Court that since the landlord, a retired government servant, had not stated that his pension was not adequate, it implied that there was no bona fide need for him to start any business is wholly unsustainable and not at all rational. There is no presumption that a pensioner who has adequate pension cannot have a bona-fide need to start his business after retirement. The High Court not only misread and misunderstood the pleadings, but also ignored the vital evidence which had been brought on the record to establish the bona fide need of the landlord. The order of the High Court, interfering with that of the Rent Controlling Authority, is clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained. These appeals, therefore, succeed and are allowed. The impugned order is, consequently, set aside. The order of the Rent Controlling Authority is hereby restored. No costs.” 13. The order of the High Court, interfering with that of the Rent Controlling Authority, is clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained. These appeals, therefore, succeed and are allowed. The impugned order is, consequently, set aside. The order of the Rent Controlling Authority is hereby restored. No costs.” 13. Counsel further relied upon the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the matter of Vinod Kumar vs. Sat Pal Kapoor, 2010 (1) RCR 92, where in para-9 it has been held as under:- “9. It is not necessary for the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant soon after his retirement. The period of four years after retirement is not much on the basis of which any inference doubting the bona-fide of the landlord can be raised.” 14. On the other hand counsel for the respondent submits that the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below cannot be disturbed by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Counsel further submits that the findings given by the learned trial court is based on sound appreciation of evidence and the same is not liable to be disturbed by this Court. Counsel further submits that the landlady has also mentioned in the eviction application that the grandson (daughter’ son) namely Anoop adopted by them, more money is required for his studies, however fact of his adoption was not proved before the learned courts below therefore the finding given by the learned courts below on issue no.1 is just & proper. 15. Counsel further submits that the eviction application was not filed by the landlady just after the retirement of her husband, therefore, the need of the suit shop was not bona-fide. Counsel further submits that the need projected by the landlady is manufactured & fabricated one and thus the finding given by the courts below does not required interference by this Court. 16. In support of contentions, the counsel relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sheel Chand vs. Prakash Chand, (1998) 6 SCC 683 , wherein in para-7 it has been held as under:- “7. The question of law formulated by the learned Single Judge, noticed above, strictly speaking is not even a question of law, let alone a substantial question of law. The question of law formulated by the learned Single Judge, noticed above, strictly speaking is not even a question of law, let alone a substantial question of law. The existence of a “substantial question of law” is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under the amended provisions of Section 100 CPC. It appears that the learned Single Judge over looked the change brought about to Section 100 CPC by the Amendment made in 1976. The High Court unjustifiably interfered with pure questions of fact while exercising jurisdiction Under Section 100 CPC. It was not proper for the learned Single Judge to have reversed the concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction Under Section 100 CPC. That apart, we find that the learned Single Judge did not even notice, let alone answer the question of law which had been formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal. There is no reference to the question of law in the impugned order and it appears that the High Court thought that it was dealing with a first appeal and not a second appeal Under Section 100 CPC. The findings of fact recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on the record. There was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. None has been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the respondent either. The findings, therefore, did not require to be upset in a second appeal Under Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the learned Single Judge, under the circumstances, cannot be sustained. This appeal consequently succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 13.09.1996 is set aside. As a result, the eviction suit filed by the landlord shall stand dismissed. No costs.” 17. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter N. Eswari W/o Adinarayana vs. K. Swarajya Lakshmi W/o Late K.V.L.N.A. Sastry, 2009 (9) SCC 678 , where in paras-12 & 13 it has been held as under:- “12. As noted herein-earlier, the Rent Controller, Vijayawada and the appellate authority concurrently held on fact on proper appreciation of evidence on record that the respondent landlady had failed to prove that she required the premises in question for her bona fide need. As noted herein-earlier, the Rent Controller, Vijayawada and the appellate authority concurrently held on fact on proper appreciation of evidence on record that the respondent landlady had failed to prove that she required the premises in question for her bona fide need. This concurrent finding of fact was upset by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. In our view, the High Court was not justified in interfering with such concurrent finding of fact in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and come to a different finding on the question of bona fide need of the respondent landlady. 13. In Rajbir Kaur vs. S. Chokesiri and Co. this Court considered this aspect of the matter and in para 43, has dealt with the aforesaid question elaborately: “43. When the findings of fact recorded by the courts below are supportable on the evidence on record, the Revisional Court must, indeed, be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the courts below. With respect to the High Court, we are afraid, the exercise made by it in its revisional jurisdiction incurs the criticism that the concurrent finding of fact of the courts below could not be dealt and supplanted by a different finding arrived at on an independent reassessment of evidence as was done in this case.” 18. This Court has considered the rival submissions made by the counsel for the parties and also the perused the material on record. 19. The argument raised by counsel for the petitioner that the perverse finding recorded by both the courts below can be entertained by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India deserves to be accepted in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raghunath G. Panhale (supra). 20. A bare reading of the findings given by both the courts below on the issue no.1 in my considered opinion is perverse. 20. A bare reading of the findings given by both the courts below on the issue no.1 in my considered opinion is perverse. The finding given by the learned courts below that the eviction application was not filed just after the retirement of the husband of the landlady is also perverse as admittedly the eviction application was filed just after 3½ years of the retirement of husband of the landlady and such period in my considered opinion cannot be said to be inordinate delay in filing the eviction application and bona-fide of the landlady for her husband cannot be doubted as has been held by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the matter of Vinod Kumar (supra). Further the finding given by the learned courts below on the issue no.1 relating to age of the husband of the petitioner that it is not possible to start a new business is also perverse as at the time of filing of the eviction application the husband of the landlady was 61 years of age. The finding given by the learned courts below on the issue no.1 is that husband of the landlady for whom the suit shop is required, has not experience to run such a business as pleaded, in my considered opinion is also perverse since the business of photostat & typing machine is not such a technical and no expertise is required to start such business. 21. Lastly, as has been proved by the landlady before the courts below that she has four daughters and her husband is not getting pension, therefore more money is required to take care of theirs, in my considered opinion, the personal need & necessity of suit shop by the landlady for her husband is reasonable and bona-fide one. 22. The first argument raised by counsel for the respondent that there is concurrent finding of the fact and this Court has limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India & cannot disturb such findings, is not acceptable the findings given by both the courts below are perverse on many counts as has been discussed above. 23. 22. The first argument raised by counsel for the respondent that there is concurrent finding of the fact and this Court has limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India & cannot disturb such findings, is not acceptable the findings given by both the courts below are perverse on many counts as has been discussed above. 23. The next argument raised by counsel for the respondent that the ground taken by the landlady in her application that she needs more money for further study of her grand son (daughter’s son Anoop) as pleaded, the same has not been proved before the courts below, is also not acceptable for the reason that the landlady has mentioned other grounds also and that was not the sole ground. 24. The last argument raised by counsel for the tenant that the application was not filed just after the retirement of the husband of the landlady is also not acceptable in view of the judgment passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the matter of Vinod Kumar (supra) and in my considered view the delay is not fatal in such matters. 25. In view of the entire discussion made above, the writ petition filed by the petitioner deserves acceptance. 26. At this stage, counsel for the respondent submitted that at least while staying the effect and operation of the present judgment, they may be granted interim relief for a period of two months. 27. Since the petitioner at the time of filing of the eviction application was 61 years of age and by passage of time has become of 80 years, this Court in the facts and circumstances is not inclined to grant the interim relief prayed for. 28. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. Both the judgments and decree of the Appellate Rent Tribunal as well as of the Rent Tribunal dated 17.8.2010 and 7.7.2008 respectively, are set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to vacant possession of the suit shop.