JUDGMENT : TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal on behalf of the plaintiff is directed against the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the learned Courts below whereby the suit for permanent injunction has been ordered to be dismissed. The parties shall be referred to as the ‘plaintiff’ and the ‘defendants’. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants alleging therein that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are co-owners of the land comprised in Khata No. 53, Khatauni No. 132, Khasra Nos. 1046, 1077, 1078, 1079, measuring 05-66-81 HM, situated in Mohal and Mauza Bharota, Tehsil Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the suit land). It was averred that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land from the date of its purchase and had purchased the suit land in the year 1990 and paid the whole consideration amount and no consideration amount was paid by defendant No.1, however, the name of defendant No.1 was got recorded by the plaintiff in the column of possession of ownership being brother. It was averred that defendant No.1 never remained in possession of the suit land and the plaintiff made the suit land cultivable after spending huge amount, but the defendant No.1 by taking the advantage of the ownership transferred the suit land to defendant No.2 through sale deed dated 3.9.2013. It was averred that the defendants in connivance with each other are threatening to dispossess the plaintiff by changing the nature of the suit land and the defendants refused to accede the lawful requests of the plaintiff and to admit his claim, hence the suit. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement wherein the preliminary objections qua maintainability, locus-standi, cause of action, valuation etc. were taken. On merits, while denying the claim of the plaintiff, the defendants contended that defendant No.1 and plaintiff jointly purchased the suit land and defendant No.1 paid half of the consideration amount. The entire suit land is being cultivated by defendant No.1 and after retirement from the Indian Army, the plaintiff is trying to take forcible possession of the suit land without seeking partition of the same. The entire suit land is being cultivated by defendant No.1 and after retirement from the Indian Army, the plaintiff is trying to take forcible possession of the suit land without seeking partition of the same. It was averred that the possession of the suit land was delivered to defendant No.1 on the spot on its purchase and he has developed the same by spending huge amount. It was further averred that defendant No.1 sold part of the suit land to defendant No.2 and also handed over the possession of the same to defendant No.2 on the spot and as such, the defendant No.2 is also a co-owner. It was averred that the plaintiff intends to take forcible possession of the suit land. The defendants denied the remaining averments and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The plaintiff filed replication wherein the contents of the plaint were reasserted and reaffirmed and the counter allegations made in the written statement were denied. 5. The learned trial Court on 31.7.2014 framed the following issues: 1. Whether defendants have no concern and connection over the suit land, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether plaintiff is in exclusive possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction? OPP 4. Whether suit is not maintainable, as alleged? OPD 5. Whether plaintiff has no cause of action or locus standi to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD 6. Whether defendant No.2 is bonafide purchaser of the suit land, as alleged? OPD-2 7. Whether suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees, as alleged? OPD 8. Whether plaintiff has not come with clean hands and suppressed the material facts, as alleged? OPD 9. Relief. 6. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 9.9.2016 and aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court, which too, has been dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 26.2.2018, constraining the plaintiff to file the present appeal before this Court. 7. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, deserves to be set-aside. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Satyen Vaidya, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. 7. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, deserves to be set-aside. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Satyen Vaidya, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate, would support the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below and would further argue that since the findings concurrently recorded by both the learned Courts below are pure findings of fact and, therefore, this Court should loath to interfere with the same. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record carefully. 9. Now, adverting to the plea that the judgments rendered by both the learned Courts below being perverse, it would be necessary to first understand the meaning of perverse. 10. What is ‘perverse’ was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another (2009) 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under:- “26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8 "8…We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 11. What is ‘perverse’ has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ‘Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- “25….. What is ‘perverse’ has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ‘Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- “25….. A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated.” 12. What is ‘perversity’ recently came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs. Sohan Devi and others (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- “8. “Perversity” has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect.” 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram (2010) 15 SCC 530, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) “10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent.” 11. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondent-defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Material alteration of a property is not a fact confined to the exclusive/and personal knowledge of the owner. It is a matter of evidence, be it from the owner himself or any other witness speaking on behalf of the plaintiff who is conversant with the facts and the situation. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. Even the witnesses on behalf of the defendant, partially admitted that the defendants had effected some structural changes. 12. Be that as it may, the question whether there is a structural alteration in a tenanted premises is not a fact limited to the personal knowledge of the owner. It can be proved by any admissible and reliable evidence. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs-1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That finding has been endorsed by the first appellate court on reappreciation of the evidence, and therefore, the High Court in second appeal was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of fact. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man’s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 13. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278-79) “34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278-79) “34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication — what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ‘103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,— (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100.” The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with.” 14. In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case, SCC p. 615) “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 ] , Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429 : AIR 1999 SC 677 ] , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [ (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372 : AIR 2010 SC 589 ] and Babu v. State of Kerala[ (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] .)” This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity. 15. We do not propose to discuss other judgments, though there is plethora of settled case law on this issue. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court.” 13. Judged in light of the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that both the parties to the suit are co-owners and rather real brothers. The learned counsel for the appellant would argue that respondent/defendant No.1 during the pendency of the suit has sold some portion of the land and has further occupied the best portion of the land. Surprisingly, even though, there is a mention of the sale in the plaint but no relief by way of declaration has been sought for by the plaintiff. That apart, admittedly, the parties are co-owners and therefore their possession is subject to partition that may be eventually carried out. 14. As regards the defendant No.1 being co-owner, it would be noticed that this fact is specifically admitted and acknowledged in the plaint itself, therefore, the further argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that he alone had purchased the suit land in fact is not available to the plaintiff. 15. The learned Courts below have specifically found and rather held that the plaintiff had not produced any material evidence to show that there was reasonable apprehension of threats from the defendants. No material evidence has been adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendants were in fact threatening to dispossess the plaintiff or to raise construction over the suit land. This is so recorded by the learned trial Court in para-19 of the judgment which reads thus: “19. Plaintiff did not produce any material evidence to show that there is reasonable apprehension of threats from the defendants. No material evidence has been adduced to show that defendants are threatening to dispossess the plaintiff or raising the construction etc. over the suit land. Plaintiff did not produce any material evidence to show that there is reasonable apprehension of threats from the defendants. No material evidence has been adduced to show that defendants are threatening to dispossess the plaintiff or raising the construction etc. over the suit land. Some reasonable apprehension is necessary in the mind of plaintiff to seek relief of injunction. The apprehension of the plaintiff that the defendants are threatening to dispossess the plaintiff and to raise construction etc. over the suit land, is baseless as there is nothing on the record to withdraw inference that as such apprehension is reasonable. Due to these reasons, no cause of action has been arisen and no case is made out to issue injunction against the defendants.” 16. Likewise, similar observation can be found in the judgment rendered by the learned first Appellate Court in paragraph-15, which reads thus: “15. Admittedly, the defendant No.1 is not raising any construction over the suit land, as such, apprehension of the plaintiff qua accrual of cause of action is also not tenable being without any basis. The plaintiff has not led any cogent and convincing evidence to substantiate that there is reasonable apprehension of alleged threats from the defendants necessary to seek the relief of injunction. The plaintiff has miserably failed to substantiate the cause of action that the defendants are threatening to dispossess the plaintiff by raising construction on the suit land. The plaintiff is not in exclusive possession of the suit land and he has not approached the Court with clean hands.” 17. Once the essential ingredients of grant of injunction were missing, obviously then the learned Courts below had no other option but to dismiss the suit and, therefore, in the given facts and circumstances, the findings rendered by the learned Courts below cannot be termed to be perverse as alleged by learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. 18. Even otherwise, the findings rendered by the learned Courts below are pure findings of fact and cannot now be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. The plaintiff or the defendants or any other co-owner obviously is free to have the land partitioned in accordance with law. 19. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. 20. 19. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. 20. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.