ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the petitioner and also heard Mr. Moa Imchen, learned Addl. senior Government advocate appearing for all the State respondents as well as Mr. R. Iralu, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Mhabeni for the respondent No. 3. 2. The petitioner was appointed on contingency basis as chowikdar with a fixed pay of Rs. 3,000 p.m. at VHC, Sanglao on land ownership basis with a condition that he can be terminated any time without further notice. After serving almost a year, on 6.2.2015, the petitioner's service was terminated with immediate effect, vide order dated 6.2.2015, issued by the Director of Veterinary & A.H. Nagaland, Kohima, vide his Office Memo No. VET/EST-3/TSG/II(Pt)/2014-15. On the same day, in his place, the respondent No. 3 (Mr. T. Hamphai) was appointed on contingency basis with fixed pay of Rs. 3,000 p.m. with effect from the date of joining the post, vide order dated 6.2.2015, issued by the same Director of Veterinary & A.H. Nagaland, vide his Office Memo No. VET/EST-3/TSG/ 11(Pt)/2014-15, with the same conditions that he can be terminated any time without further notice. Aggrieved by the said two orders, one terminating him from service and the other appointing the respondent No. 3, the petitioner has come to this court praying for setting aside and quashing the two orders and at the same time praying for issuance of appropriate writ or order or directions directing the respondents to reinstate him in service. 3. The case of the petitioner as submitted by Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel is based on three grounds. The first ground strongly urged by the learned counsel of the petitioner is as follows: If the Government respondents have removed the petitioner in order to fill up the post on permanent or regular basis by advertising the post, the petitioner would not have a case, however, when a person appointed on contingency basis is terminated and another appointment is made in his place by another appointment of the same nature, it would be against the principle of law established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 , paras 45 and 46. The contents of the two paras are extracted here below: “45. The contents of the two paras are extracted here below: “45. The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call for an ad hoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a situation, effort should always be to replace such an ad hoc/temporary employee by a regularly selected employee as early as possible. Such a temporary employee may also compete along with others for such regular selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he does not, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an ad hoc/temporary employee. 46. Secondly, an ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority.” The second ground submitted by the learned counsel is that the petitioner was removed from service without serving any notice or without giving any chance of being heard, therefore, the impugned order removing him is against the principle of natural justice. The learned counsel went on to submit that even a temporary employee deserves to be given notice and opportunity of being heard before being terminated from service. The learned counsel in support of his submission cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of The Manager, Government of Branch Press vs. D.B. Belliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477 . The contents of para 18 of the said judgment are extracted here below: “18. Mr. Veerappa's first contention is that articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution have no application, whatever, to the case of a temporary employee whose service is terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of his service because the tenure or the duration of the employment of such an employee is extremely precarious being dependent upon the pleasure and discretion of the employer-State. In our opinion, no such generalisation can be made. The protection of articles 14 and 16(1) will be available even to such a temporary Government servant if he has been arbitrarily discriminated against and singled out for harsh treatment in preference to his juniors similarly circumstanced. In our opinion, no such generalisation can be made. The protection of articles 14 and 16(1) will be available even to such a temporary Government servant if he has been arbitrarily discriminated against and singled out for harsh treatment in preference to his juniors similarly circumstanced. It is true that the competent authority had a discretion under the conditions of service governing employee concerned to terminate the latter's employment without notice. But, such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with reason and fair play and not capriciously. Bereft of rationality and fairness, discretion degenerates into arbitrariness which is the very anti-thesis of the rule of law on which our democratic polity is founded. Arbitrary invocation or enforcement of a service condition terminating the service of a temporary employee may itself constitute denial of equal protection and offend the Equality clause in articles 14 and 16(1). Article 16(1) guarantees “equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State”. Moreover, according to the principle underlying section 16 of the General Clauses Act, the expression “appointment” used in article 16(1) will include termination of or removal from service, also.” Thirdly, the learned counsel by referring to para 5 of the affidavit filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 wherein, the reason for termination of the petitioner from his service is given submitted that the petitioner cannot be punished for any wrong that might have been committed by his father, therefore, the termination order is illegal. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the fact that VHC at Sanglao was constructed on the land of the petitioner's family is supported by the certificate issued by the Chairman and Head G.B. of the Village Council of that Village. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to a photo copy of the said certificate filed by the petitioner along with his affidavit-in-reply to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 3. Thereafter, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was a deserving person, therefore, he was rightly appointed for the land donated by his family. 4. Mr. Moa Imchen, learned Addl. Thereafter, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was a deserving person, therefore, he was rightly appointed for the land donated by his family. 4. Mr. Moa Imchen, learned Addl. Government Advocate at the very outset submitted that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Piara Singh (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is applicable only to ad hoc appointees and not for appointees on contingency basis. The learned counsel also submitted that ad hoc appointment and contingency appointment are two different appointments and they are not one and the same. Thereafter, the learned Government advocate referred to the new policy notified by the Government of Nagaland with regard to appointment to Grade IV post under land ownership basis and submitted that in view of the new policy no land owner can be appointed anymore. The learned counsel also submitted that there was no agreement between the Government and the petitioner for appointing him to any post for the land donated by his family, therefore, the petitioner has no enforceable right for appointment to any Government post. The learned Government advocate went on to submit that the Government made a mistake while issuing the appointment of the petitioner in the first place, therefore, to quash and set aside the appointment of the respondent No. 3 would amount to reviving the illegal order issued earlier by the Government authorities, and that is not permissible. The learned Government advocate lastly submitted that there is no standing policy of the Government to give a contingency appointment to any land owner, therefore, the petitioner's petition is not maintainable. 5. Mr. R. Iralu, learned senior counsel appearing for the private respondent No. 3 submitted that appointment on ad hoc and contingency basis are two different appointments and they are not the same. According to the learned counsel in the dictionary the word ‘ad hoc’ means for a particular purpose whereas ‘contingency’ means a chance appointment to meet uncertain or unforeseen situation depending on uncertain even. Therefore, the principle of law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust through the President vs. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel is not applicable in this case. The learned senior counsel also submitted that nothing is clear as to whether the petitioner or the private respondent No. 3 were appointed against any vacant post or not. The learned senior counsel also submitted that nothing is clear as to whether the petitioner or the private respondent No. 3 were appointed against any vacant post or not. However, as it appears from the appointment order it is purely on contingency and not against any vacant post. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner did not come with a clean hand as he is required to do so when he approached this court under a writ jurisdiction, therefore, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. In support of his submission, the learned counsel submitted that in his writ petition, the petitioner has stated that after his father submitted his resignation to his contingency appointment as Chowkidar he was appointed but the fact is that his father was removed from the post of Chowkidar as he was found to have been employed at the same time as D.B. of his Village. Further, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner cannot threaten the Government while looking for an employment. To prove his point, the learned counsel referred to the last sentence of the letter dated 11.3.2016, written by the petitioner to the Director of Veterinary & A.H. Department wherein, it is stated that the undersigned would be compelled to remove the Office building from the land if he is not re-instated to his contingency appointment within a period of one month. 6. Mr. R. Iralu, learned senior counsel also submitted that family land of the petitioner is stated to have been donated in 1989, therefore, the Government policy notified in 2005, vide notification dated 26.7.2005, particularly para 3 of the notification which read as follows would apply: “3. No land shall be acquired free of cost and all land shall be acquired on payment of full compensation as determined by law. No land shall be acquired free of cost and all land shall be acquired on payment of full compensation as determined by law. No further condition for employment in service or contractual works should be entertained.” By referring to the contents of the para 3 of the notification given above, the learned senior counsel submitted that since there was no agreement between the petitioner's family and the Government department and since no such condition for employment on land ownership basis can be claim any longer after the issuance of such notification, the petitioner has no right at all to claim for the employment on the basis of the land ownership even if his family had donated the land for construction of Veterinary Hospital. Thereafter, the learned senior counsel also referred to the new policy of the Government notified, vide notification dated 5.3.2018, Office Memo No. LR/6-181/LIT/2015, by the Chief Secretary had submitted that after coming into force of this policy no employment can be claimed for the land donated for Government Offices, therefore, the claim of the petitioner has become reductant. The learned senior counsel also supported the submission of the learned Government advocate that to quash and set aside the removal order of the petitioner and appointment of the respondent No. 3 would amount to reviving the illegal appointment order of the petitioner. The learned senior counsel also submitted that court should not set aside the order which appears to be illegal if its effect is to revive another illegal order. The learned counsel relied upon para 14 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel (supra). The contents of the relevant paragraph of the judgment are extracted here below: “14. It is a settled legal proposition that the court should not set aside the order which appears to be illegal, if its effect is to revive another illegal order. It is for the reason that in such an eventuality the illegality would perpetuate and it would put a premium to the undeserving party/person. It is a settled legal proposition that the court should not set aside the order which appears to be illegal, if its effect is to revive another illegal order. It is for the reason that in such an eventuality the illegality would perpetuate and it would put a premium to the undeserving party/person. Gadde Venkateswara Rao vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 , Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 16 : AIR 1999 SC 3609 , Mallikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2000) 7 SCC 238 : AIR 2000 SC 2976 , Chandra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 545 : AIR 2003 SC 2889 and State of Uttaranchal vs. Ajit Singh Bhola.” Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner having accepted the condition of his appointment that is he can be removed without any notice cannot turn around and demand that he should have been given notice. 7. In reply, Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no one had challenged the petitioner's appointment order, therefore, the legality and validity of the same cannot be questioned anymore. The learned counsel also further submitted that the petitioner's case is not based on land ownership but it is based on the question of principle of law that is whether one ad hoc appointment can be replaced by other ad hoc appointment. 8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsels in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. I have also considered the proposition of law submitted by the learned counsels. The relevant questions or issues that needs to be determined in this case are: Whether the respondents were right in issuing the order removing the petitioner from service on the ground stated therein. Whether removal of the petitioner just to be replaced by another person appointed on the same basis can be sustained in law. Before I delve into the issues, it would be appropriate to reproduce here the removal order of the petitioner issued by the Director, Veterinary & A.H. Nagaland, dated 6.2.2015, and the reasons given for issuing such order in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, particularly, para 5 of the affidavit. Before I delve into the issues, it would be appropriate to reproduce here the removal order of the petitioner issued by the Director, Veterinary & A.H. Nagaland, dated 6.2.2015, and the reasons given for issuing such order in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, particularly, para 5 of the affidavit. The same are reproduced here below one after the other: “GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND DIRECTORATE OF VETERINARY & A.H. NAGALAND: KOHIMA ORDER No. VET/ES T-3/TSG/11 (Pt)/2014-15: In the interest of public service Shri C. Thangpong, Chowkidar at Veterinary Health Centre, Sanglao under CVO, Tuensang is hereby terminated with immediate effect. Sd/- Dr. Thungchamo Ezung Directorate of Veterinary & A.H. Nagaland: Kohima.” Affidavit-in-opposition of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 “5. That as regard to the statement made in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, the answering deponent respectfully states that the post against which the petitioner was appointed was held by his father, namely, Shri T. Chetie. By letter dated nil Shri T. Chetie has submitted an application praying for voluntary retirement on health ground and at the same time to appoint the petitioner in his place. Accordingly, the petitioner was appointed against the said post. Subsequently, the department found that the father of the petitioner Shri T. Chetie was holding two posts, one as Contingency Dobashi under the establishment of the Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang and the other as Contingency post of Chowkidar under the establishment of District Veterinary & Animal Husbandry Officer, Tuensang, Nagaland. The petitioner's father has been illegally holding two posts under the State Government. As the petitioner was appointed in place of his father as contingency chowkidar, the appointment to which post the father of the petitioner is not legally entitled to, the deponent has terminated the service of the petitioner and has appointed Shri T. Hamphai, the respondent No. 3, against the said post.” 9. It appears from the affidavit of the respondent Nos. It appears from the affidavit of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that the petitioner was removed because his father who was earlier appointed to the same post was found to have served in two posts under the State Government, i.e. contingency chowkidar and the post of D.B. There is no doubt that the petitioner was appointed to the same post where his father also served before, however, that would not make his appointment per se illegal because it is not by inheritance that he was appointed to the post, he is a different person and appointed by his own merit. Just because his father was found to have served in two different posts under the same Government would not make his appointment illegal. Assuming that his father committed some wrong he cannot be punished for the same. Therefore, to remove him only on that ground would not be just and proper. 10. Further, any action taken by the Government and its machineries should be free from arbitrariness and should not be discriminatory. Every power or discretion has to be exercised in accordance with reasons and such exercise must exhibit fair play and it should not be Capricious. When such discretion is bereft of rationality and fairness, discretion degenerates into arbitrariness which is the very anti-thesis of the rule of law on which our democratic polity is founded. Therefore, every action of the Government machinery should be free from any motive or intention which would render such action arbitrary, discriminatory, unjust, unreasonable and devoid of fairness. To remove a person who has already been appointed for unreasonable reason or reasons which cannot be justified and appoint another person in his place would definitely be arbitrary and discriminatory. In such a situation, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Piara Singh (supra) referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner would definitely be applicable though the word used in that judgment does not included contingency appointment. The two kind of appointments, i.e., ad hoc appointment and contingency appointment are same in nature because they are made to meet exigencies in the service and they both are temporary. The two kind of appointments, i.e., ad hoc appointment and contingency appointment are same in nature because they are made to meet exigencies in the service and they both are temporary. Taking into account the spirit of that judgment in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the removal of the petitioner from service and the appointment of the respondent No. 3 in his place on the same basis is not sustainable in law. Therefore, the removal order of the petitioner and the appointment of the respondent No. 3 in his place are quashed and set aside. 11. In consequence, the respondents are directed to restore the petitioner to the post/ position till permanent appointment is made through regular appointment. 12. With this, the writ petition is disposed of.