JUDGMENT : R.P. DHOLARIA, J. 1. The appellant-State of Gujarat has preferred the present appeal under section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 15.9.2006 rendered by learned Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 11, Gondal Camp at Dhoraji in Sessions Case No. 61 of 2000. 2. At the outset, Mr. P.B. Khanderia, learned advocate appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 2 submitted that the respondent No. 1 Arjan Siddibhai Muchhadia died on 30.10.2011 and he placed on record the death certificate which is ordered to be taken on record. Consequently, therefore, the appeal finally stands abated against respondent no. 1. 3. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the case of the prosecution is that on the day of incident i.e. 27.8.1999, at about 5.30 a.m. the deceased Maheshbhai Nathabhai Parmar sprinkle kerosene on his own body and set on fire himself. Thereafter, immediately he was shifted to Dhoraji Civil Hospital for the treatment. The condition of the deceased was very serious therefore for better treatment, he was referred to Jamnagar Civil Hospital. On 29.9.1999 at about 3.35 a.m. in early morning during the course of the treatment, Maheshbhai died. On 27.8.1999 during the 3.00 to 4.00 a.m. complaint was registered in Dhoraji Police Station. In his complaint, Maheshbhai has stated that he committed suicide due to the intimidation of accused No. 1 and accused no. 2 who asked the deceased that "you have to die otherwise we will kill you." By this sentence, the deceased feared and killed himself by pouring kerosene on his body and set on fire himself. 4. In pursuance of the complaint, the Investigating Officer carried out the investigation and filed the charge-sheet against the respondent-accused. The charge was framed against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. 4.1 In order to bring home the guilt, the prosecution has examined several witnesses and also produced documentary evidences. 4.2 At the end of the trial, after recording the statements of the accused under section 313 of the Cr.PC and hearing the arguments on behalf of the prosecution and the defence, learned trial Court delivered the judgment and order, as stated above. 5. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant State has preferred the aforesaid Criminal Appeal before this Court. 5. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant State has preferred the aforesaid Criminal Appeal before this Court. 6. By way of preferring the present appeal, the appellant has mainly contended that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record and wrongly recorded the order of acquittal. It is further contended that learned trial Judge has not appreciated the evidence on record in its proper perspective and in fact, there was no appreciation of evidence so far and hence, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is required to be reversed, as such. 7. Ms. Hansa Punani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant State has reiterated and urged the grounds mentioned in the memo of appeal. Learned APP has taken this Court through the paper-book read out the depositions of the material witnesses. She submitted that the dying declaration of deceased came to be recorded by the learned Executive Magistrate wherein the deceased himself inter-alia stated that there was dispute between the deceased and son of the respondent as regard to sharing the amount of gambling activity. Respondent after about 10 days thereafter threatened the deceased and also asked to die due to which under the pressure and fear, as threatened by the respondent, he committed suicide. That piece of evidence is already admitted on record, but the learned trial Court has not rightly appreciated in its proper perspective. 8. On the other hand Mr. P.B. Khandheria, learned advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 argued that except the dying declaration at Exh.41 no evidence is available on record. According to his submission, on the strength of the alleged dying declaration no offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 107 of Indian Penal Code could be made out against the respondents as alleged incident of quarrel between the deceased and son of respondent-accused took place for about 15 days prior to alleged incident of commission of suicide as well as alleged incident of threatening as well as asking by the respondents to the deceased to go and die also took place 2-3 days prior to the incident. Consequently, there was no instigation, no proximate cause so as to lead him to commit suicide. Consequently, there was no instigation, no proximate cause so as to lead him to commit suicide. In the facts and circumstances of the case, learned trial Court has rightly placed the reliance upon the decision rendered in case of Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2002 SC 1998 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the definition of abatement to suicide as well as instigation to commit suicide for attracting provision of Section 306 of Indian Penal Code dealt with certain judgments to lay down the law. In the said decision of Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "8. Before we advert further, at this stage we may notice a few decisions of this Court, relevant for the purpose of disposal of this case. 9. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 438, the appellant was charged for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the ground that the appellant during the quarrel is said to have remarked the deceased to go and die. This Court was of the view that mere words uttered by the accused to the deceased to go and die were not even prima facie enough to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. 10. In Mahendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 731, the appellant was charged for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C basically based upon the dying declaration of the deceased, which reads as under: "My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning." 11. This Court, considering the definition of abetment under Section 107 I.P.C. found that the charge and conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 306 is not sustainable merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased. This Court further held that neither of the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased. 12. This Court, considering the definition of abetment under Section 107 I.P.C. found that the charge and conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 306 is not sustainable merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased. This Court further held that neither of the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased. 12. In Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , this Court while considering the charge framed and the conviction for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the basis of dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate , in which she had stated that previously there had been quarrel between the deceased and her husband and on the day of occurrence she had a quarrel with her husband who had said that she could go wherever she wanted to go and that thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and had set fire. Acquitting the accused this Court said: "A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged for abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." 13. Reverting to the facts of the case, both the courts below have erroneously accepted the prosecution story that the suicide by the deceased is the direct result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25th July, 1998 wherein it is alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and had reportedly told the deceased to go and die. For this, the courts relied on a statement of Shashi Bhushan, brother of the deceased, made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. when reportedly the deceased, after coming back from the house of the appellant, told him that the appellant had humiliated him and abused him with filthy words. For this, the courts relied on a statement of Shashi Bhushan, brother of the deceased, made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. when reportedly the deceased, after coming back from the house of the appellant, told him that the appellant had humiliated him and abused him with filthy words. The statement of Shashi Bhushan, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is annexed as annexure P-3 to this appeal and going through the statement, we find that he has not stated that the deceased had told him that the appellant had asked him to go and die. Even if we accept the prosecution story that the appellant did tell the deceased to go and die, that itself does not constitute the ingredient of instigation. The word instigate denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or in a spur of the moment cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea. It is in a fit of anger and emotional. Secondly, the alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the deceased were on 25th July, 1998 ensued by quarrel. The deceased was found hanging on 27th July, 1998. Assuming that the deceased had taken the abusive language seriously, he had enough time in between to think over and reflect and, therefore, it cannot be said that the abusive language, which had been used by the appellant on 25th July, 1998 derived the deceased to commit suicide. Suicide by the deceased on 27th July, 1998 is not proximate to the abusive language uttered by the appellant on 25th July, 1998. The fact that the deceased committed suicide on 27th July, 1998 would itself clearly pointed out that it is not the direct result of the quarrel taken place on 25th July, 1998 when it is alleged that the appellant had used the abusive language and also told the deceased to go and die. This fact had escaped notice of the courts below. 14. The next and most important material is the suicide note left by the deceased. The translated copy is annexed to this appeal as annexure P-1. This fact had escaped notice of the courts below. 14. The next and most important material is the suicide note left by the deceased. The translated copy is annexed to this appeal as annexure P-1. It is extracted: "SUICIDE NOTE Danik Bhaskar 581 South Civil Lines Jabalpur Agent Name - Sengar New Agency Place - Goshalpur No. of copies - 409 Date Name of the person who prepared label Gosalpur Sengar has threatned to report under Dowery demand and threatned to involve family members due to this I am writing in my full senses that Sanjay Sangar is responsible for my death. Sanjay Sangar also Mukraj commander Loota Tha Sanjay ki. Sengar New Agency Gosalpur. I was threatened therefore I am dying Sangar Gosalpur My name Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam Babloo Goutam. In my senses Sengar responsible for my death. My moti Darling my moti. You look after my Chukho. My darling Moti Neelam Sengar @ Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam Gandhigram Budghagar. Sengar is responsible for my death Sanjay Sengar is responsible for my death Sanjay Sengar is responsible for my death Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam Gandhigram Budhagar." 15. A plain reading of the suicide note would clearly show that the deceased was in great stress and depressed. One plausible reason could be that the deceased was without any work or avocation and at the same time indulged in drinking as revealed from the statement of the wife Smt. Neelam Sengar. He was a frustrated man. Reading of the suicide note will clearly suggest that such a note is not a handy work of a man with sound mind and sense. Smt. Neelam Sengar, wife of the deceased, made a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the Investigation Officer. She stated that the deceased always indulged in drinking wine and was not doing any work. She also stated that on 26th July, 1998 her husband came to them in an inebriated condition and was abusing her and other members of the family. The prosecution story, if believed, shows that the quarrel between the deceased and the appellant had taken place on 25th July, 1998 and if the deceased came back to the house again on 26th July, 1998, it cannot be said that the suicide by the deceased was the direct result of the quarrel that had taken pace on 25th July, 1998. Viewed from the aforesaid circumstances independently, we are clearly of the view that the ingredients of abetment are totally absent in the instant case for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. It is in the statement of the wife that the deceased always remained in a drunkened condition. It is a common knowledge that excessive drinking leads one to debauchery. It clearly appeared, therefore, that the deceased was a victim of his own conduct unconnected with the quarrel that had ensued on 25th July, 1998 where the appellant is stated to have used abusive language. Taking the totality of materials on record and facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, it will lead to irresistible conclusion that it is the deceased and he alone, and none else, is responsible for his death. 16. In the result, this appeal succeeds. The charge-sheet dated 2nd July, 2001, framed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sihora, in Sessions Trial No. 469 of 1998 for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. and the order of the High Court under challenge are hereby quashed. 17. The appellant is on bail. His surety and bail bond shall stand discharged." 9. Indisputably, as per prosecution case on 27.8.1999, deceased Maheshbhai poured the kerosene on his body and set himself on fire and committed suicide and there appears no dispute that his death was suicidal and that fact is also believed by the learned trial Court. 10. Now, the question arises for determination of this Court as to whether the alleged incident of quarrel between son of respondent No. 2 with the deceased for about 15 days prior to committing the suicide and for about 2-3 days thereafter respondents threatened deceased-Maheshbhai and also asked him to die otherwise he will be killed and due to which fear of such incident, he committed suicide for about 8-10 days later on would constitute the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 107 of Indian Penal Code. 11. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, this Court has gone through dying declaration made by Maheshbhai which inter alia states that the cause of his pouring over kerosene over his person is that the son of the respondent took up the quarrel with him 10 days prior to the incident with regard to the distribution of money that derived from the gambling. After that incident about 2-3 days later on respondent threatened Maheshbhai to go and die otherwise they would finish him and under that pressure and fear, Maheshbhai poured the kerosene over his person and set himself on fire and due to which he received burnt injuries over his person. 12. On the overall evaluation of recital emerging out from the alleged dying declaration made by deceased Maheshbhai before the Executive Magistrate in tune with the aforesaid various decisions, this Court also finds that even prima facie narration would not be enough to instigate to the deceased to commit suicide even if such sort of utterances would have been made 10 days prior to the incident. Indisputably, even if the alleged threat as well as asking him to die may be believed to be true which was the incident for about 10-15 days prior to the incident. Indisputably, thereafter nothing is revealing from record that prior to the commission of suicide on the part of deceased Maheshbhai, there was any conversation between the respondent accused within 10 days, which clearly demonstrates that there was no proximate cause for any sort of inducement, instigation or abetement on the part of the respondent to deceased Maheshbhai. This Court has also gone through the entire judgment recorded by learned trial Court and while answering the points of determination, the trial Court recorded ample reasons and rightly placed the reliance upon decision of Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra). 13. In view of the aforesaid nature of evidence, learned trial Court has rightly recorded the acquittal of the accused which calls for no interference. 14. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeals, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. 15. In above view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that learned trial court was completely justified in acquitting the respondents of the charges levelled against them. This Court finds that the findings recorded by learned trial court are absolutely just and proper and in recording the said findings, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it. This Court finds that the findings recorded by learned trial court are absolutely just and proper and in recording the said findings, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it. This Court is, therefore, in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by learned court below and hence finds no reasons to interfere with the same. 16. In the result, this appeal fails and accordingly, it is dismissed. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled.