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2018 DIGILAW 1263 (GAU)

Sashi Bhushan Tiwari v. Dilip Kumar Nandy

2018-08-27

KALYAN RAI SURANA

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JUDGMENT : KALYAN RAI SURANA, J. 1. Heard Mr. B. Borah, the learned advocate for the petitioner as well as Mr. EC. Dey, the learned advocate for the respondents. 2. By this revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 09.02.2016, passed by the learned Special Tribunal, Guwahati, in Special Land Grabbing Case No. 8/2014, which was instituted under Section 8 of the Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2010 (herein after referred to as "the 2010 Act"). 3. Both the respondents herein are the petitioners in the said land grabbing case. The petitioner herein is the Opp. Party in the said case. The petitioner herein had filed an application under Section 8(4) of the 2010 Act, inter-alia, praying for the dismissal of the said proceeding. However, by the order dated 21.01.2016, which is impugned herein, the said learned Tribunal had ordered that the said petition would be disposed at the time of final judgment 4. The learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that after the case was instituted, the learned Tribunal by order dated 18.07.2014, had referred the matter to the Circle Officer, Dispur Revenue Circle for inspection and verification and to submit a report. Thus, when the Revenue staff visited the residence of the petitioner in the third week of September, 2014, he came to know about the "land grabbing" proceeding. Accordingly, 30.09.2014, the petitioner had filed the said petition under Section 8(4) of the 2010 Act, referred herein before, which was numbered as petition no. 8551/14 dated 30.09.2014. It is submitted that the respondents did not file any objection to the said petition. The learned Tribunal had called the records of TS No. 37/2008 from the Court of Civil Judge No. 2, Guwahati. It is submitted that thereafter, without filing any objection, the respondents had filed their written argument on 16.09.2015 and the petitioner had also filed his written argument in connection with the said petition no. 8551/14. 5. The learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner's father is the real owner of the disputed land and the petitioner is residing therein as the family member of his father and that the said case was instituted without making the father of the petitioner a party to the land grabbing case with doubtful motive. 8551/14. 5. The learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner's father is the real owner of the disputed land and the petitioner is residing therein as the family member of his father and that the said case was instituted without making the father of the petitioner a party to the land grabbing case with doubtful motive. It is submitted that the father of the respondent No. 2 had purchased the land now under dispute from Dr. Bipul Kalita vide registered sale deed No. 8130 dated 23.09.2003. However, the TS No. 37/2008 filed by the said vendor of the respondent No. 2 along with others had withdrawn the suit and, as such, his right, title, interest and possession over the suit land was never declared by the civil Court and, as such, any claim which the respondents had over the disputed land, had lapsed by withdrawal of the said suit by the vendor of the respondent No. 2 and, as such, the institution of the land grabbing case was an abuse of the process of law. It is submitted that the alleged vendor of the respondent No. 2 did not have possession over the disputed land and no valid title had passed on to the respondent No. 2. It is submitted that if the schedule of land which is the subject matter of TS No. 37/2008 and the present land grabbing case are compared, it would be apparent that they are two different plots of land. It is also submitted that the respondent No. 2 claimed to be the owner of the disputed land, and the case was being conducted through the respondent No. 1 on the strength of a power of attorney bearing registered deed No. 1552/2010 dated 06.05.2010. It is also submitted that the respondents had instituted proceedings under Section 145/146 Cr.P.C., which was registered as Case No. 34m/2011, wherein it was alleged that some unknown persons were trying to encroach the land. Hence, for the above reasons and other reasons as stated in the said petition, the learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the present proceeding is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, as such, he prays for setting aside the impugned order by directing the learned Tribunal to first dispose of the petition No. 8551/14 filed under Section 8(4) of the 2010 Act. 6. 6. Per contra, the learned advocate for the respondents has submitted that the 2010 Act is not in derogation of any other law in force. Hence, notwithstanding the previous proceeding under other laws, the institution of land grabbing case is not prohibited because the said Act was enacted with a view to arrest the menace of land grabbing. It is submitted that the petitioner has not made any attempt to explain the inordinate delay of 1112 years to challenge the orders dated 21.01.2016 and 09.02.2016, by which time the enquiry being conducted by the learned Special Tribunal has considerably progressed. It is submitted that the respondent No. 2 had purchased the suit land on 29.03.2003 and, as such, he has nothing to do with the institution of TS No. 37/2008 and therefore, as the respondents have been able to make out a case against the petitioner for his offence of land grabbing, the present revision has been instituted only to delay the trial. In support of his submissions to the effect that as per the scheme of 2-1-Act, the civil liability would be decided first if defence that the respondents having better title is taken and then the criminal liability is to be decided, the learned advocate for the respondents has placed reliance on the case of XXX Vs. In Re: State of Assam, 2017 (5) GLT 854. 7. Having heard the learned advocates for both sides, the materials annexed to this revision is perused. It is seen from the nature of the various pleas taken by the petitioners that unless the learned Tribunal makes a preliminary enquiry, the veracity of the plea cannot be decided summarily. In terms of the order of this court in the case of XXX Vs. In Re: State of Assam, 2017(5) GLT 854: (2018) 2 GLR 313, the learned Tribunal is required to decide the civil liability first, owing to the nature of defence taken. Thus, the order impugned herein to dispose of the petition No. 8551/14 at the time of final disposal of the case cannot be faulted with. 8. In this context, the learned Tribunal is required to be 'guided' by the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cited case. The relevant paragraph 17, 19 and 21 are quoted below. "17. 8. In this context, the learned Tribunal is required to be 'guided' by the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cited case. The relevant paragraph 17, 19 and 21 are quoted below. "17. From a conjoint reading of the various provisions of the 2010 Act, what is discernible is that the main object of the 2010 Act is to protect the owner and possessor of the land from unlawful land grabbing and to punish the criminal land grabbers. The 2010 Act seeks to prohibit and punish land grabbing, which has now become a menace in the State. It is also seen that if the alleged land grabber claims or puts up a defence of proprietary right or ownership or possessory right over the land in question, then the civil liability would be: adjudicated first and if he fails to establish any such right, then criminal proceeding for prosecution of the land grabber would recommence. Thus, as per the scheme of the 2010 Act, upon cognizance being taken of the criminal offence of land grabbing, the Special Tribunal would proceed with the prosecution of the land grabber not only for the purpose of punishing him but also to recover the grabbed land from the land grabber for restoring possession of the grabbed land to the person from whom the land was grabbed. If in this proceeding, the alleged land grabber takes up the defence of ownership, possession or better claim over the land in question, the Special Tribunal shall first determine that question and keep the criminal trial in abeyance till such determination. However, we have to bear in mind that the principal object of the 2010 Act is not to adjudicate right, title or possession over the land in question. Therefore, by its very nature, such determination of civil liability has to be of a summary nature and cannot partake the character of a full fledged civil suit, which is ordinarily a long drawn affair, thereby frustrating the very purport and object of the 2010 Act. This is so because the alleged land grabber had not approached the civil court for declaration of his right, title, interest or possession over the land in question; it is only when he is prosecuted as a land grabber that he takes up the plea of better claim over the land in question as his defence. This is so because the alleged land grabber had not approached the civil court for declaration of his right, title, interest or possession over the land in question; it is only when he is prosecuted as a land grabber that he takes up the plea of better claim over the land in question as his defence. It is for facilitating a smooth criminal trial, that the above defence, if taken, would be taken up and determined first in a summary manner having regard to the mandate of the 2010 Act. Thus, the legislature did not intend to prohibit proceeding of the criminal trial of a person alleged to have committed an offence of land grabbing, rather it postpones the criminal trial till adjudication of civil liability of the alleged land grabber in a summary manner as discussed above. In that view of the matter, the procedure prescribed in Section 10(2) of the 2010 Act cannot be said to be unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The procedure prescribed cannot also be said to be hit by the protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. Under the provisions of the 2010 Act, as discussed above, the criminal trial would be postponed or kept in abeyance till determination of the civil liability in a summary manner, if taken up as a defence plea by the accused having regard to the requirement of Section 11 whereby and where under presumption would be that land grabbing had taken place and burden would be on the accused to prove otherwise. 19. Therefore, it is a well settled law that even if a person is a trespasser, he cannot be dispossessed of his possession over a land without following the due process of law. We find that even if a person sets up his bona-fide title as a defence, still a suit for possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 would be maintainable. However, under sub-section (4) of Section 6, there is no bar for a person to sue in order to establish his title over such property and to recover possession thereof. However, under sub-section (4) of Section 6, there is no bar for a person to sue in order to establish his title over such property and to recover possession thereof. Similarly, in a proceeding under the 2010 Act, the Special Tribunal having jurisdiction shall first determine the civil liability, if a defence plea is taken, in a summary manner for a limited purpose and then decide the criminal culpability of the person who is the alleged wrong-doer. By setting up a defence of title, no person becomes entitled to take law into his own hands and unlawfully dispossess another person from a plot of land without following the due process of law. 21. In so far question No. (ii) is concerned, all that Section 8(3) of the 2010 Act says is that for the purpose of taking cognizance, the Special Tribunal may consider the location of the land alleged to have been grabbed or the estimated value of the land or the nature of land grabbing or such other relevant matter. This is very much in order and there is nothing unusual about it. Regarding the proviso, it says that the Special Tribunal shall not take cognizance of a complaint without hearing the petitioner or the aggrieved person. As per sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the 2010 Act, the Special Tribunal may take cognizance either suo-moto or on application by the aggrieved person. If the complaint is by way of application, then the Special Tribunal shall hear the petitioner and in case of suo-moto proceeding, the Special Tribunal shall hear the aggrieved party. The hearing envisaged in the proviso has to be a preliminary hearing, and not a substantial hearing, only for the purpose of the Special Tribunal prima facie satisfying itself that it is a fit case for taking cognizance. Thus, Section 8(3) of the 2010 Act read as a whole provides for a prima facie satisfaction of the Special Tribunal before taking cognizance only to ensure that cognizance is not taken mechanically and that there is application of mind before taking cognizance. This provision is akin to Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which provides for examination of the complainant while taking cognizance of a complaint. Therefore, there is no question of the provisions of Section A 8(3) of the 2010 Act being arbitrary or against the rule of law or being unconstitutional. This provision is akin to Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which provides for examination of the complainant while taking cognizance of a complaint. Therefore, there is no question of the provisions of Section A 8(3) of the 2010 Act being arbitrary or against the rule of law or being unconstitutional. This question is answered accordingly." 9. This Court in the above cited case of In Re: State of Assam (supra), has held that the hearing envisaged under proviso to sub-section (4) of Section A 8 of 2010 Act has to be a preliminary hearing, and not a substantial hearing, only for the oppose of the Special Tribunal prima facie satisfying itself that it is a fit case for taking cognizance. It is further interpreted by this Court that the purpose of Section A 8(3) of the 2010 Act read as a whole provides for a prima facie satisfaction of the Special Tribunal before taking cognizance only to ensure that cognizance is not taken mechanically and that is application of mind before taking cognizance. 10. Moreover, it is seen that trial under the 2010 Act is specifically designed for expeditious disposal, but in the present case in hand, the trial is pending since the year 2014 and, as such, this Court finds that that the learned Special Tribunal had rightly not embarked upon to decide the plea taken by the petitioner by filing petition No. 8551/14 filed under Section A 8(4) of the 2010 Act, which is in the nature of raising a preliminary issue in a regular civil suit, because the trial under the 2010 Act is not to be undertaken as if the learned Tribunal is deciding a civil suit. 11. Moreover, it is seen that the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed on 22.06.2017 to challenge the orders dated 21.01.2016 and 09.02.2016, i.e. after a delay of about 11/2 years. Although no period of limitation is prescribed to approach this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, but it is expected that the petitioner must satisfactorily explain the reasons for the inordinate delay in approaching this Court. In this regard, this Court is guided by the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bithika Mazumdar & Anr. Vs. Sagar Pal & Ors., (2017) 2 SCC 748 . In this regard, this Court is guided by the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bithika Mazumdar & Anr. Vs. Sagar Pal & Ors., (2017) 2 SCC 748 . However, in the present case, no attempt whatsoever has been made to explain the reasons for the delay in approaching this Court. 12. Furthermore, the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is only available if the order impugned suffers from jurisdictional error and this extraordinary power is required to be sparingly used to correct mere errors. In the case of Ouseph Mathai Vs. Mabdul Khadir, (2002) 1 SCC 319 : AIR 2002 SC 110 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be used only where it is established that lower Court or Tribunal has been guilty of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power, which has resulted in grave injustice to any party. In the case of Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 91, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not confer unlimited power to correct all wrong decisions, it is only to be exercised in cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law, or justice, where, in the absence of intervention of the High Court, grave injustice would remain unchallenged and uncorrected. 13. In the present case, the order impugned herein cannot prejudice the petitioner because the said order provides that the plea raised by him would be addressed at the time of final disposal of the case. Thus, this is not a case where the order has caused any grave injustice to the petitioner, which cannot be rectified. Merely, the petitioner will have to see the logical conclusion of the land grabbing proceeding. 14. Hence, viewed from all angles, the present challenge fails and, as such, this application stands dismissed by leaving the parties to bear their own cost. 15. The interim order dated 23.06.2017, thereby staying the proceeding of Special Land Grabbing Case No. 8/2014 stands vacated. The learned Special Tribunal shall now expeditiously try and dispose of the said proceeding in accordance with law.