ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Rajiv Sinha, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. 2. Heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar, counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents. 3. Heard Mr. Ashish Kumar Thakur, A.C. to S.C. (L&C) appearing on behalf of the respondent-State. 4. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:- “That, the instant writ application is filed for issuance of writ of certiorari, and appropriate direction and quashing the order dated 03/10/2006 passed in R.M.R. No.434 of 1985 – 1986 whereby the learned Commissioner has set aside the concurrent finding of facts of the Additional Deputy Commissioner and the Sub – Divisional Officer, Dumka, and allowed the petition of the private respondents seeking eviction of the petitioner from Plot No. 377 and 378 of Village – Pindra, Police Station – Saraiyahat, District – Dumka. Further, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to restrain the respondent authority from evicting the petitioner from the plots on question, on which situates residential building of the petitioner, during pendency of the writ.” 5. Counsel for the petitioners submits as under:- (a) That as back as on 26.11.1978 during settlement proceeding at Khanapuri stage ancestors of the private respondents herein had claimed that the property in question is their raiyati land, but in the said proceeding the petitioner’s ancestors claimed possession on the basis of Kurfa-Settlement from the recorded tenant dated 5th Aghan, 1345 – F.S. (Fasli). (b) The Assistant Settlement Officer vide order dated 26.02.1979 declared the possession of the petitioners. Thereafter, the private respondents on 31.03.1979 filed an application under Section 42 of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provision) Act, 1949 before the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka which was numbered as R.E. Case No. 345 of 1978-79 and the petitioners were sought to be evicted from the property occupied by the petitioners being plot nos. 377 and 378 of Jamabandi No. 33 of Mauza Pindra, P.S. Saraiyahat. (c) Pursuant to such application, notices were issued and order was passed for conducting on the spot enquiry and a detailed report of the Circle Officer, Saraiyahat dated 26.08.1980 was prepared and he found that the petitioners were in possession of the property. 377 and 378 of Jamabandi No. 33 of Mauza Pindra, P.S. Saraiyahat. (c) Pursuant to such application, notices were issued and order was passed for conducting on the spot enquiry and a detailed report of the Circle Officer, Saraiyahat dated 26.08.1980 was prepared and he found that the petitioners were in possession of the property. By referring to the report of the Circle Officer, as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ petition, counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that one of the persons namely Bhola Nath Dutta had deposed before the Circle Officer that the petitioners are in possession of the property by virtue of Kurfanama, and he was one of the witnesses to the kurfanama amongst others, and the rest of the witnesses of the kurfanama had already expired. He during his statement before the Circle Officer had also made statement that the petitioners are in possession of the property since 1938. The counsel submits that the other witnesses in the report of the Circle Officer had stated that the petitioners are in possession of the property for about 40 to 50 years. He submits that thereafter another report dated 16.03.1981 was submitted by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, which was on similar lines. (d) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that although the Kurfanama is an unregistered document, but as the possession of the petitioners on the property was prior to more than 12 years from 01.11.1949, when counted from the date of Kurfanama which is dated 5th Aghan, 1345 – F.S. (Fasli), therefore, the petitioners had perfected their title by way of adverse possession, and therefore no order could have been passed against the petitioners for evicting the petitioners from the property involved in this case in exercise of powers under Section 42 of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provision) Act, 1949 which itself came into force with effect from 1.11.1949. (e) He submits that the said petition being R.E. Case No. 345 of 1978-79 was dismissed vide order dated 28.05.1981. (e) He submits that the said petition being R.E. Case No. 345 of 1978-79 was dismissed vide order dated 28.05.1981. The private respondents preferred appeal against the order passed in R.E. Case No. 345 of 1978-79 which was numbered as R.M.A. Case No. 213 of 1981-82, and the said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 18.10.1985 and a finding was recorded that the petitioner had perfected his title by way of adverse possession by remaining in possession of the property for 12 years prior to 1.11.1949 when counted from the date of Kurfanama dated 5th Aghan, 1345 – F.S. (Fasli). (f) He submits that thereafter revision was filed by the private respondents which was numbered as R.M.R. Case No. 434 of 1985-86 before the Commissioner, Santhal Pargana Division at Dumka who allowed the revision vide order dated 27.06.1994. In R.M.R. Case No.434 of 1985-86, the said authority after holding settlement through Kurfanama as fake document, held that the petitioners were not entitled for the benefit of adverse possession in the light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court reported in 1985 BBCJ 12 (F.B) and the said authority also held that the petitioners do not have possession over the property for 12 years prior to the enactment of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 i.e., prior to 1.11.1949. (g) Against this, the petitioners filed writ petition being C.W.J.C. No.6473 of 1994 which was disposed of vide order dated 28.02.1996 and the matter was remanded back to the Commissioner for fresh consideration and for passing fresh order after considering the relevant evidences and the materials on record. The operative portion of the said order dated 28.02.1996 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6473 of 1994 to has been referred to by the counsel for the petitioners which reads as follows:- “After hearing the parties and after having gone through the order under challenge, I am of the view that the respondent Commissioner has not applied his mind and without looking into the relevant evidences, as referred to above has set aside the orders of the courts below and thereby non-suited the petitioners from the land in question. The finding quoted above is based upon surmises and conjectures. The finding quoted above is based upon surmises and conjectures. Accordingly, I quash the order dated 27.6.94 passed by the Commissioner and remit the case back to him to pass a fresh order after hearing the parties in accordance with law after taking into consideration the relevant documents. This application is accordingly, allowed to the extent indicated above.” (h) Counsel for the petitioners has also referred to the affidavit which was filed by the petitioners in the said writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 6473 of 1994 to demonstrate that the petitioners had completed more than 12 years prior to coming into force of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 and accordingly the claim of adverse possession of the petitioners was squarely covered by the judgment passed by full Bench decision reported in 1985 BBCJ 12 . (i) During the course of arguments, counsel for the petitioners has referred to the calendar prepared by Jagjiwan Ganesh Jee Jetha Bhai, 3rd edition wherein it has been mentioned that Fasli year 1308 began in 1900 A.D. and accordingly 1345 F.S.( FASLI) is equivalent 1937 A.D of the calendar year, and therefore 12 years had expired in the year 1949 prior to coming into force of Santhal Pragana Tenancy (Supplementary Provision) Act, 1949. (j) He submits that as per aforesaid affidavit filed in the earlier writ petition the 5th Aghan 1345 Fasli year corresponds to September and October 1937 and can never be November 1938. He submits that in view of the statement made in this affidavit which was filed by the petitioner in C.W.J.C. 6473 of 1994, the matter was remanded back to the Commissioner for passing fresh order after considering the materials on record and also considering these facts. (k) He submits that after the order of remand by this court in the said writ petition, the Commissioner has passed fresh order dated 03.10.2006 which is the impugned order in this case and it is submitted that the Commissioner has again failed to consider that the petitioners had completed 12 years prior to coming into force of Santhal Pragana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 and again the Commissioner has passed the order on the basis of surmises and conjecture and therefore the impugned order is perverse and is fit to be set-aside. (l) Counsel for the petitioners has referred to the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Deo Narayan Singh reported in 1985 BBCJ 12 and submits that as per the ratio of this judgment there is no applicability of Section 42 read with Section 20, if a person has perfected his title by way of adverse possession of 12 years prior to coming into force of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 i.e., prior to 1.11.1949. (m) He submits that although this particular judgment was subject matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4657 of 1984 but the said civil appeal was allowed by Hon’ble Supreme Court on another point and the ratio in connection with adverse possession which has been laid down by earlier full bench judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer Reported in 1972 PLJR 415 (FB) and followed in the case of Deo Narayan Singh reported in 1985 BBCJ 12 : 1985 PLJR 1 (FB)] has not been set-aside. (n) Counsel for the petitioners submits that without prejudice to the aforesaid contention regarding adverse possession, he is raising another issue, which according to him is pure question of law, that residential house is standing on the property and therefore provisions of Section 42 read with Section 20 the Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provision) Act, 1949 has no applicability and for this purpose counsel for the petitioners has referred to para 6 of the judgment reported in BBCJ 1988 372 and also para 12 of the judgment reported in 2003 (3) JCR 230 (Jhr). He fairly submits that although no such point was taken before any of the authorities below or even in this writ petition, but that being a pure question of law, it can be taken during the course of arguments. 6. Counsel for the private respondents on the other hand submits that in the impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner, there is specific findings that the land in question was admittedly recorded in the name of the father of the private respondents herein and that the land was not transferrable which could not be transferred by way of sale, mortgage, will lease or any other contract or agreement expressed or implied as per the provisions of sub-Section 1 of Section 20 of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949. The Commissioner while recording the findings has also doubted the genuineness of the Kufra on the basis of which the petitioners have claimed possession and has also claimed that they have perfected their title by way of adverse possession .Further the Commissioner has also considered that even if Kufra as claimed by the petitioners is taken into account and even if the Fasli year 1345 is said to be corresponding to English year 1937 then also considering the date as 5th Aghan the petitioners cannot be said to have completed 12 years of possession prior to first of November, 1949 as 5th day of Aghan of the year Fasli year 1345 will certainly fall after 1st day November, 1949 of the calendar year. Counsel for the private respondents also submits that there is no material on record and no material has been produced by the petitioners to demonstrate that on 5th of Aghan of Fasli year 1345 the petitioners had completed 12 years of possession and therefore the claim of adverse possession by the petitioners is not established and accordingly reliance of the petitioners on the judgment passed by Hon’ble full bench in the judgment reported in 1985 BBCJ 12 : 1985 PLJR 1 (FB) as well as the judgment passed in case of Bhauri Lal Jain reported in AIR 1973 Patna 1 : 1972 PLJR 415 (FB) has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of this case. 7. On the point that house has been constructed on the property in question and therefore Section 20 read with Section 42 of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 has no applicability, the counsel for the private respondents submits, that admittedly, the private respondents were recorded tenant of the property which is Jamabandi land and merely because some houses are constructed that does not change the nature of land. He also submits that otherwise also this point was never raised by the writ petitioners before any of the authorities below and also in the writ petition which has been filed before this Court, and accordingly this point cannot be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction that too at the time of arguments. He submits that this objection is without prejudice to the fact that the property in question is agricultural land. He submits that this objection is without prejudice to the fact that the property in question is agricultural land. So far as the judgment which has been relied upon by the petitioners which are reported in 2003 (3) JCR 230 : 2003 (3) JLJR 223 and 1988 BBCJ 372 are concerned, he submits that the same has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of this case. The judgment reported in 2003 (3) JCR 230 (Jhr) : 2003 (3) JLJR 223 related to a land which was admittedly acquired and was a Basauri land and the nature of the land had changed in accordance with the provisions of Santhal Pargana Regulations, Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 and so far as judgment reported in 1988 BBCJ 372 is concerned, in that case also admittedly the land in question was governed by the provisions of Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 and was no longer an agricultural land. He submits that in the instant case there is no material on record to suggest that the nature of the land was ever changed by any order of any competent authority and merely because some construction, as alleged by the petitioner, has come up, the same does not change the nature of land from agricultural to non-agricultural. 8. Counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand submits that the impugned order has been rightly passed and he also submits that even from the calendar of 1345 Fasli year, 5th of Aghan will fall only in the month of November and accordingly even if best case of petitioners is taken into account, i.e the petitioners came in possession of the property by virtue of Kufra executed as back as on 5th of Aghan in the Fasli year 1345, then also on 1st November, 1949 i.e., date on which Santhal Pargna Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 came into force, the petitioners had not completed 12 years of possession and accordingly they cannot be said to have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. This aspect of the matter has been properly considered by the authority upon remand by this court and accordingly the impugned order does not call for any interference. This aspect of the matter has been properly considered by the authority upon remand by this court and accordingly the impugned order does not call for any interference. He submits that this submission is without prejudice to the contention that the authority has giving a finding that, the kufra, which is claimed to be document by which the petitioners came in possession of the property, was itself not a genuine document. He submits that Commissioner has clearly recorded that the said Kurfa was never brought on record before any of the authorities and only photocopy of certain documents were filed before the said authority and even before this Court the said Kurfa is not on record therefore the claim of the petitioners that they came in possession of this property by virtue of kurfa has no basis. He further submits that although the petitioners’ claims to have obtained property through kurfa as back as in the fasli year 1345 but at any stage and at any point of time they never applied for any mutation in the revenue records and accordingly it is submitted that the claim of the petitioner has been rightly rejected by the impugned order. 9. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record including various judgments relied upon by the petitioners as well as pages of “100 years Indian calendar by Jagjiwan Ganeshjee Jetha Bhai 3rd edition” as produced by the counsel appearing for the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant any relief to the writ petitioners. 10. On the point of claim of adverse possession (a) From the perusal of the inspection reports which was conducted by the Circle Officer, it appears that inspection was conducted on 26.08.1980 and some of the persons had stated that the petitioners are in possession of the property for last 40 to 45 years which can relate back to the year 1935. However, one person namely Bhola Nath Dutta has made specific statement that he was a witness to kurfa which is claimed by the petitioners but he has stated that the petitioners are in possession of the property only from 1938. Another report dated 16.03.1981 was submitted by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector which was on similar lines. However, one person namely Bhola Nath Dutta has made specific statement that he was a witness to kurfa which is claimed by the petitioners but he has stated that the petitioners are in possession of the property only from 1938. Another report dated 16.03.1981 was submitted by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector which was on similar lines. (b) It is specific case of the petitioners that the petitioners came in possession of the property by virtue of kurfa executed in fasli year 1345 dated 5th of Aghan. This kurfa is admittedly unregistered document and even if the claim of the petitioners in connection with possession of the petitioners is taken to be correct then also this Court finds on account of the following reasons that the petitioners has not completed 12 years prior to coming into force of Santhal Pragana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 which came into force with effect from 1st November, 1949. The petitioners have relied upon the calendar whose para – 30 and 31 reads as follows:- “30. The Bengali San prevails throughout Bengal. It is used with the Bengali solar calendar. It dates from the time of the Emperor Akbar. His reign began in February 1556 A.D., when the Hijri year 963 was current and the Hindu solar year which began in that Hijri Year was given the same number. The reckoning has been kept up since according to solar years. The Bengali San 1307 began in 1900 A.D. 31. The Fasli San the dates of which are given in this book is current in northern India. It is used with the Luni-solar year beginning with Puruimanta Aswina Vadya 1. The peculiar way in which its days are numbered has been described above (para 16). This era also dates from the reign of Akbar. The luni-solar year which began in September 1555 was reckoned as 963 the number of the Hijri year which began about the same time, and the reckoning has been since kept up by luni solar years. The Fasli year 1308 began in 1900 A.D.” (c) From perusal of the calendar as mentioned in the said calendar produced by the petitioners, this court finds that the various months of Fasli calendar as recorded in this particular calendar has no reference to Aghan month rather it is the Bengali calendar which has Aghan month. The Fasli year 1308 began in 1900 A.D.” (c) From perusal of the calendar as mentioned in the said calendar produced by the petitioners, this court finds that the various months of Fasli calendar as recorded in this particular calendar has no reference to Aghan month rather it is the Bengali calendar which has Aghan month. The extract of the comparative calendar of Fasli year, Bengali year and English calendar year is as under :- English calendar year Fasli year Bengali year October 1937 Assun and Kartik 1345 Assin and Kartik November 1937 Kartik and magsir 1345 Kartik and Agrahayan December, 1937 Magsir and pous 1345 Agrahayan and pous (d) Thus the various months of fasli calendar as recorded in this particular calendar has no reference to Aghan month rather the calendar which also refers to Bengali calendar has Aswin and Kartik in the month of October, 1937 Kartik and Aghan month in the month of November, 1937 and Aghan and Pus month in the month of December, 1937. (e) This Court finds that Masgir month in fasli calendar almost corresponds to Aghan month of Bengali calendar which has been spelled as Agrahayan and there is no Aghan month in fasli calendar. The specific case of the petitioners is that the kurfa was executed on 5th day of Aghan in fasli calendar of the 1345. (f) This Court further finds that the Aghan month of Bengali Calendar and Masgir month of fasli calendar began only in the month of November, 1937 after Kartik month of Bengali calendar and after kartik month of fasli calendar. This court also finds that some of the days of kartik month in both the calendars fell in the month of November 1937. Thus, from the calendar which has been produced by the petitioners the Aghan month Bengali calendar Maghir month of fasli calendar commences only in the month of November 1937. Thus, even if the best case of the petitioners is taken into account then the petitioners completes 12 years of possession after 1st of November, 1949 and not prior to that and therefore the claim of the petitioners that they have completed 12 years of possession prior to come into force of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 is not correct. Accordingly the petitioners cannot claim to have perfected their title by way of adverse possession on the property prior to coming into force of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 i.e., prior to 1st of November, 1949. (g) From the perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the Commissioner, it appears that the Commissioner has considered the best case of the petitioners by taking the date as 5th of Aghan and Fasli year 1345 as corresponding to English year 1937 and has held that even if this case of the petitioners is taken into consideration the petitioners have not completed 12 years of possession prior to 1st November, 1949. This Court finds that this consideration by the Commissioner is well reasoned order and it does not require any interference and accordingly point of adverse possession as raised by the petitioners is decided against the petitioners. (h) In view of the aforesaid specific findings that the petitioners have not completed 12 years of the possession over the property prior to 1st November, 1949, this Court further holds that the judgment passed by full bench in the case of Deo Narayan Singh reported in 1985 BBCJ 12 : 1985 PLJR 1 (full bench) as well as the judgment of Bhauri lal Jain reported in AIR 1973 Patna 1 : 1972 PLJR 415 (full bench) has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of this case and does not help the petitioners in any manner, and accordingly there is no occasion to give any finding as to whether the ratio of the judgment passed in 1985 BBCJ 12 : 1985 PLJR 1 survives any more in view of the subsequent Supreme Court judgment arising out of full bench judgment in Civil Appeal No. 4657 of 1984 decided on 23.4.1997 and reported in (1997) 10 SCC 51 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- 8. ……… “It would at once become clear that Section 20(1) of the Act runs parallel to the scheme of the earlier provisions of Section 27(1) of the Regulation. Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury was a Raiyat who was recognised as the Mool Raiyat by the competent authorities under the Regulation. His entire right, title and interest in the said land which was an alienable jote was transferred under the said second transaction in favour of the appellants’ father. Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury was a Raiyat who was recognised as the Mool Raiyat by the competent authorities under the Regulation. His entire right, title and interest in the said land which was an alienable jote was transferred under the said second transaction in favour of the appellants’ father. The right to transfer was duly recorded in the Record of Rights and required the transferor to transfer if at all his entire right, title and interest in the Mool Raiyat. That is precisely what was done by Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury in favour of the appellants’ father by the transaction dated 26-6-1950. Therefore, this transaction did not offend the provisions of Section 20(1) of the Act. If that is so, it remained fully within the four corners of the said provisions and could not be treated to be illegal or invalid from any angle. Consequently there would remain no occasion for the authorities to invoke Section 20(5) of the Act read with Section 42 thereof in connection with this latter transaction of sale dated 26-6-1950. In fact in fairness to the respondents it must be submitted that all authorities below as well as the High Court by the impugned judgment have considered the invalidity of the first transaction of sale dated 22-3-1939 and in that light they have voided the second transaction as a consequential transaction. Once the nexus between the two sales gets snapped and the earlier transaction by itself cannot be found fault with from any angle, then there would remain no occasion for the respondent authorities to invoke the provisions of Section 20(1) read with sub-section (5) and Section 42 of the Act in connection with even the second sale transaction dated 26-6-1950. Once that conclusion is reached the result becomes obvious. On these peculiar facts there is no escape from the conclusion that the possession of the appellants as heirs of the deceased vendee Radha Prasad Singh can be said to have been validly obtained and a valid title that was conveyed in land admeasuring 38.09 acres, to their father Radha Prasad Singh under the second sale transaction dated 26-6-1950, got legally transmitted to the appellants by rules of succession. Consequently on these facts no action could have been taken by the authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act against the appellants. Only on this short ground, therefore, the appeal is required to be allowed. Consequently on these facts no action could have been taken by the authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act against the appellants. Only on this short ground, therefore, the appeal is required to be allowed. We make it clear that in view of the aforesaid decision of ours we have not thought it fit to consider the correctness of the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain1 as well as the impugned judgment of the Full Bench in connection with the adverse possession of the vendee under an invalid transaction of land in the area being violative of Section 27(1) of the Regulation or Section 20(1) of the Act. That question is, therefore, kept open. Similarly we have also not thought it fit to go into the wider question canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent authorities that even if mutations are rendered by the authorities under the Regulation or the Act if on subsequent facts being brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and once there was no earlier occasion or possibility for the Deputy Commissioner to exercise powers under Section 21(5) of the Act or Section 27(1) of the Regulation, such power could be exercised later on under those circumstances. We leave that question also open as it is not necessary for us to pronounce upon the same in view of the decision rendered by us on the merits of the impugned two transactions as seen earlier. 9. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court are quashed and set aside. Similarly the decision rendered by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dumka dated 30-9-1975 as well as the decision rendered by the Commissioner dated 2-6-1976 are also quashed and set aside and the application moved by Respondents 4 to 15 under Section 20, sub-section (5) read with Section 42 of the Act is ordered to be dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.” 11. Point regarding applicability of Section 20 read with Section 42 of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 as the petitioner has claimed that the property in question is not agricultural property. (a) The petitioners claim to have constructed house on the property involved in this case. Point regarding applicability of Section 20 read with Section 42 of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 as the petitioner has claimed that the property in question is not agricultural property. (a) The petitioners claim to have constructed house on the property involved in this case. From the records of this case, this Court finds that the petitioners have never raised this plea before any of the authorities and even in this writ petition and accordingly this Court is not inclined to permit the petitioners to raise this point for the first time during the course of the arguments. (b) That apart from aforesaid technical aspect of the matter, the fact remains that admittedly the property in question has been recorded as Jamabandi property and admittedly the private respondents herein or their predecessors were the recorded tenant of the property and admittedly there is no order converting the nature of land from agricultural to non-agricultural by any of the competent authority. (c) This Court is of the considered view that merely because some construction has been made over the property involved in this case that does not change the nature of land from agricultural land to non-agricultural land so as to deny the benefit of the provisions of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 to the recorded tenant of the property. (d) So far as the judgment which has been relied upon by the petitioners reported in 1988 BBCJ 372 is concerned, this Court finds that admittedly the property involved in the said case was converted into a non-agricultural property by virtue of the fact that the authorities under the provisions of Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 declared the petitioners of the said case as privileged tenant and in view of the specific order under the provisions of Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947, the property was no longer agricultural property. In the instant case the property in question continues to be recorded in the record of rights as agricultural land and there is no such supervening circumstances. Accordingly the reliance on this judgment by the petitioners does not help the petitioners in any manner and the same is clearly distinguishable. In the instant case the property in question continues to be recorded in the record of rights as agricultural land and there is no such supervening circumstances. Accordingly the reliance on this judgment by the petitioners does not help the petitioners in any manner and the same is clearly distinguishable. (e) So far as the other judgment reported in 2003(3) JCR 230 : 2003 (3) JLJR 223 is concerned, admittedly the property in question in the said case was converted into Basauri property by virtue of the provisions under Santhal Pargana Regulations and as the nature of the land was changed from agricultural land to Basauri land, it was held by this Hon’ble Court that Basauri land become transferable and such transfer do not fall within Section 20 of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949. In the instant case, this Court does not find any material on record and it is not even case of the petitioners that the nature of the land was changed from agricultural to non- agricultural by any competent authority. Accordingly the reliance on this judgment by the petitioners does not help the petitioners in any manner and the same is clearly distinguishable. (f) Therefore the contention of the petitioners that merely because some construction has been made over the property, the same takes it out of the purview of section 20 and 42 of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 is devoid of any merits. Thus, the second contention of the petitioners is also rejected. (g) From the perusal of the impugned order, this Court finds that the Commissioner has recorded specific findings and doubted the genuineness of the kurfa itself and admittedly the nature of land was never changed by any competent authority. 11. In view of the aforesaid findings, this Court does not find any merits in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed.