JUDGMENT : A.P. THAKER, J. 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 27-9-2004 passed by learned Extra Assistant Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 70 of 2001, the State has preferred this appeal under Sec. 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that complainant, Manguben wife of Gobarbhai Shardulbhai has filed a complaint before Vartej Police Station stating the fact that she is residing at Village-Hathba along with her husband and children and her father-in-law has expired. It is further stated that her mother-in-law, Kashuben, is residing separately with her elder brother-in-law. It is further the case of the prosecution that marriage of the deceased Manguben had taken place five years before the date of the incident. According to the prosecution case, the deceased-Manguben was subjected to cruelty by her mother-in-law and Rekhaben, wife of elder brother-in-law. It is further the case of the prosecution that, in the past, several times, she was beaten by the accused persons and though her parental home is in the same village, she was not permitted to go there. According to the prosecution, on the fateful day i.e. on 7-10-2000 at about 8-00 a.m., the quarrel took place with regard to the character of her sister-in-law in which she was beaten, and because of such ill-treatment and continuous harassment given to her by the accused, she committed suicide by setting herself on fire by pouring kerosene on her body and igniting the matchstick. Accordingly, the complaint was registered as C.R. No. I-254 of 2000 for the alleged offences under Secs. 498A, 306 and 314 of the Indian Penal Code. 2.1. On the basis of the complaint, investigation was carried out by the police and having found sufficient evidence, the police has arrested both the accused and, ultimately, filed a charge-sheet before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. As the case was triable by the Sessions Court, it was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, wherein it was registered as Sessions Case No. 70 of 2001. In the said case, charges were framed against the accused, however, they pleaded not guilty for the charges levelled against them and claimed to be tried. As the case was triable by the Sessions Court, it was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, wherein it was registered as Sessions Case No. 70 of 2001. In the said case, charges were framed against the accused, however, they pleaded not guilty for the charges levelled against them and claimed to be tried. After recording of evidence and having heard both the sides, learned trial Judge has acquitted the accused by the impugned judgment and order dated 27-9-2004, against which present appeal is preferred. 3. Mr. Rashesh Rindani, learned A.P.P. appearing for the appellant-State has vehemently submitted that, in this case, the entire evidence of the prosecution is based on the dying declaration and the F.I.R. given by the deceased. While referring to the deposition of the Doctors and deposition of the Executive Magistrate along with dying declaration and F.I.R., it has been urged by him that, from the dying declaration, it is found that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the present accused and due to that she has committed suicide. Accordingly, he prays to allow this appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment of acquittal. However, he has conceded that almost all the other witnesses, who are relatives of the deceased have turned hostile. 4. Heard learned A.P.P. for the appellant-State and perused the material produced on record. It appears from the record that the prosecution has examined 11 witnesses and have produced necessary documentary evidence, which consists of dying declaration of the deceased-complainant and postmortem report etc. 5. It is an admitted position that in an acquittal appeal, powers of the appellate Court is very much circumscribed as held in the case of Muralidhar @ Gidda v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014 (5) SCC 730 , wherein it is held as under in Paragraph 12: "12.......(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate Court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions, but the appellate Court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. It is so because the trial Court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate Court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial Court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate Court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate Court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate Court in the judgment of the trial Court." 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., reported in 2008 (10) SCC 450 , has crystallized the principles to be followed by the appellate Courts to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial Court's acquittal in the following manner: "70...... 1. The appellate Court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial Court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate Court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial Court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial Court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial Court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial Court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial Court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 2. The appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial Court. 3. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 2. The appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial Court. 3. If two reasonable views can be reached-one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction-the High Courts/appellate Courts must rule in favour of the accused." 7. So far as the offence under Sec. 306 of I.P.C. is concerned, it has been well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Mohan v. State, reported in 2011 (3) SCC 626 , that in order to convict a person under Sec. 306 of I.P.C., there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which leads the deceased to commit suicide leaving no option and this act must have intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she commits suicide. 8. Now, considering this well settled proposition of law and upon perusal of the entire evidence on record, it transpires that from the deposition of Dr. Mehul Makdani, at Exh. 33, that the deceased has died due to burn injuries sustained by her and it is an admitted fact that it was third degree burn. 9. On perusal of entire evidence of Khokhar Abdulrahim Haji Sultanbhai, Exh. 19, Executive Magistrate, who has recorded dying declaration of the deceased, it reveals that at the relevant time, he was working as Executive Magistrate in Bhavnagar, and on the basis of the receipt of police yadi, he had gone to the hospital and after inquiring about the mental condition of the patient from the Doctor, he recorded the dying declaration, Exh. 21. During his chief-examination, he has stated that dying declaration is recorded as per the version of the deceased. During cross-examination, he has admitted that he has not obtained any certificate from the doctor, who was attending the patient in burns ward. He has also admitted that he has not obtained any certificate from the doctor on the first part of the dying declaration. He has also admitted that there is no time and place mentioned in the so-called endorsement of the doctor on the first part of the dying declaration. He has also admitted that there is no mention as to the mental state of the patient, while recording the dying declaration. He has also admitted that there is no time and place mentioned in the so-called endorsement of the doctor on the first part of the dying declaration. He has also admitted that there is no mention as to the mental state of the patient, while recording the dying declaration. He has admitted in his cross-examination, that when he asked the patient that who has brought her to the Hospital, she has not given any answer and this question was an important question to be answered by the patient. 10. On perusal of the dying declaration at Exh. 21, it reveals that it is in a printed format, wherein blanks are kept. These blanks have been filled in by the Executive Magistrate. It is in Gujarati language, wherein it has been stated that the doctor should give certificate in the following manner and the such certificate has been printed there under. It is also found that as per the first question, it was asked that why you are in the Hospital, to that question the patient has stated that there is an illicit relationship between her elder brother-in-law and sister-in-law and regarding that relationship present accused have asked the patient in the morning, and due to that and earlier harassment, she poured kerosene on her body and committed suicide. At the same time, if we peruse the F.I.R., which is produced at Exh. 25, it is found that there is no such averment of illicit relationship between her elder brother-in-law and her sister-in-law and the only allegation is regarding asking the present accused as to whether patient has seen her sister-in-law in naked condition. Thus, there is contradiction in the F.I.R. and the dying declaration. 11. Upon perusal of the evidence of the Executive Magistrate, it does not inspire any confidence and the dying declaration recorded is also in a format form and nobody has identified the thumb impression of the deceased. It also appears from the post-mortem report that both the hands, forearms and palms of the deceased were in burned condition, and therefore, it is also doubtful as to who has put the thumb impression below the dying declaration and the F.I.R. 12. So far as other witnesses, viz. near relatives of the deceased are concerned, it is found that all of them are hostile witnesses. So far as other witnesses, viz. near relatives of the deceased are concerned, it is found that all of them are hostile witnesses. It also reveals that paternal relatives of the deceased was residing in the same village, and therefore, if any harassment was meted out by the accused during her five years marriage life, then relatives of the deceased would have supported the case of the prosecution. 13. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly transpires that learned trial Court has properly appreciated the entire evidence on record, and this being an acquittal appeal, even if another view is possible, this Court should not substitute its own decision in place of the one of the trial Court, which is based on cogent evidence. Therefore, the present appeal is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. 14. Resultantly, the present appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 27-9-2004 passed by the learned Extra Assistant Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 70 of 2001 is hereby confirmed. Bail and bail-bonds of the accused, if any, stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the concerned trial Court forthwith.