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2018 DIGILAW 1277 (GUJ)

Bipinbhai Dahyabhai Soni v. State of Gujarat

2018-12-27

B.M.TRIVEDI

body2018
JUDGMENT : B.M. TRIVEDI, J. 1. The applicant (accused No. 2) -Bipinbhai Dahyabhai Soni has preferred the present application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying to quash and set aside the FIR being CR-I No. 163 of 2014 registered with the Sola High Court Police Station, Ahmedabad for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 114 of IPC, and also the subsequent proceedings pursuant thereto. 2. As per the case of the applicant, the complainant i.e. the respondent No. 2 herein - Tikendra D. Patel had lodged the complaint alleging inter alia that his aunt i.e. Giribalaben D. Patel had entered into an agreement with Purshottambhai Patel to purchase his land bearing Survey No. 491/1 admeasuring 2000 sq. yards situated at Thaltej, Ahmedabad for a consideration of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rs. One crore only), out of which she had paid Rs. 71,25,000/- to the said Purshottambhai, and had also paid Rs. 46,00,000/- (One lac US$) to his son at America for an additional land of 1000 sq. yards. It was further alleged that the said Purshottambhai, after receiving the said amount from the aunt of the complainant, sold out the said land to one Bipinbhai Soni (the applicant herein). When she came to know about the said sale, she had met the applicant Bipinbhai Dahyabhai Soni, who had taken her to the said Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel (accused No. 1) and at that time, Purshottambhai had told Giribalaben that he would give only 900 sq. yards of land and Bipinbhai told her that he would give 1253.86 sq. yards out of the said Survey No. 491/1. However, his aunt Giribalaben insisted for 3000 sq. yard of land, to which Bipinbhai did not agree. It was further alleged that thereafter since the Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel did not agree for executing the sale deed in respect of the land admeasuring 3000 sq. yards, she had shown willingness to purchase 1253.86 sq. yards from Bipinbhai and had given a cheque of Rs. 16,08,500/- to Bipinbhai Soni towards franking charges for executing the sale deed. The said Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel thereafter had prepared a draft sale deed and had told her that he would deposit Rs. 30,00,000/- through RTGS in her account as she had paid Rs. 71,25,000/-. yards from Bipinbhai and had given a cheque of Rs. 16,08,500/- to Bipinbhai Soni towards franking charges for executing the sale deed. The said Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel thereafter had prepared a draft sale deed and had told her that he would deposit Rs. 30,00,000/- through RTGS in her account as she had paid Rs. 71,25,000/-. However, the said Purshottambhai did not execute the sale deed, and got prepared one declaration on which his aunt Giribalaben was asked to put her signature, but she had not put. It was alleged that since the said Purshottambhai was not executing the sale deed in favour of Giribalaben, a notice was given by his aunt to the said Purshottambhai, which was replied by him in which it was stated inter alia that since the land was sold out to Bipinbhai Dahyabhai Soni and he had done plotting of the said land in the name of Akshar Building, she could be given plot No. 5 admeasuring 1067.84 sq. yards. His aunt thereafter had given one cheque of Rs. 7,00,000/- to one Sandipbhai Kanubhai Patel, however, thereafter on 31.3.2014 the said Sandipbhai Patel had deposited Rs. 7,00,000/- and the said Bipinbhai had deposited Rs. 30,00,000/- through RTGS in her account, which amount was not accepted by his aunt Giribalaben. It was further stated in the complaint that his aunt Giribalaben was staying in America, and therefore, she had given power to the complainant to take necessary action, and therefore, he had filed the complaint. As stated earlier, the said complaint was registered with Sola High Court Police Station as CR-I No. 163/2014 on 23.5.2014 against the said Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel, Bipinbhai Dahyabhai Soni i.e. the present applicant and Sandipbhai Kanubhai Patel for the offences under Section 406, 420 and 114 of IPC. 3. The application has been resisted by the respondent No. 2 - complainant by filing the affidavit-in-reply contending inter alia that the offences stated in the complaint are ex facie evident and apparent, for which investigation is necessitated. The respondent No. 2, therefore, has prayed to dismiss the application. 4. It may be noted that the co-accused Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel had also preferred an application seeking to quash the said FIR under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., by filing Criminal Misc. The respondent No. 2, therefore, has prayed to dismiss the application. 4. It may be noted that the co-accused Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel had also preferred an application seeking to quash the said FIR under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., by filing Criminal Misc. Application No. 20177 of 2014, however, the said application was withdrawn by the learned Advocate appearing for the said applicant, as per the order dated 14.12.2018. 5. So far as the present application is concerned, the learned Sr. Advocate Mr. Y.S. Lakhani submitted that the applicant is the subsequent purchaser of the land in question, who did not have any knowledge about the transactions between the aunt of the complainant Giribalaben and the owner Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel, and when the applicant came to know about the same, he had tried to help Giribalaben by offering part of the land and had also prepared a draft sale deed, to which she did not agree due to her issues with Purshottambhai. He also submitted that the allegations made in the complaint even if taken on their facie value do not constitute any offence as alleged under Section 406 and Section 420 of IPC so far as the present applicant is concerned. Learned Advocate Mr. Lakhani has placed reliance on various decisions of the Supreme Court to submit that the complaint must be quashed, if it does not disclose the alleged offences, even if the allegations made therein are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Anr. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 to submit that even the ingredients of Section 114 could not be said to have been attracted, as there was no abatement alleged against the applicant as contemplated in Section 107 of IPC. 6. However, the learned Advocate Mr. Jal Unwala for the respondent No. 2 - complainant vehemently submitted that the accused Purshottambhai Prabhudas Patel had pocketed huge amount of Giribalaben, the aunt of the complainant and thereafter had sold out the land to the present applicant. According to him, after the purchase of the land from the said owner Purshottambhai, the present applicant should have executed the sale deed in favour of Giribalaben as she had the right to purchase prior to the applicant. Mr. According to him, after the purchase of the land from the said owner Purshottambhai, the present applicant should have executed the sale deed in favour of Giribalaben as she had the right to purchase prior to the applicant. Mr. Unwala also relied upon the draft sale deed and other correspondences ensued between the parties to show that the said Purshottambhai with the help of the present applicant and the other accused Sandipbhai Kanubhai Patel had duped the rights of Giribalaben in respect of the land in question. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Unwala relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Superintendent of Police, CBI and Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh, reported in (2003) 6 175 submitted that the FIR need not be an encyclopedia of facts. What is significant is that the information given must disclose commission of cognizable offence. He also submitted that it would be a matter of evidence as to what role was played by which of the accused in the commission of alleged offence. 8. At the outset, it may be stated that the law as regards the scope of Section 482 is well settled by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions. In case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited and Ors., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736 , the Supreme Court after considering earlier judgments has laid down the principles governing the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., as under:- "12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few - Madhavrao Jiwaji Roa Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre 1988 (1) SCC 692 , State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill 1995 (6) SCC 194 , Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd., 1996 (5) SCC 591 , State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla 1996 (8) SCC 164 , Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, 1999 (3) SCC 259 , Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. 2000 (3) SCC 269 , Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar 2000 (4) SCC 168 , M. Krishnan v. Vijay Kumar 2001 (8) SCC 645 , and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque 2005 (1) SCC 122 . The principles, relevant to our purpose are:- (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the Court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not." 9. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not." 9. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, if the allegations made in the complaint lodged by the respondent are appreciated, it transpires that the said complaint has been filed by the respondent, claiming to be the nephew of one Giribalaben Patel, who stays at America. That apart, even if all the facts stated in the complaint are taken on their face value to be true, there is hardly any allegation made against the present applicant so far as the alleged offences are concerned. It appears that the alleged execution of agreement in respect of the land bearing Survey No. 491/1 between the said Giribalaben and the accused Purshottambhai was made in the year 2004. Pursuant to the said agreement, the said Giribalaben appears to have made payment by cheque on 15.9.2004 and Purshottambhai had agreed to sell the land in question to her on the T.P. Scheme becoming final. According to the complainant, the said Giribalaben thereafter made payment from time to time to Purshottambhai in India and to the son of Purshottambhai staying in America, however, the said Giribalaben came to know in the year 2007 that the said Purshottambhai had sold one Bungalow at Hebatpur to one Sandipbhai Kanubhai Patel, however, the said transaction was also ultimately cancelled. The Court fails to understand as to what was the connection of the said Bungalow with the land in question and who was the said Sandipbhai Patel. Be that as it may, it has been further alleged that though Purshottambhai had received money from the said Giribalaben to the tune of Rs. 71,25,000/- and his son had received one lac $ (one lac Dollar) in America, the said Purshottambhai sold out the said land bearing Survey No. 481/1 to the present applicant Bipinbhai. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that there is no allegation made against the applicant Bipinbhai that he had purchased the land in question despite his knowledge about the alleged agreement, which allegedly was executed by Purshottambhai in favour of Giribalaben in the year 2004. On the contrary, as transpiring from the complaint itself, the applicant Bipinbhai after having come to know about the said agreement had taken Giribalaben to the said. On the contrary, as transpiring from the complaint itself, the applicant Bipinbhai after having come to know about the said agreement had taken Giribalaben to the said. Purshottambhai and had also shown his willingness to sell part of the said land. Thereafter also, some writings were executed as alleged in the complaint, however, the same also did not materialize, and therefore, the said Giribalaben through his so-called power-of-attorney holder and nephew-the complainant Tikendra D. Patel filed the complaint. 10. It is not disputed by Mr. Unwala for the respondent that though the alleged agreement was executed by the said Purshottambhai in favour of Giribalaben in the year 2004, the said Giribalaben had not bothered to file any suit for specific performance of the agreement till this date. From the allegations made in the complaint, it clearly transpires that the entire dispute was of civil nature, which has been sought to be converted into criminal litigation involving the present applicant, who was the subsequent purchaser of the land in question. Though it is true that the FIR need not contain all the facts and events and it should not be treated as an encyclopedia of facts as submitted by Mr. Unwala, nonetheless it is equally settled legal position that the FIR must contain basic facts constituting the alleged offence against the accused named in the FIR. The information given by the informant to the Police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and such information must provide a basis for the Police Officer to suspect the commission of cognizable offence. There cannot be also any disagreement to the proposition canvassed by Mr. Unwala that the powers under Section 482 must be exercised in a rare case and only where there appears to be clear abuse of process of law, however, as stated herein above, it is equally settled legal position that the complaint could be quashed, under Section 482, when the allegations, even if they are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute any offence or make out any case alleged against a particular accused. From the facts set out in the complaint also it appears that there was no privity of contract between Giribalaben and the applicant, nor Giribalaben has filed any suit for specific performance in respect of the alleged agreement with Purshottambhai. From the facts set out in the complaint also it appears that there was no privity of contract between Giribalaben and the applicant, nor Giribalaben has filed any suit for specific performance in respect of the alleged agreement with Purshottambhai. There is no allegation made in the complaint that the applicant had any knowledge about the said alleged agreement before he purchased the land from Purshottambhai. It is needless to say that the criminal machinery should not be misused to pressurize the accused to settle their civil dispute. 11. In the instant case, the offences alleged against the applicant and other accused are under Section 406, Section 420 and Section 114 of IPC. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly the allegations made in the complaint, the Court is of the opinion that the learned Advocate Mr. Unwala for the respondent has failed to make out any case of criminal breach of trust as contemplated under Section 406 or cheating as contemplated under Section 420 of IPC, so far as the present applicant Bipinbhai is concerned. None of the ingredients of abatement as contained in Section 107 for the purpose of offence under Section 114 of IPC could also be said to be attracted qua the present applicant. As stated earlier, the application filed by the accused Purshottambhai Patel for quashing the complaint against him has already been withdrawn. Hence, the Investigating Officer shall be at liberty to proceed further with the investigation qua the complaint against other accused, and to file report in accordance with law, however, the said complaint qua the present applicant deserves to be quashed and set aside for the reasons stated above. 12. In that view of the matter, the FIR being CR-I No. 163/2014 qua the present applicant Bipinbhai registered qua the present applicant Bipinbhai with Sola High Court Police Station, Ahmedabad is quashed and set aside. The application is allowed. Rule is made absolute accordingly.