JUDGMENT : D.N. PATEL, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Original respondents of W.P.(C) No. 3044 of 2010, Reported in 2011 (2) JLJR 324 which was preferred by the present respondent. This writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 9th March, 2011, whereby, even after the lease period was over, the learned Single Judge permitted occupancy of the leased premises for years together. 2. Having heard counsels appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that impugned premises, viz. a godown, is owned by these appellants. 3. Said property was given on lease to respondent (original petitioner) on 2nd May, 1997, for a period of 11 months and the lease period was over as on 31st March, 1998. Thereafter, these appellants had given a Notice, dated 3rd June, 2010, (Annexure 7 to the supplementary affidavit to this Letters Patent Appeal) to the respondent (original petitioner) to vacate the premises because appellant-the Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Chaibasa was in the need of the godown for its own use. This action of these appellants was under challenge in the writ petition filed by the respondent, being W.P. (C) No. 3044 of 2010., Reported in 2011 (2) JLJR 324 4. Thus, as it appears from the facts of the case and the reply given by the respondent in the writ petition, admittedly, lease period was over as on 31st March, 1998. Lessor had already given a Notice to vacate the premises. Thus, it appears that no further action was needed from the side of the appellants as a simple Notice is sufficient to make the lessee vacate the premises once the lease period is over. This aspect of the matter was not appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition. 5. It ought to be kept in mind that if anything is to be done during the lease period, then it requires another course of action, whereas, in the facts of the present case, the lease period was over. The lease was never extended. On the contrary, Notice was given to vacate the premises because lessor was in need of the premises. There cannot be a compulsory contract. This court cannot compel the lessor to enter into a contract with the respondent. The lease was never extended. On the contrary, Notice was given to vacate the premises because lessor was in need of the premises. There cannot be a compulsory contract. This court cannot compel the lessor to enter into a contract with the respondent. The very crucial ingredient of the free consent, under Section 13 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, will be missing, if such type of petitions are allowed by this Court. Once the lease period is over and Notice was given to vacate the premises, the lessee has to vacate the premises. Occupation of such type of premises, after lease period is over and Notice period is over, is not permissible in law. 6. Learned Single Judge has referred to Section 18 of the Agriculture Produce Markets Act, which has no relevance when lease is for fixed period and when Notice to vacate the premises has also been given. There is no standard format of a Notice to be given. It should be in a format prescribed in the code of Civil Procedure. Too much technical view ought not to be taken in such matters. 7. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 199 as under: 4. The courts below have apparently been misled by the averments in para 3 of the plaint that because the defendant could not fulfil the condition regarding obtaining of a licence, the grant made by the indenture of lease did not and could not take effect, as also that in para 7 that the tenancy of lease was from month to month. The parties could not by their pleadings alter the intrinsic character of the lease or bring about a change of the rights and obligations flowing there from. The lease was a lease for a definite term and, therefore, expired by efflux of time by reason of Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. That being so, the service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary. 5. Undoubtedly, Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with determination of a lease by efflux of time, has to be read with Section 116 of the Act. That being so, the service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary. 5. Undoubtedly, Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with determination of a lease by efflux of time, has to be read with Section 116 of the Act. But in the present case there is no allegation by the defendant that he was a tenant holding over within the meaning of Section 116 of the Act. Now, in order that a lease should be deemed to have been continued in favour of the defendant it was necessary to show that he remained in possession of the premises demised after the determination of the lease granted to him and the plaintiff had expressly or by necessary implication assented to his continued possession. There being no such plea of holding over, the matter falls to be governed by Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. If the period of lease had expired on January 10, 1970, the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased and the defendant became a trespasser. In the present case, the respondent who was the defendant, in Ground 6 of his memorandum of appeal before the High Court urged that the courts below should have held on the basis of the plaintiff’s case read with the lease deed that the lease would expire on January 10, 1970. There was, therefore, no question of service of any notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. (Emphasis supplied) 8. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal reported in (1979) 4 SCC 214 as under: 6. Section 111 deals with the question of determination of lease, and in various clauses (a) to (h) methods of determination, of a lease of immovable property are provided. Clause (g) deals with the forfeiture of lease under certain circumstances and at the end are added the words “and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease”. The notice spoken of in clause (g) is a different kind of notice and even without the State Rent Acts different views have been expressed as to whether such a notice in all cases is necessary or not. The notice spoken of in clause (g) is a different kind of notice and even without the State Rent Acts different views have been expressed as to whether such a notice in all cases is necessary or not. We only observe here that when the State Rent Acts provide under what circumstances and on what grounds a tenant can be evicted, it does provide that a tenant forfeits his right to continue in occupation of the property and makes himself liable to be evicted on fulfilment of those conditions. Only in those State Acts where a specific provision has been made for the giving of any notice requiring the tenant either to pay the arrears of rent within the specified period or to do any other thing, such as the Bombay Rent Act or the West Bengal Rent Act, no notice in accordance with clause (g) is necessary. A lease of immovable property determines under clause (h): “On the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other.” It is this clause which brings into operation the requirement of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Without adverting to the effect and the details of waiver of forfeiture, waiver of notice to quit, relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent, etc. as provided for in Sections 112 to 114-A of the Transfer of Property Act, suffice it to say that under the said Act no ground of eviction of a tenant has to be made out once a contractual tenancy is put to an end by service of a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Until and unless the lease is determined, the lessee is entitled to continue in possession. Once it is determined it becomes open to the lessor to enforce his right of recovery of possession of the property against him. In such a situation it was plain and clear that if the lease of the immovable property did not stand determined under any of the clauses (a) to (g) of Section 111, a notice to determine it under Section 106 was necessary. In such a situation it was plain and clear that if the lease of the immovable property did not stand determined under any of the clauses (a) to (g) of Section 111, a notice to determine it under Section 106 was necessary. But when under the various State Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided that a tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain sections of the said Acts, then how does the question of determination of a tenancy by notice arise? If the State Rent Act requires the giving of a particular type of notice in order to get a particular kind of relief, such a notice will have to be given. Or, it may be, that a landlord will be well advised by way of abundant precaution and in order to lend additional support to his case, to give a notice to his tenant intimating that he intended to file a suit against him for his eviction on the ground mentioned in the notice. But that is not to say that such a notice is compulsory or obligatory or that it must fulfil all the technical requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Once the liability to be evicted is incurred by the tenant, he cannot turn round and say that the contractual lease has not been determined. The action of the landlord in instituting a suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in any State Rent Act will be tantamount to an expression of his intention that he does not want the tenant to continue as his lessee and the jural relationship of lessor and lessee will come to an end on the passing of an order or a decree for eviction. Until then, under the extended definition of the word “tenant” under the various State Rent Acts, the tenant continues to be a tenant even though the contractual tenancy has been determined by giving of a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In many cases the distinction between a contractual tenant and a statutory tenant was alluded to for the purpose of elucidating some particular aspects which cropped up in a particular case. That led to the criticism of that expression in some of the decisions. In many cases the distinction between a contractual tenant and a statutory tenant was alluded to for the purpose of elucidating some particular aspects which cropped up in a particular case. That led to the criticism of that expression in some of the decisions. Without detaining ourselves on this aspect of the matter by any elaborate discussion, in our opinion it will suffice to say that the various State Rent Control Acts make a serious encroachment in the field of freedom of contract. It does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by his act of serving a notice to quit on him. In spite of the notice, the law says that he continues to be a tenant and he does so enjoying all the rights of a lessee and is at the same time deemed to be under all the liabilities such as payment of rent, etc. in accordance with the law. (Emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in M. Vijayalaxmi v. G. Goverdhan Reddy reported in (1997) 11 SCC 358 as under: 3. In this context it may be stated that no issue was raised in the suit regarding invalidity of the notice and before the trial court no contention regarding invalidity of the notice was urged by the respondent. Before the first appellate court the only objection that was raised by the respondent to assail the validity of the notice was that by the notice the tenancy had been terminated from the date of the notice. The said objection was overruled by the appellate court on the view that in para 4 of the said notice it was clearly indicated that tenancy was being terminated from the midnight of 28-2-1985. The High Court permitted the respondent to raise the plea about the notice being invalid on the basis of Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act for the first time in second appeal. Having regard to the facts of this case we are of the view that the High Court was in error in non-suiting the appellant on this ground. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the tenancy was for a fixed period of 11 months. It came to an end by efflux of time on 1-3-1985. Having regard to the facts of this case we are of the view that the High Court was in error in non-suiting the appellant on this ground. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the tenancy was for a fixed period of 11 months. It came to an end by efflux of time on 1-3-1985. No notice for terminating the tenancy under Section 106 was required for the purpose of filing the suit after 1-3-1985. The respondent cannot be treated as a tenant holding over in view of the express indication given by the appellant by his notice dated 28-1-1985 that he did not propose to continue the tenancy of the respondent. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the suit filed by the appellant was based on the alleged termination of the tenancy by notice dated 28-1-1985 and since the said notice was invalid the suit must fail. We are unable to agree. The suit was for recovery of possession of the premises after termination of the tenancy. Merely because the appellant had given a notice terminating the tenancy by notice dated 28-1-1984 (sic 1985) would not mean that the appellant was not entitled to seek the possession of the property after tenancy had come to an end by efflux of time under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, even if it is held that the notice dated 28-1-1985 was not a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act it could be regarded as a notice indicating that the tenancy would not be continued after the term of the tenancy comes to an end. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the suit filed by the appellant was not maintainable and decree for eviction could not be passed in favour of the appellant. (Emphasis supplied) 10. It also appears that there is violation of a condition of the lease dated 2nd May, 1997 (Annexure 5 to the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal), viz Clause 1(h), which is quoted hereunder: “1(h) That the lessee at the expiration of the said term of determination of the lease thereof peacefully and quietly surrender and deliver the possession of the premises (godown) to the lessor.” Aforesaid clause has been grossly violated by the respondent (original petitioner). 11. 11. Thus, as stated hereinabove, there is gross violation of the condition of the lease and after Notice is received by respondent, he has continued with possession of the premises in question illegally. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(C) No. 3044 of 2010 vide Judgment and Order dated 9th March, 2011. 12. We, therefore, quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 9th March, 2011 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 3044 of 2010. 13. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of. 14. Respondent is directed to pay a cost of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant-committee within a period of six weeks from today. I.A. No.1011 of 2011 15. In view of disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal, this Interlocutory Application also stands disposed of.