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2018 DIGILAW 1290 (RAJ)

NANU RAM v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

2018-05-16

SANGEET LODHA, VIRENDRA KUMAR MATHUR

body2018
JUDGMENT : Sangeet Lodha, J. This appeal is directed against judgement dated 2.4.09 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Bikaner in Sessions Case no.53/08, whereby the appellant has been convicted for offences under Sections 376, 366 & 363 IPC and sentenced to suffer the imprisonment as under : Under Section 376 IPC Life imprisonment with fine Rs. 5000/-; in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Under Section 366 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine Rs. 3000/-; in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. Under Section 363 IPC Three years' rigorous imprisonment with fine Rs. 2000/-; in default of payment of fine to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment. 2. Precisely, the prosecution case unfolded during the trial is that on 4.3.08, the complainant Ram Gopal's minor daughter 'X' (name withheld to protect her identity) of 8 years of age came out of the complainant's house situated at village Momasar Bas on National Highway No.11 and was standing by the side of the road. She was enticed away by the appellant herein and was taken to the land belonging to Forest Department and subjected her to rape. 3. On the basis of the written report (Ex.P/3) submitted by the complainant Ram Gopal, the police registered the FIR (Ex.P/34) and investigation commenced. 4. During investigation, the medical examination of the prosecutrix was done by the Medical Board consisting of P.W.12-Dr. Kusum Periwal and Dr. Manju Joshi, necessary memos were drawn and the statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., 1973 The foot mould available at the place of occurrence were lifted, the hairs alleged to be of the prosecutrix found at the place of occurrence were seized. The accused was arrested. The pent and shirt which the accused was wearing were seized. The identification parade was conducted. 5. After completion of the investigation, the police filed the charge sheet against the appellant Nanu Ram for offences under Sections 363, 366, 369, 376 & 394 IPC and against the accused Sawar Mal for offence under Section 412 IPC, before the Judicial Magistrate, Sri Dungargarh. The matter was committed to the Sessions Judge, Bikaner, which was later transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Bikaner. 6. The matter was committed to the Sessions Judge, Bikaner, which was later transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Bikaner. 6. The learned trial Judge framed the charges against the appellant Nanu Ram for offences under Sections 363, 366, 376, 379 IPC and against accused Sawar Mal for offence under Section 411 IPC. The accused persons denied the charges and claimed trial. 7. During the trial, prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 16 witnesses (P.W.-1 to P.W.-16) and produced the documentary evidence (Ex.P/1 to P/51). The accused persons were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., 1973 No evidence was led by the appellant in his defence. However, on behalf of the accused appellant, some documents produced by the prosecution were exhibited in evidence as Ex.D/1 to D/4. 8. After due consideration of the evidence on record and the submissions of the counsel for the accused and the Public Prosecutor, the trial Judge arrived at the finding on the basis of the evidence on record it stands established beyond doubt that the appellant accused kidnapped the prosecutrix, a minor girl, and committed rape on her and accordingly, sentenced him as indicated above. The appellant was acquitted of the charge for offence under Section 379 IPC. The accused Sawar Mal was also acquitted of the charge for offence under Section 411 IPC. 9. At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant does not want to press the challenge to the impugned judgement to the extent of appellant being convicted for offences under Sections 376, 363 & 366 IPC, on the basis of the evidence on record. Learned counsel confined his arguments only to the extent of quantum of punishment meted out to the appellant on being convicted for offence under Section 376 IPC. 10. Learned counsel submitted that the imposition of punishment of life imprisonment upon the appellant is against the principles of sentencing evolved by the Court over the years. Learned counsel submitted that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case where the appellant has not indulged in beating the minor girl or causing any other harm, the award of life imprisonment, which is the maximum punishment prescribed, is not warranted. Learned counsel submitted that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case where the appellant has not indulged in beating the minor girl or causing any other harm, the award of life imprisonment, which is the maximum punishment prescribed, is not warranted. Learned counsel would submit that the conduct of the appellant during his stay in Jail was good and thus, a lenient view needs to be taken and the sentenced awarded deserves to be altered from life imprisonment to punishment of ten years rigorous imprisonment. In support of the contention, learned counsel has relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of "Prem Chand & Anr. v. State of Haryana", AIR 1989 SC 937 and "Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana", (2006) 4 SCC 347 . Learned counsel has also relied upon Bench decisions of this court in the matters of "Amar Chand v. State of Rajasthan" 2008 (1) RLW(Raj.) 321, "Prema v. State of Rajasthan", 2008 (1) RLW(Raj.) 176 and "Jhumar Ram v. State of Rajasthan", (D.B. Criminal Appeal No.352/09, decided on 24.4.18). 11. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the appellant has been held guilty of committing rape on the prosecutrix, a minor girl of 8 years and therefore, there is absolutely no reason why the court should take a lenient view and reduce the sentence awarded by the trial Judge. 12. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 13. In view of the appellant giving up the challenge to the finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial Judge, we need not go into the findings regarding conviction of the appellant for offences under Sections 376, 366 & 363 IPC. The only question survives for consideration of this court is whether for the charge for the offence under Section 376 IPC being proved against the appellant, the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial Judge is just and proper or the same deserves to be altered being excessive. 14. In the matter of 'Bavo alias Manubhai Ambalal Thakore v. State of Gujarat' AIR 2012 SC 979 , where the accused was held guilty for offence under Section 376(2)(f) IPC for committing rape on 7 years old girl and was awarded life imprisonment by the trial Judge and confirmed by the High Court, the Supreme Court observed : "11. 14. In the matter of 'Bavo alias Manubhai Ambalal Thakore v. State of Gujarat' AIR 2012 SC 979 , where the accused was held guilty for offence under Section 376(2)(f) IPC for committing rape on 7 years old girl and was awarded life imprisonment by the trial Judge and confirmed by the High Court, the Supreme Court observed : "11. Considering the fact that the victim, in the case on hand, was aged about 7 years on the date of the incident and the accused was in the age of 18/19 years and also of the fact that the incident occurred nearly 10 years ago, the award of life imprisonment which is maximum prescribed is not warranted and also in view of the mandate of Section 376(2)(f) IPC, we feel that the ends of justice would be met by imposing RI for 10 years. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant informed this Court that the appellant had already served nearly 10 years." 15. In 'Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)' (2014) 4 SCC 375 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with a matter regarding conviction for offence under Section 304 B IPC, wherein the accused was sentenced to suffer maximum punishment of life imprisonment relying upon the principles of sentencing evolved by the court over the years in context of death penalty, observed : "12. Are we to understand that the quest and search for a sound jurisprudential basis for imposing a particular sentence on an offender is destined to remain elusive and the sentencing parameters in this country are bound to remain Judge-centric? The issue though predominantly dealt with in the context of cases involving the death penalty has tremendous significance to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the country inasmuch as in addition to the numerous offences under various special laws in force, hundreds of offences are enumerated in the Penal Code, punishment for which could extend from a single day to 10 years or even for life, a situation made possible by the use of the seemingly same expressions in different provisions of the Penal Code as noticed in the opening part of this order. 13. As noticed, the "net value" of the huge number of in-depth exercises performed since Jagmohan Singh has been effectively and systematically culled out in Sangeet and Shanker Kisanrao Khade. 13. As noticed, the "net value" of the huge number of in-depth exercises performed since Jagmohan Singh has been effectively and systematically culled out in Sangeet and Shanker Kisanrao Khade. The identified principles could provide a sound objective basis for sentencing thereby minimising individualised and Judge-centric perspectives. Such principles bear a fair amount of affinity to the principles applied in foreign jurisdictions, a resume of which is available in the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar. The difference is not in the identity of the principles: it lies in the realm of application thereof to individual situations. While in India application of the principles is left to the Judge hearing the case, in certain foreign jurisdictions such principles are formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied on principles of categorisation of offences which approach, however, has been found by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh to be inappropriate to our system. The principles being clearly evolved and securely entrenched, perhaps, the answer lies in consistency in approach. 14. To revert to the main stream of the case, we see no reason as to why the principles of sentencing evolved by this Court over the years though largely in the context of the death penalty will not be applicable to all lesser sentences so long as the sentencing Judge is vested with the discretion to award a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of the pendulum from the minimum to the maximum. In fact, we are reminded of the age-old infallible logic that what is good to one situation would hold to be equally good to another like situation. Besides, para 163 (italicised portion) of Bachan Singh, reproduced earlier (see at SCC p.385-f, above), bears testimony to the above fact." 16. In 'Ram Naresh & Ors. v. the State of Chhattisgarh' (2012) 4 SCC 257 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the elaborate principles of sentencing laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab', (1980) 2 SCC 684 and 'Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab', (1983) 3 SCC 470 , while dealing with the question of death sentence, observed that the cumulative effect of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances need to be taken into account while awarding the sentence. The court observed : "76. v. State of Punjab', (1983) 3 SCC 470 , while dealing with the question of death sentence, observed that the cumulative effect of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances need to be taken into account while awarding the sentence. The court observed : "76. The law enunciated by this Court in its recent judgements, as already noticed adds and elaborates the principles that were stated in Bachan Singh and thereafter, in Machhi Singh. The aforesaid judgements, primarily dissect these principles into two different compartments-one being the "aggravating circumstances" while the other being the "mitigating circumstances". The court would consider the cumulative effect of both these aspects and normally, it may not be very appropriate for the court to decide the most significant aspect of sentencing policy with reference to one of the classes under any of the following heads while completely ignoring other classes under other heads. To balance the two is the primary duty of the court. It will be appropriate for the court to come to a final conclusion balancing the exercise that would help to administer the criminal justice system better and provide an effective and meaningful reasoning by the court as contemplated Under section 354(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." The court while enumerating certain aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determining the questions relatable to sentencing policy further observed : "79. The court then would a draw a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Both aspects have to be given their respective weightage. The court has to strike a balance between the two and see towards which side the scale/balance of justice tilts. The principle of proportion between the crime and the punishment is the principle of "just deserts" that serves as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is justifiable. In other words, the "doctrine of proportionality" has a valuable application to the sentencing policy under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. Thus, the court will not only have to examine what is just but also as to what the Accused deserves keeping in view the impact on the society at large. 80. Every punishment imposed is bound to have its effect not only on the Accused alone, but also on the society as a whole. Thus, the courts should consider retributive and deterrent aspect of punishment while imposing the extreme punishment of death." 17. 80. Every punishment imposed is bound to have its effect not only on the Accused alone, but also on the society as a whole. Thus, the courts should consider retributive and deterrent aspect of punishment while imposing the extreme punishment of death." 17. In the matter of "Santosh Kumar @ Johny v. State of Rajasthan", (D.B. Criminal Jail Appeal No.1692/2007, decided on 29.1.15), where the charge of committing rape on a girl of 4 years, was found proved and the trial Judge while convicting the appellant under Section 376(2)(f) IPC sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment with fine Rs.500/-; in default to further undergo three months of simple imprisonment, Jaipur Bench of this court observing that there was no aggravating circumstances beyond the age of the prosecutrix and the accused happens to be a young man aged about 31 years when the occurrence occurred, reduced the maximum punishment awarded to 10 years rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the order imposing the fine. 18. In 'Sohanlal v. State of Rajasthan', (D.B. Criminal Appeal No.13/2006, decided on 18.2.15), this court while following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bavo's case (supra) and Sunil Dutt Sharma's case (supra), where the appellant therein was found guilty of committing rape on the prosecutrix, a minor girl, in absence of any other aggravating circumstances beyond the age of the victim reduced the sentence awarded from life imprisonment to ten years. 19. In Jhumar Ram's case (supra), where the accused was found guilty of committing rape on a minor girl of 4 years but there was no other violence involved in the commission of the offence, in absence of any aggravating circumstances following the decision of the Supreme Court in Bavo's case (supra) and decisions of this court in Santosh Kumar's case and Sohanlal's case (supra), the punishment of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. 20. Similarly, in Prema's case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, taking into consideration, the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the convict by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court was reduced from life imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment. 21. In the instant case undoubtedly the appellant accused is found guilty of committing rape on a minor girl of 8 years. 21. In the instant case undoubtedly the appellant accused is found guilty of committing rape on a minor girl of 8 years. But then, there is no other violence involved in commission of the offence. It is specifically observed by the Medical Board in the medical report (Ex.P/6) that there is no evidence of any injury on the body parts other than genitals. It is not the prosecution case that the appellant is a habitual offender. No other criminal case is alleged to be pending against the appellant. The conduct of the appellant in jail has been satisfactory. Thus, taking into consideration the aggravating and mitigating circumstances following the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bavo's case (supra) and by this court in Santosh Kumar's case, Sohanlal's case and Jhumar Mal's case (supra), we consider it appropriate to modify the order on sentence and reduce the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the learned trial Judge to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. 22. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant for offences under Sections 376, 366 & 363 IPC is maintained. The sentences awarded by the learned trial Judge for conviction of the appellant for offences under Sections 366 & 363 IPC are also maintained. However, the order of sentence for conviction under Section 376 IPC is modified in terms that instead of life imprisonment, the appellant shall be sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. The order with regard to the fine passed by the learned trial Judge shall remain unaltered. If the appellant has already undergone the sentence awarded, he shall be released forthwith else, he will undergo the remaining sentence. On release, the appellant shall furnish personal bond in sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge in terms of provisions of section 437A Cr.P.C., 1973 which shall remain in force for six months.