JUDGMENT : Ramchandra Singh Jhala, J. The instant writ appeal has been filed by the appellant petitioner challenging the judgment dated 9.8.2002 passed by learned Single Judge in SBCWP No. 628/1992 whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant petitioner. 2. Briefly stated facts of the case are that according to the appellant-petitioner he was appointed as Senior Mines Foreman on 16th April, 1977, and was thereafter promoted as Assistant Mines Manager since 3.4.1981. The present controversy relates to the delinquency, for which, he was served with a charge sheet dated 10.6.1987, and a supplementary charge sheet on 12.6.1987. 3. The charges were that on 29.4.1987, at about 7.30 PM, while being on duty as Shift Incharge, the appellant-petitioner unauthorisedly took away a jeep of the company bearing No. RSJ 4020, outside the mines premises for personal use. It was reported that the jeep was being driven by Someshwar, returned to the mines at about 10.30 PM, but the appellant-petitioner did not return with it, while the appellant-petitioner was required to be on duty up to 10 PM. Thus, the appellant-petitioner was alleged to have willfully absented himself from duty from 7.30 PM to 10.00 PM. The second charge was that as a result of unauthorised movement of the Company's jeep aforesaid, outside the mines premises, the company suffered a financial loss to the extent of unnecessary expenditure incurred by the company on this unauthorised use of the company's vehicle, and that as a result of this act of misconduct, the said jeep met with an accident, and thus, the act also amounted to causing willful damage to the company's property. The third charge was that while unauthorisedly absenting from duty, when the appellant petitioner came to know about the accident, and that a disciplinary action was contemplated against him on this count, he went to the company's dispensary on 3.5.87, attempted to force the Compounder on duty to enter his name in the patients' register, and even to make out a false prescription for him for 29.4.1987. This effort was made with a view to cover up the unauthorised absence on 29.4.1987. This effort was made with a view to cover up the unauthorised absence on 29.4.1987. On the Compounder's refusal, he was threatened by the appellant-petitioner using his capacity as a Shift Incharge, and the Compounder under threat and duress of the petitioner, made out the required false prescription, and also substituted the petitioner's name in the Register of Patients in place of Shri Sukh Lal, and recorded as such in the Register. The next charge is that on 3.5.1987 aforesaid, the appellant-petitioner not only threatened the Compounder Roshan Lal for falsification of the record as above, but the appellant-petitioner himself also substituted his name in the Register of the Patients in his own hand, and thereby committed willful falsification and defacement of the company's record. The fifth charge was that by the aforesaid conduct, the appellant-petitioner repeated his previous act of misconduct of 13.5.1985 and 2.1.1986, when he had unauthorisedly removed the company's vehicle outside the mines premises, and for which he had been awarded punishment. Thus, the appellant-petitioner was alleged to be in the habit of misusing the company's vehicle, and also being in the habit of willful insubordination and disobedience of the reasonable orders of the Superior authorities. 4. The charge incorporated in the supplementary charge sheet dated 12.6.1987 was that he willfully remained absent on 11.6.87 and marked attendance in the Attendance sheet for June 1987 for 11th, 12th and 13th June, 1987 in advance, on any day prior to 11.6.87. In the column for 14.6.1987, the appellant petitioner marked "R", and thus committed fraud and willful falsification of company's record. After the enquiry, the appellant petitioner was held guilty of the charges and Manager Director of the Company passed the order of punishment of dismissal from service on 20th July, 1987 (Annex.8 of the writ petition). Against the aforesaid punishment order, the appellant-petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority, however, the said appeal was also rejected vide order dated 23.8.1991 (Annex.12 of the writ petition). 5. Against the dismissal of said appeal of the appellant petitioner, the appellant-petitioner filed SBCWP No. 628/92 which was dismissed by this Court on 9th August, 2002. Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 9th August, 2002, the appellant-petitioner has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 6. 5. Against the dismissal of said appeal of the appellant petitioner, the appellant-petitioner filed SBCWP No. 628/92 which was dismissed by this Court on 9th August, 2002. Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 9th August, 2002, the appellant-petitioner has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record of the case including the judgments cited by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner raised all the arguments as pleaded in the memo of appeal and has reiterated all the arguments which were raised before the learned Single Judge and submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant petitioner. He has relied upon the following judgments:- (i) 1986 (3) SCC 103 - Ram Chander v. UOI & Ors. (ii) 1985 (3) SCC 398 - UOI & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors. (iii) 2006 (4) SCC 713 - Narinder Mohan Vyas v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents have supported the impugned judgment and submitted that no error has been committed by learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition vide order dated 9th August, 2002. The learned Single Judge has passed the said judgment after proper appreciation of material available on record. 9. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 9.8.2002 dismissed the writ petition with the following observations:- "At the outset, I may observe that though very many things have been written in the writ petition, so also in the documents annexed with the writ petition, but then they were not so pressed into service, during the course of arguments, except the above submissions. I may also observe in this regard that a plea has been taken in the writ petition about the existence of deep rooted prejudice with the respondents against the petitioner, and on the Court's asking the learned counsel for the petitioner to give out as to what is the prejudice, by which authority, what is the name of the authority and for what reason, at the same time, the learned counsel was also asked to point out the material to substantiate the pleading, so that, I could assess the relevance, reliability and sufficiency of the material to arrive at a conclusion about the alleged existence of deep rooted prejudice. But then, the learned counsel flatly conceded that except the fact that on receipt of inquiry report, the notice was given to the petitioner proposing punishment of dismissal from service, there is no other material to establish the existence of prejudice, inasmuch as, that notice shows that the authority had made up its mind to inflict a particular punishment. It was pointed out to the learned counsel that the argument puts the other party on a dilemma, inasmuch as, if the proposed punishment were not to be mentioned in the notice, the notice must not carry any sense so as to enable the delinquent to make submissions, and when it is mentioned, it is sought to be raised as a ground of deep rooted prejudice. Therefore, the learned counsel was called upon to substantiate the contention, and show as to whether there is anything else on the basis of which the allegation of prejudice is pleaded, the learned counsel flatly conceded that there is no other reason. Be that as it may. Taking up the contentions of the learned counsel ad seriatum, coming to the question of non supply of documents, it is not in dispute that petitioner was supplied the copies of documents/record, on his application. The learned counsel has not pointed out anything during the course of arguments, despite being asked, as to what other documents he had asked for, which have not been supplied to him, what was their relevance, and also to throw some light as to how any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. Thus, the learned counsel was required to submit in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Judgment Today, 1996 (6) SC 604, State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K.V. Perumal and Ors., wherein it has clearly been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, mere non furnishing of the documents asked for by the delinquent officer ipso facto would not vitiate the departmental inquiry, rather it is the duty of the delinquent officer to point out, how each and every document was relevant to the charges, and it is only when the Tribunal finds in favour of the delinquent officer that any relevant document was not supplied, and such non supply has prejudiced the case of the delinquent officer, then only the inquiry can be said to be vitiated. As against this, in the present case, as found above, the petitioner has not even shown, as to, what other documents he had asked for, much less as to how they were relevant, and as to how non supply thereof has caused any prejudice to him, so as to ask this Court to hold the inquiry to be vitiated, and the learned counsel, instead of elaborating the argument, only submitted that, I should simply notice the argument that the petitioner was not supplied the documents, and that by itself amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. With all humility at my command, I am enable to concede to the submission, on the face of the aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K.V. Perumal and Ors. Regarding the testimony of four witnesses, except making the passing argument, the argument was not sought to be elaborated or substantiated, obviously, the same could not be done in view of the fact that the petitioner has neither produced the copy of the statement of four witnesses, so as to enable this Court to look at them, and find out the sustainability of argument, nor the copy of the inquiry report has been produced which admittedly was sent to the petitioner. Not only this, despite the case remaining part heard for a long time, i.e. from 30.5.01 to 24.7.02, even no request was made on the side of the learned counsel for the petitioner for requisitioning these documents from the respondents. It appears that the petitioner is not serious in pressing into service this contention. Regarding non production of the witnesses Someshwar and Kishan, in my view, Someshwar had not been produced by the department as rightly advised, even according to charge sheet, the Someshwar had driven the Jeep at the dictates of the petitioner, and had taken the jeep outside the premises of the company in an unauthorised manner and jeep met with an accident. In such circumstances, if at all the petitioner wanted to dispute the allegation, he could very well have produced Someshwar. In such circumstances, if at all the petitioner wanted to dispute the allegation, he could very well have produced Someshwar. Regarding non production of Kishan, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that it was on 02nd July itself that the date was fixed on 04th July, 1987 for defence, in such circumstances, simply because the petitioner had left the proceedings on 02nd July, there was no obligation on the department to give notice to the petitioner. However, when a notice was given, and it is not established by the petitioner that it was not affixed at the door of the house, non-production of witness is hardly of any relevance. In my view, when the petitioner had appeared in the proceedings on 06th July, 1987, in any case on that day, he could have moved an application, and pointed out that he wanted to lead evidence in defence, and that there is no notice of date of hearing, which may have been earlier fixed (i.e. 4.7.87) whatever may have been the fate of that application, but then, this Court would have been able to find out the bonafides of the stand, and might have helped the petitioner. In that view of the matter, non production of Kishan, in my view, does not adversely effect the punishment order. So far as not providing the services of lawyer is concerned, admittedly, the petitioner was provided the services of Shri U.K. Jha, though it has not been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he was not informed about inability of Mr. Jha, or about his being not given any opportunity to chose any other defence nominee, and the only argument raised was that the petitioner should have been provided the lawyer Shri Ramchandra Paliwal as defence nominee, in my view, if the petitioner with any bonafides, was desirous of defence nominee, he obviously was required to consult him before hand, obtain his consent, and ask the department to provide him as a defence nominee. Obviously then, the delinquent officer was required to be in touch, and consultation with the chosen defence nominee. In the present case, had the petitioner done any such thing, the things would have been clear to him that Mr. Obviously then, the delinquent officer was required to be in touch, and consultation with the chosen defence nominee. In the present case, had the petitioner done any such thing, the things would have been clear to him that Mr. Jha was out of town, and had returned shortly before the date of hearing, and is not able to defend him, in which event, the petitioner could have asked for any other defence nominee. But then, since the petitioner did not genuinely desire to have any defence nominee, but only wanted to have the Advocate as a defence nominee, which was not obligatory to be provided, in view of the controversy involved in the matter, and on the face of language of Regulation 52. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that by not providing Shri Ramchandra Paliwal, Advocate, as defence nominee, the petitioner stood deprived of any sufficient opportunity of hearing, or violation of any principles of natural justice. So far as the last contention about sufficiency of time given to the petitioner is concerned, the contention has already been dealt with in the foregoing para, while dealing with the contention about the effect of non production of Kishan, as such it needs not be reconsidered again. Coming to the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the judgment in Dr. S.P. Kapoor v. State of Himchal Pradesh and Ors., reported in AIR 1981 SC 2181 , is a case relating to entirely different controversy as that was a matter relating to promotion by Departmental Promotion Committee, and has no bearing on the controversy involved in the present case. So far as the two judgments in "The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nandkarni and Ors, reported in AIR 1983 SC 109 , and Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. reported in AIR 1983 SC 454 , are concerned, they are clearly distinguishable on facts. Regarding the judgment in Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1983 SC 454 , are concerned, they are clearly distinguishable on facts. Regarding the judgment in Union of India and Ors. v. Dinanath Shantaram Karekar and Ors., reported in 1998 (7) SCC 569 is concerned, that case again is distinguishable on facts, inasmuch as, as found above, it is not the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was not at all served or was not aware of the date of hearing, rather had it been so, when he appeared on 6th July, he could have taken necessary steps as observed by me above, and thus, this judgment also does not help the petitioner. So far as the judgment in Hardwari Lal v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in JT 1999 (8) SC 418 is concerned, that case is again distinguishable on facts, inasmuch as, the witnesses not examined in that case were the complainant and the person escorting the delinquent to the hospital. The charge in that case was that during night hours, being under the influence of liquor, the delinquent officer hurld abuses in the Police Station at the constable. It was in that background that the complainant and the person escorting the delinquent officer to the hospital would obviously be material witnesses with respect to back ground and the facts on the basis of which the charge was desired to be substantiated. As against this, in the present case, Mr. Someshwar could have been examined by the defence to negative the charge, and was not required to be examined by the department to substantiate the charge." 10. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and record, we find that the learned Single Judge has elaborately dealt with every contention of the appellant-petitioner and explained how the contentions of the appellant-petitioner are not tenable. The learned Single Judge has also discussed in the judgment that how the case laws cited on behalf of the appellant-petitioner are not applicable in the present case and held that the facts of the present case are quite distinguishable from the cases cited by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner. The learned Single Judge discussed every point in the judgment which was raised by the appellant-petitioner. 11. We have also perused the judgments cited above by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner and found that the facts of the aforesaid cases are also quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The learned Single Judge discussed every point in the judgment which was raised by the appellant-petitioner. 11. We have also perused the judgments cited above by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner and found that the facts of the aforesaid cases are also quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 12. In view of above discussions, we are satisfied that the finding of learned Single Judge cannot be said to be perverse in any manner. The findings arrived at by learned Single Judge are correct and based on relevant and cogent reasons and the same are also in the light of material available on record. The learned Single Judge neither misread nor overlooked any material available on record. The findings of learned Single Judge are also based on provisions of law, therefore, no case is made out for interference in the impugned judgment. We find no force in the present appeal filed by the appellant Shashi Kant and the same is liable to be dismissed. 13. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed. No order as to costs.