ORDER : C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J. 1. The concurrent finding in a petition filed under section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for brevity 'the Act') is under challenge in this revision petition. The revision petitioners are the legal heirs of the respondent/tenant in R.C.P.No.56 of 2013 on the files of the Rent Control Court, Nadapuram. Respondents 1 and 2 herein were the petitioners therein and the third respondent herein is also one of the legal heirs of the respondent tenant. In the rent control petition, it is stated that the first petitioner therein/respondent No.1 herein, has been conducting hotel business in the tenanted premises. It is for the purpose of starting business of fancy-cum-ladies materials for the second petitioner/second respondent herein that they sought eviction of the original tenant from the tenanted premises. 2. Before the Rent Control Court, the second petitioner/second respondent herein was examined as PW1 besides getting marked Exts.A1 to A3, on the side of the petitioner. The original tenant was examined as RW1 and on his side, Exts.B1 to B4 were got marked. Evaluation of the evidence on record and the rival contentions culminated in an order in favour of the petitioners under section 11(3) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the original tenant preferred R.C.A.No.58/2015 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. During the pendency of the appeal, the original tenant died and consequently, his legal heirs were got impleaded as supplemental appellants. The Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Rent Control Court. It is in such circumstances that the captioned revision petition has been filed. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2. In fact, notice on admission by speed post was issued to the respondents and it is in pursuance thereof that respondents 1 and 2 had entered appearance. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to hereafter in this order, in accordance with their rank and status in the revision petition, unless otherwise specifically mentioned. 4. In fact, notice on admission by speed post was issued to the respondents and it is in pursuance thereof that respondents 1 and 2 had entered appearance. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to hereafter in this order, in accordance with their rank and status in the revision petition, unless otherwise specifically mentioned. 4. The core contention of the revision petitioners is that the authorities below ought to have found the rent control petition filed under section 11(3) of the Act as not maintainable for the reason that going by the averments in the rent control petition, a petition under section 11(8) of the Act alone would lie. It is submitted, relying on the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Kunhammi v. Abdullakutty [ 2015 (1) KLT 795 (FB)] that sections 11(3) and 11(8) of the Act are mutually exclusive and independent. The foundation for such a contention is that going by the averments in the claim petition, the first respondent herein who is none other than the husband of the second respondent, has been conducting a hotel business in the tenanted building. Admittedly, it is in the very same building that the second respondent viz., the wife of the first respondent intends to start the aforesaid business. According to the revision petitioners, it is nothing but an expansion of the business by the landlord being conducted in another room of the building where the tenanted shop room is a portion. The learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 14 of the decision in Kunhammi's case to fortify his contention that in the circumstances obtained in the case, rent control petition under section 11(3) of the Act ought to have held as not maintainable. In other words, according to the petitioner, the authorities below ought to have upheld his contention that only a petition under section 11(8) would have been the remedy available to the respondents in the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. In the contextual situation, it is only relevant to refer to the relevant recital from paragraph 14 of the said decision which was heavily relied on by the revision petitioner. 5. In the contextual situation, it is only relevant to refer to the relevant recital from paragraph 14 of the said decision which was heavily relied on by the revision petitioner. Evidently, in Kunhammi's case, the following recital from the decision in Indian Saree House v. Radhalakshmy [ 2006 (3) KLT 129 ] has been extracted with approval:- "Admittedly, petitioners 4 and 5 in the Rent Control Petition are in occupation of a portion of the whole building (or larger building). They do not want to vacate it and shift that business to the tenanted premises. They want to expand their business activities and for that purpose, the tenanted portion of the building is also required. Therefore, their requirement does not satisfy the ingredients of the expression “bona fide needs the building for his own occupation” under S.11(3). On the other hand, the claim comes within the meaning of the expression “he requires additional accommodation for his personal use”. The need for additional accommodation shall be for the “personal use” of the landlord. Of course, personal use includes use by the members of the landlord's family. At the same time, if the need for personal use is only for the members of the family of the landlord and it is unconnected with the occupation by the landlord of a portion of the building already in his possession, S.11(8) may not apply and such a case would be covered by S.11(3)." (emphasis added) In Kunhammi's case, this Court held thus:- "We are of the view that Ss.11(3) and 11(8) are mutually exclusive and independent. However, Ss.11(3) and 11(8) are not always mutually destructive. Even if Ss.11(3) and 11(8) are mentioned in the Rent Control Petitions, the Court would be entitled to consider the question whether S.11(3) or 11(8) would apply in the facts of the case. The Court would not be precluded from allowing a petition under S.11(3) even if S.11(8) alone or also is mentioned in the Rent Control Petition, and vice versa, provided the facts pleaded and proved in the case would justify such a conclusion. With respect, we do not agree with the view taken in Shaji Varghese's case (supra) that Ss.11(3) and 11(8) are not mutually exclusive. We also approve the dictum laid down in Indian Saree House v. Radhalakshmy ( 2006(3) KLT 129 )." 6. With respect, we do not agree with the view taken in Shaji Varghese's case (supra) that Ss.11(3) and 11(8) are not mutually exclusive. We also approve the dictum laid down in Indian Saree House v. Radhalakshmy ( 2006(3) KLT 129 )." 6. We are afraid the said decision relied on by the revision petitioners could not and would not fetch any help to them in view of the enunciation of law, as extracted above. As noticed hereinbefore, respondents 1 and 2 herein are co-owners of the building in question. This position is admitted by the petitioner himself. True that the first respondent is already in occupation of one of the rooms in the building and he is conducting hotel business therein. Admittedly, the bona fide need projected in the petition is absolutely unconnected with the expansion of the said business being conducted by him thereon and also not for his own occupation in the strict sense. True that 'personal use' includes use by the members of the land lord's family. However, the decision in Kunhammi's case (supra) itself would reveal that if the need for personal use is only for the members of the family of the landlord and it is unconnected with the occupation by the landlord of a building already in possession of the tenant, section 11(8) might not apply and such a case would be covered by section 11(3) of the Act. Obviously, it is for the purpose of starting business of sales of fancy-cum-ladies materials for the second respondent that ejectment of the original tenant from the petition schedule room was sought for. The second respondent who is the co-owner of the building require the said shop room not for expansion of the business being conducted by the first respondent/petitioner, but for starting business for herself. Being a co-owner, the second respondent is also having a right to seek for eviction for her own occupation. That is the case of the other co-owner viz., the first respondent as well. Thus, being the co-owner, the second respondent was certainly entitled to maintain a petition under section 11(3) of the Act for her own occupation. Being a co-owner, the second respondent is also having a right to seek for eviction for her own occupation. That is the case of the other co-owner viz., the first respondent as well. Thus, being the co-owner, the second respondent was certainly entitled to maintain a petition under section 11(3) of the Act for her own occupation. That apart, even if it is taken that it is for the personal use of a family member of the first respondent viz., for the use of the second respondent, then it is to be taken as a purpose unconnected with the occupation by him of a portion of the building and therefore, going by Kunhammi's case (supra), a petition under section 11(3) would lie. In short, the contention of the revision petitioner is only to be repelled. The revision petitioner claimed that he is entitled to get the benefit of second proviso to section 11(3) of the Act. However, he had failed to establish the twin conditions required to be established for earning eligibility to get the said benefit. He has failed to establish that he is mainly depending on the income derived from the business being conducted in the petition schedule shop room. Obviously, the evidence on record would also reveal that he had failed to establish non-availability of rooms in the locality suitable to satisfy the said requirement. In such circumstances, the authorities below had rightly declined his claim for the benefit under the said proviso. In such circumstances, we do not find any illegality or impropriety in the judgment passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority confirming the order passed by the Rent Control Court and in fact, the decisions of the authorities below are perfectly in tune with the decision in Kunhammi's case (supra). The upshot of the discussions is that there is absolutely no merit in the revision petition and it is liable to fail. While we are about to part with the judgment, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners sought for some reasonable time to the revision petitioners to give vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the landlord. The upshot of the discussions is that there is absolutely no merit in the revision petition and it is liable to fail. While we are about to part with the judgment, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners sought for some reasonable time to the revision petitioners to give vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the landlord. Having heard the rival submissions in that regard, we are inclined to grant six months' time from today, on condition that the revision petitioners shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court carrying an undertaking that they would give vacant possession of the same to the landlord on the date of expiry of the aforesaid period. However, if execution petition is pending, then it shall be filed not before the Rent Control Court, but, shall be filed before the execution court. Needless to say that during the said period, the revision petitioners shall pay rent at the admitted rate and any two consecutive default in payment of rent, as above, would entail automatic recalling of the aforesaid benefit. Subject to the above, this revision petition is dismissed.