ORDER : Dinesh Mehta, J. The present second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the appellant laying challenge to the judgment and order dated 30.11.2016 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Shahpura, District Bhilwara (hereinafter referred to as the 'Appellate Court') in Appeal No. 66/2009 filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 15.05.2009 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Shahpura, District Bhilwara (hereinafter referred to as the 'Trial Court') 2. Succinctly stated, the facts of the present case are that the appellant-plaintiff filed a suit (No. 60/2005) for recovery of possession of the property, which he had purchased vide registered sale deed dated 15.04.1993 and mandatory injunction against the defendants. The said suit filed by the plaintiff came to be dismissed by the learned Trial Court, vide its judgment and decree dated 15.05.2009, inter alia, observing that an earlier suit, being Suit No. 73/1994, filed by the plaintiff for grant of mandatory and permanent injunction of the disputed property had already been rejected by the learned Trial Court for which, as subsequent suit for the relief of possession was barred, as per the provisions contained in Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 15.05.2009, the appellant preferred an appeal which was registered, as Appeal No. 66/2009 and came to be dismissed by the learned Appellate Court, vide its judgment and decree dated 30.11.2016. While rejecting appellant's appeal and affirming the rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 vide order dated 15.05.2009 passed by the Trial Court, the learned Appellate Court has found the subsequent suit to be barred by the principles of acquiescence and estoppel read with the provisions contained under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Mr. Gopal Acharya, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the principles of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable in the present factual backdrop and the subsequent suit for possession filed by the appellant was not barred by law, as the subject-matter of the suit and relief claimed was entirely different. 3. Mr. Gopal Acharya, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the principles of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable in the present factual backdrop and the subsequent suit for possession filed by the appellant was not barred by law, as the subject-matter of the suit and relief claimed was entirely different. Advancing his arguments further, he submitted that the earlier suit, being Suit No. 73/1994 was filed by the appellant for seeking mandatory injunction, which had been rejected by the Trial Court holding, that the plaintiff did not have possession of the house property, in absence whereof, mandatory and permanent injunction could not be granted. Mr. Acharya further added that the subsequent suit filed by the appellant was for claiming possession and permanent injunction, hence the provisions contained under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply. 4. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record, including the records of both the Courts below and the order dated 06.01.2003 in earlier suit filed by the plaintiff. The provisions contained under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been incorporated with a view to reduce multiplicity of the litigation. As such, it was required of the appellant-plaintiff to have sought relief of possession, while filing the first suit in the year 1994 itself, as he did have possession over the contentious property even as per his own version. The appellant-plaintiff having failed to claim rather relinquished/abandoned the relief of possession at the time of first suit cannot sue for claiming relief of possession of the contentious property. 5. A perusal of the earlier order dated 06.01.2003 in Suit No. 73/1994 filed by the Appellant-Plaintiff reveals that the plaintiff had filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in his possession, indicating that pursuant to the sale-deed dated 15.04.1993, he was handed over the possession, which continued till the date of filing the suit, however, during the trial, the plaintiff himself stated that the possession was forcibly taken on 10.09.1994 for which, the suit was filed on 12.09.1994. The Trial Court had found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he had the possession of the property for the period during 15.04.1993 to the date of filing the suit as the plaintiff has been dispossessed on 10.09.1994. In view of these facts, the Trial Court held that the Plaintiff did have the possession, for which, he could seek injunction. In view of these facts, the Trial Court held that the Plaintiff did have the possession, for which, he could seek injunction. It will be apt to refer to the relevant part of the Order dated 06.01.2003 to have a better appreciation of the factual matrix, which is being reproduced here infra:- ^^16 & i{kdkjku dh vkSj ls izLrqr dh xbZ mijksDr lk{; dk rqyukRed foospu fd;s tkus ls tcfd okn i= oknh ds }kjk fnuakd 12-09-1994 dks izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA oknh ds }kjk viuh eq[; ijh{kk esa ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd [kjhnus ds ckn fnuakd 15-04-1993 ls 10-09-1994 rd mldk dCtk FkkA bl izdkj oknh dk fookfnr tk;nkn ij dCtk fnuakd 10-09-1994 rd gh FkkA fdUrq oknh ds }kjk mDr okn i= fnuakd 12-09-1994 dks izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa Lohd`r :i ls fookfnr tk;nkn ij okn izLrqr fd;s tkus dh frfFk vFkkZr fnuakd 12-09-1994 dks oknh dk fookfnr tk;nkn ij dCtk ugha FkkA 17 & oknh dh vkSj ls mijksDr okn i= LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk dk izLrqr fd;k x;k gS] ftlesa oknh ds }kjk ;g vuqrks"k pkgk x;k gS fd izfroknhx.k] oknh dh mijksDr tk;nkn esa fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ gLr{ksi ugh djs o oknh ds dCts esa n[ky ugha nsosA bl izdkj oknh ds }kjk tks vuqrks"k vius okn i= esa pkgk x;k gS ,oa oknh ds }kjk tks LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk dh izkFkZuk dh xbZ gS] ,slh fLFkfr esa oknh dks fookfnr tk;nkn ij okn i= izLrqr fd;s tkus dh frfFk dks viuk dCtk izekf.kr fd;k tkuk fof/k vuq:i vko';d gSA 18 & oknh ds }kjk dsoy ek= LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk dk izfroknhx.k ds fo:) okn i= izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ,oa ,d izkFkZuk ;g Hkh dh xbZ gS fd ;fn nkSjkus okn izfroknhx.k ds }kjk mls csn[ky dj fn;k tk;s rks mls dCtk fnyk;k tkosaA fdUrq oknh ds }kjk tks eq[; ijh{kk esa dFku fd;k x;k gS fd [kjhnus ds ckn 15-04-1993 ls 10-09-1994 rd mldk dCtk FkkA mlds vuq:i gh fnuakd 10-09-1994 rd gh mldk dCtk Fkk ,oa bl izdkj dh dksbZ lk{; Hkh oknh ds }kjk izLrqr ugha dh xbZ gS fd nkSjkus okn izfroknhx.k ds }kjk oknh dks fookfnr tk;nkn ls csn[ky fd;k x;k gksA bl izdkj Lohd`r :i ls mijksDr okni= izLrqr fd;s tkus dh frfFk fnuakd 12-09-1994 dks oknh dk fookfnr tk;nkn ij dCtk ugha FkkA LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk dk vuqrks"k pkgus ds fy;s oknh ds i{k esa okn i= izLrqr fd;s tkus dh frfFk dks fof/kd nkf;Ro vFkkZr~ oknh dk dCtk gksuk vko';d gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa tcfd okn i= izLrqr fd;s tkus dh frfFk dks oknh dk fookfnr tk;nkn ij dCtk ugha Fkk rks oknh fof/k vuq:i izfroknhx.k ds fo:) LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa mijksDr foospu ds vuq:i rudh la[;k 1 ,oa 2 oknh ds fo:) ,oa izfroknhx.k ds i{k esa fuf.kZr dh tkrh gSA** 6. In considered opinion of this Court, keeping in view the facts of the case, the learned Courts below have rightly rejected the plaint filed by the appellant-plaintiff on the ground of provisions contained under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Evidently, the appellant had abandoned his claim of possession of the disputed land when he filed the first suit for grant of injunction wherein he himself admitted to not having the possession. Hence, neither any interference is called for in the concurrent findings of facts and view taken by the Courts below, nor any question of law much less, substantial question of law, arises for determination by this Court. 7. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed.