JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. 1. Plaintiff is the appellant against a confirming judgment. The suit was for declaration of title over the suit property, delivery of possession and permanent injunction. 2. The case of the plaintiff was that the ex-intermediary granted a permanent lease deed on 2.8.1941 in his favour in respect of the suit land. In the sabik settlement, the suit land was recorded as river. But subsequently by process of alluvium, the land became a patha and fit for cultivation. He reclaimed the same and made it fit for cultivation. He planted trees over the same. He used to raise crops. The ex-intermediary submitted ekpadia in his favour after vesting. Though he had applied for settlement of the land to the Tahasildar, but no order was passed. He is in possession of the suit land peacefully, continuously and with the hostile animus to the defendants for near about 46 years and, as such, perfected title by way of adverse possession. In the current settlement, the land has been recorded as Abadayogya Anabadi. Due to his ignorance, he could not challenge the same before the Commissioner, Land Records and Settlement. While the matter stood thus, the Tahasildar initiated Encroachment Case Nos. 61 of 67-68 and 8 of 67-68 against him, but the same were dropped. Again the Tahasildar initiated an Encroachment Case No. 24 of 1988 against him. With this factual scenario, he instituted the suit seeking the relief mentioned supra. 3. The defendants entered contest and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendants was that mandatory provision under Section 80 C.P.C. had not been complied with. The suit was hit under Section 16 of the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act (OPLE Act). No permanent lease deed was granted by the ex-intermediary in favour of the plaintiff on 2.8.1941. The specific case of the defendants was that the land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The plaintiff had no right, title and interest over the same. Since the plaintiff had encroached upon the suit land, encroachment cases were initiated against him. Order of eviction was passed on 16.8.1988. The plaintiff was evicted on 11.10.1988. In the settlement, the suit land has been recorded as Abadayogya Anabadi. The suit land is river. 4. The plaintiff had no right, title and interest over the same. Since the plaintiff had encroached upon the suit land, encroachment cases were initiated against him. Order of eviction was passed on 16.8.1988. The plaintiff was evicted on 11.10.1988. In the settlement, the suit land has been recorded as Abadayogya Anabadi. The suit land is river. 4. Learned trial court dismissed the suit holding, inter-alia, that the plaintiff had no right, title and interest over the suit land. The unsuccessful plaintiff challenged the same before the learned IInd Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Cuttack in Title Appeal No. 20 of 1997, which was eventually dismissed. It is apt to state here that during pendency of this appeal, the sole appellant died, whereafter his legal heirs have been substituted. 5. The Second Appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law enumerated in ground nos.1 and 3 of the appeal memo. The same are: “1. Whether in view of the fact that application under Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on 18.8.1998 and the same was ordered to be put up on 22.8.1998 but no order was passed on 22.8.98 and the suit was proceeded and in view of such state of affairs if proceeding of the suit without disposal of the application under Section 80(2) of C.P.C. was legal and justified and if in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned trial court is to be directed to dispose of the said application and then proceed with the suit. 3. Whether in view of the fact that the plaint averments to the effect that Encroachment Case No. 8 of 67-68 and 61 of 67-68 was stated against the plaintiff and had been dropped is not cotroverted by the defendants and another encroachment case no. 24 of 88 has been stated against the plaintiffs has not been controverted by the defendants if the defendants shall be deemed to have admitted the same as provided under Order 8, Rule 5 of C.P.C.” 6. Mr. Bishnu Charan Swain, learned Advocate on behalf of Mr. P. Kar, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants submits that the plaintiff filed an application under Section 80(2) C.P.C. to waive notice. The learned trial court did not pass any order, but proceeded with the trial of the suit. The procedure is unknown to law. Mr. Bishnu Charan Swain, learned Advocate on behalf of Mr. P. Kar, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants submits that the plaintiff filed an application under Section 80(2) C.P.C. to waive notice. The learned trial court did not pass any order, but proceeded with the trial of the suit. The procedure is unknown to law. He further submits that when two previous encroachment cases had been dropped, the Tahasildar committed a manifest illegality in initiating the third encroachment case against the plaintiff. He further submits that the ex-intermediary had granted permanent lease deed (hatpatta) in favour of the plaintiff, vide Ext.4. The plaintiff reclaimed the suit land and planted trees. He is in cultivating possession of the suit land peacefully, continuously and with the hostile animus to the defendants for more than a statutory period and, as such, perfected title by way of adverse possession. 7. Mr. Swayambhu Mishra, learned A.S.C. submits that the plaintiff asserts title on the basis of hatpatta, vide Ext.4. Plaintiff’s alternative case is that he has perfected title by way of adverse possession. The plea is inconsistent. Further, the plaintiff was in unauthorized occupation of the suit land. Encroachment cases were initiated against him. Order of eviction was passed. He was duly evicted from the suit land. 8. Admittedly, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 80 (2) C.P.C. The same was not disposed of but the learned trial court proceeded with the suit. The question does arise as to whether the learned trial court has granted leave? The subject of matter dispute is no more res-integra. In Jayasingh Mallick vs. State of Odisha and Another, 2016 (2) ILR Cut. 1069, this Court in paragraphs-9, 11 and 12 of the report held: “9. xxx xxx xxx the suit was filed along with a petition under Section 80 (2) of C.P.C. for waiver of notice on the defendants. The learned trial court has not passed any express order granting leave. The suit was admitted. Issues were framed. Both parties adduced evidence. The learned trial court held that the suit was not maintainable for non-service of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. but decided the suit on merit. The learned lower appellate court concurred with the findings of the learned trial court. Both the courts held that suit is bad for non-service of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. xxx xxx xxx 11. The learned trial court held that the suit was not maintainable for non-service of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. but decided the suit on merit. The learned lower appellate court concurred with the findings of the learned trial court. Both the courts held that suit is bad for non-service of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. xxx xxx xxx 11. In Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad vs. Rachawwa and Others, AIR 1971 SC 442 , the apex Court held that where the plaintiff's cause of action is against a Government and the plaint does not show that notice under Section 80 claiming relief was served in terms of the said section, it would be the duty of the Court to reject the plaint recording an order to that effect with reasons for the order. In such a case the Court should not embark upon a trial of all the issues involved and such rejection would not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. 12. The necessary corollary is that once the plaint is presented along with an application under Section 80(2) of C.P.C. the Court shall pass an order. In the event the Court is satisfied that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the suit, it shall return the plaint for presentation after complying with the requirements of sub-section (1). No fault can be found with the plaintiff. A party can not be made to suffer on account of an act of the Court. There is a well-recognised maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit which means an act of the court shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. In view of the same, the courts below committed patent illegality in holding that suit is bad for non-service of notice under Section 80 C.P.C.” 9. The Tahasildar is the creature of the OPLE Act. If any person is in unauthorized occupation of the suit land, he has jurisdiction to initiate proceeding under Section 7 of the O.P.L.E. Act. In the instant case, the Tahasildar had initiated Encroachment Case Nos. 61 of 67-68 and 8 of 67-68 against the plaintiff on the ground that he was in unauthorized occupation of the Government land. The same were dropped. In the instant case, the Tahasildar had initiated Encroachment Case Nos. 61 of 67-68 and 8 of 67-68 against the plaintiff on the ground that he was in unauthorized occupation of the Government land. The same were dropped. The Tahasildar again initiated Encroachment Case No. 24 of 1988 for unauthorized occupation of the plaintiff over the suit land. Order of eviction was passed. He was duly evicted. Merely because two earlier encroachment cases had been dropped, it cannot be said that the Tahasildar de hors its jurisdiction in initiating another encroachment case. 10. The hatpata, Ext.4, requires registration. In Ram Nath Mandal and Others vs. Jojan Mandal and Others, AIR 1964 Pat. 1 , the Full Bench of Patna held that under Section 117 of the T.P. Act, a lease for agricultural purposes is not necessary to be made by a written instrument and it may be effected by an oral agreement in which case the question of registration will not arise. However, if the transaction is reduced to writing, then in the case of a lease from year to year or for any term exceeding a year or reserving a yearly rent, registration would be required under Section 17 of the Registration Act, and if unregistered the lease will be inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act and other evidence of its terms will be precluded under Section 91 of the Evidence Act. In that case, the claim of creation of tenancy on the basis of rent receipts in pursuance of an oral agreement was negatived on the ground that no such case had been put forward by the plaintiff in the plaint. 11. In Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil and Others vs. Balwant alias Balasaheb Babusaheb Patil (dead) by LRs. and heirs and Others, (1995) 2 SCC 543 , the apex Court made an in-depth analysis of claim of title and claim to adverse possession over the property. The apex Court held: “Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not to be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title. The apex Court held: “Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not to be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no tide at all.” 12. The apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal (deceased) through his LRs. Kachru and Others vs. Mirza Abdul Gaffer and Another, (1996) 1 SCC 639 held: “As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e. up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi nec clam nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.” 13. The plaintiff’s claim of title to the property and adverse possession are in terms contradictory. 14. The kissam of the land is river. The entire natural resources of the State belong to the public and Government is a trustee. In M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath and Others, (1997) 1 SCC 388 , the apex Court held that the doctrine of Public Trust primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. Our legal system-based on English Common Law-includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the seashore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 15. In the wake of aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.