Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1322 (HP)

Atma Ram v. Daya Devi

2018-07-16

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2018
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - This regular second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court on 29.05.2017 whereby she dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff (hereinafter to be referred to as the plaintiff) upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court on 28.05.2012 wherein the suit filed by the plaintiff for permanent prohibitory injunction and in the alternative for possession came to be dismissed. 2. The facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents/defendants (hereinafter to be referred to as the defendants) restraining them from uprooting the hedge, raising any construction and changing nature of the suit land. In the alternative, suit for possession was filed of the land comprising Khasra No. 838, measuring 0-05-09 hectares. It was contended that the plaintiff is the joint owner in possession along with other co-sharers of the suit land, whereas, the defendants are strangers and, therefore, have no right, title and interest in the suit land. According to plaintiff, on 16.10.2009, the defendants started forcibly uprooting the iron poles of the hedge which were fixed by the plaintiff on the suit land and did not adhere to the request of the plaintiff. It was further contended that the plaintiff had sought demarcation of the suit land vide application dated 17.01.2008 and the Patwari visited the spot, but did not give the demarcation, hence the suit. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement wherein preliminary objections regarding maintainability, locus standi, cause of action, valuation, estoppel and limitation, were raised. On merits, it was averred that the defendants neither caused any interference nor claimed any right, title and interest in the suit land. It was further contended that the plaintiff had filed the suit just to harass the defendants as earlier also a Civil Suit bearing No.43/94 had been filed by the plaintiff against the defendants which had been dismissed. It was also contended that the plaintiff had filed an application for demarcation in which the demarcation was given by the field staff on 23.03.2009. Further, it was contended that the wall and ''chhajja'' of the defendants were more than 25 years old and, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. 4. On 14.12.2009, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- "1. Further, it was contended that the wall and ''chhajja'' of the defendants were more than 25 years old and, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. 4. On 14.12.2009, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- "1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of injunction, as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by his act and conduct? OPD. 4. Relief." 5. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff and the appeal filed against the said judgment and decree has also been dismissed by the learned first appellate Court, constraining the plaintiff to file present appeal. 6. It is vehemently contended by Shri Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the plaintiff that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse on the face of the records and are, thus, liable to be set aside. He further argued that the report of the Local Commissioner Ex. PW-3/A which forms the basis of decision of both the learned Courts below was in fact illegal, wrong, null and void and contrary to the directions issued by the Financial Commissioner as also contrary to the High Court Rules and Orders. It is further contended that the report of the Local Commissioner otherwise could not have been relied upon inasmuch as the said report was furnished without there being any ''musabi'' on the record. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the defendants have supported the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 8. What is ''perverse'' was considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another , (2009) 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under:- "26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another , (1977) AIR Karnataka 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough,1878 1 LR 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Moffett v. Gough,1878 1 LR 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined ''perverse'' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner''s Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster''s Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. , (2003) 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8 "8 We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others , (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others , (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of ''perverse'' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others , (1992) Supp2 SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 9. What is ''perverse'' has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ''Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- "25 .. A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated." 10. What is ''perversity'' came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs.Sohan Devi and others , (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- "8. What is ''perversity'' came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs.Sohan Devi and others , (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- "8. "Perversity" has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam , (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect." 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram , (2010) 15 SCC 530 , at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." 11. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondentdefendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondentdefendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Material alteration of a property is not a fact confined to the exclusive/and personal knowledge of the owner. It is a matter of evidence, be it from the owner himself or any other witness speaking on behalf of the plaintiff who is conversant with the facts and the situation. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. Even the witnesses on behalf of the defendant, partially admitted that the defendants had effected some structural changes. 12. Be that as it may, the question whether there is a structural alteration in a tenanted premises is not a fact limited to the personal knowledge of the owner. It can be proved by any admissible and reliable evidence. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs-1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That finding has been endorsed by the first appellate court on reappreciation of the evidence, and therefore, the High Court in second appeal was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of fact. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man''s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man''s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 13. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann , (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278- 79) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal, (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100." The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with." 14. In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India , (2013) 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration , (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case6, SCC p. 615) "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. , (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police , (1999) 2 SCC 10 , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. , (2009) 10 SCC 636 and Babu v. State of Kerala , (2010) 9 SCC 189 .)" This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity. 15. We do not propose to discuss other judgments, though there is plethora of settled case law on this issue. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court." 11. Adverting to the first contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the findings regarding the report of the Local Commissioner being contrary to the instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner as also High Court Rules and Orders, I really do not find any substance in the said contention. The plaintiff had examined Shri Rajeev Thakur, Tehsildar, Palampur, who had given his demarcation report Ex.PW-3/A. Even though, in his examination in chief, this witness stated that there was one retaining wall which was one metre inside the land of the plaintiff and further stated that the person who had constructed the retaining wall had encroached three metres of land which was a ''kuhal''. However, when put to cross examination, he candidly admitted that the counsel for the plaintiff was present on the spot. He also admitted that permanent points were fixed as agreed to by the counsel for the plaintiff. However, when put to cross examination, he candidly admitted that the counsel for the plaintiff was present on the spot. He also admitted that permanent points were fixed as agreed to by the counsel for the plaintiff. He further goes to admit that as per the demarcation, no encroachment by the defendants was found over Khasra No.838. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is obviously bound by the demarcation report Ex.PW-3/A, especially, when permanent points were fixed as agreed to by his counsel. Thus, it is not open to the plaintiff to urge that the demarcation had not been carried out as per the instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner which have been incorporated in Chapter 1-M, Volume-I of High Court Rules and Orders pertaining to ''Hadd-Shikni cases''. 12. Now, adverting to the second contention that the demarcation had been conducted without ''musabi''. Even this contention is liable to be rejected because the learned Courts below have referred to the ''musabi''. In addition thereto I myself have perused the records and find that a copy of the ''musabi'' in fact is part and parcel of the demarcation report. Thus, it is not open for the plaintiff to argue against the records. 13. It is otherwise more than settled that the appellate Court continues to be a final court of fact and law and second appeal to the High Court lies only where there is a substantial question of law. Meaning thereby, the pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before this Court in second appeal. It shall be apt to refer to three Judge Bench decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs , (2001) 3 SCC 179 wherein it was observed as follows: "15 The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." 14. What would be the substantial question of law was thereafter considered in para 12 of the judgment, which reads thus: "12. The phrase ''substantial question of law'', as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta & Anr. Vs. T. Ram Ditta , (1928) AIR PC 172, the phrase "''substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 of the C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. The Century Spinning and Manufacuring Co., Ltd. , (1962) Supp3 SCR 549, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. The Century Spinning and Manufacuring Co., Ltd. , (1962) Supp3 SCR 549, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju , (1952) ILR(Mad) 264:- "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:- "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 15. Finally, in paragraph 14, the Hon''ble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines on the test of as to what is the substantial question of law, which reads thus: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. Finally, in paragraph 14, the Hon''ble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines on the test of as to what is the substantial question of law, which reads thus: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." 16. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below are based on the correct appreciation of the pleadings and evidence and, therefore, cannot be held to be perverse. Moreover, the findings rendered by both the learned Courts below are pure findings of fact which are immune from challenge in second appeal. 17. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. 18. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.