JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 23.03.2007, passed by the learned Sub Judge–II, Ranchi, in Title (Eviction) Suit No. 02 of 2005, whereby and whereunder, the learned court below decreed the suit on contest with costs against the defendant and held that the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of arrear of rent of Rs.4,83,093.60 only along with pendentelite and future interest thereon @ 6% per anuum till realization and further held that the plaintiff is entitled to get the vacant possession of the suit premises also. The defendant was also directed to pay the arrear of rent along with interest within one month from the date of order and also to give vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff within one month from the date of order, failing which, the plaintiff will be entitled to realize the arrear of rent and also to get the vacant possession of the suit premises from the defendant through process of the court. 3. The case of the plaintiff in brief is that the plaintiff is the owner of the building and land described in detail (here-in-after referred to the suit premises) in the schedule of the plaint. The defendant is the month to month tenant of the plaintiff with respect to the suit premises measuring in total area of about 2951 Sq. Ft. at the monthly rent of Rs.7,400/- per month. The plaintiff is engaged in the business of Cycle and accessories (Sales and repairing) and running one Ice Cream Parlor. The tenancy is according to English calendar month beginning from first to the last day of month. There is an arrear of rent amounting to Rs.4,83,093.60/- against the defendant but he failed to pay the said default amount of rent in-spite of repeated requests and notices sent by the plaintiff. As the said arrear of rent was not paid till the filing of the suit, hence it is submitted that on this score the defendant is liable to be evicted from the suit premises. The plaintiff further pleaded that the suit premises is required for their own use and occupation for bona-fide purposes as all the brothers of the plaintiff are having their sons who have become major and belong to a joint undivided Hindu family. The plaintiff further pleaded that the suit premises is required for their own use and occupation for bona-fide purposes as all the brothers of the plaintiff are having their sons who have become major and belong to a joint undivided Hindu family. Hence, the suit premises is required for the personal necessity of the plaintiff. The suit premises is fit for doing business and as such the defendant is liable to be evicted from the suit premises. The plaintiff further pleaded that in order to avoid any complications, the plaintiff served notices through his advocate by registered post and courier on 18.04.2003, 01.05.2003 and 18.03.2005, calling upon the defendant to pay the arrears of the rent to the plaintiff and on failing to pay the arrears to quit and vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the premises to the plaintiff. The said notices were duly received by the defendant. It is further the case of the plaintiff that after receiving the notice, the defendant did not pay the arrears of rent amounting to Rs.4,83,093.60/- to the plaintiff nor the defendant vacated the suit premises. The plaintiff prayed for the decree for ejectment of the defendant from the suit premises and the plaintiff be put in possession of the same and also a decree for payment of Rs.4,83,093.60/- on account of arrears of rent with interest of 12% throughout from the date of filing of the appeal and further relief’s. 4. After notice, the defendant appeared and filed his written statement. Besides usual defence, the defendant also pleaded that fair rent of the premises was fixed by the Rent Controller at the instance of the plaintiff. The order of the rent Controller was modified by the Deputy Commissioner in an appeal preferred by the defendant. The Deputy Commissioner fixed the rent at the fair amount of Rs.7,400/- per month w.e.f. 30.08.1991 and before fixation of fair rent, the rent was Rs.240.62/- per month. After fixation of the fair rent the plaintiff sent a notice demanding Rs.10,34,695.22/- as being arrears of rents but as the calculation of the plaintiff was wrong, the defendant sent reply to the same on 19.06.2000 showing the actual due was Rs.4,83,093.60/- and requested the plaintiff to check his record and confirm the above calculation but the plaintiff did not send any reply to the said letter. Since the defendant did not receive any reply from the plaintiff, he regularly sent monthly rent to the plaintiff by Account Payee Cheque at the rate of Rs.7,400/- which was received by the plaintiff. The defendant always requested the plaintiff to settle the amount so that he can make the payment. The plaintiff again sent a notice through his lawyer on 18.04.2003 demanding a sum of Rs. 9,89,840.65/- and the defendant sent reply to the said notice on 24.04.2003 stating again that the actual due was Rs.4,83,063.60/- and requested to allow him to pay the said amount in equal instalments of Rs.14,800/- per month out of which Rs.7,400/- would be adjusted towards the current rent and Rs.7,400/- would be adjusted towards the arrears of rent. Pursuant to the said letter, the defendant sent two cheques of Rs.7,400/- each to the plaintiff and the plaintiff received both the cheques and thereafter, the defendant again sent two cheques each for Rs.7,400/- to the plaintiff i.e. one for current rent and another for the arrears of rent. The plaintiff did not accept the cheques for arrears of rent. The defendant submitted that he has never defaulted in payment of rent. The defendant denied that the plaintiff required the building for their own use. The defendant also denied that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his brothers and brother’s sons. The plaintiff is one of the wealthiest men in the town and possess different properties in different parts of the state and there are four brothers in the family of the plaintiff namely Hari Prasad Budhia, Rajendra Prasad Budhia, Devendra Prasad Budhia and Hemendra Budhia. The defendant has further pleaded that Hari Prasad Budhia has two factories. One in the name of Gautam Ferro Alloys at Ramgarh and the other namely Bihar Foundary and Castings Ltd. at Ramgarh. Besides these factories, he has got other businesses as well. Rajendra Prasad Budhia has also several businesses. He is doing lucrative business in the name of Atmaram Agencies Ltd. which has amongst the others the dealership of Hindustan Motors, Fiat, Mahindra Tractors etc. He has got business in the name of Republic Pvt. Ltd. (Hundai Motors) at Commerce House, Line Tank Road, Ranchi and has also got large number of buildings and houses, which has been let out by him to different tenants. He has got business in the name of Republic Pvt. Ltd. (Hundai Motors) at Commerce House, Line Tank Road, Ranchi and has also got large number of buildings and houses, which has been let out by him to different tenants. Devendra Prasad Budhia is also carrying on business in the name of A.R. Tyres and Cold Retraders, which has the business of cold resoling of tyres. He has also got business in the name of Budhia Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and he has also got number of buildings and houses which has been let out to the different tenants. Hemendra Budhia also has a very lucrative business of transport in the name of Radhey Shyam Bus Service, which is one of the leading transport companies in the State. Besides it has also got business in the name of Budhia Tours and Travels at Main Road, Ranchi and he has also got large number of houses which has been let out by him to different tenants. Hence, the plaintiff does not requires the suit premises for his brothers or nephews. 5. On the basis of the rival pleadings, the learned court below framed the following issues:- (i) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (ii) Is there any valid cause of action for the suit? (iii) Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (iv) Does the plaintiff require the building shop premises for his own use and occupation bonafidely, reasonably and in good faith to settle his son and his brothers’ sons as premises is fit for doing business? (v) Whether the defendant is defaulter in the eye of law under section 11 of the B.B. (L.R. & E) Control Act, 1982? (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of Rs.4,82,093.60 paise only on account of arrears of rent along with interest @ 12% from the date of filing of the suit pendentelite and future till realization? (vii) Whether the defendant is the tenant under the plaintiff for the suit premises at a monthly rent of Rs.7,400/- per month? (viii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of ejectment of the defendant from the suit premises and the plaintiff be put in khas possession of the same? (ix) As to what relief or relief’s the plaintiff is entitled to? 6. (viii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of ejectment of the defendant from the suit premises and the plaintiff be put in khas possession of the same? (ix) As to what relief or relief’s the plaintiff is entitled to? 6. In support of his case, the plaintiff altogether examined three witnesses and also proved the following documents:- (i) Ext.1 – Advocate’s notice dated 18.04.2003. (ii) Ext.1/a – Advocate’s notice dated 01.05.2003 (with objection) (iii) Ext.1/b – Advocate’s notice dated 18.03.2005 (iv) Ext.2 – Letter dated 23.04.2003 of Kedia Cycle Store. (v) Ext.3 – Postal receipt for registration. 7. From the side of the defendant 9 witnesses were examined and the following documents were proved and marked as Exhibits:- (i) Ext. A to A/III – Letter dated 04.05.2005, 19.05.2005, 10.06.2000 and the reply of letters. (ii) Ext. B to B/XXIII – 23 letters in number for the period 12.02.1999 to 13.01.2001. (iii) Ext. B/XXIV to B/XXV – Letter dated 10.05.2001 & 11.07.2001. (iv) Ext. B/XXVI to B/LXXXII – 57 letters in number for the period 10.02.2001 to 10.06.2006. (vi) Ext. C to C/LXXXIV – Postal receipts which are 85 in numbers. (vii) Ext. D to D/LXXXVII – Money order coupons for the period September 1991 to 1998 (with objection) (viii) Ext. C/LXXXV to C/171 – Postal receipts which are 87 in numbers. (ix) Ext. E to E/III – Four letters dated 14.04.2001, 11.06.2001, 11.07.2001 and 10.05.2001 (with objection) (x) Ext. E/IV to E/LXIV – Letters which are 61 in numbers (with objection) (xi) Ext. E/LXV to E/LXL – Letters which are 26 in numbers (with objection) (xii) Ext. E/LXLI – Letter dated 10.03.1999 (with objection) (xiii) Ext. F to FXXX – Acknowledgement cards which are 31 in numbers (with objection) (xiv) Ext. F/XXXI to F/LIV – Acknowledgement cards which are 29 in numbers. (xv) Ext. G to G/1 – Two cheques dated 10.05.2005. 8. The learned court below first took up issue no.7 and basing on the evidence in the record gave a finding that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the defendant is tenant of the plaintiff at the rate of Rs.7,400/- per month. The learned court below took up the issue nos. 8. The learned court below first took up issue no.7 and basing on the evidence in the record gave a finding that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the defendant is tenant of the plaintiff at the rate of Rs.7,400/- per month. The learned court below took up the issue nos. 5 and 6 together and concluded that Rs.7,400/- was the fixed fair rent w.e.f. 30.08.1991 and Rs.4,83,093.60/- became due as arrear of rent upon the defendant and taking note of the fact that the defendant who was examined as defence witness no. 6 in this case, accepted that he was directed to pay the balance due amount of Rs.4,83,093.60/- upon him which has not been paid by him till the date of his examination as D.W.6 in the court and gave the finding that the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of arrears of rent of Rs.4,83,093.60/- from the defendant, which the defendant acknowledged to be due and payable and also came to the conclusion that the defendant has committed default in payment of legally fair rent payable to the plaintiff, thus the defendant is liable to be evicted from the suit premises. In respect of issue no.4, the learned court below considered that the plaintiff has larger family and his brothers and their sons are engaged in doing business and one of his family members namely Ashish Budhia requires the suit premises to use it as office for the construction company started by him and therefore, the plaintiff requires the suit premises bona-fide and reasonably. The issue no.3 was not pressed before the learned court below. On the basis of the findings of the aforesaid issues, the learned court below held that the suit is maintainable and there is valid cause of action for the suit and the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of ejectment and decreed the suit as already indicated above. 9. Mr. On the basis of the findings of the aforesaid issues, the learned court below held that the suit is maintainable and there is valid cause of action for the suit and the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of ejectment and decreed the suit as already indicated above. 9. Mr. Srijit Choudhary, learned counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned judgment mainly on two grounds, the first ground was that there being no default on the part of the defendant in payment of the amount of two consecutive month rent lawfully payable by the tenant to the landlord, the tenant being the defendant and the landlord being the plaintiff, the learned court below erred by giving a finding that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises because of default of payment in arrears of rent. The second ground agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant is that it being a mandatory requirement of law that a duty is cast upon the trial court to consider a question of partial eviction even if no such plea is taken by the tenant and the learned court below having not considered the question of partial eviction, this is a fit case where the impugned judgment and decree be set aside and the suit be remanded to the learned court below to consider the question of partial eviction after giving the opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. In support of his submission, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court Bimal Kishore Gupta v. Smt. Beena Devi & ors. reported in 2001 (2) PLJR 837 wherein, in paragraph no. 14, the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held as under: - “14. So far second ground is concerned, from perusal of the plaint, it appears that the suit property described in schedule-B is East to West 22 feet and North to South 21 feet. The court below has not mentioned, much less considered the question of partial eviction as required under proviso to section 11(1) (c) of the Act. Law on this point is well settled. The court below has not mentioned, much less considered the question of partial eviction as required under proviso to section 11(1) (c) of the Act. Law on this point is well settled. Duty is cast upon the court to consider the question of partial eviction even if no such plea is taken by the tenant and while considering this question duty is cast on the court to consider whether reasonable requirement of the landlord would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises. The court is required to determine the extent of the premises which is required reasonably by the landlord and this has to be decided on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. Thereafter, the court has to consider as to whether the aforesaid requirement is substantially satisfied and not fully satisfied by ordering partial eviction. As stated above, the court below has not considered this question at all and accordingly, the order of the court below directing eviction of the petitioner without considering the question of partial eviction is not according to law and as such the same is set aside and the matter is remitted to the court below to consider the question of partial eviction after giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence on the said point. The learned Munsif is directed to dispose of the matter of partial eviction within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. He will give 15 days’ time to the plaintiffs to adduce further evidence if the plaintiffs desire and thereafter 15 days’ time to the defendant-petitioner to adduce his evidence on the point of partial eviction and thereafter the court below will decide the matter within the time frame as mentioned above.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the appellant next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Md. Jahangir v. Smt. Kirti Devi reported in 2001 (4) PLJR 488 wherein the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held as under:-. “6. The last point that has been raised from the side of Mr. Trivedi has got some force. Jahangir v. Smt. Kirti Devi reported in 2001 (4) PLJR 488 wherein the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held as under:-. “6. The last point that has been raised from the side of Mr. Trivedi has got some force. It is his contention that in the eviction suit the duty is cast by the Act itself upon the court to adjudicate whether the personal necessity as envisaged from the side of the landlord could be satisfied by partial eviction or not but that issue has neither been framed nor been adjudicated by the learned court below. Mr. Mazumdar submitted by referring to a single line of the judgment to the effect that the landlord has stated in her evidence that whole of the suit premises is necessary for the purpose of opening up of a medical shop suffices the need of deciding the partial eviction. It has rightly been pointed out by Mr. Trivedi that such stray statement in the judgment does not suffice the necessity of deciding the issue of partial eviction. It has further been submitted by Mr. Mazumdar that the suit premises is a small one and question does not arise of partial eviction because by partial accommodation in the suit premises can never be construed to be sufficient for the purpose of opening up of a medicine shop. Only of smallness of the suit premises does not mean to give away the adjudication regarding personal necessity. Even in a business market complex a very small shop having one and two cubits width opening may be construed to be sufficient for the purpose of doing business even though the same depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Moreover the tenant had not been given that opportunity to adduce evidence regarding partial eviction. The question of taking of plea of partial eviction in the written statement does not arise because such issue comes to play at the decision being arrived at by the adjudicating court that the personal necessity exists and the eviction can be done on the ground of personal necessity. The question of taking of plea of partial eviction in the written statement does not arise because such issue comes to play at the decision being arrived at by the adjudicating court that the personal necessity exists and the eviction can be done on the ground of personal necessity. In that way when such decision is not arrived at by the learned court below I remand for the purpose of deciding that issue holding that the decision in the other issue by the learned court below are proper, just and hence upheld.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Sampath Kumar Karmkar & ors. v. Gopal Kumar reported in 2000 (1) PLJR 875 wherein the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held as under:- “5. Regarding partial eviction also the learned court below rejected the same only on the ground that there was a stray statement by the defendant to the effect that he would not like to share the suit premises with the plaintiff. It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff’s wife is dead but he has got two or three children. The suit premises consists of several rooms and whether two family can be accommodated or not has not been considered by the learned Court below while considering the issue of partial eviction. Defendant-petitioners before this Court has submitted that he would have no objection if proper accommodation is made to both the parties in the suit premises. Moreover, it appears that the need of the plaintiff for residence was definitely there because he had already come out from his brother’s family and is accommodating himself in another room and if one room were to justify for this accommodation or not is a matter to be considered by the Court below, on appreciation of evidence in the matter. On perusal of the impugned judgment, I find that issue of personal necessity and of partial eviction had been considered casually by the court below without going in to the deep in it. On perusal of the impugned judgment, I find that issue of personal necessity and of partial eviction had been considered casually by the court below without going in to the deep in it. Much stress was given regarding business of the plaintiff but nowhere in the plaint there was any plea of business by the plaintiff and even if such business is there for the purpose of eviction as a personal necessity then also such business remains a vague one as no-where it has been specifically stated as to what business the plaintiff wants to start. The landlord cannot have any unfettered right to get the eviction on the simple plea of personal necessity. Desire and wish cannot take place the bona-fide and genuineness of personal necessity. For the purpose of eviction on the ground of personal necessity it must be held before grant of decree to the effect that such necessity is bona-fide, real non-imaginary and more than wish or desire. But it appears that the learned court below has not approached the case in its proper perspective for consideration of personal need. But when the plaintiff has got no personal accommodation of his own then perhaps he might have a bona-fide need for personal accommodation but how many rooms would cater his need has also not been considered. In that way the impugned judgment his hereby set aside and the matter is sent back to the court below for considering the matter afresh both on point of bona-fide of personal necessity and of partial eviction in the light of the observations made above. If necessary party may also be given further opportunity to adduce more evidence on those two points.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Shailendra Kumar Chaurasia v. Ram Nath Sah reported in 1999 (2) PLJR 177 wherein the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held as under:- “10. It appears while granting eviction decree on personal necessity the learned court below has not considered the question of partial eviction. It appears while granting eviction decree on personal necessity the learned court below has not considered the question of partial eviction. It is true that this plea has not been taken from the side of the defendant but it has now become settled principle of law as enunciated not only of this Court but also by the Apex Court that it is the bounden duty of the court to see whether partial eviction of the suit premises can suffice the need of the plaintiff or not, whether there is plea from the side of the defendant or not to that effect. Although voluminous evidence has been recorded by the court below of the witnesses adduced from both the sides but on this point practically there is no evidence on record as is found on scrutiny. When no evidence is there, there is little scope of this revisional court to consider that matter in the revisional jurisdiction. Hence, this point of partial eviction is required to be decided by the Court below after giving opportunity to both the parties to adduce further evidence.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the appellant next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench in the case of Nagendra Prasad Barnwal v. Jitendra Prasad Barnwal reported in 1998 (2) PLJR 582 wherein the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held as under: - “7. However, learned counsel for the petitioner rightly submitted that even though the plaintiff has been able to establish his claim that the suit premises is required by him in good faith for his own occupation still trial court is required to make an enquiry and to record a specific finding as required under Section 11 (c) of the Act that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the defendant form the part of the building and allowing the tenant to continue in occupation of the rest if the tenant agreed to such occupation and in absence of such finding the order of the trial court directing the eviction of the tenant from the entire suit premises which admittedly consists of three rooms is apparently illegal in view of the aforesaid proviso. On perusal of the judgment of the trial court it is clear that the trial court erred in not recording a specific finding on this point because admittedly the suit premises consists of only three rooms and the plaintiff requires only that portion of the premises which is suitable for opening a shop. If that is so the trial court should have considered the case of both the parties if at all the partial eviction of the defendant-tenant will serve the purpose of the landlord and the defendant also agrees to occupy the remaining portion of the suit premises on payment of rent to be fixed by the court. The court is required, in such a situation, to record a specific finding if the partial eviction will serve the purpose or the entire suit premises is required by the landlord for his bona-fide requirement. 8. The Supreme Court in similar situation in a case reported in AIR 1994 SC 489 (Krishna Murari Prasad vs. Mitar Singh) specifically observed that even though the suit premises consists of one room still trial court is required to record a specific finding if the partial eviction will serve the purpose as required in Section 11(c) of the Act. Thus, remitted the case to the trial court only for a limited purpose whether the premises can be divided and eviction of the tenant from the part of the premises can substantially satisfy the landlord’s need. The Division Bench of our own High Court in a case reported in 1993 Vol.1 B.L.J.R. 281 : 1992 (2) PLJR 692 (M/s. Bharati Pustak Kendra vs. C.L. Daruka) held that even if the tenant does not raise this point of partial eviction, the court has to make an enquiry in view of Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act which is mandatory. Thus, though the finding of the trail court that the suit premises was required for bona-fide need and occupation of the landlord still the case was remitted for a limited purpose if partial eviction of the suit premises will serve the requirement of the landlord and to record a specific finding thereon in view of the provision of Section 11 (1) (c) of the Control Act and if the partial eviction order for the entire suit premises can be recorded by the trial court on the basis of the evidence on the record or the parties may adduce evidence on this point. Similar is the view of this Court in a case reported in 1987 PLJR 582 (Dr. Hemchandra Jha vs. Smt. Anjana Lal) and the case was remitted to the trial court for giving opportunity to the parties to lead evidence only on the point whether the petitioner should be evicted from the whole building or his partial eviction will fulfil the requirement of the landlord and the finding of the court below on other question were duly confirmed.” (Emphasis Supplied) Besides these submissions, learned counsel for the appellant also assailed the impugned judgment and decree on the ground that the same is against the weight of evidence and the materials in record and that the learned court below do not appreciate the evidence in record in its proper perspective. Hence, it is submitted that the impugned judgment and decree being not sustainable in law be set aside. 10. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that Section 11 (1) (d) of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2000 says that there are two situations where the decree of eviction can be passed for default of payment of rent. The first is that “where the amount of two months rent lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having being paid within the time fixed” and second default is “for not having validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 16 of the said act” and Section 16 refers to requirement for deposit of rent consequent upon the order made by the appellate authority or the commissioner. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that if the rental arrear or the rental amount due is more than the rent of two months then the landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground of default of payment of money and in this case, admittedly the defendant having not paid the arrears of Rs.4,83,093.60, the learned court below rightly held that the appellant defaulted in payment of arrears rent and hence, there is no illegality in the impugned judgment of the learned court below in this respect. So far as the submission of the appellant regarding the non-consideration of the question of partial eviction is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent submitted firstly that mandatory requirement of considering the question of partial eviction is to the proceeding where the eviction is sought only on the ground of personal necessity but this being a case where besides the personal necessity, the landlord-plaintiff has also sought the eviction of the respondents on the ground of default of payment of arrears rent and as all the judgments which are relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant being of the cases where eviction was sought by the appellant only on the ground of personal necessity and thus the facts of this case is entirely different from the facts of those cases hence the ratio of those cases is not applicable in the present case. Alternatively, it is also submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that in the concluding paragraph of issue no.4 in the internal page no.20 of the impugned judgment, learned court below has considered the extent of requirement and has recorded the finding that the entire premises consisting a total area of 2951 square feet is required for doing the business of one of the family members of the plaintiff namely Ashish Budhia for using the same as the office for his construction company and thus the learned trial court has considered and answered the question of partial eviction. In this context learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anamika Roy v. Jatindra Chowrasiya reported in 2013 (6) SCC 270 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - “19. In this context learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anamika Roy v. Jatindra Chowrasiya reported in 2013 (6) SCC 270 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - “19. There is no dispute with regard to the ratio laid down by this Court in Rehman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand that the provision contained in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 mandates the court to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated therein should be ordered or the entire building should be directed to be vacated. However, while deciding the issue of reasonable personal requirement of the landlord, if the trial court or the appellate court also considers the extent of requirement and records a finding that the entire premises or part thereof satisfies the need of the landlord, then, in our considered opinion, there is sufficient compliance with the provision contained in the said Act.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada reported in (2003) 2 SCC 320 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “10. The provisions of the Act do not bar a partial eviction being ordered — rather contemplate a partial eviction specifically — which would of course depend on the answer to the question — whether it would be enough to dislodge the tenant from only a part of the premises in his possession, and to what extent, to satisfy the proved requirement of the landlord associated with consideration of comparative hardship. If the court is satisfied that the ends of justice would be met if the tenant is not called upon to vacate the entire tenancy premises but only a part of it, then the court may order partial eviction so that the requirement of the landlord is satisfied and the tenant is also not deprived of his running business activity. Inasmuch as Section 13(2) entails the consequence of the landlord being denied decree of eviction, wholly or partly, in spite of his having proved reasonable and bona fide requirement within the meaning of Section 13(1) (g), the burden of proving availability of grounds under Section 13(2) of the Act is on the tenant. Inasmuch as Section 13(2) entails the consequence of the landlord being denied decree of eviction, wholly or partly, in spite of his having proved reasonable and bona fide requirement within the meaning of Section 13(1) (g), the burden of proving availability of grounds under Section 13(2) of the Act is on the tenant. It is expected of the parties to raise necessary pleadings, and the court to frame an issue based on the pleadings so as to enable parties to adduce evidence and bring on record such relevant material as would enable the court forming an opinion on the issue as to comparative hardship and consistently with such finding whether a partial eviction would meet the ends of justice. Even if no issue has been framed, the court may discharge its duty by taking into consideration such material as may be available on record.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the respondent next relied upon the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sohail Karimi vs. Sanjida Begam & Others in civil revision No.24 of 2012 decided on 29.11.2012. Though it was agitated before this court in the case of Sohail Karimi (supra) that the learned court below failed to discharge its duty to explore the possibility of partial eviction, the coordinate Bench of this Court considering the observation made by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Most. Jagtarana Kuer & Others vs. Lalmuni Kuer & Others reported in 2007 (4) PLJR 98 wherein in paragraph no.8, it was held as under:- “8. It may be stated in this regard that the plea of partial eviction has to be raised by the defendant in his written statement and his deposition in the eviction suit and that plea cannot be decided suo moto as has been held by this court in case of Food Corporation of India & Ors. vs. Vishun Properties and Enterprises & Ors. reported in BBCJ 711. Furthermore the onus squarely lies upon the defendant to show that partial eviction shall satisfy the personal necessity of the plaintiffs as has been held by this court in case of M/s Bata India Ltd. vs. Dr. Md. Quaruzzama reported in 1993 (1) PLJR 87 . vs. Vishun Properties and Enterprises & Ors. reported in BBCJ 711. Furthermore the onus squarely lies upon the defendant to show that partial eviction shall satisfy the personal necessity of the plaintiffs as has been held by this court in case of M/s Bata India Ltd. vs. Dr. Md. Quaruzzama reported in 1993 (1) PLJR 87 . When tenant himself is not agreeing to partial eviction, failure of court to consider it does not vitiate its judgment as has been held by this court in case of Om Prakash Sharma vs. Kishun Mistry reported in 1985 PLJR 727 . However, where the tenant has not taken the plea of partial eviction in his pleading or evidence, the court may consider the same and record its finding regarding it, only in a case where the suit is filed for eviction only on the ground of personal necessity.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Maganlal v. Nanasaheb reported in (2008) 13 SCC 758 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - “25. It is common experience in our country that especially landlord-tenant litigations prolong for a long time. It is true that neither can the person who has started the litigation sit idle nor can the development of the event be stopped by him. Therefore, the crucial event should be taken as on the date when the suit for eviction was filed, unless the subsequent events materially change the ground of relief.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the respondent next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Akhileshwar Kumar and others vs. Mustaqim and others reported in AIR 2003 SC 532 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - “3. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court cannot be countenanced and has occasioned a failure of justice. Overwhelming evidence is available to show that the plaintiff No. 1 is sitting idle, without any adequate commercial activity available to him so as to gainfully employ him. The plaintiff No. 1 and his father both have deposed to this fact. Simply because the plaintiff No. 1 is provisionally assisting his father in their family business, it does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. The plaintiff No. 1 and his father both have deposed to this fact. Simply because the plaintiff No. 1 is provisionally assisting his father in their family business, it does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. What the High Court has overlooked is the evidence to the effect, relied on by the trial Court too, that the husband of plaintiff No. 4, i.e. son-in-law of Ram Chandra Sao, was assisting the latter in his business and there was little left to be done by the three sons.” (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the respondent further relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Savitri Sahay vs. Sachidanand Prasad reported in 2003 (1) JLJR SC 171 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not find any fault with the non-consideration of the plea of partial eviction and dismissed the civil revision. Learned counsel for the respondent next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Jagat Bandhu Batabayal vs. Jiban Krishna Roy reported in 2001 SCC Online 454 wherein in paragraph no.32, the Hon’ble Court has held as under: - “32. Furthermore, the question of partial eviction was rightly not considered by the Learned Judge of the first Appellate Court as the tenant never raised such issue before the Lower Appellate Court nor any material was available before the Learned Judge of the Lower Appellate Court on the basis whereof the Learned Judge could form an opinion that the requirement of the plaintiff can be substantially satisfied by ejecting the tenant from a part and/or portion of the suit premises. Since, no such material was available before the Learned Judge of the Lower Appellate Court, question of partial eviction of the tenant was rightly not considered by the Learned Judge of the First Appellate Court under S. 13(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.” (Emphasis Supplied) and this decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court was held to be rightly decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anamika Roy (supra). Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the learned court below has rightly considered the evidence in record in its proper perspective. Hence, he submitted that this appeal being without any merit be dismissed. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the learned court below has rightly considered the evidence in record in its proper perspective. Hence, he submitted that this appeal being without any merit be dismissed. 11. Having heard the rival submission made at the bar and after perusal of the record, this Court is of the considered view that the following points of determination emerged for consideration in this appeal: - (i) Whether the learned court below has rightly come to a finding that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of ejectment because of default of the defendant to pay the arrears rent and on the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff? (ii) Whether the learned court below erred in not considering the question of partial eviction? 12. First Point for Determination. So far as first point of determination is concerned, out of the three witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiff, the P.W.1-Rajendra Prasad Budhia has stated that he is the owner of the suit premises and the defendant is monthly tenant under him on a monthly rent of Rs.7400/-. He has corroborated the averments made in the plaint and has further stated that the defendant has not paid the rent and on account of rent a sum of Rs.4,83,093.60/- is due and payable by the defendant to the plaintiff which the defendant is not paying even after repeated reminders. P.W.1 also stated about the requirement of suit premises for his personal necessity. It is pertinent to mention here that the testimony of P.W.1 regarding the defendant being the monthly tenant for a monthly rent of Rs.7400/- or his testimony that Rs.4,83,093.60/- has not been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff has not been challenged in any manner in the cross-examination of P.W.1. In his cross-examination he has stated that Ashish Budhia is a partner in a construction company. P.W.2-Devendra Kumar Budhia has stated that he is also a member of the plaintiff and the defendant is the monthly tenant under plaintiff for a monthly rent of Rs.7400/-. He has also stated about the defendant not paying a sum of Rs.4,83,093.60/- in-spite of repeated reminders. He has further stated that the suit premises is required by the plaintiff for personal necessity. He has also stated about the defendant not paying a sum of Rs.4,83,093.60/- in-spite of repeated reminders. He has further stated that the suit premises is required by the plaintiff for personal necessity. He proved the documents which have been marked as Ext.1, 2, 1/A and 1/B. In his cross-examination, on being confronted to him by the defence, the letter written by him has been marked as Ext.A and A/1. He has also stated about the other properties of them. P.W.3-Ashish Budhia has stated that after attaining majority, he has started his own business in the name of Budhia Construction Pvt. Ltd. but he does not have any office of him and hence the suit premises is suitable for his office and therefore, the suit premises will be required for him. He has further deposed that the defendant is having his house and shop at Lake Road Ranchi and has rented out the said house at high rent to other persons. The defendant is not vacating the suit premises even after he was asked to vacate the same. In his cross-examination, he has stated that Budhia Construction Pvt. Ltd. came into being in the year 1997-98. His testimony regarding requirement of the suit premises for the use as office of Budhia Construction Pvt. Ltd. has remained unchallenged as no question was put to him in this respect in his cross-examination. 13. Out of the 9 witnesses examined by the defendant, D.W.1-Puran Mal Khowal has stated that the suit premises is not required by the plaintiff or any member of his family. He has also stated about the various businesses of the plaintiff and a vacant place is available in the suit premises which is suitable for the requirement of the plaintiff. In his cross-examination, he has stated that Ashish Budhia is running a firm namely Budhia Construction. The defendant is having his own house at a distance of one kilometer from the suit premises. D.W.2-Arun Kumar Choudhary has stated about the brothers of the plaintiff and about their businesses. None of the members of the family of the plaintiff require the suit premises. One shop is in the same building, in which the suit premises is situated, is lying vacant for three to four years after one Bagla Press has vacated that shop. D.W.2-Arun Kumar Choudhary has stated about the brothers of the plaintiff and about their businesses. None of the members of the family of the plaintiff require the suit premises. One shop is in the same building, in which the suit premises is situated, is lying vacant for three to four years after one Bagla Press has vacated that shop. In his cross-examination, he has stated that in the suit premises office can be opened and the suit premises is proper for opening an office. D.W.3-Gouri Shankar Sahay has stated that in one portion of the building of the suit premises, he runs a shop namely Ratan Medical Hall. Apart from the suit premises, the plaintiff has several other premises which were vacant. Many other shops are on rent and some are lying vacant. The premises vacated by Bagla Press is suitable for any business. Neither the plaintiff nor any of the members have any requirement of the suit premises. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the plaintiff has also instituted a fair rent case against him, the defendant and one Babulal Modi. In respect of one vacated house in the premises of the suit property, a case has been going on. The plaintiff has also filed a civil eviction suit against D.W.3. D.W.4- Pritam Kumar is a formal witness. He has proved the documents on behalf of the defendant. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he does not know what was written in the documents proved by him nor the documents were written in his presence. D.W.5-Ashok Kumar is also a formal witness. He has been examined to prove the documents. D.W.6-Rajendra Kedia is the defendant of the suit. He has corroborated the averments made in his written statement. He has further stated that the plaintiff is having many buildings and houses some of which has been given on rent but some of which are lying vacant. If the plaintiff requires any place for his business then a 5000/- Sq. ft. of vacant space at the 1st floor of the suit building can be used for that. He has proved the documents which have been marked as Ext.D to D/87 with objection, C/85 to C/171, E/1, E/2 and E/3 to E/90 all with objection. If the plaintiff requires any place for his business then a 5000/- Sq. ft. of vacant space at the 1st floor of the suit building can be used for that. He has proved the documents which have been marked as Ext.D to D/87 with objection, C/85 to C/171, E/1, E/2 and E/3 to E/90 all with objection. In his cross-examination the D.W.6 has stated that he was directed to pay the balance due amount but he has not paid the same till the date of his examination in court. D.W.7-Nand Lal Sahu has stated that the plaintiff and his brothers have several shops apart from the suit premises. Some of them are vacant. The suit premises is not required by any members of the plaintiff. In his cross-examination, he has stated that all the sons of Budhia family are in business. D.W.8-Surendra Kumar Kedia is the brother of the defendant. He has proved the documents which has been marked as Ext. F to F/54 with objection as well as G to G/1. In his cross-examination, he has stated that there is no receiving endorsement of the plaintiff on the cheque. P.W.9-Shivraj Bhagat is an employee of the shop of the defendant. He has stated that on being instructed by the defendant, he used to give the cheques towards the rent of the suit premises to the employee of the plaintiff and he was obtaining receipts thereof from the office of the plaintiff. He has proved the receipts which has been marked as Ext. H to H/7 with objection. In his cross-examination, he has stated that in his presence no cheque was ever written. 14. As already discussed above, the evidence in record is sufficient to establish that the defendant has defaulted in payment of Rs.4,83,093.60/- in respect of the suit premises to the plaintiff as admitted by the defendant in his testimony in this case and as the testimony of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that the defendant has defaulted in payment of the said rental dues has remained unchallenged, in their respective cross examination and hence has to be accepted. 15. It is relevant to quote Section 11 (1) of Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2000 which reads as under:- “11. Eviction of tenants. 1 and 2 that the defendant has defaulted in payment of the said rental dues has remained unchallenged, in their respective cross examination and hence has to be accepted. 15. It is relevant to quote Section 11 (1) of Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2000 which reads as under:- “11. Eviction of tenants. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract of law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds, - (a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for sub-letting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment; (b) where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or negligence or default of the tenant or of any person residing with the tenant or for whose behavior the tenant is responsible; (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall hence forth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5. Explanation I. – In this clause the word “landlord” shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of Section 2. Explanation II. Explanation I. – In this clause the word “landlord” shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of Section 2. Explanation II. – Where there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference. (d) Where the amount of [two months] rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 16; (e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of the tenancy; and (f) the landlord requires the premises in [order] to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Municipality of Municipal Corporation or the Notified Area Committee or the Regional Development Authority or any other Authority within whose jurisdiction the building lies and such building work cannot be properly and fully carried out without the premises being vacated.” (Emphasis Supplied) Section 11 (1) (d) categorically envisages that where the amount of two months become due and is in arrear, the tenant will be liable for eviction and as already discussed above, there is no challenge to the testimony of P.W.1 and 2, in record that the rent of the tenanted premises was Rs.7400/- per month and the amount due was Rs.4,83,093.60/-, so in this backdrop, I have no hesitation in holding that the learned court below has rightly came to a finding that the defendant-tenant has defaulted in payment of the rent which was much more than the amount of two months’ rent and which has not been paid even though the defendant was directed to pay the said balance amount by the authorities concern. 16. As already mentioned above, the testimony of P.W.3 that there is requirement of the suit premises for his use, the same as his office for Budhia Construction Pvt. Ltd. has also remained unchallenged. 16. As already mentioned above, the testimony of P.W.3 that there is requirement of the suit premises for his use, the same as his office for Budhia Construction Pvt. Ltd. has also remained unchallenged. Even the D.W.6 has not categorically stated that the plaintiff has no personal necessity of any place for running the office of Budhia Construction Pvt. Ltd. rather he has deposed that if at all the plaintiff has any personal necessity or personal requirement of the premises, the same can be met by other premises available with the plaintiff. In this respect, the explanation of (II) of Section 11 (1) (c) of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000 is relevant which envisages that if there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference and it is also settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Savitri Sahay v. Sachidanand Prasad reported in 2002 (8) SCC 765 wherein in paragraph no.4 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “4. Thus it is to be seen that, under the said Act, if there are two or more premises the landlord could choose which one would be preferable to him or her and the tenant cannot question such preference.” 17. Thus, I have no hesitation in holding that the learned court below has rightly came to a conclusion that the suit premises is bona-fide and reasonably required by the plaintiff-landlord. The first point for determination is answered accordingly. 18. Second point for the determination So far as the second point for determination is concerned, after going through the impugned judgment, I find that the learned court below in the concluding paragraph of the discussion made regarding issue no.4 has discussed that the requirement of the total area of 2951 sq. ft. for being used as the office of Budhia Construction Company of the P.W.3, there is unchallenged evidence in record that the P.W.3 who is the member of the family of the plaintiff is running a Pvt. Ltd. Construction Company since 1997-98 and the personal necessity of the plaintiff has already been upheld in the said circumstances. ft. for being used as the office of Budhia Construction Company of the P.W.3, there is unchallenged evidence in record that the P.W.3 who is the member of the family of the plaintiff is running a Pvt. Ltd. Construction Company since 1997-98 and the personal necessity of the plaintiff has already been upheld in the said circumstances. It is also not the case of the defendant-appellant that his purpose would suffice with any portion less than the entire suit premises. For running the office of a Pvt. Ltd. Construction Company anything less than an area of 2951 sq. ft. of carpet area cannot be termed as an excessive requirement and certainly such an office cannot be run in a place less than such an area i.e. less than the suit premises of 2951 sq. ft. More so because the defendant as D.W.6 himself stated that if the plaintiff requires any place for his business then a 5000/- Sq. ft. can be used for that. So I do not find any illegality in this score warranting interference of this Court. The second point for determination is answered accordingly. 19. Thus, this appeal being without any merit is dismissed but in the circumstances without any costs. The defendant-appellant is directed to handover the vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff-respondent within three months from the date of this judgment. 20. Let the lower court record be sent back to the court below with a copy of this judgment forthwith.