JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma,J. The instant writ petition has been filed against the award dated 22.11.2014 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Agra, Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as ''the Labour Court'). The petitioner before this Court was employed with the respondent no. 2 i.e. the Principal, St. George's College, 3, Garden Road, Agra,(hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent school') as an Accountant. When on 12.5.2006 the respondent school did not allow the petitioner to work with it, the petitioner raised an Industrial Dispute which was referred as Adjudication Case No. 29 of 2007. After pleadings were exchanged and evidence was led an award dated 22.11.2014 was passed and as it had answered the reference in the negative, the instant writ petition was filed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the resignation dated 12.5.2006 alleged to be that of the petitioner was, in fact, not that of the petitioner and, therefore, his services were wrongly dispensed with. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Labour Court erred in itself looking into the correctness of signature of the petitioner on the Resignation Letter when the petitioner had denied that his signatures were there on it. He submits that the Labour Court should have referred the matter to an expert and, thereafter, should have concluded as to whether the signature on the resignation letter was actually that of the petitioner which was exhibited as Exhibit E -23. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the provisions of sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and has submitted that the Labour Court should not have itself acted as an expert and should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert who would have compared the disputed signature of the petitioner over the resignation letter with some admitted signature of his and thereafter would have come to a proper conclusion. He has submitted that it was not within the domain of the Labour Court to have acted as an expert. 4. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2, the respondent School, however, has submitted that under Article 226 and 227, this Court has a very limited scope of interfering with the findings of fact as had been arrived at by the Labour Court and relied upon a judgment reported in 2015 (12) SCC 754 : (Gauri Shankar vs. State of Rajasthan). 2, the respondent School, however, has submitted that under Article 226 and 227, this Court has a very limited scope of interfering with the findings of fact as had been arrived at by the Labour Court and relied upon a judgment reported in 2015 (12) SCC 754 : (Gauri Shankar vs. State of Rajasthan). 5. He also relied upon a judgement reported in 2002 (8) JT SC 471 (M/s. Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar) and specifically read out the paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, of it. These paragraphs are therefore being reproduced here as under:- "2. Generally speaking, exercise of jurisdiction under Article of the Constitution is limited and restrictive in nature. It is so exercised in the normal circumstances for want of jurisdiction, errors of law, perverse findings and gross violation of natural justice, to name a few. It is merely a revisional jurisdiction and does not confer an unlimited authority or prerogative to correct all orders or even wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Courts below. The finding of fact being within the domain of the inferior Tribunal, except where it is a perverse recording thereof or not based on any material whatsoever resulting in manifest injustice, interference under the Article is not called for: 3. The observations above however, find affirmance in the decision of this Court in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895 . In Nibaran (supra) this Court has been rather categorical in recording that the jurisdiction so conferred is by no means appellate in nature for correcting errors in the decision of the subordinate Courts or Tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority. More recently, in Mani Nariman Daruwala and Bharucha (deceased) through LRs & Ors. v. Phiroz N. Bhatena & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 1494 this Court in the similar vein stated : "In the exercise of this jurisdiction the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an inferior Court or tribunal if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal who has come or in other words it is a finding which was perverse in law. Except to the limited extent indicated above the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact." 4. Needless to record that there is total unanimity of judicial precedents on the score that error must be that of law and patently on record committed by the inferior Tribunal so as to warrant intervention it ought not to act as a Court of appeal and there is no dissention or even a contra note being sounded at any point of time till date. Incidentally, the illegality, if there be any, in an order of an inferior Tribunal, it would however be a plain exercise of jurisdiction under the Article to correct the same as otherwise the law Courts would fail to subserve the needs of the society since illegality cannot even be countenanced under any circumstances." 6. Learned counsel further submitted that undeniably findings of fact could have been reversed had perversity been found in the order but he submits that since the petitioner himself in his oral statement before the Labour Court had admitted his signatures on exhibit E-23 which is the resignation letter and he had not requested for any hand writing expert the Labour Court's finding regarding the signature was, therefore, in no manner perverse. 7. Learned counsel also has submitted that since the petitioner had received his full and final payment which was due to him after his resignation on 3.7.2006, it could safely be said that he was all through admitting the fact that he had, in fact, resigned and only as an afterthought he had raised the Industrial Dispute after some lapse of time. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was an educated and a well qualified person and there was no reason for him to wait for two full months before approaching the Labour Court. His acceptance of the full and final payment also, he submits, remains unexplained. In this regard the learned counsel has relied upon a decision reported in 2006 (110) FLR 1043, M/s Sagari leathers (P) Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (4), Agra and Others, wherein it had been held that if an employee accepts his full and final payment then it would be treated as a case where he had voluntarily left the job. 8. 8. Learned counsel further submitted that under Section 73 of the Evidence Act it was the duty of the Court to have compared the disputed signatures with the admitted signatures itself. However, he submits that had the admission not been there of the petitioner that the signature on exhibit E-23 was his then of course, as a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety the Court should not have taken upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signatures with any admitted signatures of the petitioner. However, since there was an admission of the petitioner himself, the petitioner now could not turn back and say that the Court should have obtained an expert opinion about the veracity of the signature. This is also what has been stated in AIR 1997 SC 3255 (Ajit Savant Majagavi v. State of Karnataka). Learned counsel read out paragraph 37 and 38 of the above decision and so they are being reproduced here as under:- "37. This Section consists of two parts. While the first part provides for comparison of signature, finger impression, writing etc. allegedly written or made by a person with signature or writing etc. admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written by the same person, the second part empowers the Court to direct any person including an accused, present in Court, to give his specimen writing or finger prints for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare it with the writing or signature allegedly made by that person. The Section does not specify by whom the comparison shall made. However, looking to the other provision of the Act, it is clear that such comparison may either be made by a handwriting expert under Section 45 or by anyone familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned as provided by Section 47 or by the Court itself. 38. As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature of handwriting and in the event of slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But this does not mean that the Court has not power to compare the disputed signature with admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act. But this does not mean that the Court has not power to compare the disputed signature with admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act. (See : State (Delhi Administration) vs. Pali Ram, AIR 1979 SC 14 : (1979) 2 SCC 158 )" 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the Labour Court had no other option but to conclude that the petitioner had himself resigned. The fact that he had taken his full and final payment and also the fact that he had not been disputing his signatures in his oral statement, clearly established that the petitioner had resigned. Further in view of the admission there was no requirement to refer the matter to any expert. It is not a matter of course that whenever a signature is disputed, the opinion of an expert had to be obtained. In this case when there was an admission of the petitioner and when by his conduct he was showing he had resigned, I am of the opinion that there was no requirement to refer the matter to any expert whatsoever. 10. Further, since the perusal of the Award shows that there is no perversity in it, I also feel that no interference under Article 226 and 227 is required. 11. The writ petition is dismissed.