ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the letter contained in memo no. 106 dated 28.06.2016 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Chaibasa (respondent no. 3) whereby the PDS licence of the petitioner has been placed under suspension. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner was granted licence for running a shop under the Public Distribution System bearing Licence No. 09/2006 for distribution of food grains and other items to the ration card holders. A complaint was received against the petitioner whereupon the respondent no. 3 directed to hold enquiry in the matter. The Block Supply Officer, Manjhari submitted enquiry report on 22.04.2016 mainly providing information regarding ration cards made available to the petitioner in January, 2016. On 11.05.2016, the Assistant Manager, State Food Corporation Manjhari also submitted a report to the Circle Officer, Manjhari stating that on physical verification of the stock in the shop of the petitioner, the same was found in order. The Circle Officer, Manjhari vide letter no. 127 dated 14.05.2016, submitted report to the respondent no. 3 and thereafter vide impugned memo no. 106 dated 28.06.2016, the licence of the petitioner was put under suspension with a direction to submit his reply for the proposed cancellation which gives rise to the filing of the present writ petition. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the copy of the report of the Circle Officer, Manjhari has not been provided to the petitioner, however he came to know that the impugned show cause notice has been issued to him relying on the statements of those persons who are neither the card holders nor have any concern with PDS shop of the petitioner. It is further submitted that immediately after receiving the show cause notice, the petitioner filed the reply denying the allegations levelled against him, however the matter has still been kept pending. It is also submitted that under the provisions of the Jharkhand Trade Article (Unification of Licence) Order, 1984 (in short “the Order, 1984), a licence cannot be placed under suspension for an indefinite period in contemplation of its cancellation. The impugned order of suspension is vitiated on account of non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Order, 1984 which otherwise has been issued in violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned order of suspension is vitiated on account of non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Order, 1984 which otherwise has been issued in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 3 is not vested with unfettered and unbridled powers to place the licence of the petitioner under suspension on unfounded, unsubstantiated and omnibus allegations. The District Supply Officer, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa had circulated a guidelines to locate and earmark those persons who were not entitled to get the benefits of PDS scheme under the provisions of the National Food Security Act, 2013 and consequently the petitioner had taken action against some forged beneficiaries. The persons, whose names were enlisted under the dis-entitled/disqualified category, hatched up a conspiracy out of grudge and biasness and made omnibus complaints against the petitioner. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents while relying on the counter affidavit dated 16.06.2017 filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 2 and 3 submits that the reply to the show cause notice filed by the petitioner was received on 01.07.2016 and the same is being verified by Block Development Officer, Manjhari who has not submitted the report as yet. It is further submitted that a licence can be placed under suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days without giving any opportunity to the licensee. Since the petitioner was served memo no. 106/aa dated 28.06.2016 therefore, it cannot be said that the stipulated period of 90 days has elapsed as per the provisions of section 11(2) of the Order, 1984 at the time of filing of this writ petition. Thus, the petitioner cannot say that the suspension of the license was for an indefinite period. It is also submitted that the process of verification is still under process. All the provisions of the Order, 1984 have been complied by the respondents before issuing the show cause notice but, the petitioner rushed to this Court before any decision on the said show cause notice is taken, resultantly no further action could be taken. The suspension of the petitioner’s licence was necessary for fair enquiry of the allegation against him. The respondents have not punished the petitioner by keeping his licence under suspension, rather the same was done only to facilitate the on-going enquiry process. 5. The suspension of the petitioner’s licence was necessary for fair enquiry of the allegation against him. The respondents have not punished the petitioner by keeping his licence under suspension, rather the same was done only to facilitate the on-going enquiry process. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner has challenged the order of suspension of his PDS Licence. Admittedly, the petitioner has filed reply to the show cause notice and in the meantime he approached to this Court with a plea of the violation of the principles of natural justice as well as on the ground that the provisions of Order, 1984 has not been followed while passing of the order of suspension. 6. On perusal of Sub-clause (1) of Clause 11 of the Order, 1984, it would appear that if any licensee or his agent or servant or any other person acting on his behalf contravenes any of the terms and conditions of the licence, then his licence may be cancelled or suspended. Under sub-clause (2), it has been provided that no order of cancellation shall be made unless the licensee has been given a reasonable opportunity for presenting his case against the proposed cancellation but during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceeding of cancellation of licence, the same can be suspended for a period not exceeding 90 days without giving any opportunity to the licensee to present his case. Thus, when the order of suspension is passed under sub-clause (1) as a punishment i.e. without contemplating cancellation of licence, the principles of natural justice is required to be followed before passing such order. However, when the authority proposes to pass an order of cancellation, then it may, during the pendency of the proceeding, suspend the licence of a person for a period not exceeding ninety days and in such case, no opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the licensee before passing the order of suspension since it is a temporary action. 7. The Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of M/s. Swami Distributors Vs. State Of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1990 (1) PLJR 210 held as follows:- “10. The question, therefore arises whether the suspension by way of punishment can be inflicted without giving a reasonable opportunity in absence of any provision under Cl. 11(1). 7. The Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of M/s. Swami Distributors Vs. State Of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1990 (1) PLJR 210 held as follows:- “10. The question, therefore arises whether the suspension by way of punishment can be inflicted without giving a reasonable opportunity in absence of any provision under Cl. 11(1). The suspension of a licence to carry on trade and business by way of punishment is a drastic measure, inasmuch as the power to carry on trade, and business is taken away for a certain period, whereas the cancellation of a licence with the same consequences for the entire period for which the licence is granted. The licensee, therefore, suffers from a severe civil consequence as in both the cases, trade and business activities come to a halt, thus putting the licensee to serious jeopardy. It results in serious abridgement of the right to carry on business and, therefore, it must ensure just exercise of power. In the case of Gauri Shankar Badri Narain V/s. State of Bihar, 1973 Pat LJR 129, a Bench of this Court while considering validity of Cl. 8(2) of the Bihar Motor Spirit High Speed Diesel Oil Licensing Order, 1966, which reads "The State Govt. may without giving any previous notice and without assigning any reason suspend or cancel any licence under Order." has held the same as ultra vires and void (see also AIR 1974 SC 175 and AIR 1974 SC 1539 ). Much water has flown since then. In the case of Mohinder Singh Gill V/s. The Chief Election Commr., New Delhi, AIR 1978 SC 851 ), audi alteram was held to be a functional obligation, the silence of statute has no exclusionary effect." It is not always a necessary inference that if opportunity is expressly provided in one provision and not so provided in another, opportunity is to be considered as excluded from that other provision. It may be a weighty consideration to be taken into account but the weightier consideration as whether the administrative action entails consequences was so observed by the Supreme Court in the case of S.L. Kappor V/s. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 . It may be a weighty consideration to be taken into account but the weightier consideration as whether the administrative action entails consequences was so observed by the Supreme Court in the case of S.L. Kappor V/s. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 . Catena of authorities, both of this Court and of the Supreme Court, have veered round this point that an action which visits a person with civil consequences, the person affected must be provided a reasonable opportunity to be heard and this right has to be read in the statute. To follow the course of natural justice is irrigating inconvenience albeit inconvenient obligation for men in authority, since, notice and opportunity are its very marrow. I, therefore, hold that suspension by way of punishment can only be passed by providing a reasonable opportunity to the person concerned, even though Cl. 11(1) of the Unification Order, 1984, is silent on this point. What is reasonable in given circumstances, is in the domain of practibility, not formalised rigidity.” 11. So far as the question of giving opportunity in the case of interim suspension is concerned, Cl.11(2) of the Unification Order, 1984, expressly excludes the same. The question is whether it is permissible since an interim suspension also affects the right of the licensee. This question came up for consideration in the case of Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 65 . Where the Apex Court was considering the provision of Cl. 11 of the Punjab Food grains Dealers Licensing and Price Control Order, 1978. As there is some similarity between Cl. 11(2) of the Unification Order, 1984, and 2nd proviso to Cl. 11 of the Punjab Food grains Dealers Licensing and Price Control Order, I am tempted to quote Cl. 11 of the Punjab Food grains Dealers Licensing and Price Control Order which reads as follows :- (1) If a licensee or his agent or any person acting on his behalf contravenes any of the terms and conditions of his licence or any provision of this Order then without prejudice to any action that may be taken against him, the licensing authority may by an order in writing, cancel or suspend licence in so far as it relates to the food grains in respect of which contravention has been made. Provided that no order shall be made under this clause unless the licensee has been given a reasonable opportunity of stating his case. Provided further that the licensing authority may suspend a licence without giving a reasonable opportunity to the licensee of stating his case for a period not exceeding ninety days during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of his licence." The attack was to the vires of the second proviso to Cl. 11 of the said order which expressly excluded giving of a reasonable opportunity in case of interim suspension of licence during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of a licence. The question of giving an opportunity in the case of suspension by way. of punishment was provided for, unlike Cl. 11(1) of the Unification Order, 1984. While upholding the vires of the second provision, the Supreme Court held that the suspension of licence is a drastic measure, but "if the breach is of such a nature that it must result in the cancellation of a licence", the licensee must face the further consequence of suspension of the licence during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of the licence. According to their Lordships, it seeks to strike a proper balance between the freedom of trade or business guaranteed under Art.19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by Cl. (6) of Art.19 of the Constitution. It is therefore, difficult to hold that the second proviso to sub-cl. (1) of Cl. 11 of the order is of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interests of the general public" Their Lordships struck a note by observing : "It must, however, be read along with the main enacting provision in sub-cl. (1) and if so construed, the power of suspension during the pendency of an inquiry cannot be exercised unless there is contravention of any of the terms and conditions of the licence or any of the provisions of the Order. Secondly, it provides for a reasonable safeguard, in that it limits the period of suspension. The period of suspension would necessarily depend upon the nature of the breach, and in no case, can it exceed ninety days. During this period, the licensing authority is expected to complete the inquiry and take a decision as to the cancellation or otherwise of the licence. The period of suspension would necessarily depend upon the nature of the breach, and in no case, can it exceed ninety days. During this period, the licensing authority is expected to complete the inquiry and take a decision as to the cancellation or otherwise of the licence. Thirdly, as a check upon possible injustice that might result from an improper exercise of the power of suspension of a licence by the licensing authority under the second proviso, there is an additional safeguard to a dealer by way of an appeal to the Director, Food and Supplies, under Cl. 13 of the Order. This Court has repeatedly laid down that where the discretion to apply the provisions of a particular statute is left with the Government or one of the highest officers, it will be presumed that the discretion vested in such highest authority will not be abused." The observations referred to above, even though made with regard to interim suspension for a limited period, throws sufficient light to show that where the suspension is by way of punishment, even though the provision makes no reference for giving a reasonable opportunity, a person visited with civil consequences shall be entitled to it as a matter of course, and the said right of the person affected has to be read in the statute.” 8. On perusal of the record, it appears that on receiving complaint against the petitioner, his licence was put on suspension on 28.06.2016 and he was asked to submit his explanation against proposed cancellation. Thus, the respondent no. 3 did not pass the order of suspension under sub-clause (1) of clause 11 of the Order, 1984 so as to require issuance of show cause notice, rather the impugned order of suspension was passed under sub-clause (2) in contemplation of cancellation of licence. Thus, I find no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent no.3 has committed illegality in not providing any opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order of suspension. 9. Further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the said order of suspension has been passed on omnibus and unfounded allegations. Admittedly, a complaint was received against the petitioner alleging irregularities committed by him in the course of affairs of PDS shop and only thereafter the action has been taken against him. 9. Further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the said order of suspension has been passed on omnibus and unfounded allegations. Admittedly, a complaint was received against the petitioner alleging irregularities committed by him in the course of affairs of PDS shop and only thereafter the action has been taken against him. No malafide has been alleged against the respondent authorities. Since the proceeding is still pending before the respondent no. 3 and the petitioner has also filed reply in the matter, it is not the appropriate stage to determine the legality of the allegation when the procedure and forum for adjudication of the said issue has itself been provided in the Order, 1984. 10. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the present writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondent no.3 to conclude the proceeding pending against the petitioner by taking an informed decision in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.