JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of this revision petition, the petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs:- “It is, therefore most respectfully prayed that this petition may be accepted and the impugned order dated 19.4.2011, passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (III), Shimla, in case No. Execution Petition No. 31-S/10 of 2008, title as Sh. Dharam Pal versus Sh. Yashwant Singh and another, may be ordered to be quashed and set aside and the petitioner may be held entitled to recover the compensation awarded by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II), Shimla, by proceeding in the above execution petition before the court below.” 2. It is not in dispute that the claim petition filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners, namely, Dharam Pal in the Court of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II) Shimla, i.e. MAC No. 74-S/2 of 1994, was decided by way of award dated 27.04.2000 in the following terms:- “In view of my findings on all the issues hereinabove, this petition is allowed. A sum of Rs. 2,64,000/- alongwith interest @ 12% per annum from the date of the petition till the deposit of the entire amount of compensation is awarded as compensation to the petitioner. Let the memo of costs be prepared accordingly. Out of the amount of compensation, let a sum of Rs. 24,000/- plus interest incurred upon the entire amount of compensation up to date, be released to him, whereas the remaining Rs. 2,40,000/- be invested in fixed deposit in his name for a period of two years in any nationalised bank at Shimla. The record of this petition, be completed, and consigned to record.” 3. It is also not in dispute that learned Tribunal vide award dated 27.4.2000 held that respondent No. 4 therein i.e. New India Assurance Company Ltd., was liable to satisfy the award. Relevant paras of the award are reproduced herein-below:- “25. In view of the case law cited supra, as well as, the perusal of the evidence available on record, it is held that no doubt the uill fated bus was being driven at the time of accident by respondent NO. 3, who was not having the valid driving licence, but, the said respondent was allowed to drive the same by Sh. J.K. Verma, who was the duly licence-holder driver engaged by respondents No. 1 and 2. 3, who was not having the valid driving licence, but, the said respondent was allowed to drive the same by Sh. J.K. Verma, who was the duly licence-holder driver engaged by respondents No. 1 and 2. In this way the respondent No. 4 is not entitled to its exclusion viz from the liability to pay compensation to the petitioner. 26. In view of the discussions herein-above, it is respondent No. 4 liable to satisfy the award, because the objection raised by the said respondent to seek its exclusion stand rejected. This issue thus stand accordingly answered and against the respondent No. 4.” 4. It is also a matter of record that in a appeal filed by the Insurance Company, this Court in FAO No. 341 of 2000, vide its judgment dated 16.11.2006, modified the award in the following terms:- “In view of the aforesaid findings, appeal Nos. 325 of 2001, 342 of 2000 and 165 of 2002, filed by the insurance company are dismissed. Appeal Nos. 340 and 341 of 2000, filed by the insurance company are allowed to the extent that their liability for payment of claims awarded by the Tribunal on account of damage to third party property is held to the extent of Rs. 6,000/-, only, in each of the two cases, with proportionate interest.” 5. Grievance of the present petitioner is that thereafter execution filed by the claimants for execution of the award has been erroneously dismissed by MACT (III), Shimla, vide order dated 19.4.2011 by holding that there was no order imposing liability on Yashwant Singh and Govind Mehta, i.e. the owners of the bus involved in the accident. 6. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner as also learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 and learned Counsel for respondent No. 2. I have also gone through the records of the case. 7. A perusal of the impugned order dated 19.4.2011 demonstrates that learned Executing Court has dismissed the execution petition by holding that there was no order imposing liability on Yashwant Singh and Govind Mehta, i.e. respondents No. 1 and 2 before learned Tribunal, and therefore, the execution was not maintainable against the judgment debtors. 8. As the order passed by the learned Executing Court is not lengthy, the same is reproduced herein-below for ready reference:- “It is 12:30 P.M. At this stage Sh. 8. As the order passed by the learned Executing Court is not lengthy, the same is reproduced herein-below for ready reference:- “It is 12:30 P.M. At this stage Sh. Ajay Sharma, advocate appeared for the decree holder. This execution petition has been raised against Yashwant Singh and Govind Mehta for recovery of Rs. 7,13,488/- on the strength of award passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (II), Shimla dated 27.04.2000 rad with final order passed by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in FAO No. 341 of 2000 decided on 16.11.2006. A perusal of the order of the Tribunal dated 27.04.2000 would show that the liability to pay the compensation was fixed on the Insurance Company and Insurance Company went in appeal before the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in FAO No. 341/2000 and appeal preferred by the Insurance Company was allowed and their liability for payment of claim was limited to Rs. 6,000/-. There is no order imposing liability on Yashwant Singh and Govind Mehta. As such, in my humble opinion, this execution petition is not maintainable against the judgment debtors herein. This being the position, execution petition is dismissed. Be consigned to record room.” 9. Having heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and leaned Counsel for the respondents, in my considered view, the impugned order passed by the learned Executing Court is perverse and not sustainable in the eyes of law. 10. It is not in dispute that in a Motor Accident Claims petition preferred by predecessor in interest of the present petitioners against Yashwant Singh and Govind Mehta, learned Claims Tribunal after holding that the accident had occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of respondent No.3 therein held the claimants were entitled for compensation. 11. The issues which were framed by the learned tribunal are quoted herein-below:- “1. Whether the petitioner had suffered loss on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of respondent No. 1 & 2?OPP. 2. To what amount of compensation is the petitioner entitled and from whom? OP Parties. 3. Whether the respondent No. 1 and 2 had contravened the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, as alleged? If so, with what effect? OPR-4. 3-A. Whether the petition is bad for mis-joinder of necessary parties?OPR-1. 4. Relief.” 12. 2. To what amount of compensation is the petitioner entitled and from whom? OP Parties. 3. Whether the respondent No. 1 and 2 had contravened the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, as alleged? If so, with what effect? OPR-4. 3-A. Whether the petition is bad for mis-joinder of necessary parties?OPR-1. 4. Relief.” 12. A perusal of Issue No. 3 framed by learned Tribunal demonstrates that the Insurance Company had taken a stand before the learned Tribunal that they were not liable to indemnify the owners of the bus, i.e. insured, as they had contravened the terms and conditions of the policy. Learned Tribunal firstly held in favour of the petitioner/claimant that he had suffered loss on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the owners of the bus. Thereafter while deciding Issue No. 3, learned Tribunal held that respondents No. 1 and 2 had not contravened the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy and fastened the liability to indemnify on the Insurance Company. In other words, firstly learned Tribunal held claimant to be entitled for compensation from the owners of the bus and thereafter, as learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the owners were duly insured qua the bus with the Insurance Company and there was no contravention of the conditions of the Insurance Policy, it held that Insurance Company was liable to indemnify the owner. Therefore, it cannot be said that learned Tribunal did not hold the owners of the bus liable to indemnify the claimants. 13. Now incidentally, the award passed by the learned Tribunal was only assailed by the Insurance Company but not by the owners of the bus. In appeal, this Court held that Insurance Company was only liable for payment of claim on account of third party damage to the extent of Rs.6,000/- with proportionate interest. 14. In this view of the matter, it is but obvious that the award so passed by the learned Tribunal has now to be satisfied by the judgment debtors, i.e. owners of the bus. Said owners cannot shun their liability by taking a hyper technical stand that it is nowhere expressly mentioned in the award that they were liable to compensate the claimant. Said owners cannot shun their liability by taking a hyper technical stand that it is nowhere expressly mentioned in the award that they were liable to compensate the claimant. Simply because it is not written in the award in so many words that owners were liable to compensate the claimant, the owners cannot be permitted to evade their liability. In fact, learned Tribunal after holding that there was a valid Insurance Policy executed by the owners of the bus with the Insurance Company, directed that compensation has to be paid by the Insurance Company. However, before returning these findings, learned Tribunal has also held that the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the owners of the bus. This, but of course, means that at first instance, owners of the bus were liable to indemnify the claimant but, as in the view of the learned Tribunal, there was valid insurance policy, it further held that liability has to be fastened upon the Insurance Company. This very important aspect of the matter has been ignored by the executing Court while dismissing the execution petition. The approach adopted by learned Executing Court is a hyper technical one. The contention of learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 that executing Court cannot go behind a decree, does not hold good in the peculiar facts of this case, because after in the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, this Court had held Insurance Company to indemnify the claimant to a limited extent only, then it is but obvious that the remaining part of the award, which has not been disturbed by this Court, has to be satisfied by the owners of the vehicle. 15. In view of findings returned herein-above, this petition is allowed with costs. Impugned order dated 19.04.2011, passed by MACT (III), Shimla, in case No. 31-S/10 of 2008, is quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to learned Executing Court with a further direction to execute the award dated 27.04.2000, passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II), Shimla, in M.A.C. No. 74-S/2 of 1994 in letter and spirit. The petition stands disposed of in above terms, so also pending miscellaneous application (s), if any.