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2018 DIGILAW 1349 (HP)

Dev Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2018-07-20

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant Cr. Revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC is directed against judgment dated 9.7.2008, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. in Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 2007, affirming judgment of conviction and sentence dated 14.8.2007, passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh in Police Challan No. 38-I-2004 RBT No. 61-II/2007, whereby court below, while holding petitioner-accused (hereinafter, ‘accused’) guilty of having committed offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, convicted and sentenced him to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- for the offence punishable under Section 279 IPC; pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the commission of offence punishable under Section 337 IPC; undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months for the commission of offence punishable under Section 338 IPC and simple imprisonment for a period of two years for the commission of offence punishable under Section 304A IPC; and further to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the commission of offence under Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act and in default of payment of fine, accused has been directed to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. 2. Facts, as emerge from the record are that PW-8 Ami Chand got his statement recorded under Section 154 CrPC i.e. Exhibit PW-14/A dated 1.5.2004, alleging therein that at about 12.30 pm, when he was present outside his shop at Bhalet, a Tempo bearing registration No. PB-10-AW-7872 came in a rash and negligent manner from Sujanpur side and while it reached Bhalet, it hit persons namely Prithi Chand and Vipan Kumar, who at the relevant time were working on cable line on the road side. He further reported to the police that Kushal Kumar and Ajay Kumar were crushed under the Tempo, whereas motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-22-1869 was also crushed by the Tempo, as a consequence of which, person namely Kushal Kumar died on the spot, whereas other three injured persons were shifted to the hospital. Driver of the Tempo fled away from the spot after alleged incident. On the basis of aforesaid statement of PW-8, Ami Chand recorded under Section 154 CrPC, a formal FIR exhibit PW-8/A came to be registered against the accused. Driver of the Tempo fled away from the spot after alleged incident. On the basis of aforesaid statement of PW-8, Ami Chand recorded under Section 154 CrPC, a formal FIR exhibit PW-8/A came to be registered against the accused. After completion of investigation, police presented Challan in the competent Court of law, who being satisfied that prima facie case exists against accused, put notice of accusation to the accused for having committed offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, to which accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Learned trial Court subsequently, on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution held accused guilty of having committed offences punishable under aforesaid provisions of law and convicted and sentenced him as per description given herein above. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial court, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, however, the fact remains that the same was dismissed vide judgment dated 9.7.2008, as a consequence of which, judgment of conviction recorded by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Hamirpur came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, accused approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his acquittal after setting aside impugned judgments of conviction passed by learned Courts below. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 5. Having carefully perused the impugned judgment vis-àvis material available on record of the case, this Court is not inclined to agree with the contention of Mr. Suneet Goel, learned counsel representing the petitioner that impugned judgments passed by the learned Courts below are result of misreading, misinterpretation and misconstruction of evidence, rather, this Court having carefully examined the evidence led on record by the prosecution has no hesitation to conclude that both the learned Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and there appears to be no scope of interference by this court. This court is also unable to accept the contention of Mr. Goel, learned counsel representing the petitioner that the learned Courts below have not appreciated the evidence led on record by prosecution in its right perspective, as a consequence of which erroneous findings have come to the fore. This court is also unable to accept the contention of Mr. Goel, learned counsel representing the petitioner that the learned Courts below have not appreciated the evidence led on record by prosecution in its right perspective, as a consequence of which erroneous findings have come to the fore. Evidence led on record by prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of alleged incident, vehicle in question was being plied rashly and negligently by the accused, as a consequence of which, two persons lost their lives and two others were seriously injured. In the case at hand, factum with respect to accident is not in dispute. Accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC has categorically admitted the factum with regard to the accident and he has taken a defence that the accident occurred on account of mechanical failure. Though, suggestions put to the prosecution witnesses suggest that accused made an endeavour to prove on record that the ill-fated vehicle was not being driven by him, but that is of no consequence, especially when in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, defence taken by him with regard to mechanical failure is not corroborated by the evidence led on record. 6. Prosecution, in the case at hand, examined as many as 15 witnesses to prove its case, whereas accused did not lead any evidence in his defence. All the material prosecution witnesses i.e. PW-1 Satish Kumar, PW-2 Vipan Kumar and PW-3 Prithi Chand have categorically deposed before the court below that accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of accused, as a consequence of which, persons namely Kushal Kumar and Ajay Kumar lost their lives. 7. DW-7 Rajan Sharma, who mechanically examined the Tempo, has nowhere supported the version put forth by the accused, rather vide report Exhibit PW-7/A, which stands duly proved on record, he stated that vehicle was found to be in a fit condition and there was no mechanical defect. 8. PW-1 Satish Kumar deposed that he had gone to the shop of one Ami Chand, to purchase Biri, at that time, he saw Kushal, Ajay and Vipan Kumar working on the cable line. He further deposed that Kushal Kumar had parked his motor cycle on the road side and they were talking. 8. PW-1 Satish Kumar deposed that he had gone to the shop of one Ami Chand, to purchase Biri, at that time, he saw Kushal, Ajay and Vipan Kumar working on the cable line. He further deposed that Kushal Kumar had parked his motor cycle on the road side and they were talking. He further deposed that as he had purchased Biri, he saw a Tempo coming from Sujanpur side in a rash and negligent manner and its driver could not control the vehicle and hit the aforesaid persons, who were subsequently injured and shifted to the hospital. He further deposed that Kushal Kumar died on the spot, whereas, Ajay Kumar succumbed to the injuries on the way to the hospital. 9. PW-2 Vipan Kumar and PW-3 Prithi Chand also corroborated the version put forth by PW-1 Satish Kumar by stating that persons namely Prithi Chand, Ajay Kumar and Kushal Kumar were working on the spot on cable line and they were hit by Tempo being driven rashly and negligently by the accused. Cross-examination conducted upon these witnesses, nowhere suggests that the defence was able to extract anything from these witnesses contrary to what they stated in their examination-in-chief. 10. PW-4 Bidhi Singh and PW-5 Suresh Kumar are formal witnesses and their statements may not be very relevant to determine the guilty, if any, of the accused. 11. PW-6 Dr. Chaman Lal, who medically examined Vipan Kumar vide MLC exhibit PW-6/A, observed following injuries on the person of Vipan Kumar: “1. There was a red colour bruised measuring 3 cms x 2 cms. of size on left hand. There was marked swelling on left hand. Advised X-ray left hand. 2. There was a lacerated wound measuring 1 cm. x 5 cm. of size skin deep situated in front of forehead margins of would were irregular. 3. Patient was not able to stand walk. There was no external injury advised X-ray.” 12. PW-8 Ami Chand, complainant also stated that on the date of alleged incident, he was standing on the roadside when Tempo No. PW-10AW-7872 hit cable workers on the spot, as a result of which, Kushal Kumar died on the spot and other injured were shifted to the hospital. 13. There was no external injury advised X-ray.” 12. PW-8 Ami Chand, complainant also stated that on the date of alleged incident, he was standing on the roadside when Tempo No. PW-10AW-7872 hit cable workers on the spot, as a result of which, Kushal Kumar died on the spot and other injured were shifted to the hospital. 13. Statements of other witnesses i.e. PW-9 Brahm Dass, PW-11 Pritam Chand, PW-12 Surender Kumar and PW-13 Ashok Kumar are not very relevant for the adjudication of the case, as such, same are not being discussed here. 14. True it is, that PW-10 Parkash Chand in his cross-examination admitted that name of driver was mentioned as Karnail Singh but no benefit can be claimed on this count by the accused because in his statement under Section 313 CrPC he himself admitted the factum with regard to accident as well as his being the driver of the vehicle in question, so admission, if any, made by PW-10 with regard to mention of Karnail Singh as driver of the offending vehicle, is of no relevance. 15. Similarly, this Court is not very much convinced and impressed with the argument of the learned counsel representing the petitioner that since complainant Ami Chand PW-8 had resiled from his statement with regard to identification of driver because once the accused himself has admitted the factum with regard to accident and his being driver of the vehicle, statement/admission, if any, made by Ami Chand PW-8 is of no consequence and could not be considered while determining the guilt of the accused. 16. Having carefully perused the statements of material prosecution witnesses, this Court is in agreement with Mr. S.C. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General that the prosecution has successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of alleged incident, vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently by the accused, as a consequence of which, two persons lost their lives. Otherwise also, this court has a very limited scope to re-appreciate the evidence, while exercising power under Section 397 CrPC, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Kerala versus Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999)2 SCC 452 . Otherwise also, this court has a very limited scope to re-appreciate the evidence, while exercising power under Section 397 CrPC, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Kerala versus Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999)2 SCC 452 . No doubt, Hon'ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.” 17. In the case at hand, as has been discussed in detail, both the learned Courts below have carefully examined and analysed the evidence led on record by the prosecution, which proves beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of alleged incident, vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently by the accused as such this court finds no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments of conviction recorded by the learned Courts below. 18. While inviting attention of this Court to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Saurabh Bakshi, 2015 (5) SCC 182 , Mr. 18. While inviting attention of this Court to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Saurabh Bakshi, 2015 (5) SCC 182 , Mr. S.C. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General contended that the person driving in a rash and negligent manner does not deserve any leniency, rather he needs to be dealt with severely. 19. This Court is also fully conscious of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Saurabh Bakshi (supra), wherein it has been held that no leniency should be shown to reckless drivers. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:- “25. Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving where the other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty and the civilized persons drive in constant fear but still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such obtaining circumstances, we are bound to observe that the law-makers should scrutinize, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC, so with immense anguish.” 20. There can not be any disagreement with the concern expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment with regard to carelessness/recklessness of the drivers, especially under the influence of alcohol. Hence, after bestowing my thoughtful consideration to the facts of the case, I find no reason to differ with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below and as such judgment of conviction recorded by learned trial Court and affirmed by first appellate Court deserves to be upheld. 21. Consequently, in view of aforesaid discussion as well as judgments referred to herein above, this Court is of the view that the judgments passed by learned Courts below are based on correct appreciation of evidence and there is no scope, whatsoever for this Court to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by learned Courts below. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. 22. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. 22. At this stage, learned counsel representing accused stated that the accused is 55 years old person having a family to support and in case he is sent behind the bars pursuant to judgments of conviction recorded by the courts below, great prejudice would be caused to him as well as his family He further stated that more than fourteen years have passed after the alleged incident and during this period, accused has also suffered trauma on account of pendency of case against him firstly before trial Court then before appellate court and now before this court, as such, he deserves to be extended benefit of Probation of Offenders Act. 23. In support of the aforesaid arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner-accused also invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by this Court in Yudhbir Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh 1998 (1) S.L.J. 58, wherein it has been held as under:- “9. The only mitigating circumstance that appears to be there is that the time gap of about six years between the date of occurrence as well as the date of decision of this revision petitioner. During this entire period sword of present case looming over the head of the petitioner was always there. That being so, this court is of the view that instead of sending the petitioner to jail as ordered by the courts below, he is given the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Accordingly, it is ordered that he shall furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- to the satisfaction of the trial Court within a period of four weeks from today to keep peace and to be of good behavior for a period of one year from the date of execution of the bond before the court below as well as not to commit any such offence. In addition to being given benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, petitioner is further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000/- each to PWs Baldev Singh and Dilbagh Singh injured as compensation. Shri R.K. Gautam submitted that this amount of compensation be deposited with the trial Court on or before 31.8.1997, who will thereafter pay the same to said persons.” 24. 3,000/- each to PWs Baldev Singh and Dilbagh Singh injured as compensation. Shri R.K. Gautam submitted that this amount of compensation be deposited with the trial Court on or before 31.8.1997, who will thereafter pay the same to said persons.” 24. In this regard, reliance is placed upon judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramesh Kumar @ Babla versus State of Punjab 2016 AIR (SC) 2858, wherein it has been held as under:- “7. Accordingly the appeal is allowed in part by converting appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC to one under Section 324 IPC. On the question of sentence, it is pertinent to note that the occurrence took place in 1997. In his statement under Section 313 of the code of Criminal Procedure the appellant gave his age in 2002 as 36 years. He claimed that he and others went to the place of occurrence on getting information that his brother Sanjay Kumar was assaulted by Ramesh Kumar (Complainant). He brought his brother to Police Station and lodged a report. As noticed by trial court, parties are involved in civil as well as criminal litigation from before. High Court has noted that appellant, as per custody certificate, is not involved in any other case. In such circumstances, it is not deemed necessary to send the appellant immediately to Jail custody after about 19 years of the occurrence when he appears to be 50 years of age and fully settled in life. 8. In view of aforesaid, in our view the ends of justice would be met by granting benefit of Probation of Offenders Act to the appellant. We order accordingly and direct that the appellant be released on executing appropriate bond before the trial court to appear and receive sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 1 (one) year when called upon to do so and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.” 25. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court Hari Kishan & Anr versus Sukhbir Singh & Ors., 1988 AIR(SC) 2127, wherein it has been held as under:- “8. The question next to be considered is whether the accused are entitled to the benefit of probation of good conduct? We gave our anxious consideration to the contentions urged by counsel. We are of opinion that the High Court has not committed any error in this regard also. The question next to be considered is whether the accused are entitled to the benefit of probation of good conduct? We gave our anxious consideration to the contentions urged by counsel. We are of opinion that the High Court has not committed any error in this regard also. Many offenders are not dangerous criminals but are weak characters or who have surrendered to temptation or provocation. In placing such type of offenders, on probation, the Court encourages their own sense of responsibility for their future and protect them from the stigma and possible contamination of prison. In this case, the High Court has observed that there was no previous history of enmity between the parties and the occurrence was an outcome of a sudden flare up. These are not showing to be incorrect. We have already said that the accused had no intention to commit murder of any person. Therefore, the extension of benefit of the beneficial legislation applicable to the first offenders cannot be said to be inappropriate. 9. This takes us to, the third questions which we have formulated earlier in this judgments. The High Court has directed each of the respondents to pay Rs.2500/- as compensation to Joginder. The High Court has not referred to any provision of law in support of the order of compensation. But that can be traced to section 357 Criminal Procedure Code Section 357, leaving aside the unnecessary, provides:- “357. Order to pay compensation: (1) When a court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied- (a) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution; (b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a civil Court; xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxx (3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation. Such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been sentenced. Such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been sentenced. (4) An order under this section may also be made by an Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its power of revision. (5) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation under this Section. 11. The payment by way of compensation must, however, be reasonable. What is reasonable, may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of crime, the justness of claim by the victim and the ability of accused to pay. If there are more than one accused they may be asked to pay in equal terms unless their capacity to pay varies considerably. The payment also vary depending upon the acts of each accused. Reasonable period for payment of compensation, if necessary by installments, may also be given. The Court may enforce the order by imposing sentence in default.” 26. In view of the aforesaid law as well as submissions having been made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused and after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered opinion that the present petitioner-accused can be granted benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 27. Accordingly, Registry is directed to call for the report of the Probation Officer, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh on or before 31.8.2018. Registry to list this matter on 31.8.2018.