JUDGMENT : RULE. Rule is made returnable forthwith. The petition is heard finally at the stage of admission with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. 2. In the present case, the question that arises for consideration is whether the respondent could be discharged for the offences punishable under Sections 500, 120(B) and 182 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) at the stage at which the proceedings were pending before the Magistrate, on the ground that there was absence of previous sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) to proceed against the respondent, he being a police officer. 3. The present case has its genesis in an incident that took place on 01.11.1993 when a lady, Rekha Belode, was found dead in a burnt condition at her residence. A report of accidental death was initially registered in respect of the said incident by the respondent who was the Police Station Inspector of the concerned police station at the relevant time and he was the Investigating Officer. The respondent recorded statements of seventeen witnesses, on the basis of which it was found that there were no suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of the aforesaid lady, Rekha Belode, on 01.11.1993. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that some time later, the respondent along with the husband of the deceased lady and others hatched a conspiracy against the petitioner and his uncle, in order to falsely implicate them in connection with the aforesaid death. On this basis, one Ashok Binzwal, as an informant, submitted a report alleging that he had heard certain conversations involving the petitioner and his uncle, which pointed towards their involvement in the death of the said lady. On this basis, a First Information Report (F.I.R.) was registered against the petitioner and his uncle for the offences punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of I.P.C. and they were prosecuted. On the basis of charge-sheet submitted against them, they were made to face trial before the Sessions Court at Amravati. It is significant that the respondent suppressed the statements of seventeen witnesses initially recorded by him upon registration of the case of accidental death in respect of the aforesaid incident. 5. On the basis of charge-sheet submitted against them, they were made to face trial before the Sessions Court at Amravati. It is significant that the respondent suppressed the statements of seventeen witnesses initially recorded by him upon registration of the case of accidental death in respect of the aforesaid incident. 5. It was the petitioner and his uncle (accused), who brought on record the said statements of seventeen witnesses and thereafter, considering the entire material on record, by the judgment and order dated 25.09.2001, the petitioner and his uncle were acquitted by the Sessions Court, Amravati. 6. Thereafter, in the year 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint bearing Criminal Complaint Case No. 142 of 2002, against the respondent herein, the aforesaid informant Mr. Ashok Binzwal, Pandit Belode (the husband of deceased Rekha) and others, for offences punishable under Sections 500, 120(b) and 182 of I.P.C. for having falsely implicated the petitioner and his uncle due to which they were made to face the aforesaid trial before the Sessions Court. On 12.07.2002, the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Warud, issued process in the said complaint. The respondent (accused no.8) filed an application for discharge before the Court of Magistrate claiming that when the petitioner himself had stated in his complaint that he had applied for sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C., which was not obtained, the respondent could not be proceeded against. The petitioner filed his reply to the said application contending that sanction would be required to proceed against the respondent only if he had acted in discharge of his official duty but, in the present case, he had acted otherwise by entering into a criminal conspiracy with the other accused to falsely implicate the petitioner and that therefore, the respondent could not be discharged in the absence of sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. 7. On 27.01.2017, the Court of Magistrate passed an order rejecting the application for discharge moved by the respondent, observing that the matter had been fixed for evidence before charge and that there was no material as yet on record to show whether the respondent (accused no.8) had acted within or beyond his official duty. Thereafter, the evidence of the petitioner and his uncle was recorded and the respondent reserved his right to cross-examine them. Thereafter, the evidence of the petitioner and his uncle was recorded and the respondent reserved his right to cross-examine them. The petitioner moved an application before the Court of Magistrate to issue witness summons to the Police Station Officer who was having the custody of the statements of the aforesaid seventeen witnesses, which had been recorded initially by the respondent in connection with the death of said Rekha Belode on 01.11.1993. By order dated 21.09.2017, the Court of Magistrate passed an order on the said application issuing witness summons to the said Police Station Officer, directing him to remain present with the record concerning Accidental Death Case No.41 of 1993, pertaining to the death of aforesaid Rekha Belode. 8. In the meanwhile, the respondent had filed a revision bearing Criminal Revision Petition No.9 of 2017, before the Sessions Court at Amravati, challenging the order of the Court of Magistrate rejecting the application for discharge filed by the respondent. By the impugned judgment and order dated 15.11.2017, the Sessions Court at Amravati allowed the revision petition, set aside the aforesaid order of the Court of Magistrate and discharged the respondent (accused no.8). The Sessions Court in the impugned order held that when the petitioner himself had stated in his complaint before the Magistrate that previous sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. was necessary and he had indeed applied for such sanction to the concerned authority, in the absence of any order granting sanction, the respondent could not be proceeded against. Apart from this, the Sessions Court relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Asif Yusuf Patel Versus State of Maharashtra (2017 ALL MR (Cri) 381) to hold that there could not be any dispute that the respondent was discharging his official duties for the actions claimed by the petitioner to make the respondent liable for offences as claimed by him. On this basis, the Sessions Court discharged the respondent. 9. Mr. N.B. Kalwaghe, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, in support of the present writ petition, submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court was wholly unsustainable because it could not have held against the petitioner merely on the ground that the petitioner himself had stated in the complaint that sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. was necessary to proceed against the respondent. It was submitted that the Court was bound to examine as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in law, such a sanction was required to proceed against the respondent. It was further submitted that reliance placed by the Sessions Court on the judgment of this Court in the case of Asif Versus State (Supra) was wholly misplaced because the facts and circumstances of that case were completely different from the present case. It was further submitted that the facts of the present case demonstrated that the respondent along with other accused had actively conspired to falsely implicate the petitioner and his uncle for the offences under the provisions of I.P.C., which could not be said to be the part of discharging official duty by the respondent. On this basis, it was contended that no sanction was required to proceed against the respondent. It was further submitted that the petitioner had already applied to the Court of Magistrate for summoning the concerned police officer who was in the custody of the record concerning registration of the accidental death pertaining to the incident dated 01.11.1993, involving the death of the aforesaid Rekha Belode, which had been allowed and that it was only after evidence was considered by the Court below that the question as to whether sanction was required under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. to proceed against the respondent, could be decided. On this basis, it was contended that the order of the Court of Magistrate was fully justified and that the impugned judgment and order reversing the same and discharging the respondent deserves to be set aside. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Nandkumar S. Kale Versus Bhaurao Chandrabhanji Tidke & Another (2007 ALL MR (Cri) 2737) and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh & Others Versus State of Punjab Thr. CBI [ (2016) 12 SCC 87 ]. 10. Per contra, Mr. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Nandkumar S. Kale Versus Bhaurao Chandrabhanji Tidke & Another (2007 ALL MR (Cri) 2737) and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh & Others Versus State of Punjab Thr. CBI [ (2016) 12 SCC 87 ]. 10. Per contra, Mr. P.S. Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, submitted that the impugned judgment and order did not deserve interference, firstly because the petitioner himself had stated in his complaint that an application for grant of sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. had been made by him, on which no specific order had been passed by the concerned authority and secondly, because the respondent had been clearly discharging his official duty in the present case and that he could not be proceeded against, in the absence of sanction from the appropriate authority. 11. The facts of the present case demonstrate that the grievance of the petitioner is about the manner in which the respondent allegedly conspired with other accused in falsely implicating him and his uncle in respect of the death of Rekha Belode on 01.11.1993. The allegations made in the complaint by the petitioner show that the respondent was actively involved in suppressing relevant material on record and entering into a criminal conspiracy with other accused, including the husband of the deceased, Rekha Belode, to falsely implicate the petitioner and his uncle. In such a situation, the question that arises for consideration is, as to whether it could be said that such alleged actions of the respondent could be covered under the expression “discharge of official duty”. 12. Before answering the said question, it would be appropriate to deal with the contention of the respondent that when the petitioner himself had contended in his complaint that sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. to proceed against the respondent was mandatory and that he had applied for the same, he could not thereafter contend that no such sanction was necessary. The aforesaid contention raised on behalf of the respondent deserves to be rejected because there cannot be any estoppel against law. The aforesaid contention raised on behalf of the respondent deserves to be rejected because there cannot be any estoppel against law. Even if the petitioner, under a wrong impression, may have proceeded on the basis that sanction was necessary to proceed against the respondent, what is relevant is whether such sanction is mandatory under law, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to proceed against the respondent. Therefore, merely because such a statement was made on behalf of the petitioner in his complaint, the respondent cannot claim discharge because there is absence of the sanction order in the present case. The Sessions Court clearly committed an error in the impugned judgment and order while holding against the petitioner on the aforesaid basis. 13. Now the main question arising in the present case that needs to be addressed is, as to whether the Sessions Court was justified in proceeding on the basis that the respondent was discharging his official duties and that therefore, in the absence of the sanction order, he could not be proceeded against and that he deserved to be discharged. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Nandkumar Versus Bhaurao (Supra) wherein, it was held by this Court that when a false document is prepared by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation, such an act could not be said to have been done in discharge of his official duty. In fact, in the said judgment of this Court, it has also been held that merely because the complainant had stated that sanction was necessary to proceed against the accused, there could not be an order of discharge in favour of the accused on the basis that such sanction had not been obtained. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as follows: “6. Therefore, when any false document is prepared by the investigation officer during the course of investigation such an act would not be saved. He can be certainly said to be acting out of bounds and therefore this brings the case out of clutches of Section 197. It is different thing when there is wrong exercise or excessive exercise of power and it is a different thing to manipulate a record to save somebody from being punished. In a case reported in Shambhoo Nath Misra Vs. It is different thing when there is wrong exercise or excessive exercise of power and it is a different thing to manipulate a record to save somebody from being punished. In a case reported in Shambhoo Nath Misra Vs. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2102 : [1997 ALL MR (Cri) 987 (S.C.)], it is held that fabrication of record and misappropriation of public fund by pubic servant is not the official duty and therefore, sanction is not necessary. 7. The learned counsel for the applicant contended that in the complaint itself respondent has pleaded that he has applied for sanction and the same is awaited. It was contended that even the applicant admits that sanction is necessary and now he cannot resile from the same. There cannot be any estoppel against law. If sanction is required it is required. The Court has to look into the question if such sanction is necessary or not if the accused is a public servant. It was contended on behalf of the respondent complainant that this question cannot be considered at the threshold but has to be considered along with the merits of the case. The contention is not correct.” 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Versus State of Punjab (Supra), which concerns the principles governing decision on the question as to when would an application for sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. be necessary and the stage at which such a question could be considered by the Court. After reviewing various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts on the said issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has held as follows: “39. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarised hereunder: 39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 CRPC has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. 39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under Section 197 of CrPC. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down such rule. 39.4. In case of assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties, sanction would be necessary under Section 197 CrPC, but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 CrPC would apply. 39.5. In case sanction is necessary, it has to be decided by competent authority and sanction has to be issued on the basis of sound objective assessment. The court is not to be a sanctioning authority. 39.6. Ordinarily, question of sanction should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance, but if the cognizance is taken erroneously and the same comes to the notice of court at a later stage, finding t that effect is permissible and such a plea can be taken first time before the appellate court. It may arise at inception itself. There is no requirement that the accused must wait till charges are framed. 39.7. Question of sanction can be raised at the time of framing of charge and it can be decided prima facie on the basis of accusation. It is open to decide it afresh in light of evidence adduced after conclusion of trial or at other appropriate stage. 39.8. Question of sanction may arise at any stage of proceedings. On a police or judicial inquiry or in course of evidence during trial. It is open to decide it afresh in light of evidence adduced after conclusion of trial or at other appropriate stage. 39.8. Question of sanction may arise at any stage of proceedings. On a police or judicial inquiry or in course of evidence during trial. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage and material brought on record depending upon facts of each case. Question of sanction can be considered at any stage of the proceedings. Necessity for sanction may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case and it would be open to the accused to place material during the course of trial for showing what his duty was. The accused has the right to lead evidence in support of his case on merits. 39.9. In some cases it may not be possible to decide the question effectively and finally without giving opportunity to the defence to adduce evidence. Question of good faith or bad faith may be decided on conclusion of trial.” 15. The principles that have been culled out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment clearly show that it would be open to decide the question of sanction at any stage of the proceedings and that in some case, it would be appropriate to decide the question effectively only after giving an opportunity to the defence to adduce evidence. Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, it becomes clear that the Sessions Court has committed an error in the present case by arriving at the conclusion that sanction was not necessary to proceed against the respondent. The question as to whether the respondent was indeed discharging his official duty in the present case could not have been decided on the basis of the material that was available before the Sessions Court. In this regard, the application moved by the petitioner before the Court of Magistrate for issuing witness summons to the Police Station Officer who was in custody of the material pertaining to Accidental Death Case No. 41 of 1993, assumes significance. In this regard, the application moved by the petitioner before the Court of Magistrate for issuing witness summons to the Police Station Officer who was in custody of the material pertaining to Accidental Death Case No. 41 of 1993, assumes significance. The order dated 21.09.2017 passed by the Magistrate on the said application is also relevant because by the said order, witness summons had been issued to the said Police Station Officer and he had been directed to remain present with record pertaining to Accidental Death Case No. 41 of 1993. 16. Thus, in the present case, evidence was yet to be recorded and material was yet to be examined as to whether the actions for which the respondent was sought to be made liable could be said to have been undertaken by him in discharge of his official duty. The evidence before charge of the petitioner and his uncle stood recorded and by the aforesaid order of the Court of Magistrate, witness summons were already issued to the said police officer. Therefore, at the stage at which the respondent had approached the Sessions Court in revisional jurisdiction, there was insufficient material before the Sessions Court to have reached to conclusion that the respondent deserved to be discharged. In fact, the order dated 27.01.2017 passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application for discharge and observing that the material was yet to be placed on record to examine as to whether the respondent (accused no.8) had acted within or beyond his official duty, was wholly justified. The said order was clearly in terms of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Versus State (Supra) concerning the manner in which the nexus between the allegations made and discharge of official duty of the accused, was to be determined. In the light of the above, it is evident that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court is not sustainable and it is liable to be set aside. 17. Accordingly, this writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order is set aside. The parties are at liberty to lead evidence before the Court of Magistrate on the question as to whether the respondent had acted in discharge of his official duty while undertaking the actions for which he was sought to be made liable by the petitioner for the aforementioned offences. The impugned judgment and order is set aside. The parties are at liberty to lead evidence before the Court of Magistrate on the question as to whether the respondent had acted in discharge of his official duty while undertaking the actions for which he was sought to be made liable by the petitioner for the aforementioned offences. It is found that the complaint made by the petitioner pertains to the year 2002. It is almost sixteen years and yet the said complaint is still pending at the preliminary stage. Hence, the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Warud is directed to expedite the proceedings. 18. With these observations, this writ petition is disposed of.