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2018 DIGILAW 1364 (GAU)

Dwijendra Barman v. Principal Judge, Family Court, Cachar

2018-09-15

SUMAN SHYAM

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JUDGMENT : Suman Shyam, J. Heard Mr. A.S. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S.G. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner. I have also heard Mr. U.K. Nair, learned Senior Standing Counsel, Gauhati High Court, appearing for respondent no. 1 and Mr. D. Nath, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for the respondent nos. 2 and 3. 2. The writ petitioner is aggrieved due to non-consideration of his case for promotion to the post of Superintendent in the establishment of Family Court, Cachar at Silchar, on regular basis. The facts of this case, in a nutshell, are that the writ petitioner was originally appointed in the post of LDA in the establishment of the Family Court, Cachar. While the petitioner was serving in the post of LDA, by the notification dated 19/01/2006, the Government of Assam had created one post of UDA and one post of Nazir in the said establishment. Since both the newly created posts carried the same pay scale, the writ petitioner and the private respondent (since deceased), who were both serving as LDA, were considered for promotion against the said posts, where-after, the respondent no. 4 was promoted to the post of UDA while the writ petitioner was promoted to the post of Nazir. Subsequently, the private respondent was promoted to the post of Superintendent but the petitioner's case was not considered for promotion on the ground that as per the provision of Assam Family Courts Rule, 1990, Nazir is not one of the feeder posts for promotion to the next higher post of Superintendent and the said post can be filled up only from the cadre of UDA. During the pendency of this writ petition, the respondent no 4, who was promoted to the post of Superintendent in the Family Court, Cachar at Silchar has expired, as a result of which, the writ petitioner has been officiating in the post of Superintendent with effect from 01/08/2016 till today. 3. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the post of Nazir does not find mention in Rule 10 of the Rules of 1990 since the said post was not in existence when the Rules were framed. 3. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the post of Nazir does not find mention in Rule 10 of the Rules of 1990 since the said post was not in existence when the Rules were framed. But after the creation of the post of Nazir, the Rules ought to have been amended suitably so as to incorporate therein, the post of Nazir, which had not been done in this case. In view of such omission to amend the Rules, the petitioner has been deprived of regular promotion to the post of Superintendent to which he is entitled to by virtue of his seniority. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel that the petitioner had been posted as Nazir not by his own choice but it was the decision of the respondents to promote him to the post of Nazir while promoting the respondent no. 4 to the post of UDA and therefore, the petitioner cannot be penalized for the said action of the authorities. 4. By referring to the Government notification bearing No. JDJ(E)24/2002/76 dated 19/01/2006 issued by the Joint LR and Joint Secretary to the Government of Assam, Judicial Department, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel further submits that since the post of UDA and Nazir carry the same pay scale both the posts have to be treated as equivalent and considering the fact that the petitioner is the senior most person in the cadre of Nazir/UDA and is presently functioning as Superintendent , he would have a fundamental right to be considered for regular promotion to the next higher post. Mr. Bhattacharjee has, therefore, prayed that this Court may read down the rules and issue a direction upon the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Superintendent with retrospective effect from which the post had fallen vacant. 5. Mr. U.K. Nair, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1 submits on instruction from his client that although the post of Nazir and UDA are two equivalent post carrying the same pay scale and qualification norms, yet, the post of Nazir does not find mention in the Rules on account of the fact that the said post was created by the Government only on 19/01/2006 i.e. subsequent to the framing of the Rules of 1990. Mr. Mr. Nair submits that as per his instruction, steps have already been initiated to amend the Rules but until such time the Rules are suitably amended, the post of Nazir would have to be treated as an ex-cadre post. Mr. Nair has however, fairly submitted that since the petitioner had been promoted from the post of LDA by following the Rules of 1990, hence, there would be no bar under the Rules to assign him a substantive posting as UDA in the establishment of Family Court, Cachar at Silchar since the said post is presently lying vacant. 6. I find from the record that by the judgement and order dated 10/08/2012 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in connection with WP(C) No. 1476/2012 and WP(C) 2749/2012, it has been held that the post of Superintendent in the establishment of Family Court is a promotional post which can be filled up only by promoting candidates from the feeder cadre of UDA. The aforesaid decision was rendered by the Division Bench in connection with two writ petitions filed individually by the writ petitioner and the deceased respondent no. 4 assailing the advertisement notice dated 16/12/2010 issued by the respondent no. 1 for filling up the vacant post of Superintendent by means of direct recruitment. After the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench, it is now settled that the post of Superintendent can only be filled up by promoting candidates from the rank of UDA. The question that would arise for decision in this case is whether, the petitioner, who is admittedly holding the substantive post of Nazir, can be considered for promotion to the post of Superintendent under the Rules of 1990. This Court is called upon to answer the said question by interpreting the Rules of 1990. 7. It is not in dispute that like the respondent no.4, the petitioner was also serving as LDA in the establishment of Family Court, Cachar at Silchar and he had been promoted to the post of Nazir on 23/04/2007. It is apparent from the record that the post of Nazir was created only on 19/01/2006 and, therefore, the said post does not find mention in Rule 10 of the Rules of 1990. It is apparent from the record that the post of Nazir was created only on 19/01/2006 and, therefore, the said post does not find mention in Rule 10 of the Rules of 1990. There is no dispute about the fact that at the time of his promotion from LDA, the petitioner did not opt for the post of Nazir but it was the decision of the authorities to promote him to the vacant post of Nazir while respondent no. 4 was promoted to the post of UDA. Both the post of UDA and Nazir in the establishment of the family Court, Cachar, carry the same pay scale and appears to be interchangeable in nature. 8. The petitioner is admittedly the senior most ministerial staff in the establishment of Family Court at Silchar and is otherwise eligible for being considered for promotion to the post of Superintendent on regular basis under the Rules of 1990. The only ground on which he has been denied promotion, as noted above, is on account of the fact that the substantive post held by him is that of "Nazir", which is an ex-cadre post. However, in view of the submission made by Mr. Nair that the petitioner can be posted as an UDA since the said post is now lying vacant, the issue of further interpretation of Rule of the Rules of 1990, need not detain this Court. Since, there is no bar under the Rules to give a substantive posting to the petitioner as UDA, hence, I am of the view that the petitioner's grievance can be appropriately redressed even under the existing Rules by giving him a substantive posting as UDA. 9. Taking note of the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, I dispose of the writ petition with a direction upon the respondent no. 1 to issue necessary order of posting in respect of the petitioner as UDA in the establishment of Family Court, Cachar at Silchar, within a month from the date of receipt of the order of this Court. 10. Upon such posting the case of the petitioner be considered for promotion to the next higher post of Superintendent in accordance with the Rules. 11. With the above observation, this writ petition stands allowed. There would be no order as to costs.