JUDGMENT : 1. This Writ Petition has been filed to call for the records of the first respondent bearing Dis. Con. No. 776 dated 25.02.2005 modifying the order of the second respondent bearing Dis. Con. No. 608 dated 16.11.2004 and the order of the second respondent bearing Dis. Con. No. 608 dated 16.11.2004 and quash the same. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the petitioner's averments are as follows: The petitioner while working as a Senior Assistant in the Sivakasi Branch of the respondent bank, her husband was also working in the respondent bank at Sivakasi Town Branch, who was under detention and suspension from service for certain irregularities committed by him. While that being so, a charge memo dated 20.05.2003 was said to have been served on the petitioner, alleging that two demand drafts drawn on Sivakasi Branch were tendered by a customer of Sivakasi Town Branch for credit in his account and the petitioner's husband, who was working as Assistant at the Sivakasi Town branch, did not credit the amount of drafts to the customer's account. 3. It was further alleged in the said charge memo that the said two demand drafts were presented at the Sivakasi Branch where the petitioner was working, and encashed by one K.P. Senthilkumar, who was alleged to have been introduced by the petitioner. This was the charge against the petitioner. 4. It was further contended by the petitioner that on receiving the said charge memo, she had requested the authorities to furnish the documents relating to the charges, and the same was denied by the respondent bank. Thereafter, the respondent proceeded to conduct a domestic enquiry by appointing an Enquiry Officer, in which, the petitioner has participated and full-fledged enquiry, wherein, the petitioner had let in evidence and the said enquiry had come to the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner was not proved and exonerated the petitioner from all the charges. 5. However, the second respondent as against the domestic enquiry report, had straight away disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held the charges proved. Thereafter, the petitioner was called for personal hearing and for an enquiry on 06.04.2004, in which, the petitioner demonstrated as to how the dissent note of the second respondent is illegal and contrary to law. Thereafter, the petitioner was called for personal hearing and for an enquiry on 06.04.2004, in which, the petitioner demonstrated as to how the dissent note of the second respondent is illegal and contrary to law. However, the second respondent proceeded to issue a second show cause notice on 29.10.2004 and based on the dissent note, the second respondent passed an order, imposing a punishment of reduction in basic pay by two stages for three years with cumulative effect. 6. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 14.02.2005 before the first respondent. However, the first respondent, without considering the objections raised by the petitioner, concurred with the findings of the second respondent by modifying the punishment of reduction in basic pay by two stages for two years without cumulative effect. 7. The petitioner has preferred the present Writ Petition as against the orders of the first and second respondent herein, alleging that, she was not furnished with any documents relating to the charges levelled against her, and the second respondent while disagreeing with the enquiry report, had not expressed any reasons for such disagreement as legal grounds and apart from certain factual aspects with regard to the enquiry and the evidences let in thereupon during the enquiry, the respondent had not given an opportunity to the petitioner to represent on the same, this is in violation of principles of natural justice. 8. The respondent had filed their counter, mainly on the ground that the maintainability of the Writ Petition was assailed in favour of the impugned order, stating that the Disciplinary Authority after taking into consideration of the submissions made by the petitioner, concluded that there is preponderance of probability that the petitioner had colluded with her husband in encashing the said drafts by one K.P. Senthil Kumar at Sivakasi Branch, where the petitioner was working at that period of time and further, she had knowledge of the activities of her husband. The respondent has also contended that the Appellate Authority while agreeing with the findings of the second respondent, has modified the order of punishment of reduction in basic pay by two stages for two years without cumulative effect. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 10. Mr. The respondent has also contended that the Appellate Authority while agreeing with the findings of the second respondent, has modified the order of punishment of reduction in basic pay by two stages for two years without cumulative effect. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 10. Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel for the petitioner, would argue that the second respondent while disagreeing with the enquiry report, has not given any findings or reasons as to why he is disagreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer and as such the law mandates the authority who expresses to disagree with the enquiry officer report, to give reason as to why such decision of arrival of disagreement. Therefore, the punishment imposed by the second respondent, subsequently, concurred by the first respondent by modifying the same, is illegal and has to be set aside. Further, the conduct of the second respondent, by not furnishing the documents relating to the charges levelled against the petitioner, which is in violation of principles of natural justice. 11. In contrary, the respondent counsel would contend that this Court, should refuse to entertain the Writ Petition as the petitioner cannot question the findings arrived at the domestic forum. The learned counsel for the respondent would also submit that this Court, will not as an Appellate Authority, over the domestic enquiry, and the decision arrived thereupon, as long as the enquiry is in accordance with law. No interference is valid or called for and the petitioner cannot maintain the Writ Petition as against the order of punishment, when the same is commensurate with the proved misconduct. 12. The first and foremost issue, which has to be decided that the second respondent, while disagreeing with the enquiry report, whether he has to apply his mind and to specify the reasons for such disagreement. 13. It would be appropriate to refer the findings in paragraph 4 and 5 of the report of the Enquiry Officer, which is as follows: "In the Enquiry Proceeding the Presenting Officer (PO) has produced two Exhibits No. P.Ex.1 and P.Ex.2. These two exhibits are the said drafts. On the back side of the drafts were the endorsements of Paramasivam and K.P. Senthil Kumar and the Signature of the CSE as the introducer. The P.O. says the drafts were not properly endorsed in favour of K.P. Senthil Kumar. These two exhibits are the said drafts. On the back side of the drafts were the endorsements of Paramasivam and K.P. Senthil Kumar and the Signature of the CSE as the introducer. The P.O. says the drafts were not properly endorsed in favour of K.P. Senthil Kumar. But the D.R. says it the duty of the counter clerk and the Passing Official to look into the details of endorsements and it is not the responsibility of the person who identifies the payee. Further he (DR) says that if the prosecution wants to say that the first payee Paramasivam had affixed his signature in the drafts not with an intention to endorse payment in favour of second payee, he (Paramasivam) should be produced as witness to know the fact. But the PO has failed to produce him as witness. The PO says the said drafts were intentionally not branded with crossing stamp by Sri. A. Jeyachandran (the husband of CSE) at Sivakasi Town Branch and the CSE has colluded with him for encashment through Sri. K.P. Senthil Kumar, who is not a holder in due course. But the DR says that the prosecution has not produced anything to prove that these drafts were produced at the counter of Sri. A. Jeyachandran or the allegation that he intentionally avoided branding of rubber stamps in the drafts. He further says that the Prosecution has argued that the CSE had helped Sri. K.P. Senthil Kumar who is not a holder in due course to encash the drafts. But the Passing Official satisfied himself about the endorsement in favour of K.P. Senthil Kumar and passed the drafts and the CSE's role in the encashment of these drafts are limited to the extent of identifying the second payee as Mr. K.P. Senthil Kumar. The Prosecution has argued that the CSE, being a Bank Employee should have verified the antecedents of the second payee. But the DR emphasis that the CSE is not charged for it. Hence the Presenting Officer has failed to prove that: (1) The said drafts were presented at Sivakasi Town Branch or the issuance of counterfoils. (2) The CSE knew that the said drafts were already presented at Sivakasi Town Branch. (3) To establish any relationship between A. Jeyachandran and K.P. Senthil Kumar. (4) She has colluded with her husband to encash the draft. (5) Sri. (2) The CSE knew that the said drafts were already presented at Sivakasi Town Branch. (3) To establish any relationship between A. Jeyachandran and K.P. Senthil Kumar. (4) She has colluded with her husband to encash the draft. (5) Sri. Paramasivam had affixed his signature in the drafts not with an intention to endorse payment in favour of the second payee K.P. Senthil Kumar. Hence, I am of the opinion, in the instant case that the first payee Sri. Paramasivam has made a valid endorsement. Smt. K. Mariammal, the CSE, in Good faith and without negligence has identified Sri. K.P. Senthil Kumar when he presented the drafts at Sivakasi Branch, as she did not know anything about the presentation of the said drafts at Sivakasi Town Branch or about issuance of counterfoils at Sivakasi Town Branch. Therefore I came to the conclusion that she is not guilty of the charges and the charges are not reasonably proved." 14. From the above enquiry report, it could be seen that the enquiry officer, after full-fledged enquiry by affording sufficient opportunity to both the parties, has come out with the decision in favour of the petitioner as charges not proved and thereby, exonerating the petitioner from all the charges. 15. The paragraph 3 and 4 of the dissent note of the second respondent dated 22.03.2004, which reads as follows: "3. On an independent examination of the Enquiry Proceedings, Prosecution and Defence Briefs. Enquiry Officer's Report, I, the Disciplinary Authority disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the charges levelled against you and hold the charge as proved. A statement furnishing my observation in respect of the charge is enclosed. (Dissent Note of the Disciplinary Authority dated 22.03.2004. 4. Consequent on the Judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court of India and High Court, Madras you are to be given a personal hearing with regard to the disagreement/dissent note of Disciplinary Authority on the findings of Enquiry Officer. Hence, you are directed to appear before the Disciplinary Authority on 06.04.2004 at 3.00 p.m. for a personal hearing on the dissent note of Disciplinary Authority without fail." 16. From the very reading of the above statement of the disciplinary proceedings issued by the second respondent, it could be seen that the Disciplinary Authority has expressed his predetermined to disagree with the enquiry report. From the very reading of the above statement of the disciplinary proceedings issued by the second respondent, it could be seen that the Disciplinary Authority has expressed his predetermined to disagree with the enquiry report. There is no reason, whatsoever, has been expressed by the Disciplinary Authority for disagreeing with the enquiry report. 17. Though this Court is not sitting on an appeal over the correctness of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer nor the decision taken by the second respondent, the Disciplinary Authority, however, it is the duty of the second respondent, who has got every right to disagree with the report of the Enquiry Officer, but when there is no reasons stated by the Disciplinary Authority for disagreeing with the enquiry report. This Court is of the view that the order passed by the second respondent, subsequently, concurred by the first respondent by modifying the punishment, has to be set aside. 18. The Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of CSHA University and Another vs. B.D. Goyal, 2010 (15) SCC 776, has observed that “it is no doubt true that the punishing authority or any higher authority could have disagreed with the finding of the enquiring officer, but in such a case the authority concerned is duty-bound to record reasons in writing and not on IPSE DIXIT can alter the finding of an enquiring officer." 19. From the reading of the above judgment, it could be seen that the second respondent, in his order dated 22.03.2004, has not given any reason for his decision to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the charges levelled against the petitioner. Mere statement that the Disciplinary Authority disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer is not sufficient, as the Disciplinary Authority is duty-bound to record reasons in writing and express his views for disagreeing the report of the Enquiry Officer. 20. The Judgment referred by the respondent in the case of J.A. Naiksatam vs. Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court of Bombay and Others, 2004 (8) SCC 653 which has no relevance with the present case on hand and hence, it cannot be considered by this Court. 21. 20. The Judgment referred by the respondent in the case of J.A. Naiksatam vs. Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court of Bombay and Others, 2004 (8) SCC 653 which has no relevance with the present case on hand and hence, it cannot be considered by this Court. 21. The unreported Judgment referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in W.A. No. 1699 of 2010 dated 23.12.2011, wherein, it has been held by this Court that the statutory authority has taken its final decision without giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant at the state at which it proposed to differ with the findings given by the Inquiry Officer, this violation goes to the root of the matter and as such, is sufficient to vitiate the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority contrary to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. 22. The another decision referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in W.A. Nos. 2456 and 12108 of 2010 dated 07.02.2011, wherein, it has been held by this Court in paragraph 7 and 31, which is as follows: "7. In Punjab National Bank vs. Kunj Behari Misra, 1998 (7) SCC 84 , the Supreme Court held that Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India mandates the Disciplinary Authority to give an opportunity of representation to the charged employee on the findings. While explaining the principles laid down in Managing Director, ECIL vs. B. Karnakar, 1993 (4) SCC 727 , on the aspect of principles of natural justice, in furnishing a copy of the enquiry officer's report, with an opportunity to the delinquent officer to submit his further representation on the report and in the case of disagreement with the enquiry officer's report, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 18 and 19, held as follows: 18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar's case. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. 31. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. 31. In view of the above, a delinquent employee has the right of hearing not only during the enquiry proceedings conducted by the enquiry officer into the charges levelled against him but also at the stage at which those findings are considered by the disciplinary authority and the latter, namely, the disciplinary authority forms a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. If the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before reversing those findings. The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer. This is in consonance with the requirement removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is not taken in the matter, the enquiry shall be deemed to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the disciplinary authority does not bring about the closure of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings would come to an end only when the findings have been considered by the disciplinary authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon the delinquent. That being so, the right to be heard would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or service rule including rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution." 23. That being so, the right to be heard would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or service rule including rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution." 23. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the view that the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same has to be set aside. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the order passed by the first respondent, bearing Dis. Con. No. 776 dated 25.02.2005 modifying the order of the second respondent bearing Dis. Con. No. 608 dated 16.11.2004, is hereby set aside. No Costs. 24. At the time of pronouncing order, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that punishment of stoppage of increment was without cumulative effect and the period of punishment has been elapsed since the date of punishment. No stoppage of increment and she was brought back to the same position.