JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.PC., is directed against the judgment dated 28.8.2017, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No.26 of 2016, affirming the judgment/order of conviction dated 17.5.2016 and 19.5.2016, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Manali, District Kullu, H.P., in Criminal Complaint No. 51-1/2013/55-II/2013, whereby the learned trial Court while holding petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act”), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 7,00,000/- 2. Succinctly, fact necessary for adjudication of the present case are that respondent-complainant preferred a complaint against the petitioner-accused, under Section 138 of the Act, in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Manali, District Kullu, H.P., alleging therein that he and petitioner-accused were having cordial relations with each other and as such, on the askance of the accused, complainant lent him a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- on 10.4.2012. Petitioner-accused assured the complainant that he will return the aforesaid amount on demand by the complainant. Accused with a view to discharge his liability, issued a cheque bearing No. 019601 dated 16.12.2012, amounting to Rs. 6,00,000/-, drawn at Bank of India, Branch Manali, in favour of the complainant, however fact remains that on its presentation, same was returned with remarks “insufficient funds”. Complainant after having received memo dated 24.12.2012, got served him with legal notice dated 29.12.2012, calling upon him to make the payment good within the stipulated period. Since petitioner-accused failed to make payment good within the stipulated period despite issuance of legal notice, respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings before the competent Court of law under Section 138 of the Act. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court, the petitioner-accused preferred an appeal under Section 374(3) CrPC before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, H.P., however, fact remains that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, vide judgment dated 28.8.2017, dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner-accused, as a result of which the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, present petitioner-accused approached this Court in the instant proceedings, seeking therein his acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the courts below. 5. Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate, representing the petitioner, while referring to the impugned judgment of conviction recorded by the courts below vehemently argued that same are not based upon correct appreciation of evidence and as such, same deserve to be quashed and set-aside. Mr. Sharma, while making this Court to peruse the evidence adduced on record by the respective parties made a serious attempt to persuade this Court to agree with his contention that courts below have not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective, as a consequence of which, erroneous findings have come to the fore to the detriment of the petitioner-accused, who has been falsely implicated by the complainant. Mr. Sharma, further argued that it stands duly proved on record that cheque in question was issued as security and not towards discharge of any lawful liability and as such, both the courts below have fallen in grave error while holding petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. 2. Per contra, Mr. Jagat Pal, learned counsel representing the respondent-complainant, supported the impugned judgment of conviction recorded by the court below and argued that there is no illegality and infirmity in the judgments of conviction recorded by the courts below and as such, same requires no intervention of this Court. Mr. Pal further argued that keeping in view of the concurrent finding of fact and law recorded by the courts below, there is very limited scope of interference of this Court. Mr. Pal further argued that keeping in view of the concurrent finding of fact and law recorded by the courts below, there is very limited scope of interference of this Court. He further argued that while exercising revisionary power, this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and as such, impugned judgments passed by the courts below, being legally correct, need to be upheld by this Court. Mr. Pal further argued that since factum with regard to the issuance of cheque and signature thereupon of the accused are not in dispute, courts below rightly held him guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and as such, present petition deserves to be dismissed being devoid of any merits. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the record. 7. Before ascertaining the correctness of the statements having been made by the learned counsel representing the parties vis-à-vis impugned judgments passed by the courts below, it may be noticed that this Court on the askance of the learned counsel representing the petitioner, repeatedly adjourned the matter to enable the petitioner-accused to settle the matter amicably inter-se him as well as respondent, but despite repeated opportunities, accused failed to pay the amount in terms of judgment passed by the learned trial Court. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel representing the petitioner-accused, fairly stated that despite there being written communication sent to the petitioner-accused, he is not coming forward to impart instructions and as such, matter may be disposed of on the merits. 8. Having carefully perused the material available on record, this Court finds it difficult to agree with Mr. Ajay Sharma, that courts below while holding the accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Sections 138 of the Act misread, misrepresented and misconstrued the evidence available on record, rather this Court is convinced and satisfied that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and have arrived at correct conclusion that complainant has successfully proved that cheque in question was issued by the accused towards discharge of his liability and not as security. 9. 9. In the case at hand, factum with regard to the issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon of accused, is not in dispute because accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, though denied the case of the complainant, but stated that cheque in question was not given to the complainant for discharge of any legal liability and the complainant has mis-used the blank cheque, but no evidence in this regard is led on record by the accused. Similarly, complainant has successfully proved on record that since accused was well known to him and they had cordial relations with each other, he lent a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- to him on 10.4.2012, who in turn with a view to discharge his liability, issued the cheque in question amounting to Rs. 6,00,000/- drawn at Bank of India, Branch Manali, in favour of the complainant. Signature of the accused on the cheque Ext.CW1/B is not disputed by the accused and as such, controversy, if any, which is required to be decided by this Court, is whether cheque in question was issued by the accused in discharge of his legal liability or same was issued towards security. 10. Careful perusal of statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC nowhere suggests that accused took defence that cheque in question was issued as security, but it appears that counsel representing him in the court of law made an attempt to carve out a defence for the accused that cheque in question was issued as security. The complainant, who examined himself in support of his case tendered his evidence by way of Affidavit Ext.CW1/A and deposed that accused approached him to lend some amount in order to meet his personal and domestic expenses and he on the demand of the accused, provided Rs. 6,00,000/- to him. He further deposed that accused with a view to discharge his liability issued cheque Ext.CW1/B in his favour, but when the cheque was presented in the bank for collection, same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds. He further stated that he after having received memo from the bank served the accused with the legal notice calling upon him to make the payment good within the stipulated period. In his cross-examination, he categorically admitted that he is having 20-30 bighas of land and his annual income is more than rupees 7-8 lacs. He further stated that he after having received memo from the bank served the accused with the legal notice calling upon him to make the payment good within the stipulated period. In his cross-examination, he categorically admitted that he is having 20-30 bighas of land and his annual income is more than rupees 7-8 lacs. It has also come in his cross-examination that he knows the accused for last 7-8 years and no other complaint of similar nature was ever filed by him before the Court. It has also come in his cross-examination that he advanced a loan to the accused in the month of April, 2012 in the presence of one Shri Nimat Ram. He denied the suggestion put to him that cheque in question was issued as security to Nimat Ram. Careful perusal of statement/deposition having been made by the complainant proves beyond reasonable doubt that cheque (Ext.CW1/B) was issued by the accused towards discharge of his lawful liability not as security. 11. Otherwise also as has been observed above, accused never took a defence that cheque in question was issued as security rather, he in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC categorically stated that he had not issued any cheque and his black cheque has been misused by the accused, which statement of him, is not corroborated by any evidence. Though, suggestion was put to the complainant that cheque was issued as security to the Nimat Ram, but there is no explanation rendered on record that why person namely Nimat Ram was not produced as witness by the accused in support of his aforesaid claim. Person namely Nimat Ram could be the best person to depose before this Court with regard to the issuance of cheque as security as claimed by the accused. 12. Leaving everything aside, since there is no dispute with regard to the issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon of the accused, statutory presumption as contemplated under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act is available in favour of the complainant, who otherwise by leading cogent and convincing evidence successfully proved on record factum with regard to the issuance of cheque Ext.CW1/B by the accused towards discharge of his lawful liability. Section 118 of the Act clearly provides that it shall be presumed that, until the contrary is proved the cheque was drawn for consideration, whereas Section 139 of the Act stipulates that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that holder of the cheque receives the cheque for the discharge of whole or part of any debt or liability. 13. Complainant has successfully proved that he having received cheque Ext.CW1/B presented the same in the bank, but on its presentation, same was returned vide memo Ext.CW1/C and Ext.CW1/D. It also stands proved on record that the complainant after having received memo served the accused with legal notice CW1/E, which fact has been otherwise not disputed by the accused. Ext.CW1/F and Ext.CW1/G i.e. postal receipt and acknowledgments prove the factum with regard to the receipt of legal notice Ext.CW1/E by the accused. No doubt, presumption as available to the complainant being holder of cheque as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, is rebuttable but in the case at hand, accused has not been able to put up probable defence that he had not issued cheque towards discharge of any lawful liability, rather cheque in question was issued as security. There is nothing led on record by the accused that cheque issued by him was not towards the discharge of legal liability, rather same was blank cheque issued as security. To the contrary, defence set-up by the accused while cross-examining the complainant is totally contrary to the stand taken by him in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, wherein he stated that his blank cheque has been mis-used by the accused and as such, Courts below have rightly returned the finding that in case cheque was misused, complaint ought to have been filed by the accused before the competent authority against the complainant, who allegedly misused his cheque, but interestingly, there is no evidence worth the name led on record by the accused in this regard. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013 (1) RCR(Cri), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013 (1) RCR(Cri), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No. 23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 14. Having carefully gone through the evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court sees no reason to interference with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below, which otherwise are based upon the correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the CrPC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the CrPC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 SCC 452 , wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 15. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but Mr. Sharma learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 16. Sharma learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 16. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned finding recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appears to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same is upheld. Present petition fails and dismissed accordingly. Order dated 13.10.2017, passed by this Court, whereby sentence imposed by the court below was suspended, is hereby vacated and the petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial court.