JUDGMENT : MIR ALFAZ ALI, J. 1. This second appeal is by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 30-09-2003 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon in Title Appeal No. 31/2001, whereby the learned Civil Judge allowing the appeal filed by the defendant dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 2. The facts leading to the second appeal may briefly be stated thus : The plaintiff purchased 1K 5L of land under Dag No. 612 of Periodic Patta No. 14, from the defendant No. 1 by registered sale deed dated 18-5-1967 and obtained possession. Thereafter, the plaintiff also purchased 1K 5Ls of land from Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya on 30-12-1968 and took possession. The land purchased by the plaintiff in the year 1967 and 1968 respectively constituted one compact plot of 2K 10Ls and the name of the plaintiff was also mutated in respect of the said lands. The plaintiff had been possessing the said land measuring 2k 10 Ls by constructing residential house on the portion of the land purchased from Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya. Plaintiff was an old person and he was taken to his son's house at Tura in the year 1987. Taking advantage of absence of the plaintiff, the defendants occupied the suit land measuring 1K 5Ls, which was purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant No. 1. As the defendant no. 1 illegally trespassed into the suit land, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of right, title and interest and recovery of possession. 3. The pleaded case of the defendant No. 1 was that he entrusted the plaintiff to purchase the plot of land measuring 2Ks 10 Ls, which was arranged with the help of Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya. Though the entire money was paid by the defendant No. 1, the sale deed was executed in the name of defendant No. 1 and said Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya. The defendant No. 1 had been possessing the suit land by constructing house and Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was also residing on a part of the land. Subsequently, the defendant no. 1 dispossessed Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya from the suit land in the year 1984. In the month of May, 1967, the defendant No. 1 sold 1k 5l of land out of 2k 10ls, to the plaintiff and since then both the plaintiff and defendants were living separately on their respective land. Subsequently, the defendant no. 1 dispossessed Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya from the suit land in the year 1984. In the month of May, 1967, the defendant No. 1 sold 1k 5l of land out of 2k 10ls, to the plaintiff and since then both the plaintiff and defendants were living separately on their respective land. The defendants, however, denied the sale deed executed by Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya and pleaded that the sale deed allegedly executed by Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was forged and the plaintiff did not acquire any right, title and interest over the suit land. On the basis of the above pleadings, learned Munsiff framed the following issues:- 1. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the suit is properly valued? 3. Whether the suit suffers from mis joinder of and non-joinder of necessary parties? 4. Whether the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit land? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for khas possession by demolishing the structure from the suit land? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any other relief? 4. Both the parties adduced evidence and on appreciation of evidence learned Munsiff decreed the suit of the plaintiff for declaration of right, title and interest and recovery of possession. 5. Aggrieved, the defendants preferred an appeal and the learned first appellate court, reversing the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 6. Aggrieved by the appellate judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred the present second appeal, which was admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law:- (1) Whether the findings of the learned lower court to the effect that the plaintiff could not establish his title was perverse on account of misreading as well as non-consideration of materials on record? (2) Whether the reasons recorded by the learned court in excluding the admission on the part of the defendant in respect of the title of the plaintiff-appellant and the concession for granting of relief in his favour are sustainable in law as well as on facts? (3) Whether the learned lower court misconstrued the documents of Title, Exts. 1, 2 and 3 in recording its findings? 7. Learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. P.K. Kalita assisted by Ms. T. Goswami for the appellants and Mr. D. Nandi assisted by Ms. P. Sarmah for the respondents were heard. 8. (3) Whether the learned lower court misconstrued the documents of Title, Exts. 1, 2 and 3 in recording its findings? 7. Learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. P.K. Kalita assisted by Ms. T. Goswami for the appellants and Mr. D. Nandi assisted by Ms. P. Sarmah for the respondents were heard. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. P.K. Kalita submitted that there was no dispute as regards the sale deed by which 2K 10Ls of land was purchased jointly by the defendant No. 1 and Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya as well as the sale deed executed by Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya and defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant No. 1 also admitted in his evidence that he had no objection in passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff and in view of admission of the defendant No. 1, both, in pleadings and evidence, learned Munsiff rightly decreed the suit, declaring title of the plaintiff over the suit land, but the impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court was perverse for being contrary to the pleadings and evidence of the parties, submits Mr. Kalita. 9. Learned counsel, Mr. Nandi for the respondents, challenging the second appeal submitted, that there was no substantial question of law involved in the instant appeal, inasmuch as, finding of the first appellate court with regard to transfer of the suit land and the title of the plaintiff were all finding of facts, which were immune from challenge in second appeal. In support of his submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions:- (i) Lisamma Antony & Anr. v. Karthiyayani & Anr. (2015) 11 SCC 782 (ii) Har Kumar Dhar and Ors. v. On the death of respondent No. 1 Jayanta Dutta, His LRs Bani Dutta and Ors, 2015 (2) GLR 688 (iii) Union of India v. Surya Hazarika & Anr., 2016 (6) GLR 636 10. From the pleadings and evidence, it is admitted position that land measuring 2K 10Ls were jointly purchased by the defendant No. 1 and Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya by Ext. 1 sale deed. Although the defendant No. 1 took a plea that entire sale price of the land was paid by him (defendant No. 1), such plea remained unsubstantiated, as no evidence was adduced in support of such plea. Rather, admitted position was that Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was also possessing the land purchased by Ext. 1. 1 sale deed. Although the defendant No. 1 took a plea that entire sale price of the land was paid by him (defendant No. 1), such plea remained unsubstantiated, as no evidence was adduced in support of such plea. Rather, admitted position was that Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was also possessing the land purchased by Ext. 1. It was also evident, that both Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya and the defendant No. 1 sold 1k 5ls of land each, in favour of the plaintiff vide sale deeds Ext. 2 & Ext. 3 respectively. DW 1, the sole witness examined by the defendants clearly admitted in his evidence that the suit land measuring 1k 5ls was purchased by the plaintiff from his father, the original defendant No. 1 and plaintiff was the owner of the said land. The DW 1 further stated in his evidence that the defendant has no objection in declaring right and title of the plaintiff over the suit land. 11. The specific pleading of the plaintiff was that he constructed dwelling house over the land purchased from Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya and he had been possessing the entire 2k 10ls of land. This pleadings of the plaintiff that he constructed dwelling house over the land purchased from Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was not specifically denied. Thus, specific case of the plaintiff was that the land measuring 1k 5ls purchased from original defendant no. 1 Kripa Sindhu Purkayastha (father of DW 1) was the suit land. The Schedule of the sale deed, Ext. 2 and the Schedule of the suit land also demonstrated that the land purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant no. 1 was the suit land. Though, the defendant No. 1 took a plea in the written statement, that the sale deed executed by Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya (Ext. 3) was forged one, the defendants neither mentioned in the written statement any particular of forgery, as per requirement of Order VI Rule 4 CPC, nor any evidence was adduced in support of the plea that the sale deed Ext. 3, executed by Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was forged, rather DW 1 admitted in his evidence that Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya also sold his share of land to plaintiff. Be that as it may, when evidently and admittedly the land measuring 1 K 5 ls purchased by the plaintiff from defendant no. 1 is the suit land, this question is redundant. 3, executed by Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was forged, rather DW 1 admitted in his evidence that Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya also sold his share of land to plaintiff. Be that as it may, when evidently and admittedly the land measuring 1 K 5 ls purchased by the plaintiff from defendant no. 1 is the suit land, this question is redundant. Therefore, the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and admission of the DW 1 clearly established that the suit land was purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant No. 1, and thereby acquired title thereon. 12. It is trite law, that admission is a substantive evidence to prove a fact and is the best piece of evidence. In Ahmed Saheb (Dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Sayed Ismail reported in (2012) 8 SCC 516 , relied by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Apex Court observed in para 12 that "It is needless to emphasis that admission of a party in the proceeding either in the pleadings or oral is the best evidence and the same does not need any further corroboration." The admission in civil case can be excluded u/s. 23 of the Evidence Act, only when it is made either upon an express condition that the evidence of it is not be given or under circumstances from which the court can infer that the parties agreed together that the evidence of it should not be given. There was absolutely nothing to discard the admission made in the pleadings as well as in evidence by the DW 1(defendant), that the suit land was sold by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. Learned first appellate court appeared to have over turned the judgment and decree passed by learned Munsiff on the ground that the admission of the defendant could not be acted upon, as the defendant might have made the admission without understanding its consequence. Such finding of the learned first appellate court in discarding the admission of the defendant No. 1 being a substantive piece of evidence on mere surmise and conjecture was perverse, and not sustainable. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent tried to impress this Court with a submission, that though, Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was the co-sharer of the total land measuring 2k 10ls, purchased jointly with defendant No. 1, Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya did not sell any land to defendant no. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent tried to impress this Court with a submission, that though, Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was the co-sharer of the total land measuring 2k 10ls, purchased jointly with defendant No. 1, Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya did not sell any land to defendant no. 1, rather he only ratified the sale deed executed by defendant no. 1 in respect of 1k 5 ls of land in favour of the plaintiff. Such submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is unacceptable, for the simple reason, that it was never the case of the defendant either in the pleadings or evidence. Pleaded case of the contesting defendant was that the sale deed executed by Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya was forged, which remained unsubstantiated, as no evidence was adduced to prove the plea of forgery in respect of Ext. 3, sale deed executed by Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya in favour of plaintiff, in respect of 1k 5ls of land. Rather, DW 1 unequivocally admitted during evidence that Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya sold his share of land to the plaintiff. Surprisingly learned first appellate court also appears to have swayed by such argument, that by both the sale deeds (Ext. 2 & Ext. 3) Tarak Brahma Bhattacharryya and defendant no. 1, sold the same land measuring only 1k 5ls and held, that the plaintiff purchased the same land measuring 1k 5ls from defendant no. 1 and Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya. Such finding of the first appellate court was apparently beyond the pleadings and evidence, reason being that neither it was the pleaded case of the defendants that defendant No. 1 and Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya sold the same land, nor any evidence was adduced to that effect. Therefore, such finding of the first appellate court was perverse for being against the pleadings and evidence of the party. 14. It is no doubt true, court can mould the relief in an appropriate case for doing justice on the basis of the pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties. But, court cannot grant a relief to a party, for which there was no factual foundation in the pleadings or no evidence was put forward. The court cannot bring in a third case not pleaded by any of the parties and no relief can be granted going beyond the pleadings of the parties. But, court cannot grant a relief to a party, for which there was no factual foundation in the pleadings or no evidence was put forward. The court cannot bring in a third case not pleaded by any of the parties and no relief can be granted going beyond the pleadings of the parties. Therefore, the finding of the learned first appellate court that plaintiff purchased the same land measuring 1k 5ls from both Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya and defendant No. 1 was erroneous and unsustainable for being contrary to the pleadings. 15. Admittedly and evidently the total land measuring 2K 10Ls was jointly purchased by defendant No. 1 and Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya and both defendant No. 1 and Tarak Brahma Bhattacharyya sold the entire land by executing the two sale deeds (Ext. 2 & Ext. 3) in favour of the plaintiff, and as such, the plaintiff apparently acquired title in respect of entire 2k 10ls of land by right of purchase. Evidently the land purchased by the plaintiff from defendant No. 1 was the suit land. In the face of the pleadings and clear evidence including the admission of the defendant, clearly establishing the title of the plaintiff over the suit land, the finding of the first appellate court that the plaintiff did not acquire title over the suit land was against the pleadings and evidence of the parties. All the substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 16. It is no doubt true, that in a second appeal the finding of facts cannot be interfered, unless such finding of fact is perverse. The common thread passing through the decisions of the Apex Court in Lisamma Antony & Anr. v. Karthiyayani & Anr. (supra), Har Kumar Dhar and Ors. v. On the death of respondent No. 1 Jayanta Dutta, His LRs Bani Dutta and Ors. (supra) and Union of India v. Surya Hazarika & Anr. (supra) relied by Mr. Nandi is that high Court while exercising jurisdiction in second appeal cannot reverse the factual finding of lower court, inasmuch as, the first appellate court is the final court of facts. The above proposition of law not being disputed at the bar, I feel it unnecessary to burden this judgment by reproducing those decisions. (supra) relied by Mr. Nandi is that high Court while exercising jurisdiction in second appeal cannot reverse the factual finding of lower court, inasmuch as, the first appellate court is the final court of facts. The above proposition of law not being disputed at the bar, I feel it unnecessary to burden this judgment by reproducing those decisions. Facts remained is that when the findings of the first appellate court suffers from perversity for ignoring the evidence and pleading or the finding of facts are contrary to the pleadings and evidence, such factual finding suffering from perversity is not immune from interference in second appeal. 17. The plaintiff having clearly proved his right, title and interest over the suit land, learned Munsiff rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff, and as such, the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned first appellate court reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, ignoring the pleadings and evidence on record on the basis of mere surmise and conjecture was totally perverse and cannot be allowed to hold the field. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree of the learned first appellate court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the learned trial court is restored. No cost. 18. The second appeal is allowed. Decree be prepared accordingly. 19. Send back the LCR.