JUDGMENT Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present regular second appeal is maintained by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 13.03.2003, passed by the learned Additional District Judge (II), Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., in Civil Appeal No.105 K/99, whereby the learned Appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree dated 11.11.1999, passed by the then Sub Judge, Ist Class(I), Kangra (H.P.) in Civil Suit No.56 of 1996, with the prayer to set aside the same and to restore the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter to be called as "the plaintiff") maintained a suit for permanent injuction restraining the defendants permanently from damaging, disposing of brick kiln and other assets or destroying or changing the accounts or to deal with the assets and profits of M/s Dayal Brik Kiln Industries situated at Village and Post Office, Nagrota Surian at present Village Jarpal, Post Office, Amlela, Tehsil Jawali, District Kangra in any manner till the partnership is legally dissolved and accounts are rendered and paid to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has averred that the partnership was constituted between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 on 31.8.1992 in the name and Style of M/s Dayal Brick Kiln Industries (hereinafter to be referred as ''Partnership firm''). According to the partnership between the plaintiff and defendant No.1, the plaintiff had 40% share and defendant No.1 was having 60% share in the partnership business. It has been alleged that the partnership deed was registered with the Sub Registrar, Kangra on 31.8.1992. Thereafter, the business of installing Brick Kiln was carried out and after its manufacturing the Bricks, tiles etc., were sold as per the terms and conditions in the partnership deed. It has been alleged that the place of the business was shifted to village Jarpal. During this business, a truck was also purchased by the Partnership firm bearing No.PBL9064 from its funds and was used for the business of this firm. On 31.3.1993, defendant No.1 retired from the partnership business and his shares were given to defendants No. 2 and 3. During this business, a truck was also purchased by the Partnership firm bearing No.PBL9064 from its funds and was used for the business of this firm. On 31.3.1993, defendant No.1 retired from the partnership business and his shares were given to defendants No. 2 and 3. It has been alleged that the other conditions were also settled between the plaintiff and defendants No. 2 and 3 on 01.04.1993 and as per that agreement the plaintiff had share of 30% whereas the defendant No.2 was having 30% share and defendant No.3 was having 20% share, who futher carried out the business of M/s Dayal Brick Kiln Industries. It has been contended that the plaintiff never took out the profits from the funds of the firm which were reinvested in the capital. Again the other agreement was entered into by which defendant No.1 rejoined defendant No.2 and defendant No.3, as partners. As per that agreement, defendant No.1 became partner to the extent of 20% share, defendant No.2 to the extent of 30% share and defendant No.3 to the extent of 20% share. The remaining 30% share remained with the plaintiff, as per the earlier agreement. It has further been contended that the firm has not been dissolved nor the share of the plaintiff has been paid to him by rendering acounts and the plaintiff was running business alongwith other partners, but thereafter, the intention of the defendants became malafide an they did not permit him to enter in the business premises. They also threatened to do away with the capital or other assets of the firm and not allowed the plaintiff to inspect the accounts of the firm. They also threatened to dispose of the Brick Kiln and other assets including the truck and to destroy the account books for which the defendant has got no right or title. It has been alleged that a notice was also issued by the plaintiff to the defendants showing his intention to get partnership dissolved after determining the accounts, but the defendants are adament not to permit the plaintiff to participate in the business and has got the firm dissolved in accordance with law. It has been alleged that as the threats were started to be advanced in the month of April, 1995, the plaintiff has thus filed the suit in the Court. It has been alleged that as the threats were started to be advanced in the month of April, 1995, the plaintiff has thus filed the suit in the Court. Thereby decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from causing any damage to the assets of the firm without getting the accounts rendering properly by getting the firm dissolved. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants on the preliminary objections of cause of action and locus standi, limitation valuation, estoppel, jurisdiction. By filing a detailed written statement, the averments made by the plaintiff have been stated to be wrong. It has been alleged that earlier the plaintiff was a partner of M/s Dayal Brick Kiln Industries with defendant. However, the firm was dissolved by the dissolution deed dated 02.5.1995, signed and executed by the plaintiff and other partners. Thereby he had retired and he ceased to have any concern with the partnership business. The business is being carried out by the defendants, who are the sole partners to the exclusion of the plaintiff. It has further been averred that earlier business was carried out by the partners at Nagrota Surian, which was thereafter shifted to Jarpal. However, investment made by the plaintiff as per his share stands disputed. It has been admitted that the truck was purchased by the firm. The averments made qua change of share between the partners from time to time as claimed by the plaintiff, has also been admitted to be correct. The dissolution was stated to be held with the mutual consent of the parties on 03.3.1995 and thereafter, dissolution deed was stated to have been prepared on 02.5.1995. It has been alleged that there is no malafide intention in the pareparation of dissolution deed. No threats so far have been advanced to the plaintiff or to damage the assets and account books etc. of the partnership business. However, it has been averred that the business is being carried out by the defendants after the retirement of the plaintiff to his exclusion for which they have every right and threreby it has been averred that the plaintiff has got no locus standi and cause of action to file the present suit. 4. The plaintiff filed replication, in which the averments made in the plaint have been reasserted. The preliminary objections taken by the defendants and the averments made in the written statement have been denied. 4. The plaintiff filed replication, in which the averments made in the plaint have been reasserted. The preliminary objections taken by the defendants and the averments made in the written statement have been denied. It has been alleged that there was no dissolution of the firm as on 02.5.1995, as alleged by the defendants. 5. It has been further reiterated that the partnership deed dated 31.3.1993 is still in operation and the plaintiff is entitled for 30% share in the assets of the firm of its business. It has been sated that the firm was never dissolved. However, the plaintiff issued a notice to settle the accounts by rendering accounts since there is mistrust between the parties. Hence, the plaintiff prayed for decree of the suit by way of grant of decree for injunction. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues on 05.8.1996 : "1. Whether the plaintiff is partner of M/s Dayal Brick Kiln Industries with the defendants, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff was having share of 40% and defendant No.1 was having share of 60% in the partnership business, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether on 31.3.1993, defendant No.1 retired from the partnership business of M/s Dayal Brick Kiln Industries and in his place, he gave his share to defendant Nos. 2 & 3, as alleged? OPP 4. Whether it was agreed upon on 01.4.1993 that the plaintiff was having 30% share, defendant No.2, 50% share and defendant No.3, 20% share in the partnership, as alleged? OPP 5. Whether another agreement was entered into by which defendant No.1 again joined defendants No.2 and 3, as partners in the business and defendant No.1 became partner to the extent of 20% share, defendant No.2 to 30% share and defendant No.3, 30% share, as alleged? OPP 6. Whether the partnership of M/s Dayal Brick Kiln Industries is not so far legally dissolved and the plaintiff who was having 40% share in the total assets of the firm has not been paid his share by rendering the accounts etc., as alleged? OPP 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for 40% share upto 31.3.1993 and 30% thereafter in all the assets of the firm? OPP 8. Whether the defendants are threatening to damage dispose off the Brick Kiln and other assets of the firm including the truck and shall destroy the accounts etc., as alleged? OPP 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for 40% share upto 31.3.1993 and 30% thereafter in all the assets of the firm? OPP 8. Whether the defendants are threatening to damage dispose off the Brick Kiln and other assets of the firm including the truck and shall destroy the accounts etc., as alleged? OPP 9. Whether the plaintiff has got no cause of action and locus standi to sue? OPD 10. Whether the suit is not competent in the present form? ...OPD 11. Whether the suit is not within limitation? ...OPD 12. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? ...OPD 13. Whether the act, conduct, acquiescence and silence of the plaintiff is a bar to the present suit? ...OPD 14. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try and decide the present suit? OPD 15. Whether plaintiff retired from the partnership on 2.5.1995, as alleged? OPD 16. Whether the alleged resolution dated 2.5.1995 is fraudulent, false and has been set up collusively by the defendants and others, as alleged? ...OPD 17. Relief." 7. The learned trial Court decided Issues No.1 to 8 and 16 in favour of the plaintiff and the remaining issues in favour of the defendants and decreed the suit. 8. The defendants maintained the appeal in the learned lower Appellate Court, which was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court was set aside. Hence, the present regular second appeal, which was admitted on 17.12.2003, on the following substantial question of law: "1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has rendered erroneous findings by holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the Plaintiff? In the absence of the defendants taking the objection that dispute between the parties to be arbitrable, before taking steps in the suit, could the Lower Appellate court hold that the remedy of the plaintiff was to go to the Arbitration as per the terms of the Partnership Deed? 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave error of law in holding that the suit for mere injunction is not maintainable and the plaintiff ought to have sought further relief in the suit, as mandatory injunction etc.? Has not the Lower Appellate Court failed to appreciate the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and the Code of Civil Procedure? 3. Has not the Lower Appellate Court failed to appreciate the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and the Code of Civil Procedure? 3. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave procedural illegality in taking into consideration inadmissible evidence i.e. Mark ''D'', the notice served by the defendants on the plaintiff? Could such inadmissible evidence be relied upon merely on the ground that it was the plaintiff who produced such document and specially when the defendants did not admit such document either in their pleadings or during the course of their evidence? 4. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has misunderstood and misapplied the provisions of Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure by holding that the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable for want of proper pleadings, especially when the defendants did not take such objection at the earliest point of time of lack of material particulars, in the absence of proper objection was not such plea deemed to have been waived by defendants?" 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has argued that the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is without appreciating the facts, which have come on record to its true perspective and the same is required to be set aside. He has further argued that it was incumbent upon the learned lower Appellate Court to give findings on each fact, but the learned lower Appellate Court has failed to do so. Hence, the appeal is required to be remanded back to the learned lower Appellate Court for afresh trial. To support his contentions, he has relied upon judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court rendered in Shasidhar and others versus Ashwini Uma Mathad and another , (2015) 11 SCC 269 . He has also placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in B.M. Narayana Gowda versus Santhamma (Dead) By LRs and another , (2011) 15 SCC 476, on this aspect. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondents/defendants has argued that the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is just reasoned, as the suit for simpliciter injunction was not maintainable, so, the decree was liable to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondents/defendants has argued that the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is just reasoned, as the suit for simpliciter injunction was not maintainable, so, the decree was liable to be set aside. He has further argued that the plaintiff has remedy by way of arbitration and this is also the reason that the suit was rightly set aside. He has further argued that the learned lower Appellate Court below has given findings on each and every aspect in detail and no interference is required to be taken at this moment, as there is no substantial question of law involved. 12. In rebuttal the learned counsel for the apellant/plaintiff has argued that there are substantial questions of law involved, which needs to be adjudicated upon, as the defendants/respondents have never taken objection in the suit that the dispute between the parties is arbitrable. He has further argued that the appeal be allowed. 13. To appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, I have gone through the record of the case, in detail. 14. Pw1 has stated that the partnership is still in existence an it has not been dissolved and he has not been paid his dues. He has further stated that he used to work alone at the Brick Kiln and whenever the appellants used to visit, they used to obtain his signatures on blank paper on the pretext that the papers are to be submitted with an Advocate and that he has never signed any dissolution deed. The appellants were the sons of his father''s sister and therefore, he used to sign the paper in confidence. In his crossexamination, he has admitted that the membership in the firm continued to change from time to time alongwith the shares of the partners. While denying the execution of the dissolution deed, Ex.DA on 02.5.1995, he admitted his signatures on the said dissolution deed, encircled as Ex.DB. He also admitted the signatures of Tarsem Kumar and Manju Sharma appellants as well as the thumb impression of Jogeshwari Devi on dissolution deed dated 02.5.1996. He also admitted the signatures of Tarsem Kumar, Manju Sharma and thumb impression of Jogeshwari Devi. He also admitted the signatures of Tarsem Kumar and Manju Sharma appellants as well as the thumb impression of Jogeshwari Devi on dissolution deed dated 02.5.1996. He also admitted the signatures of Tarsem Kumar, Manju Sharma and thumb impression of Jogeshwari Devi. However, it is unpresumable under any stretch of imagination that without his presence on the spot at the time of execution of the dissolution deed Ex.DA, he is in a position to identify the thumb impression of Jogeshwari Devi. He has admitted that the marginal witnesses of the dissolution deed Ex.DA, Mohan Lal and Subhash Chand were not in any manner inimical towards him and that Subhash Chand had already died. The signatures of Mohan Lal second marginal witness are not disputed by him, rather the respondent has admitted his signatures even on the first page of Ex.DA encirled as Ex.DC. He has also admitted that he is a literate person and is running a shop. PW1 has no where stated that the stamp papers used in Ex.DA were at any point of time signed by him in blank state, rather he has stated that he is not aware as to when he signed Ex.DA. He has also stated that he is not aware of any dissolution deed and that he filed the suit after one month when dispute arose. This fact also seems unsustainable from the record for the reson that according to him, the dispute arose in April, 1995, as he pleaded in his plaint and got issued notice mark ''D'', dated 23.09.1995, showing his intention to dissolve the partnership w.e.f. 1.12.1995, whereas, he instituted the suit for injunction after the appellants on 28.9.1995. A perusal of the notice mark ''D'', which has been brought on record by the respondent himself, reveals that respondent pleaded in the said notice that the appellants obtained his signatures on a blank stamp paper of Rs. 5/ on the pretext that the stamp paper is required for getting the loan limit from the bank. It appears that the respondent has taken different stand at different point of time with regard to the execution of the dissolution deed, Ex.DA. A perusal of the dissolution deed Ex.DA, reveals that it contains two pages and stamp papers of Rs. 10/ and Rs. 5/ have been used. It appears that the respondent has taken different stand at different point of time with regard to the execution of the dissolution deed, Ex.DA. A perusal of the dissolution deed Ex.DA, reveals that it contains two pages and stamp papers of Rs. 10/ and Rs. 5/ have been used. In the notice the stand of the respondent is that his signatures were obtained on a blank stamp paper of Rs. 5/ on the pretext that the stamp paper is required for getting the loan limit from the bank, whereas in para No.5 of his replication, he pleaded that there is no dissolution deed executed on 02.5.1995, and while appearing as PW1, he has deposed totally different facts that his signatures were used to obtain on stamp papers on the pretext that the same are to be handed over to Advocate for income tax and sales tax purposes. The respondent pleaded different facts in his written statement. He has stated totally different facts in the notice mark ''D'' and has led evidence totally contrary to the facts, he mentioned in his replication and also in notice mark ''D''. So, it appears that the respondent has not maintained consistency in the facts pleaded and he tried to prove on record while appearing as PW1. 15. The plaintiff has failed to show that the dissolution deed was prepared by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake and so the findings, as recorded by the learned lower Appellate Court, on the fact that the dissolution of partnership was there, needs no intereference. Further, from the evidence on record, it is clear that the dissolution deed Ex.DA, dated 02.5.1995 was executed and the respondent retired from the partnership. However, this fact has been proved by Amar Nath, DW1 as well as by Mohan Lal, DW2, who signed the dissolution deed, as a marginal witness. The respondent while appearing as PW1, during his crossexamination has admitted that he has no enmity with Mohan Lal, DW2 in any manner. The version given by DW2, Mohan Lal that dissolution deed (Ex.DA) was signed by the parties in his presence, therefore, appears to be not rightly appreciated by the learned trial Court and his statement has been rejected without there being any sufficient reason or cause for it. The version given by DW2, Mohan Lal that dissolution deed (Ex.DA) was signed by the parties in his presence, therefore, appears to be not rightly appreciated by the learned trial Court and his statement has been rejected without there being any sufficient reason or cause for it. Shri Mohan Lal (DW2) in his crossexamination has corroborated the statement of DW1, Amar Nath to the effect that no transaction took place at the time of execution of the dissolution deed, as the parties admitted that they have already settled their accounts with regard to their assets and liabilities on 31st March, how much amount was settled, it was not discussed in his presence. He has denied that at the time of dissolution deed, Ex.DA was executed, appellant Tarsem Lal was not present on the spot. He also denied that the signatures of the respondent were obtained prior to the scribe of Ex.DA. He also denied that the dissolution deed was not executed in his presence. The respondent while crossexamining Mohan Lal, DW2, who is a marginal witness of the dissolution deed has no where brought any such circumstance, which gives any inference that Mohan Lal, DW2 had his inclination to favour appellants or to disfavour the respondent in any manner. Even if, for argument sake, the claim of the respondent is admitted that he did not execute the dissolution deed Ex.DA. Even then, the respondent is ceased to be a partner of the firm of his own act and conduct, as he himself issued notice to the appellants mark ''D'', dated 23.9.1995, under the terms of the partnership deed a two months notice, wherein he expressed his intention to retire from the partnership of the firm w.e.f. 01.12.1995. 16. The suit was for injunction only, which is itself not maintainable, as the plaintiff has failed to maintain the suit for rendition of accounts. This Court finds that the findings of the learned lower Appellate Court are just reasoned. Further, as the parties have themselves stated that before the learned lower Appellate Court, there was arbitration clause, the parties can even go for arbitration for settlement of their dispute per dissolution deed. 17. In Shasidhar and others versus Ashwini Uma Mathad and another , (2015) 11 SCC 269 , the Hon''ble Apex Court has held as under: "11. Further, as the parties have themselves stated that before the learned lower Appellate Court, there was arbitration clause, the parties can even go for arbitration for settlement of their dispute per dissolution deed. 17. In Shasidhar and others versus Ashwini Uma Mathad and another , (2015) 11 SCC 269 , the Hon''ble Apex Court has held as under: "11. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge V.R. Krishna Iyer, J (as His Lordship then was the judge of Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in Kurian Chacko vs. Varkey Ouseph, reminded the first appellate Court of its duty as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned judge held as under: "1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff''s title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learnedcted of him as an appellate Court. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation....." Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final Court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate Court. 3. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation." 18. This Court finds that the learned lower Appellate Court has dealt with each and every facts of the case and so, the ratio of this judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 19. This Court finds that the learned lower Appellate Court has dealt with each and every facts of the case and so, the ratio of this judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 19. Hon''ble Apex Court in B.M. Narayana Gowda versus Santhamma (Dead) By LRs and another , (2011) 15 SCC 476, has held as under: "3. "This Court has observed in a number of cases that the first appeal is a valuable right of the appellant and therein all questions of fact and law decided by trial court are open for reconsideration. In a case where the High Court found the trial court judgment is unsatisfactory and wanted to set aside the judgment, the High Court ought to have carefully examined the facts and the law and given cogent reasons for setting aside the trial court''s judgment. The legal position in law is no longer res integra. This Court had repeatedly said that in first appeal the High Court needs to decide questions of fact and law comprehensively by giving fulldressed hearing. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to a judgment of this Court in Sanjay Singh Rawat and Others Vs. National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd., the relevant portion of the judgment i.e. paras 3 4, reads as under: "3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the first appeal filed in the High Court did raise questions of fact and law which called for a fulldressed hearing. First appeal is a valuable right of the appellant and therein all the questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. In our opinion, the disposal of the appeal by the High Court, in the manner in which it has been done, is not satisfactory. 4. The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dismissing the appeal summarily is set aside. The appeal is remanded to the High Court for hearing and decision afresh and in accordance with law." 5. The learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on another judgment of this Court in H.K.N.Swami Vs. Irshad Basith, the relevant portion of the judgment i.e. para 3, reads as under: "3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. The learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on another judgment of this Court in H.K.N.Swami Vs. Irshad Basith, the relevant portion of the judgment i.e. para 3, reads as under: "3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title. The order of the High Court is cryptic and the same is without assigning any reason." 6. The learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on yet another judgment of this Court in Rama Pulp & Papers Ltd. Vs. Maruti N.Dhotre. In this judgment, this Court observed that in first appeal the High Court has to properly consider the evidence on record or for that matter even the arguments and the grounds raised in support of their case. 7. We are constrained to observe that in the impugned judgment the High Court has not followed the settled legal position crystallised by a number of judgments of this Court. Consequently, we set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. We request the High Court to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. 8. We direct the parties to maintain status quo, as of today, till the disposal of the appeal by the High Court." 20. This Court finds that the learned lower Appellate Court has dealt with each and every facts of the case and so, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. 21. This Court finds that the learned lower Appellate Court has dealt with each and every facts of the case and so, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. 21. The net result of the above discussion is that as the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable for simpliciter injunction after the dissolution of the firm, the substantial question No.1 is answered holding that as the suit was not maintainable, the observations of the learned lower Appellate Court that the parties could go for arbitration are as per law. Similarly, substantial question No.2 is answered holding that as the suit was required to be maintained for rendition of accounts after the dissolution of the partnership deed, which the plaintiff has himself executed. The learned lower Appellate Court has not taken any illegality in dismissing the suit, as the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable for simpliciter injuction. The substantial question No.3 is answered holding that the Court below has not committed any illegality, as it is only the mark ''D'', which is taken into consideration, but taking into consideration the other material on record and discussing it at length, the learned lower Appellate Court has given the findings and it cannot be said that the findings are based on the appreciation of mark ''D'' only. So, the substational question No.3 is answered accordingly. The substantial question No.4 is answered holding that the learned Court below has not misunderstood or misapplied the provisions of Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the suit was not dismissed for want of proper pleadings, but it was not maintainable for simpliciter injunction and so, the substantial question No.4 is answered accordingly. 22. The net result of the above discussion is that the appeal, which sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. 23. Pending application(s) if any, also stands disposed of.