JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. H.K. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2 and Mr. B. Chowdhury, learned PP appearing for the State. 2. This revisional application arises of a proceeding under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The petitioner No.1 herein is accused of causing domestic violence to the respondent No.1 and in consequence thereof the said complaint under Section 12 of the said Act has been filed before the court of Judicial Magistrate, Agartala, Court No.1, being C.R. 216 of 2016. 3. According to the complainant, she shared ‘space’ with the accused-petitioner and from the said relation the respondent No.2 was born. But the accused-petitioner refused to acknowledge the respondents and to take responsibility of their maintenance and other measures. The respondent No.1 claimed maintenance from the accused-petitioner for a sum of Rs.15,000/- per month and a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- for the educational and other expenses of the respondent No.2. The trial court by the order dated 14.02.2017 dismissed the said complaint on the ground of maintainability. The respondents No.1 and 2 herein, filed an appeal under Section 29 of the said act against the order dated 14.02.2017 in the court of the Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. In the course of time, the matter was transferred to the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.5, West Tripura, Agartala. 4. The said appeal being Criminal Appeal No.05 of 2017 has been allowed by the impugned order dated 03.01.2018 after observing that even though there is no specific statement in the petition under Section 12 of the Act about long standing relationship in the nature of marriage but that being a disputed question of facts cannot be decided merely on the basis of the petition and certain documents filed by the petitioner herein in connection with criminal proceeding initiated by the respondent No.1 herein. While passing the order, according to the appellate court, the Magistrate only considered the statements in the complaint filed under Section 12 of the said Act. 5. Mr. While passing the order, according to the appellate court, the Magistrate only considered the statements in the complaint filed under Section 12 of the said Act. 5. Mr. H. K. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has emphatically submitted that there is no material for taking cognizance of the complaint filed by the respondent No.1, unless there are some materials, even if by the DNA test it is reflected that the petitioner is the biological father of the respondent No.2, then also a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 cannot be put in the motion, unless it is shown that there was domestic relation within the definition of Section (f) of the said Act. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied on a decision of the apex court in Indra Sarma versus V.K.V. Sarma reported in AIR 2014 SC 309 where the apex court has observed as follows : “37. Reference to certain situations, in which the relationship between an aggrieved person referred to in Section 2(a) and the respondent referred to in Section 2(q) of the DV Act, would or would not amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage, would be apposite. Following are some of the categories of cases which are only illustrative: (a) Domestic relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male who lived or, at any point of time lived together in a shared household, will fall under the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and in case, there is any domestic violence, the same will fall under Section 3 of the DV Act and the aggrieved person can always seek reliefs provided under Chapter IV of the DV Act. (b) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman and a married adult male: Situations may arise when an unmarried adult women knowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male. The question is whether such a relationship is a relationship “in the nature of marriage” so as to fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act. (b) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman and a married adult male: Situations may arise when an unmarried adult women knowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male. The question is whether such a relationship is a relationship “in the nature of marriage” so as to fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act. (c) Domestic relationship between a married adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Situations may also arise where an adult married woman, knowingly enters into a relationship with an unmarried adult male, the question is whether such a relationship would fall within the expression relationship “in the nature of marriage”. (d) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male: An unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male, may, in a given situation, fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and such a relationship may be a relationship in the “nature of marriage”, so far as the aggrieved person is concerned. (e) Domestic relationship between same sex partners (Gay and Lesbians): DV Act does not recognize such a relationship and that relationship cannot be termed as a relationship in the nature of marriage under the Act. Legislatures in some countries, like the Interpretation Act, 1984 (Western Australia), the Interpretation Act, 1999 (New Zealand), the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (South Africa), the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act, 2004 (U.K.), have recognized the relationship between the same sex couples and have brought these relationships into the definition of Domestic relationship.” [Emphasis added] 6. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has further submitted that the relation, even going by the statements appearing in the complaint filed by the respondent No.1, cannot be held as ‘domestic relation’ between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male and hence, there was no infirmity in the order of the Magistrate. By interference, the appellate court has caused gross injustice to the petitioner. 7. From the other side, Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2 has submitted that the Magistrate’s order was entirely mechanical as the complainant did not get any opportunity to prove her allegation in respect of the maintenance and other reliefs. Mr. By interference, the appellate court has caused gross injustice to the petitioner. 7. From the other side, Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2 has submitted that the Magistrate’s order was entirely mechanical as the complainant did not get any opportunity to prove her allegation in respect of the maintenance and other reliefs. Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel has further submitted that the Magistrate has mis-constructed the provisions of Section 28(1) of the said act inasmuch as it provides that save as otherwise provided in that Act, all proceedings under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). It has been further provided in the form of non obstante clause that nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the said act shall prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23. 8. According to Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel the power to the Magistrate as conferred by Section 23 of the said Act is not unbridled, but regulated by principle of natural justice and that provision is only relevant for the interim order having the main reliefs sought in the complaint in consideration. If the Magistrate is satisfied that the person accused has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent can repeat an act of domestic violence, in such circumstances, even an ex-parte order can be allowed by the Magistrate. According to Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel there was no opportunity for the complainant to lay even the preliminary evidence. He has supported the judgment as challenged in this petition. 9. When there is no specific provision in Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, this court has already held the general provisions of the Cr.P.C. shall follow when a complaint is taken into cognizance by a Magistrate. He has supported the judgment as challenged in this petition. 9. When there is no specific provision in Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, this court has already held the general provisions of the Cr.P.C. shall follow when a complaint is taken into cognizance by a Magistrate. It can only be discharged by way of not issuing of the process when the Magistrate is not satisfied after preliminary evidence is recorded under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Since, this is a special Act and at least the principle of natural justice was incumbent to be followed, this court is of the view that a reasonable opportunity should be given to the complainant to established her case. The accused or the respondent shall as well get the adequate and comprehensive opportunity to rebut such evidence. From the averments of this petition, this court finds that only on the basis of some papers like the written complaint filed alleging that the petitioner herein had raped the complainant and some testimonies recorded in that proceeding, the Magistrate passed the order rejecting the complainant. There is no doubt that those papers were from a separate proceeding and as such, the evidence ought to have been recorded. This court, even though, is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order but directs the Magistrate to allow the complainant adduce evidence whatever, following the provisions of the summary trial. Needless to say that the petitioners be afforded opportunity to rebut the evidence of the complainant. There shall be an attempt to complete the entire proceeding within 2 (two) months from the date when the Magistrate will receive a copy of this order. Any observation made in this order will have no bearing in the proceeding. The Magistrate shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence that would be recorded in terms of this order. In terms of the above, this petition stands disposed of. Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the in-Charge Magistrate of the said court. Further, a copy of this order be furnished to the learned counsel appearing for the parties.