JUDGMENT : 1. Supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner alongwith compromise deed is taken on record. 2. The petitioner-Anubhav Swaroop Yadav has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition challenging the First Information Report dated 30.03.2018, vide case Crime No.120 of 2018, under Sections 498-A, 506, 507 IPC and 3/4 D.P.Act, Police Station-Kotwali, District-Raebareli. 3. This court had passed the following order on 24.05.2018:- "List this case on 29.05.2018 as fresh. It has been stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that there are possibility of settlement of the issues between the parties. Accordingly, for the said purpose let respondent no.3 be present on the next date. Learned AGA to communicate this order to the Station House Officer concerned. The respondent no. 3 shall be apprised of this order by the Station House Officer concerned." 4. Pursuant to aforesaid order the respondent No.3-Rupika Bajpai is present before this court and Shri Pradeep Kumar Tripathi, Advocate has filed his power on her behalf, which is taken on record. 5. It seems that by conciliation between the petitioner and the opposite party No.3 they have arrived at a compromise and a compromise deed has duly been signed by the petitioner-Anubhav Swaroop Yadav and the opposite party No.3-Rupika Bajpai, which has been filed alongwith the supplementary affidavit. The parties have entered into compromise/agreement on the terms and conditions disclosed in the compromise deed, which are extracted hereinafter:- "1. That the matrimonial dispute arose between the parties and the First Party lodged the First Information Report dated 30.03.2018 relating to case crime NO.0120 of 2018 under section 498-A, 506, 507 IPC and 3/4 D.P.Act, at police Station-Kotwali, District -Raebareli Bareli. 2. That presently parties entered in to compromise and amicably settled their disputes and ready to resolve the present dispute. 3. That the second party/petitioner gave written undertaking that he will neither contact the first party nor try to maintain any relation with her or her parents in future. 4. That the second party/petitioner further undertakes that they are ready to dissolve their marriage by way of mutual agreement/consent and also ready to file joint petitioner for divorce under Section 13-B Hindu Marriage Act, 1055 (Divorce by mutual consent) at their marriage place i.e. at Kanpur. 5. 4. That the second party/petitioner further undertakes that they are ready to dissolve their marriage by way of mutual agreement/consent and also ready to file joint petitioner for divorce under Section 13-B Hindu Marriage Act, 1055 (Divorce by mutual consent) at their marriage place i.e. at Kanpur. 5. that the second party/petitioner is also ready to dissolve their marriage by way of mutual agreement/consent and also ready to file joint petition for divorce under section 130B Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Divorce by mutual consent) at their marriage place i.e. at Kanpur 6. That both the parties are entered into compromise and not willing to contest the present Petition and the first party has no objection if this Hon'ble Court quash the first information report dated 30.03.2018 relating to case crime no.0120 of 2018, under Section 498-A, 506, 507 IPC and 3/4 D.P.Act, Police Station- Kotwali, District-Raebareli Bareli. 7. That the present compromise deed is executed by the parties with their own free will and without any force or threat." 6. In the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner it has categorically been stated by the petitioner that on coming to know that the opposite party No.3 is not willing to maintain or continue any relation with the petitioner. However, she is ready to resolve the matter on the condition of written undertaking by the petitioner that he will neither contact her nor try to maintain any relation in future. The petitioner undertakes that he will neither contact her nor have any relation with the opposite party No.3 or her parents in future. They have entered into compromise to settle the dispute amicably. Further it has been stated in the supplementary affidavit that the petitioner undertakes that he is ready to dissolve their marriage by way of mutual agreement/consent and also ready to file joint petition for divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 at their marriage place i.e. at Kanpur. 7. Compromise deed also discloses that the parties have settled their dispute and ready to dissolve the present dispute and they will file a joint divorce petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 at their marriage place i.e. at Kanpur. 7. Compromise deed also discloses that the parties have settled their dispute and ready to dissolve the present dispute and they will file a joint divorce petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 at their marriage place i.e. at Kanpur. Lastly the parties have stated that the first party i.e. Rupika Bajpai-victim of the impugned First Information Report has no objection if this Hon'ble Court quashes the First Information Report dated 30.03.2018, vide case Crime No.120 of 2018, under Sections 498-A, 506, 507 IPC and 3/4 D.P.Act, Police Station-Kotwali, District-Raebareli. 8. The opposite party No.3 is present in person before the court. She categorically and in unambiguous terms stated that since she has settled her dispute with the petitioner and petitioner is ready to dissolve their marriage by way of mutual agreement/consent by filing a joint petition for divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the petitioner has undertaken that he will neither contact her nor try to maintain any relationship with her or her parents in future, she does not want to press the impugned First Information Report and prosecute the petitioner and requested that the First Information Report, impugned in the present writ petition, be quashed. 9. We have considered the submissions of the parties and perused the record. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of B. S. Joshi and others versus State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 has held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of Cr.P.C. is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. The relevant paragraph 8 of the said judgment is extracted below:- "8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case (1977) 4 SCC 551 does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case (1977) 4 SCC 551 does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power." 11. The aforesaid judgment was followed in the case of Nikhil Merchant versus C.B.I. and another, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma versus State and others, (2008) 16 SCC 1 . However, in Gian Singh versus State of Punjab, (2010) 15 SCC 118 , a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court doubted the correctness of these decisions including one in B.S. Joshi's case and matter was referred to a three Judges Bench. 12. In view of the aforesaid reference, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh versus State of Punjab and another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 considered the questions referred to it and reiterated the ratio of the judgment in B.S. Joshi's case. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has held that the cases predominantly with civil flavour particularly offences arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or other like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony particularly relating to dowry etc., or the family disputes, where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have settled their dispute outside the Court, in these category of cases, the High Court should quash the criminal proceedings, if High Court is of the opinion that as a result of compromise between the parties, possibility of conviction is remote or bleak. In para 61 of the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court has held as under:- "61. In para 61 of the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court has held as under:- "61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 13. The Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 while relying on the earlier judgment in Gian Singh's case has held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent power may quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are non compoundable but the parties have settled their disputes between themselves. The relevant para i.e. 29.1 to 29.7 of the aforesaid judgment is extracted hereinbelow:- "29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2 When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2 When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3 Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4 On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delecate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime." 14. In view of above, this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can quash the proceedings of F.I.R. to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any court. The object of the criminal prosecution is to punish the guilty for committing the offence, but when the result of the prosecution is almost settled that it would result in acquittal inasmuch as the complainant herself would not support the prosecution case, it would not serve the purpose for allowing the prosecution to go on, when it is crystal clear that the continuance of the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and nothing but to waste the time of the Government machinery and oppression and prejudice to the parties. 15. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that no fruitful purpose would be served by allowing the prosecution, lodged by the impugned First Information Report, to continue, rather it may cause oppression and prejudice also. Our this view is also fortified by a recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court Parbhatbhai Ahir Vs. 15. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that no fruitful purpose would be served by allowing the prosecution, lodged by the impugned First Information Report, to continue, rather it may cause oppression and prejudice also. Our this view is also fortified by a recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court Parbhatbhai Ahir Vs. State of Gujarat, (2017) AIR SC 4843 and Others in which Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the broad principles in respect of quashing of the First Information Report. The paragraph 15 of the said judgment, on reproduction, reads as under:- "15. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions: (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash Under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash Under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power; (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated; (vi) In the exercise of the power Under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute; (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance." 16. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the categorical statement of the opposite party No.3-Rupika Bajpai before the court that she does not want to press the impugned First Information Report and prosecute the petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuation of criminal proceedings in pursuance of the impugned First Information Report, lodged by opposite party No.3. Accordingly, it would be appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to quash the impugned First Information Report as continuation of the proceedings of the First Information Report would be a futile exercise. 17. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and quash the First Information Report dated 30.03.2018, vide case Crime No.120 of 2018, under Sections 498-A, 506, 507 IPC and 3/4 D.P.Act, Police Station-Kotwali, District-Raebareli, lodged by Rupika Bajpai-the opposite party No.3 and the proceedings thereof. 18. 17. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and quash the First Information Report dated 30.03.2018, vide case Crime No.120 of 2018, under Sections 498-A, 506, 507 IPC and 3/4 D.P.Act, Police Station-Kotwali, District-Raebareli, lodged by Rupika Bajpai-the opposite party No.3 and the proceedings thereof. 18. Before parting we would like to clarify that any violation of the undertaking given by the parties before this Court and terms of settlement arrived at between them or this order would amount to contempt of this Court, for which the parties may approach this Court in accordance with law