ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. I.A. No. 9419 of 2017 1. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 20 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the reasons stated in this interlocutory application, especially in paras-5, 6, 7 & 8 thereof, there are reasonable reasons for condonation of delay. 3. We therefore, condone the delay in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 4. I.A. No. 9419 of 2017, is allowed and disposed of. L.P.A. No. 595 of 2017 5. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner whose writ petition being W.P. (C) No.2947 of 2017 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 10.10.2017 and the prayer of this appellant to allow the petitioner to purchase waste and sweeping papers from respondent was not accepted by the learned Single Judge because, there was a breach of a condition imposed in the notice inviting tender by the respondent. The condition was to supply prices per kilogram, for each type of waste paper, whereas, this appellant had offered a lump-sum amount which is at Rs.1,66,192/-. 6. Having heard counsel for the appellant and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that as per notice inviting tender, which was issued by respondent no.1, price per kilogram for each type of waste papers was to be given by the offeree. 7. This appellant (original petitioner) has offered a lump-sum amount of Rs.1,66,192/- for the total quantity of both the types of waste papers. Thus, what was required as per the condition no.1 of the notice inviting tender (Annexure-5), was not given or in other words what is offered by this appellant was never mentioned in condition no.1 of the notice inviting tender or in other words this appellant has modified that condition no.1 of notice inviting tender which is not permissible in the eye of law. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P.(C) no. 2947 of 2017 vide judgment and order dated 10.10.2017. 8. Neither this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can modify the condition imposed in notice inviting tender nor can be waived. 9. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P.(C) no. 2947 of 2017 vide judgment and order dated 10.10.2017. 8. Neither this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can modify the condition imposed in notice inviting tender nor can be waived. 9. This appellant has offered a lump-sum amount instead of given price per kilogram of two types of waste papers. Thus, even if, this appellant (original petitioner) is ready to offer higher amount, he has to follow the condition of notice inviting tender, otherwise, tomorrow he may come and say that instead of price in rupees, he is offering 5000 kg., of wheat or rice for 1 quintal of waste papers. Thus, the amount of consideration is not to be looked into, but, the conditions mentioned in the notice inviting tender have to be fulfilled, which are having the vital importance and this Court cannot modify such conditions. 10. In the case of Poddar Steel Corpn. v. Ganesh Engineering Works reported in (1991) 3 SCC 273 it has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court as under: “6. It is true that in submitting its tender accompanied by a cheque of the Union Bank of India and not of the State Bank clause 6 of the tender notice was not obeyed literally, but the question is as to whether the said non-compliance deprived the Diesel Locomotive Works of the authority to accept the bid. As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that an authority inviting tenders is bound to give effect to every term mentioned in the notice in meticulous detail, and is not entitled to waive even a technical irregularity of little or no significance. The requirements in a tender notice can be classified into two categories — those which lay down the essential conditions of eligibility and the others which are merely ancillary or subsidiary with the main object to be achieved by the condition. In the first case the authority issuing the tender may be required to enforce them rigidly. In the other cases it must be open to the authority to deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance of the condition in appropriate cases. This aspect was examined by this Court in C.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka a case dealing with tenders. In the other cases it must be open to the authority to deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance of the condition in appropriate cases. This aspect was examined by this Court in C.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka a case dealing with tenders. Although not in an entirely identical situation as the present one, the observations in the judgment support our view. The High Court has, in the impugned decision, relied upon Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India but has failed to appreciate that the reported case belonged to the first category where the strict compliance of the condition could be insisted upon. The authority in that case, by not insisting upon the requirement in the tender notice which was an essential condition of eligibility, bestowed a favour on one of the bidders, which amounted to illegal discrimination. The judgment indicates that the court closely examined the nature of the condition which had been relaxed and its impact before answering the question whether it could have validly condoned the shortcoming in the tender in question. This part of the judgment demonstrates the difference between the two categories of the conditions discussed above. However it remains to be seen as to which of the two clauses, the present case belongs.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In the case of B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 548 it has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court as under: “66. However it remains to be seen as to which of the two clauses, the present case belongs.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In the case of B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 548 it has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court as under: “66. We are also not shutting our eyes towards the new principles of judicial review which are being developed; but the law as it stands now having regard to the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions may be summarised as under: (i) if there are essential conditions, the same must be adhered to; (ii) if there is no power of general relaxation, ordinarily the same shall not be exercised and the principle of strict compliance would be applied where it is possible for all the parties to comply with all such conditions fully; (iii) if, however, a deviation is made in relation to all the parties in regard to any of such conditions, ordinarily again a power of relaxation may be held to be existing; (iv) the parties who have taken the benefit of such relaxation should not ordinarily be allowed to take a different stand in relation to compliance with another part of tender contract, particularly when he was also not in a position to comply with all the conditions of tender fully, unless the court otherwise finds relaxation of a condition which being essential in nature could not be relaxed and thus the same was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction; (v) when a decision is taken by the appropriate authority upon due consideration of the tender document submitted by all the tenderers on their own merits and if it is ultimately found that successful bidders had in fact substantially complied with the purport and object for which essential conditions were laid down, the same may not ordinarily be interfered with; (vi) the contractors cannot form a cartel. If despite the same, their bids are considered and they are given an offer to match with the rates quoted by the lowest tenderer, public interest would be given priority; (vii) where a decision has been taken purely on public interest, the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint.” (emphasis supplied) 12. If despite the same, their bids are considered and they are given an offer to match with the rates quoted by the lowest tenderer, public interest would be given priority; (vii) where a decision has been taken purely on public interest, the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint.” (emphasis supplied) 12. In the case of Bakshi Security & Personnel Services (P) Ltd. v. Devkishan Computed (P) Ltd. reported in (2016) 8 SCC 446 it has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court as under: “12. First and foremost, under tender Condition 2.5.5, commercial bids have to strictly conform to the format provided in Annexure 2 of the tender document. Annexure 2 which contains the format for the price bid makes it clear that the salary paid to deployed manpower should not be less than the minimum wage. It further goes on to state in Para 3 thereof that if the component of salary quoted is less than the minimum wage prescribed, the bid is liable to be rejected. On this ground alone, Respondent 1’s bid is liable to be rejected inasmuch as, vide its letter dated 3-9-2015, Respondent 1 stuck to its original figure of Rs. 2,77,68,000 which is way below the minimum wage fixed by the Government. Secondly, Shri Raval is also right in stating that the without prejudice offer of Rs. 3,00,92,346 is an offer which is not fixed, but open ended. This is clear from the fact that it was up to the Government then to pick up either figure by way of acceptance. This is clearly interdicted by Clause 2.5.6 of the tender which states that prices quoted by the bidder have to be fixed, and no open-ended bid can be entertained, the same being liable to be rejected straightaway. Such condition is obviously an essential condition of the tender which goes to the eligibility of persons who make offers under the tender. 13. Unfortunately, even though the High Court noticed the open-ended nature of Respondent 1’s bid, it went on to add that the offer of Respondent 1 shall be treated as matching with the revised minimum wage calculation and that it is nowhere envisaged by the tender conditions that rejection of an offer which may have the potential of causing loss to the tenderer is present. It is not for the High Court to revisit a condition contained in Annexure 2 read with Condition 2.5.5 of the tender in the manner aforesaid. Once the tender condition states that the tender must strictly conform to the format provided in Annexure 2, and Annexure 2 in turn clearly states that if the component of salary quoted is less than the minimum wage prescribed, the bid is liable to be rejected, and the High Court cannot hold otherwise. The High Court’s further finding that Respondent 1’s offer was “clear” is wholly incorrect. It was a without prejudice offer which muddied the waters and rendered the price quoted by the bidder as variable and not fixed.” (emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the aforesaid decisions, if any breach is committed by the bidder of the condition of the notice inviting tender, he has disqualified his bid which cannot be looked into by the institutions, who have invited the offers. 14. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons, and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P.(C) no. 2947 of 2017 vide judgment and order dated 10.10.2017, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal is, hereby, dismissed.