JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. All these writ petitions have been filed by different five writ petitioners aggrieved by similar notices issued to them under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 whereby they have been summoned to give evidence. 2. Shri Vikas Pawa, learned senior advocate for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were summoned by notice under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 from the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence in relation to allegedly imported “rough precious stone” discovered by DRI in the raid conducted in the office premises of Sri Sai Logistics, a Clearing House Agent (CHA). The respondents on 18th April, 2018 raided the office premises of CHA and seized documents with regard to 12 consignments that were imported through them. 3. Petitioners have approached this Court because they apprehend that if they appear before the respondents, they would be subjected to third degree torture and/or like tactics of torture, threats and physical violence in order to coerce them into making false statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. In doing so, the respondents are seeking to decide an outcome beforehand and then subsequently working towards gathering evidence in support of such an outcome, by forcing statements out of innocent people, who are carrying on legitimate business. 4. It is argued that one Mr. Babulal, employee of Sri Sai Logistics (CHA), whose office premises was raided by DRI, was picked up by the respondents from the CHA office during the aforesaid raid and was illegally detained in their office for two days. The said employee was severely tortured and beaten up by officials of DRI and was released only next day i.e. 19.04.2018. The employee was coerced at the behest of the officials of respondent no.2 into making some false statement, possibly even against the petitioners herein and other business concerns, whose consignment documents were seized. He was tortured and beaten up mercilessly for more than a day and was not allowed to meet his family. Mr. Babulal, on release from his illegal detention from the office of DRI at Jaipur has subsequently retracted from the statement by writing to the Assistant Director of DRI on the same day on which he was released. 5. He was tortured and beaten up mercilessly for more than a day and was not allowed to meet his family. Mr. Babulal, on release from his illegal detention from the office of DRI at Jaipur has subsequently retracted from the statement by writing to the Assistant Director of DRI on the same day on which he was released. 5. Learned Senior Counsel in support of his arguments cited the judgment of Supreme Court in Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue, Intelligence vs. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362 and argued that the Supreme Court, relying on its earlier judgment in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 426, directed the interrogation of the respondent in that case to be held within the sight of his advocate or any other person duly authorized by him. Learned Senior Counsel also cited the order passed by the Supreme Court in Vijay Sajnani & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr., 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1094 in which case also, it was directed that during interrogation of the petitioner by the custom authorities under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, his/their counsel would be allowed to be present within visible distance, but beyond hearing range. Reliance is also placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Munshi Singh Gautam (Dead) & Ors. vs. State of M.P., (2005) 9 SCC 631 . 6. On hearing learned senior counsel for the petitioners and perusing the record, we find that all these petitions raise similar argument wherein all the petitioners have claimed that they are law binding citizens of the country and that if they appear before the DRI authority for evidence under Section 108 of the Act, the latter would extract statement from them by coercion, threat, violence and intimidation. Example of one Mr. Babulal, the employee of Sri Sai Logistics, a Clearing House Agent has been given, who later retracted from his statement by letter dated 19.04.2018 addressed to the Assistant Director alleging that he was coerced at the behest of the official of respondents into making some false statement against the petitioners. We are however not impressed. The said letter of Mr. Babulal cannot be the basis for general allegation against DRI that in all these cases pertaining to 12 consignments, which have been picked up for investigation. We are however not impressed. The said letter of Mr. Babulal cannot be the basis for general allegation against DRI that in all these cases pertaining to 12 consignments, which have been picked up for investigation. There is no reason to presume that all the parties, including the petitioners, would be subjected to torture or coercion, threat, violence and intimidation. We do not find any justification for the petitioners to use this kind of expressions in such a sweeping manner. 7. In the case of Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue, Intelligence, supra, the Supreme Court while considering Articles 22(1), 21 and 20(3) of the Constitution as to the right of a witness for the presence of his counsel during interrogation observed that respondent not being an accused, direction of courts below that his interrogation may be held in presence of his lawyer was unsustainable. The respondent in that case was granted anticipatory bail on the ground that he was not an accused and that his medical report showed that he had been suffering from heart disease. Thereafter, respondent filed an application for modification of the order granting him anticipatory bail to the extent that the interrogation and examination of the respondent by DRI officials be conducted in the presence of his advocate and a cardiologist. The Court of Sessions, partly allowed the application of the respondent after perusing the medical report and held that the presence of an advocate at the time of interrogation by DRI officials is necessary to ensure free and fair interrogation. DRI challenged the said order in revision petition before the High Court and thereafter before the Supreme Court. While allowing the appeal partly, the Supreme Court held that the respondent not being an accused, direction of the Court below that his interrogation may be held in presence of his lawyer was unsustainable. However, having regard to the special facts and circumstances of the case, it was directed that interrogation of the respondent may be held within the sight of his advocate or any other person duly authorised by him. Such are not the facts of the present case inasmuch as the aforesaid direction was passed on peculiar facts of that case as the respondent therein had been granted anticipatory bail and that he was found to be suffering from heart ailment. 8. Such are not the facts of the present case inasmuch as the aforesaid direction was passed on peculiar facts of that case as the respondent therein had been granted anticipatory bail and that he was found to be suffering from heart ailment. 8. Subsequent three-judge bench order in Vijay Sajnani, supra is a brief order which does not provide sufficient guidance. Besides, this order has not noticed the earlier three-judge bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Poolpandi & Ors. vs. Superintendent, Central Excise & Ors., (1992) 3 SCC 259 , a mention of which is found in the judgment of Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue, Intelligence, supra. The said case arose out of proceedings under Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. The common question that arose for consideration before the Supreme Court therein was whether the appellants/petitioners were entitled to the presence of lawyer when they are questioned during interrogation under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The argument that was raised before the Supreme Court was that there was no statutory provision prohibiting the presence of a counsel during the interrogation of the person concerned, so if a request in that behalf is made, cannot be legitimately refused. To deny him such a right would be violative of Article 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Nandini Satpathy vs. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424 . The Supreme Court however repelled the contention by relying on its Constitution Bench judgments in Ramesh Chandra Mehta vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 940 and Illias vs. Collector of Customs, Madras, AIR 1970 SC 1065 . The observation of the Supreme Court in paras 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the report are apposite to reproduce hereunder: 6. xxxxxxxxxxxxx In Ramesh Chandra Mehta case, the appellant was searched at the Calcutta Airport and diamonds and jewelleries of substantial value were found on his person as also currency notes in a suitcase with him, and in pursuance to a statement made by him more pearls and jewellery were recovered from different places. He was charged with offences under the Sea Customs Act. He was charged with offences under the Sea Customs Act. During the trial, reliance was placed on his confessional statements made before the Customs Authorities, which was objected to on the ground that the same were inadmissible in evidence inter alia in view of the provisions of Article 20(3). While rejecting the objection, the Supreme Court held that in order that the guarantee against testimonial compulsion incorporated in Article 20(3) may be claimed by a person, it has to be established that when he made the statement in question, he was a person accused of an offence. Pointing out to the similar provisions of the Sea Customs Act as in the present Act and referring to the power of a Customs Officer, in an inquiry in connection with the smuggling of goods, to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary to give evidence or to produce a particular document, the Supreme Court observed thus:- "The expression ‘any person’ includes a person who is suspected or believed to be concerned in the smuggling of goods. But a person arrested by a Customs Officer because he is found in possession of smuggled goods or on suspicion that he is concerned in smuggling is not when called upon by the Customs Officer to make a statement or to produce a document or thing, a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The steps taken by the Customs Officer are for the purpose of holding an enquiry under the Sea Customs Act and for adjudging confiscation of goods dutiable or prohibited and imposing penalties. The Customs Officer does not at that stage accuse the person suspected of infringing the provisions of the Sea Customs Act with the commission of any office. His primary duty is to prevent smuggling and to recover duties of Customs when collecting evidence in respect of smuggling against a person suspected of infringing the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, he is not accusing the person of any offence punishable at a trial before a Magistrate." The above conclusion was reached after consideration of several relevant decisions and deep deliberation on the issue, and cannot be ignored on the strength of certain observations in the judgment by three learned Judges in Nandini Satpathy's case which is, as will be pointed out hereinafter, clearly distinguishable. 7. 7. A perusal of the facts in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (Supra) would clearly indicate that the decision has no application in the present cases. The matter arose out of a complaint filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance) against the appellant under section 179 of the Indian Penal Code before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack. The Magistrate took the cognizance of the offence and issued summons for appearance against the appellant. It was contended unsuccessfully that the charge was non-sustainable in view of the protection under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution and the immunity under section 161 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this background the observations relied upon by Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit were made and they cannot be treated to have in any way diluted the ratio in Ramesh Chandra Mehta's case. The question whether customs officials are police officers, and whether the statements recorded by the customs authorities under section 107 and 108 of the Customs Act were inadmissible in evidence were examined in Illias v. Collector of Customs (supra) and answered in the negative by a Bench of five Judges and it is, therefore, no use referring to the observations made in the judgment in a regular criminal case initiated by the police. 8. Reference was also made to the Constitution Bench decision in Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah and another v. D.K. Guha and Others, (1973) 1 SCC 696 . The appellant Ramanlal was arrested on August 31, 1971 under Section 19B of the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 1947, and the grounds of arrest served on him included the accusation relating to a transaction with reference to which he was summoned on April 17, 1972 to appear before the Deputy Director, Enforcement, Directorate on April 28, 1972 to give evidence. The petitioner pointed out that he was accused at the time when he was arrested for having committed an offence which was the subject matter of the enquiry and the summons should, therefore, be withdrawn. The prayer was rejected by the Deputy Director who insisted that the petitioner had to comply with the same. On these facts the matter was considered by the Supreme Court. The prayer was rejected by the Deputy Director who insisted that the petitioner had to comply with the same. On these facts the matter was considered by the Supreme Court. It was pointed out that the First Information Report in the case had been lodged earlier, and since "it is well settled that with the lodging of the First Information Report a person is accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3)", the appellant was entitled to partial relief. The decision in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal was referred to and not dissented from. We, therefore, reject the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants founded on Article 20(3) of the Constitution. It will be further noticed that in Ramanlal's case (supra) the Bench took the precaution of observing that the only protection that Article 20(3) gives to a person accused of an offence is that he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself, but this does not mean that he need not give information regarding matters which do not tend to incriminate him. Rejecting the prayer of the appellant for setting aside the summons, the Court directed him to appear before the Deputy Director and answer such questions as did not tend to incriminate him. It is significant to note that these observations permitting him not to answer self-incriminating questions were made only because the appellant was held to be an accused on the relevant date. 9. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 10. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 11. We do not find any force in the arguments of Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit that if a person is called away from his own house and questioned in the atmosphere of the customs office without the assistance of his lawyer or his friends his constitutional right under Article 21 is violated. The argument proceeds thus : if the person who is used to certain comforts and convenience is asked to come by himself to the Department for answering question it amounts to mental torture. We are unable to agree. It is true that large majority of persons connected with illegal trade and evasion of taxes and duties are in a position to afford luxuries on lavish scale of which an honest ordinary citizen of this country cannot dream of and they are surrounded by persons similarly involved either directly or indirectly in such pursuits. We are unable to agree. It is true that large majority of persons connected with illegal trade and evasion of taxes and duties are in a position to afford luxuries on lavish scale of which an honest ordinary citizen of this country cannot dream of and they are surrounded by persons similarly involved either directly or indirectly in such pursuits. But that cannot be a ground for holding that he has a constitutional right to claim similar luxuries and company of his choice. Mr. Salve was fair enough not to pursue his argument with reference to the comfort part, but continued to maintain that the appellant is entitled to the company of his choice during the questioning. The purpose of the enquiry under the Customs Act and the other similar statutes will be completely frustrated if the whims of the persons in possession of useful information for the departments are allowed to prevail. For achieving the object of such an enquiry if the appropriate authorities be of the view that such persons should be dissociated from the atmosphere and the company of persons who provide encouragement to them in adopting a non-cooperative attitude to the machineries of law, there cannot be any legitimate objection in depriving them of such company. The relevant provisions of the Constitution in this regard have to be construed in the spirit they were made and the benefits thereunder should not be "expanded" to favour exploiters engaged in tax evasion at the cost of public exchequer. Applying the ‘just, fair and reasonable test' we hold that there in no merit in the stand of appellant before us.” 9. In view of authoritative enunciation of the law noticed above, we are not inclined to hold that recording of statement of the petitioners under Section 108 of the Customs Act by DRI officials without the presence of their counsel would in any manner violate any of their fundamental rights. On the contrary, if the kind of allegations which the petitioners have made against the DRI officials are accepted on their mere ipse dixit and all the statements of this nature are generally ordered to be recorded in the presence of their advocate, the purpose of enquiry under the Customs Act and the other enactments of similar nature may be defeated. If the DRI authorities in the present case have identified many such dubious transactions, they have legitimate right to question such importers and persons associated with them in isolation and not necessarily in the company of their counsel. Such act on the part of DRI cannot be held to be violative of Article 20(3), 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. 10. In view of above discussion, the prayer of the petitioners that their statement should be recorded in the presence of their counsel cannot be accepted. It however goes without saying that the respondents while recording their statement are always expected to follow the due process of law. 11. We therefore do not find any merit in these petition, which are accordingly dismissed. 12. Stay applications as well as applications for early listing filed with the petitions also stand disposed of. 13. Office to place a copy of this judgment in each connected file.