ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. I.A. No. 9000 of 2017 1. This Interlocutory Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the appellant for condonation of delay of 162 days in preferring the instant Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard learned counsel for both sides and looking to the reasons stated in paragraph 3 of the Interlocutory Application, there are reasonable reasons for condoning the delay in preferring the Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Accordingly, I.A. No. 9000 of 2017 is allowed and delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 463 of 2016 4. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner, whose writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 6147 of 2011 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 19th March, 2016, whereby an order of dismissal passed by the respondents-authorities dated 11th July, 1987 (now it is submitted by counsel for both sides that there is a typographical error in the impugned order and the correct date of dismissal is 13th August, 1987), was upheld by the learned Single Judge and hence, the original petitioner has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 5. Having heard learned counsel for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant is the original petitioner who was working as a Cashier with the State Bank of India. 6. Because of gross misconducts committed by this appellant, charge-sheet was issued against this appellant-delinquent that several times this appellant has withdrawn money from the customers' bank accounts without knowledge and permission of the customers. 7. Enquiry Officer was appointed , adequate opportunity of being heard was given to this appellant and on the basis of the evidence on record, Enquiry Officer gave his report on 17th October, 1986 and it has been held by the Enquiry Officer that the charges levelled against this appellant have been proved. 8. On the basis of the Enquiry Officer's report and after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the appellant, the disciplinary authority imposed a punishment of dismissal from service vide order dated 13th August, 1987 (in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, there is typographical error referring as 11th July, 1987). 9. 8. On the basis of the Enquiry Officer's report and after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the appellant, the disciplinary authority imposed a punishment of dismissal from service vide order dated 13th August, 1987 (in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, there is typographical error referring as 11th July, 1987). 9. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the appellant that there is no adequate proof and unnecessarily, the Enquiry Officer has arrived at a conclusion that the charges levelled against the appellant have been proved. We are not accepting this contention mainly for the reason that we are not sitting in appeal against the decision given by the Enquiry Officer. Suffice it to say that looking to the enquiry report, it cannot be said that the report given by the Enquiry Officer is based upon no evidence. Several times the amount has been withdrawn by this appellant from the customers' accounts and that too, by forgery. Thus, the amount withdrawn from the accounts of the customers has been misappropriated by this appellant and the total amount comes to Rs.81,000/-. These facts have been proved by the oral evidence given by the witnesses before the Enquiry Officer and we see no reason take a view that the enquiry report is based upon no evidence. No error has been committed by the respondents-authorities in holding the enquiry and in following the procedures thereof. The enquiry is legal and valid. 10. Now, the only question left out to be adjudicated upon, by this Court is the quantum of punishment. 11. Looking to the nature of duties assigned to this appellant, which is of a Cashier, it appears that there is grave misconduct committed by this appellant, which is not befitting to an employee of the State Bank of India. Several times amount has been withdrawn from the accounts of the customers by forging their signatures and making entries in the accounts of the State Bank of India. This is a grave misconduct committed by this appellant and the punishment inflicted upon this appellant by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 13th August, 1987 (Annexure 12) cannot be said to be unreasonably excessive nor it can be labelled as shockingly disproportionate punishment. On the contrary, looking to the nature of misconduct, the punishment inflicted upon this appellant is absolutely just and proper. 12. On the contrary, looking to the nature of misconduct, the punishment inflicted upon this appellant is absolutely just and proper. 12. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the appellant that he has been exonerated from the criminal charges by the competent trial Court in the criminal case. This contention is also not helpful to the appellant mainly for the reasons that: - (a) There is a difference between the civil charges against this appellant and the criminal charges. Looking to the Civil charges against this appellant, it appears that because of his misconduct, there is a dereliction in the duty and the nature of misconduct is such, that is not befitting to continue, the employee, in service of the State Bank of India. There is a charge that there is a loss of confidence against this appellant by the respondents-Bank. This is not the charge on a Criminal side. (b) Even otherwise also, in a criminal matter, the charges are to be proved beyond reasonable doubts, whereas, in Civil proceedings, on the preponderance of probability, the charges are to be proved. 13. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 in paragraph 13 as under: - “13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance. (Emphasis supplied) 14. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Others reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764 in paragraph 11 as under:- “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. It has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 572 , in paragraphs 11 and 22 as under:- “11. In our view, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are fallacious. This Court has taken the view consistently that acquittal in a criminal case would be no bar for drawing up a disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent officer. It is well-settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. 22. In the present case the appellant acted beyond his authority in breach of the Bank’s regulation. Regulation 3(1) of the Bank’s Regulations required that every officer of the Bank at all times takes all possible steps to protect the interest of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which will be unbecoming of a bank officer. It is a case of loss of confidence in the officer by the bank. In such a situation, it would be a futile exercise of judicial review to embark upon the decision of the disciplinary authority removing the officer from service, preceded by an enquiry, and to direct the bank to take back the officer in whom the bank has lost confidence, unless the decision to remove the officer is tainted with mala fides, or in violation of principles of natural justice and prejudice to the officer is made out. No such case is made out in the present case. (Emphasis supplied) 16. No such case is made out in the present case. (Emphasis supplied) 16. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Southern Railway Officers Association and Another v. Union of India and others, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 24 , in paragraph 37 as under:- “37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. It has been also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 442 , in paragraphs 11, 13 and 24 as under:- “11. The question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal court arises only and only if the dismissal from services was based on conviction by the criminal court in view of the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) [sic Article 311(2) second proviso (a)] of the Constitution of India, or analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case. In a case where enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal court is of no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood acquitted by a criminal court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied. 13. In State of Karnataka v. T. Venkataramanappa, this Court held that acquittal in a criminal case cannot be held to be a bar to hold departmental enquiry for the same misconduct for the reason that in a criminal trial, standard of proof is different as the case is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt but in the departmental proceeding, such a strict proof of misconduct is not required. 24. 24. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not based on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in a criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor can such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. It has been also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , in paragraphs 24 to 28 as under:- “24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor which is as follows: (Raghava case, SLR p. 47, para 8) “8. … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor which is as follows: (Raghava case, SLR p. 47, para 8) “8. … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’” (Robert Stuart case, ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so. 27. We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. There may be cases where the service rules provide that in spite of domestic enquiry, if the criminal court acquits an employee honourably, he could be reinstated. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules. 28. In view of the abovementioned circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings as against the respondent, in its limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P. (S) No. 6147 of 2011 vide judgment and order dated 19th March, 2016 and we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. We are in full agreement with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed, with a cost of Rs. 25,000/-, which will be deposited by the appellant before the Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development & Social Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, towards Juvenile Justice Fund. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed, with a cost of Rs. 25,000/-, which will be deposited by the appellant before the Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development & Social Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, towards Juvenile Justice Fund. This amount will be deposited in Bank A/c No. 3734498462-5, Jharkhand Juvenile Justice Fund, State Bank of India, Project Bhawan, Hatia, Ranchi, either by cheque or bank draft, within a period of twelve weeks from today towards Juvenile Justice Fund. The aforesaid amount shall be utilized for the welfare of the juveniles as per the duties assigned to the State in the Juvenile Justice Act. 20. Copy of this order will be sent to, (a) The Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development & Social welfare, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi; and, (b) The Member Secretary, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Nyay Sadan, Doranda, Ranchi.