ORDER : The petitioner is arrayed as the accused in Crime No.1127/2017 of Thiruvalla Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 376 & 506(1) of IPC, now pending as C.P. No.33/2017 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thiruvalla. The de facto complainant, who is the 3rd respondent herein gave a First Information Statement on 18.04.2017, wherein she alleged that the petitioner assured to marry her and on the basis of that promise, committed rape of her during the period January 2016 to February 2017 at her house and also in a flat. It was stated that he had misappropriated 8 sovereigns of gold ornaments and a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-from her. He allegedly threatened her to commit murder. Accordingly, crime was registered and after investigation final report was filed. 2. Crl.M.C. is laid by the petitioner on a premise that pending the proceedings, the dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved and the 3rd respondent has no further grievance against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, relying on Annexure A5 affidavit submitted that the 3rd respondent has no objection in quashing the proceedings. 3. Since the allegations against the petitioner herein is serious and one involving an offence under Section 376 IPC, this Court was not inclined to quash the criminal proceedings on consent of the parties. Hence, the learned counsel for the petitioner chose to advance arguments on merits. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the FI statement, the specific case of the 3rd respondent was that on the basis of a promise to marry, the petitioner had physical relationship with the 3rd respondent. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that through out her statement she had not stated anywhere that the petitioner had a malafide intention to cheat her or that the assurance given by him to marry her was false, even at the time of its initial inception. 4. It is true that, there is no such allegation in the petition. However, there is a general allegation that the petitioner had promised to marry her and had resiled from the promise. However, this has to be distinguished from a consent for physical relationship obtained on the basis of a false promise. 5. 4. It is true that, there is no such allegation in the petition. However, there is a general allegation that the petitioner had promised to marry her and had resiled from the promise. However, this has to be distinguished from a consent for physical relationship obtained on the basis of a false promise. 5. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even in the FI statement she has stated that from 2016 May onwards, they had stayed together in a flat as husband and wife. Evidently, it indicates that both were leading a live-in relationship, even without entering into a formal marriage. This militates against her contention that the physical relationship was based on a false promise to marry. Essentially, they have been living together as husband and wife for quite some time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uday V. State of Karnataka [ (2003) 4 SCC 46 ], Deelip Singh Alias Dilip Kumar V. State of Bihar [ (2005) 1 SCC 88 ] and Kaini Rajan V. State of Kerala [ (2013) 9 SCC 113 ] has held that the submission of a woman to her lover to have physical relationship, or a physical relationship entered into between two persons who have attained the age of majority on an expectation to marry on future date, by itself cannot constitute a mistake of facts under Section 19 of the Indian Evidence Act and constitute an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. It is to be noted that even according to the 3rd respondent they had physical relationship on several occasions over a length of time. It is alleged that in the meanwhile, gold ornaments and cash were handed over. This shows the close relationship between the parties. In the above circumstance, as held by the various decisions referred to above, establishing an offence under Section 376 IPC, in a court of law appears to be extremely impossible. 6. It is pertinent to note that Section 164 Cr.P.C. Statement of the victim was recorded. Even though she was produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate for recording her Section 164 Cr.P.C. Statement, she did not make any allegation of offence constituting Section 376 IPC. She asserted that she has no complaint against the petitioner herein and does not propose to pursue the matter. Even though she was produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate for recording her Section 164 Cr.P.C. Statement, she did not make any allegation of offence constituting Section 376 IPC. She asserted that she has no complaint against the petitioner herein and does not propose to pursue the matter. To a specific question put by the Magistrate as to whether she was giving a statement under threat or coercion her reply was that she was giving a statement on her of volition. A perusal of Section 164 Cr.P.C. Statement clearly shows that the 3rd respondent had absolutely no allegation that the petitioner herein had committed rape of her. 7. Having considered the above facts and the stand now taken by the petitioner herein through her affidavit, I feel that a successful prosecution is remote. Further, the offence under Section 376 IPC is not discernible from the facts of the case as mentioned above. Hence, no purpose will be served by prosecuting the petitioner herein. Hence the Crl.M.C. is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, Crl.M.C. is allowed. All further proceedings in Crime No.1127/2017 of Thiruvalla Police Station now pending as C.P. No.33/2017 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thiruvalla stand quashed. The words “Section 19 of the Indian Evidence Act” occurring in the 16th and 17th lines of paragraph 5 at page 3 of the final order dated 05/01/2018 in Crl. M. C. No. 7610/2017 are corrected and substituted with the words “Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code” as per order dated 26/06/2018 in Crl.M.C. No.7610/2017.