JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This is one of the glaring cases where, by single stroke of a pen, construction work of Bus Stand, Barchhwar, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, awarded to the petitioner, was stopped by the respondents as far as back on 12.4.2013 vide Annexure P8 and the same despite being of great public utility has still not been resumed. 2. What is even more shocking is that no enquiry was held in the matter, even though the evident reason as set out in the communication dated 12.4.2013 for stopping the construction work of the bus stand was that the then Transport Minister had desired that an enquiry as to the deviations of quality work be conducted by the Executive Engineer level Officer. Though, ironically even the amount spent by the petitioner on the construction work has even been paid to him. 3. It is in this background that the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition for grant of the following substantive reliefs: 1. A writ in the nature certiorari may very kindly be issued and impugned letter dated 12.4.2013 as contained in Annexure P-8 may very kindly be quashed and set aside. 2. That this Hon’ble Court may very kindly be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents to immediately issue the orders of resumption of work by the petitioner at bus stand Barchwar, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. as per the letter of award dated 16th June, 2012 (Annexure P-1). 3. That the respondents may very kindly be directed to pay damages to the tune of Rs.10,000/- per day and Rs.12,000/- per month separately for the salary of two Chowkidars. 4. That the respondents may further be directed to renegotiate the terms of the contract with the petitioner, keeping in view of the escalation of costs, which has resulted from the illegal commissions on the part of the respondents. 4. The respondents in their reply have raised preliminary objection regarding non-maintainability of the instant writ petition on the ground of there being an arbitration clause in the award contract. As regards factual averments, the same have not been seriously disputed by the respondents. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record carefully. 6. As regards factual averments, the same have not been seriously disputed by the respondents. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record carefully. 6. Adverting to the preliminary objections regarding non-maintainability of the instant writ petition on the ground of there being an arbitration clause in the agreement in question, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Tantia Construction Private Limited (2011) 5 SCC 697 , while making observation on arbitration clause held that it is now well settled that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court and that without exhausting such alternative remedy, writ petition would be maintainable. It is further held that injustice whenever and wherever takes place, has to be struck down as an anathema to the rule of law and the provisions of the Constitution. The relevant observation reads thus: “33. Apart from the above, even on the question of maintainability of the writ petition on account of the Arbitration Clause included in the agreement between the parties, it is now well-established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court and that without exhausting such alternative remedy, a writ petition would not be maintainable. The various decisions cited by Mr. Chakraborty would clearly indicate that the constitutional powers vested in the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be fettered by any alternative remedy available to the authorities. Injustice, whenever and wherever it takes place, has to be struck down as an anathema to the rule of law and the provisions of the Constitution.” 7. In M/s Ram Barai Singh & Co. vs. State of Bihar & ors. JT 2014 (14) SC 357 the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the Division Bench of Patna High Court, which had dismissed the writ petition on the ground of maintainability in view of existence of an arbitration clause. It was held that though existence of alternative remedy can be a ground of refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction, but the same cannot ipso facto, render a writ petition not maintainable and it was held as follows: “9. It was held that though existence of alternative remedy can be a ground of refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction, but the same cannot ipso facto, render a writ petition not maintainable and it was held as follows: “9. We find ourselves in agreement with case of the appellant that the Division Bench failed to notice the relevant facts including the history of earlier litigation. It also failed to notice that the agreement itself had worked out long back and in the earlier round of litigation as well as in the present round the respondents never raised any objection on the basis of arbitration clause. 10. The Division Bench noticed the judgment of this Court in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. v. Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22 as well as in the case of ABL International Ltd. & Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 553 for coming to the conclusion that where the contract itself provides an effective alternative remedy by way of reference to arbitration, it is good ground for declining to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that the Court will not permit recourse to other remedy without invoking the remedy by way of arbitration, “unless, of course, both the parties to the dispute agree on another mode of dispute resolution.” 11. In our considered view, the aforesaid two decisions did not warrant setting aside of the judgment of learned Single Judge without going into merits and dismissing the writ petition at appellate stage on ground of alternative remedy when no such objection was taken by the respondents either before the writ court or even in the Memorandum of Letters Patent Appeal. 12. “In our view, a constitutional remedy by way of writ petition is always available to an aggrieved party and an arbitration clause in an agreement between the parties cannot ipso facto render a writ petition “not maintainable” as wrongly held by the Division Bench”. Availability of alternative remedy is definitely a permissible ground for refusal by a writ court to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. Availability of alternative remedy is definitely a permissible ground for refusal by a writ court to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. But once the respondents had not objected to entertainment of the writ petition on ground of availability of alternative remedy, the final judgment rendered on merits cannot be faulted and set aside only on noticing by the Division Bench that an alternative remedy by way of arbitration clause could have been resorted to.” 8. Similar reiteration of law is found in a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. vs. M/s Dhansar Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. JT 2016 (9) SC 385, wherein after quoting the Tantia Construction (supra), it was held as under: “25. Similarly, it is not necessary for us to burden this judgment with the decisions relied on by the respondents, to contend that existence of alternative remedy is no bar to entertain a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as held in the cases of Popcorn Entertainment vs. City Development Corporation [JT 2007 (4) SC 70: 2007 (9) SCC 593 ], Harbanslal Sahnia & Anr. V. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. [JT 2002 (10) SC 561 : 2003(2) SCC 107 ], Union of India & Ors. vs. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd. [JT 2011 (5) SC 59 : 2011 (5) SCC 697 ], M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. & Anr. Vs. Jahan Khan [JT 2007 (10) SC 571] and Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai [JT 1998 (7) SC 243: 1998 (8) SCC 1 ].” 9. From the conspectus of the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, what emerges is that a constitutional remedy by way of writ petition is always available to an aggrieved party and an arbitration clause in an agreement between the parties cannot if so facto render a writ petition “not available”. Though availability of alternative remedy is definitely a permissible ground for refusal by a writ court to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate case, but the same is a rule of discretion and not one of the compulsion. 10. Though availability of alternative remedy is definitely a permissible ground for refusal by a writ court to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate case, but the same is a rule of discretion and not one of the compulsion. 10. Thus, it can safely be held that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but where the statute provides efficacious and alternative remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because of misplaced consideration, statutory procedure cannot be allowed to be circumvented. 11. However, in the present case, as noticed above, there is no statutory bar and it is only on account of the arbitration clause that the respondents have challenged the maintainability of the writ petition. This contention in view of the aforesaid discussion cannot be upheld and accordingly the writ petition despite there being an arbitration clause in the agreement is held to be maintainable. 12. Now, adverting to the merits of the case, as already observed above, without the petitioner being put to any reasonable notice, the construction work was abruptly stopped by the respondents. Not even a show cause notice was served upon the petitioner. 13. It is more than settled that nonobservance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It is here then that the action of the official respondent is required to be tested on the touchstone of justice, equity, fair play and in case its decision is not based on justice, equity and fair play and has been taken after taking into consideration other material, then even though on the face of it, the decision may look to the legitimate, but as a matter of fact the reasons are not based on values but on extraneous consideration that decision cannot be allowed to stand. 14. In this connection, the decision in S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 is relevant. In paragraph 16 of the judgment, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as follows: "....In our view, the requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. 14. In this connection, the decision in S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 is relevant. In paragraph 16 of the judgment, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as follows: "....In our view, the requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has furnished the information on which the action is based if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. We do not suggest the opportunity need be a 'double opportunity' that is one opportunity on the factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty. Both may be rolled into one. But the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met...." (Emphasis added) ....... In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The nonobservance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal." (Emphasis supplied) 15. In Wade & Forsyth ' Administrative law', the learned Authors have said thus: "A proper hearing must always include a 'fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting anything prejudicial to their view'. Lord Denning has added : 'If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. Lord Denning has added : 'If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them....." (Emphasis supplied) 16. Apart from above, it would be noticed that in case the respondents felt that the construction work being carried out by the petitioner was not as per the award contract, then they were free to hold enquiry against the petitioner and if there was any adverse finding against the petitioner, steps in accordance with law could have been taken for termination of the contract. 17. In absence of either of the above, the respondents could not have kept the petitioner in lurch for so many years. After all, the petitioner was also to earn something out of the award contract that had been legally awarded to him. 18. What clearly appears to have been overlooked by the respondents and their officers is that they are holding public offices, which are sacrosanct. Such offices are meant for use and not for abuse and in case repositories of such offices spoil the rule, then the law is not powerless and would step in to quash such arbitrary orders. The respondents being a creation of a statute is admittedly the “State” within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution of India and cannot, therefore, as like a private individual, who is free to act in a manner whatsoever he likes, unless it is interdicted by law. It needs no reiteration that the State or its instrumentalities have to strictly fall within the four corners of the law and all its activities are governed by the rules, regulations, instructions etc. 19. Having said so, the order dated 12.4.2013 (Annexure P-8) passed by the respondents regarding stoppage of construction work cannot sustain and is accordingly quashed and set aside. Since there was a lawful award contract in favour of the petitioner, it would obviously not be possible for the petitioner to execute the contract on the same terms and conditions as have been mentioned in award contract dated 16.6.2012. Since there was a lawful award contract in favour of the petitioner, it would obviously not be possible for the petitioner to execute the contract on the same terms and conditions as have been mentioned in award contract dated 16.6.2012. Therefore, the respondents are directed to renegotiate with the petitioner and award the contract in his favour so that the remaining construction work of bus stand Barchhwar, which is of utmost public importance, is completed without there being an undue delay. 20. Needless to say that the respondents shall, while carrying out the negotiations with the petitioner, take into consideration the escalation of costs, rise in inflation etc. 21. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner prays that the petitioner may be permitted to file a suit for damages against the respondents. Though, no such permission is required, however the petitioner is at liberty to institute a suit and needless to say that the same shall be decided by the concerned Court in accordance with law. 22. The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, leaving behind the parties to bear their own costs. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.