JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J. - Instant Criminal Revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the judgment, dated 15.11.2017 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No.35 of 2017, affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 15th/18th March, 2017, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., in Criminal case No. 1647I/2013/ 228I/2015 (old), 840I/2016/13/840III/2016/13 (new), whereby learned trial Court while holding petitioneraccused guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for four months and to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,80,000/ to the complainant and in default of payment of compensation to further undergo simple imprisonment for two months. 2. Briefly Stated Facts, As Emerge From The Record Are that respondent (for short ''complainant'') filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ( for short ''Act'') in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., alleging therein that the petitioner (for short ''accused''),was known to her and they were having cordial relations. Accused approached the complainant and borrowed a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/ from her and assured to return the same within reasonable time. Accused in order to discharge his liability, issued a cheque (Ex.CB), amounting to Rs. 4,00,000/ in favour of the complainant,however, fact remains that on presentation, the said cheque was dishonoured on account of "insufficient funds" in the account of the accused. Complainant after having received the memo from the bank concerned, got served him with legal legal notice (Ex.CD), calling upon him to make the payment good within the stipulated period. Since, the accused failed to make payment good within stipulated period despite issuance of legal notice, complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, in the appropriate Court of law. 3. Learned Trial Court On The Basis Of The Evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, held accused guilty of having committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as per the description given hereinabove. 4. 3. Learned Trial Court On The Basis Of The Evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, held accused guilty of having committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as per the description given hereinabove. 4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial court, present petitioneraccused preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 15.11.2017, as a consequence of which, judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, petitioner approached this Court by way of instant Criminal Revision Petition, praying therein for his acquittal after quashing and setting aside the impugned judgments passed by learned Courts below. 5. Mr. Maan Singh, Learned Counsel Representing The petitioner, while referring to the impugned judgment of conviction recorded by the courts below, strenuously argued that same are not based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence and as such, same cannot be allowed to sustain. Mr. Singh, while making this Court to travel through the entire evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, vehemently argued that courts below have not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which, erroneous findings have come on record to the detriment of the petitioneraccused, who has been falsely implicated by the complainant. Mr. Singh, further argued that bare perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, clearly suggest that learned trial Court itself returned contradictory findings and as such, same cannot be allowed to sustain. He further argued that it stands duly proved on record that cheque in question was issued as security and not towards discharge of any lawful liability and as such, both the courts below have fallen in grave error while holding petitioneraccused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Anup Rattan, learned counsel representing the respondentcomplainant, supported the impugned judgment of conviction recorded by the learned courts below and argued that there is no illegality and infirmity in the judgment of conviction recorded by the courts below and as such, same requires no intervention of this Court. Mr. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Anup Rattan, learned counsel representing the respondentcomplainant, supported the impugned judgment of conviction recorded by the learned courts below and argued that there is no illegality and infirmity in the judgment of conviction recorded by the courts below and as such, same requires no intervention of this Court. Mr. Rattan, further argued that keeping in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below there is very limited scope of interference by this Court. He further stated that while exercising revisionary power, this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and as such, impugned judgments passed by the courts below, being legally correct, need to be upheld by this Court. Mr. Rattan, further submitted that since factum with regard to issuance of cheque and signature thereupon of the accused are not in dispute, courts below rightly held him guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and as such, present petition deserves to be dismissed being devoid of any merits. 7. I Have Heard Learned Counsel For The Parties And carefully gone through the record. 8. Before Adverting To The Factual Matrix Of The Case, it may be noticed that this Court on the askance of the learned counsel representing the petitioner, repeatedly adjourned the matter to enable the petitioneraccused to settle the matter amicably interse him as well as respondent, but despite repeated opportunities, accused failed to pay the amount in terms of the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. Mr. Maan Singh, learned counsel representing the petitioneraccused, fairly stated that despite there being written communication sent to the petitioneraccused, he is not coming forward to impart instructions and as such, appropriate order after hearing the parties may be passed. 9. Having Carefully Perused The Material Available On record, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the contention of Mr. Maan Singh, learned counsel representing the petitioneraccused, fairly stated that despite there being written communication sent to the petitioneraccused, he is not coming forward to impart instructions and as such, appropriate order after hearing the parties may be passed. 9. Having Carefully Perused The Material Available On record, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the contention of Mr. Maan Singh, learned counsel representing the petitioneraccused that courts below while holding the accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, misread, misinterpreted and misconstrued the evidence adduced on record, rather this Court is convinced and satisfied that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and have arrived at correct conclusion that complainant successfully proved that cheque in question was issued by the accused towards discharge of his liability and not as a security. 10. Though, In The Case At Hand, Accused Has Simply denied the factum with regard to issuance of cheque by him, but while conducting crossexamination of the complainant,s a suggestion has been put to the complainant that blank cheque was issued and only a sum of Rs. 10,000/ was to be paid by the accused, hence, there is considerable force in the arguments of learned counsel representing the respondent that there is no dispute with regard to issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon of accused. Similarly, suggestion has been put to the complainant that cheque in question was not given to the complainant for discharge of any legal liability and the complainant has misused the blank cheque, but interestingly no evidence in this regard has been led on record by the accused, hence, aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of the accused cannot be accepted. On the other hand, complainant has successfully proved on record that since accused was well known to her and they had cordial relations with each other, she lent a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/ to her, who in turn with a view to discharge his liability issued cheque Ex.CB , dated 19,9,2913, amounting to Rs. 4,00,000/ drawn on Punjab National Bank, Branch Dhalpur, District Kullu, H.P., in favour of the complainant. Signature of the accused on the cheque Ex. 4,00,000/ to her, who in turn with a view to discharge his liability issued cheque Ex.CB , dated 19,9,2913, amounting to Rs. 4,00,000/ drawn on Punjab National Bank, Branch Dhalpur, District Kullu, H.P., in favour of the complainant. Signature of the accused on the cheque Ex. CB is not disputed by the accused and as such, controversy, if any, which is required to be decided by this Court, is whether cheque in question was issued by the accused in discharge of his legal liability or same was issued towards security, as has been stated by learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. Careful perusal of the statement having been made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C, nowhere suggests that accused took defence that cheque in question was issued as security, rather he denied the case of the complainant in toto by stating that he had not issued any cheque in favour of the complainant. But as has been noticed hereinabove, accused by putting suggestion to the complainant in her crossexamination to the effect that he had handed over blank cheque and only Rs. 10,000/ was payable, has virtually admitted the factum with regard to issuance of cheque and his signature on the cheque in question, hence, there is no force in the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner that cheque in question was issued as security. 12. Complainant, Who Examined Herself In Support Of her case tendered her evidence by way of affidavit Ex.CA and deposed that accused approached her to lend some amount in order to meet his personal and domestic expenses and she on the demand of the accused, provided Rs. 4,00,000/ to him. She further deposed before the Court below that accused with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque Ex.CB in her favour, but when the cheque was presented in the bank for collection same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds. She further deposed that she after having received memo from the bank served the accused with legal notice calling upon him to make the payment good within the stipulated period. 13. Careful Perusal Of The Crossexamination Conducted on the complainant, nowhere suggest that accused was able to extract something contrary what she stated in her examinationinchief, rather crossexamination conducted upon the complainant demolishes the entire defence taken by the accused. 13. Careful Perusal Of The Crossexamination Conducted on the complainant, nowhere suggest that accused was able to extract something contrary what she stated in her examinationinchief, rather crossexamination conducted upon the complainant demolishes the entire defence taken by the accused. Complainant has specifically denied the suggestion put to her that cheque in question was issued as a security. Careful perusal of the pattern of crossexamination conducted on the complainant, clearly suggest that accused with a view to save himself from legal liability raised contradictory defence and as such, learned courts below rightly rejected the same while ascertaining his guilt. Careful perusal of the statement/deposition having been made by the complainant proves beyond reasonable doubt that cheque Ex.CB was issued by the accused towards discharge of his lawful liability not as security. Otherwise also, as has been taken note hereinabove, accused never took a defence that cheque in question was issued as security, rather he in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C denied the case of the complainant that he had issued any kind of cheque in her favour and same was in discharge of any liability. 14. Leaving Everything Aside, When There Is No Dispute with regard to issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon of the accused, statutory presumption as contemplated under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, is available in favour of the complainant, who otherwise by leading cogent and convincing evidence successfully proved on record that cheque in question was issued by the accused towards discharge of his lawful liability. Section 118 of the Act, clearly envisage that it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved the cheque was drawn for consideration, whereas Section 139 of the Act stipulates that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that holder of the cheque receives the cheque for the discharge of whole or part of any debt or liability. 15. In The Case At Hand, Complainant Has Successfully proved that she having received cheque Ex.CB presented the same in the bank, but on its presentation, same was returned vide memo Ex.CC. It also stands proved on record that complainant after having received memo served the accused with legal notice Ex.CD. Ex.CE i.e. postal receipt placed on record proves the factum with regard to the receipt of legal notice Ex.CD issued by the complainant. It also stands proved on record that complainant after having received memo served the accused with legal notice Ex.CD. Ex.CE i.e. postal receipt placed on record proves the factum with regard to the receipt of legal notice Ex.CD issued by the complainant. No doubt, presumption as available to the complainant being holder of the cheque as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, is rebuttable but in the case at hand, accused has not been able to put up probable defence that he had not issued cheque towards discharge of any lawful liability, rather it stands duly proved on record that cheque in question was issued by the accused towards his lawful liability. In the case at hand, accused has not led any evidence to prove on record that cheque in question issued by him was not towards the discharge of legal liability, rather same was blank cheque issued as security. 16. The Hon''ble Apex Court In M/S Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013 1 RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein: "23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof". The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy." 17. Having carefully examined the evidence available on record, this Court sees no reason to interference with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below, which otherwise appears to be based upon the correct appreciation of evidence and as such, same need to be upheld. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to reappreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon''ble Apex Court in case " State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri , (1999) 2 SCC 452 ", wherein it has been held as under:- "In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." 18. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, and as such, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 19. True it is that the Hon''ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another , (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but Mr. Singh, learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 20. Consequently, In View Of The Discussion Made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned finding recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appears to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same is upheld. Accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed. Order dated 2.1.2018, passed by this Court, whereby sentence imposed by the court below was suspended, is hereby vacated and the petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court.