JUDGMENT : S. Sertom, J. Heard Mr. Lalpianfela Chawngthu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. Mary. L. Khiangte, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondent Nos. 1 to 3. 2. Facts and circumstances leading to the filing of this writ petition briefly stated are as follows:- While the petitioner was serving as Store Keeper under the Office of District Civil Supply Officer, Champhai, he was suspended from service vide Order No. C. 14013/2/07- DTE(SPY)CONF/4, dated 12.04.2007 issued by the Director, Food, Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs, Government of Mizoram in contemplation of a departmental inquiry against him. Soon thereafter, he was served with a memo of charge dated 29.10.2007 vide Office Memo No. C.14013/2/07-DTE(SPY)CONF/85 by the Director of the same department under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The charge against the petitioner as per the Articles of charge given in the Annexure-I of the memorandum are as follows:- "ANNEXURE I STATEMENT OF ARTICLES OF CHARGE FRAMED AGAINST PU T. HRILLIANA SK (Offg) (U/S) ARTICLE I That the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) while functioning as the Godown in charge at Farkawn during the period from 1st Oct/2007, shortage of Govt. foodstuff as mentioned below for which he was solely responsible, has been detected on 31st March/2007 during handing and taking over of the Godown charge between himself as relieved officer and Pu. R. Lalrimtuia SK as relieving officer. Sl No. Name of Commodity Quantity of shortage Rate per quintal Value of shortage 1 Grade ‘A’ Rice 3928.04 qtls Rs.930/- 3653077.20 2. ‘C’ rice 351.74 qtls Rs.830/- Rs.291944.20 3. Sugar 0.29 qtls Rs.1343.94/- Rs.390/- 4. Sale Proceeds (Cash) Rs.16,36,754.00/- On further scrutiny of the Accounts. It has been revealed the actual discrepancies as shown below 1. Grade ‘A’ rice 5704.99 qtls Rs.930/- Rs.5,305,640.70/- 2. ‘C’ rice 216.63 qtls Rs.830/- Rs.1,79,802.90/- 3. Sugar 2.88 qtls Rs.1343.94/- Rs.3870.54/- 4. Sale Proceed (Cash) Rs.15,27,245.00/- Total Rs.70,16,559.14/- (Rupees seventy lakhs sixteen thousand five hundred fifty nine and fourteen paise) only. The above misappropriation of public money has straightaway has clearly showed that Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) has totally lack integrity and dishonestly served his employer. Thus, the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) is charged to have acted in contradiction of Rule 3 (1)(i)(ii)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964. The above misappropriation of public money has straightaway has clearly showed that Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) has totally lack integrity and dishonestly served his employer. Thus, the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) is charged to have acted in contradiction of Rule 3 (1)(i)(ii)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964. ARTICLE II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK clearly knew that, he holds a position of truct where honesty and WP(C) No. 18 of 2018 Page 4 of 16 integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning the post he hold. He also knew that he dealt with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, highest degree of integrity and trust withness is must and unexceptionable. But the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) knowingly ignored the above nature of conduct. In contradiction he dishonestly served the Govt. with intension of wrongful gain for his personal benefit. Right from the first month of his tenure, i.e. Oct'01 the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) did not fully deposited sale proceeds he realized retaining Rs. 32,894.00/-, and continuously retaining the public money, thus became Rs. 15,27,245.00/- when he relinquished his post on 31st March 2007. The above act of his conduct had apparently showed that the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) has bad intention of wrongful gain for his personal benefit. Apart from the above grave misconduct, by defalcation sale proceeds, the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) has further sold foodstuff as mentioned at Article I above to the value of Rs. 54,89,314.14/-. But wrongly shown as shortage. As a result of his misconduct, unfaithfully serving his employer, the public exchequer to the tune of Rs. 70,16,559.14/- has been lost. And therefore, the said Pu. T. Hrilliana SK (Offg)(u/s) is charged to have acted in contravention Rule 3(1)(i)(ii)(iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964." 3. After the inquiry was completed, the Inquiry Officer in his findings recorded in his elaborate inquiry report stated as follows:- "VII. To sum up:- On scrutiny of the Stock Account and the Cash Account of the DCSO, Champhai Office records, it has been revealed that the actual discrepancies for which T. Hrilliana, SK was solely responsible was Rs. 59,31,739.00/- (Rupees fifty nine lakh thirty one thousand seven hundred thirty nine)." 4. To sum up:- On scrutiny of the Stock Account and the Cash Account of the DCSO, Champhai Office records, it has been revealed that the actual discrepancies for which T. Hrilliana, SK was solely responsible was Rs. 59,31,739.00/- (Rupees fifty nine lakh thirty one thousand seven hundred thirty nine)." 4. On receipt of the inquiry report, the Director of Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Government of Mizoram issued the Order dated 2.05.2013 under Office Memo No. C. 14013/25/107-DTE(SPY)CONF/347, which is impugned in this writ petition. The relevant portion of the order for which the petitioner is aggrieved with are reproduced herein below:- "NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned finds that there is a good and sufficient reason to impose penalties under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 to Pu T. Hrilliana. Gch the then Officiating Storekeeper, Food, Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Department and in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 15 (3) & (4) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 hereby award to the said Pu T. Hrilliana, Gch the then S.K the following penalties under Rules (iii) and (v) of Rule 11 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and it is - (i) Ordered that Pu T. Hrilliana, Gch shall recover Rs. 35.00 lakhs in lumpsum before 31.7.13 failing which his disciplinary case will be reviewed. He shall also recover the balance of the whole of the pecuniary loss caused by him @ Rs. 17,200/- per month in 141 installments and @ Rs. 6,539/- in the 142nd installment commencing from the pay of May, 2013 to be drawn in June, 2013. (ii) It is therefore ordered that the pay of Pu T. Hrilliana, Gch be reduced by one stage from Rs. 8440 + 1650/- to Rs. 8140 + 1650/- in the time-scale of pay of Rs. 4440 7440 + GP 1650/- with cumulative effect from the date of joining his duty. (ii) It is therefore ordered that the pay of Pu T. Hrilliana, Gch be reduced by one stage from Rs. 8440 + 1650/- to Rs. 8140 + 1650/- in the time-scale of pay of Rs. 4440 7440 + GP 1650/- with cumulative effect from the date of joining his duty. It is further directed that Pu T. Hrilliana, Gch will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on the expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay." The suspension of Pu T. Hrilliana, Gch is hereby revoked with immediate effect and the period of his suspension shall be treated as on duty for the purpose of leave, increment and pension only and he shall not be entitled to pay and allowances during the period of his suspension except subsistence allowances already granted to him. Consequent upon the revocation of his suspension from service Pu T. Hrilliana, Gch shall join his duty in this Directorate." After the above stated order was issued, a corrigendum was issued and the same is also reproduced herein below:- "DIRECTORATE OF FOOD, CIVIL SUPPLIES & CONSUMER AFFAIRS MIZORAM, AIZAWL CORRIGENDUM Dated Aizawl, the 16th May, 2013 No. C. 14013/25/107-DTE(SPY)CONF/348: In partial modification to this Directorate order of even No. dt. 2.5.2013, the penalty imposed on Pu. T. Hrilliana, Gch at (i) shall be read as follows:- (i) It is ordered that Pu T. Hrilliana, G/Ch shall recover Rs. 43.00 lakhs in lumpsum before 31.7.2013 failing which his disciplinary case will be reviewed. He shall also recover the balance of the whole of the pecuniary loss caused by him @ Rs. 11,573/- per month in 140 installments and @ Rs. 11,519/- in the 141st installment commencing from the pay of June, 2013 to be drawn in July, 2013. Sd/- (R. LALVENA) Director Food, Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Mizoram :: Aizawl" 5. As per the writ petition and submission of the learned counsel of the petitioner, the petitioner is not aggrieved as far as the findings of the inquiry reports are concerned, but he is aggrieved only because two punishments are meted out to him. 6. The case of the petitioner as submitted by his learned counsel is that a Government servant cannot be inflicted with two punishments at the same time for the same wrong committed by him. 6. The case of the petitioner as submitted by his learned counsel is that a Government servant cannot be inflicted with two punishments at the same time for the same wrong committed by him. The learned counsel submitted that by the impugned order, the petitioner has been inflicted with one minor punishment and one major punishment. The first being the order directing him to make the lost good by depositing a sum of Rs. 43 lakhs in lumpsum before 31.07.2013 and to recover the balance amount of the pecuniary loss caused by him @ Rs. 11,573/- per month in 140 installments and @Rs. 11,519 in 141 installments commencing from the pay of June, 2013 to be drawn in July, 2013. And the second being the major punishment inflicted upon him that is his pay would be reduced by one stage from Rs. 8440+1650/- in the time scale of pay of Rs. 4440-7440+GP 1650/- with cumulative effect from the date of joining of his duty and that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and on the expiry of the period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Union of India and Another vs. S.C. Parashar, (2006) 3 SCC 167 . The relevant paragraph is at paragraph 12. The same is reproduced herein below:- "12. The penalty imposed upon the respondent is an amalgam of minor penalty and major penalty. The respondent has been inflicted with three penalties: (1) reduction to the minimum of the timescale of pay for a period of three years with cumulative effect; (2) loss of seniority; and (3) recovery of 25% of the loss incurred by the Government to the tune of Rs. 74,341.89p. i.e. Rs. 18,585.47p. on account of damage to the Gypsy in 18 (eighteen) equal monthly instalments. Whereas reduction of timescale of pay with cumulative effect is a major penalty within the meaning of clause (v) of Rule 11 of the CCS Rules, loss of seniority and recovery of amount would come within the purview of minor penalty, as envisaged by clauses (iii) and (iii)(a) thereof. The disciplinary authority, therefore, in our opinion acted illegally and without jurisdiction in imposing both minor and major penalties by the same order. The disciplinary authority, therefore, in our opinion acted illegally and without jurisdiction in imposing both minor and major penalties by the same order. Such a course of action could not have been taken in law." 7. After having submitted as stated above, the learned counsel further submitted that since the intention of the disciplinary authority is to inflict major penalty, the disciplinary authority should have inflicted the petitioner only with the major punishment i.e. reduction of his pay by one stage with cumulative effect. The learned counsel, then, referred to Rule 11 Clause 3 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 under the heading "Minor punishment" and Clause 5 under the heading "Major punishment" and submitted that the punishment for recovery from his pay, the whole amount of which lost he is found to have been responsible comes under the minor punishment, and stepping down of his pay scale by one stage lower and stoppage of his increment during the period of such reduction falls under major penalty. After having referred to the above, provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the learned counsel submitted that the disciplinary authority should have inflicted the major punishment leaving aside the minor punishment. 8. Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 at the very outset submitted that the writ petition is barred by delay and laches. She further submitted that though we are aware that strict rules of limitation do not apply in the case of writ jurisdiction. The delay, however, should have been explained reasonably, but in this case, no explanation has been offered by the petitioner for the delay of 5 years i.e. from the date of impugned Order dated 2.05.2013 was passed till the date the writ petition was filed. In support of her submission, she relied on two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The first is the judgment passed in the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs- Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137 . The relevant paragraph is at paragraph 16. The contents of the same is reproduced herein below:- "16. Some of the respondents might have filed representations but filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. The contents of the same is reproduced herein below:- "16. Some of the respondents might have filed representations but filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant. Opinion of the High Court that GOMs No. 126 dated 29-5-1998 gave a fresh lease of life having regard to the legitimate expectation, in our opinion, is based on a wrong premise. Legitimate expectation is a part of the principles of natural justice. No fresh right can be created by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. By reason thereof only the existing right is saved subject, of course, to the provisions of the statute. (See State of H.P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan.)" 9. The second judgment cited by the learned Government Advocate is the judgment passed in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council vs- Pan Singh and Others, (2007) 9 SCC 278 . The relevant paragraph is at paragraphs 17 and 18. The contents of the two paragraphs are reproduced herein below:- "17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. 18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: "9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. 10. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone." 10. Secondly, the learned Government Advocate submitted that as per Rule 25 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, a Government servant should first exercise his right to appeal and it should have been done within 45 days from the date on which a copy of the order was delivered to him. But in this case, the petitioner kept quiet and did not avail of the statutory provision within the time frame given and, instead came straight to this Court, that too, after almost a period of 5 years is passed from the date the impugned order was passed. Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed even on that ground alone. Rule 25 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 regarding period of limitation of appeal is reproduced herein below:- "25. Period of limitation of appeals No appeal preferred under this part shall be entertained unless such appeal is preferred within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order appealed against is delivered to the appellant: Provided that the Appellate Authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time." 11. The learned Government Advocate also submitted that inflicting of more than one penalty is allowed as per the Director General P & T's Letter No. 10-44/79-PE.II, dated 26.11.1979 and Department of Telecom, Letter No. 15-26/86-TE.II, dated 2.03.1989. The learned Government Advocate also submitted that inflicting of more than one penalty is allowed as per the Director General P & T's Letter No. 10-44/79-PE.II, dated 26.11.1979 and Department of Telecom, Letter No. 15-26/86-TE.II, dated 2.03.1989. The portion of the letters referred to by the learned Government Advocate is reproduced herein below:- "(4) Imposition of two penalties for one lapse/offence. A question has been raised as to whether two statutory penalties can be imposed for a single offence committed by an official. Instructions in this behalf already exist, but it is advisable to reiterate them for ready recapitulation. It has been laid down that while normally there will be no need to impose two statutory penalties at a time, the penalty of recovery from pay of the whole or part of any loss caused by an official to the Government by negligence or by breach of order can be imposed along with another penalty, Para, 108 of the P. & T. Manual, Volume-III, also lays down that in addition to the penalty of recovery, technically there is no bar to impose any statutory penalty if the circumstances of the case justify it. The punishing authority should, however, bear in mind that when more than one penalty is imposed, one of which is recovery of pay of the whole or part of loss caused to the Government, the net cumulative effect on the Government servant should not be of such a severity so as to make it impossible for him to bear the strain. 2. The aforesaid instructions would reveal that while normally there should be no necessity for imposing two penalties at a time, there is no bar to awarding the penalty of recovery along with any other penalty. But in such cases also, the severity of the strain vis-a-vis the nature of offence committed by the official should be carefully assessed and borne in mind by the punishing authority. Further, the penalties indicated in Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, are graded only. Accordingly, when the penalty of recovery is awarded, there should be no necessity to award a lower penalty. The necessity to award another penalty should arise only when it is considered absolutely necessary to award a higher penalty like reduction." 12. Further, the penalties indicated in Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, are graded only. Accordingly, when the penalty of recovery is awarded, there should be no necessity to award a lower penalty. The necessity to award another penalty should arise only when it is considered absolutely necessary to award a higher penalty like reduction." 12. The learned Government Advocate after referring to the above letter went on to submit that the punishment was inflicted upon the petitioner as provided under the rules only, therefore, it is neither perverse nor illegal. Court can interfere only when such order are found to be perverse and illegal. In support of her submission, the learned Government Advocate refers to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Commissioner of Rural Development vs- A.S. Jagannathan, (1999) 2 SCC 313 . The relevant paragraph is paragraph 5. The same is reproduced herein below:- "5. The Tribunal clearly had no jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority under the order of 4-6-1991. The Tribunal has purported to pass the order on the ground that three punishments cannot be imposed for the same charge. Now, the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules prescribe various penalties that may be imposed under Rule 8. One of the penalties under Rule 8 is of withholding of increments. Another penalty which can be imposed under Rule 8(v)(a) is recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the State Government by negligence or breach of orders. Under Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, Rule 9(1)(b), such pecuniary loss can also be recovered from the pension of the employee if the pecuniary loss is caused by negligence or grave misconduct while in service and the employee has been found guilty of such misconduct or negligence. In the present case, the disciplinary authority has clearly found that there were serious charges against the respondent which were established against him in a disciplinary enquiry which was properly conducted. The disciplinary authority has rightly observed that looking to the serious nature of the charges proved, a minor punishment of only stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect has been imposed on the respondent by taking a lenient view since he is about to retire. The disciplinary authority has rightly observed that looking to the serious nature of the charges proved, a minor punishment of only stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect has been imposed on the respondent by taking a lenient view since he is about to retire. The order for recovery of the loss caused on account of the respondent's negligence and misconduct is also permissible under the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules as also under the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, the former permitting recovery from pay and the latter permitting recovery from pensionary benefits after retirement. The Tribunal is wrong in holding that if an order is passed for recovery of the amount lost from the employee, no punishment can be imposed on him. The disciplinary authority, in the present case, was entitled to impose the punishment of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect. At the time of passing the final order, the disciplinary authority was also entitled to pass order relating to the suspension period pending enquiry. It has directed that the period during which the respondent was under suspension be treated as service period but without pay. The order must be read as a whole. In the present case, the disciplinary authority has awarded punishment and given directions looking to the nature of the charges proved. The Tribunal was not entitled to interfere with the punishment so accorded." 13. Lastly, the learned Government Advocate submitted that the punishment for recovery was inflicted upon the petitioner just to recover what was lost, therefore, there is nothing wrong in inflicting the minor punishment in addition to the major punishment. 14. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is only a Grade IV employee, therefore, he is not aware of his right under the rules and laws, therefore, the delay and laches can be excuse in his case in the interest of justice. The learned counsel also submitted that it is true that there is an appeal provision for such case but the petitioner being unaware of such provision did not avail his right to appeal. The learned counsel also submitted that it is true that there is an appeal provision for such case but the petitioner being unaware of such provision did not avail his right to appeal. The learned counsel further submitted that the letter of Director General P & T is dated 30.03.1981 whereas the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited by him was passed on 24.02.2006, therefore, it should be deemed that after the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment was passed, the letter of the Director General P & T has no legal force any longer. 15. Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Government Advocate in reply to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted further that ignorance of law cannot be a defense and the right to appeal as per the provision of law should have been first exercise by the petitioner that too in time. 16. After having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and after having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has failed to overcome the first hurdle i.e. the bar by delay and laches. As can be clearly made out, after the inquiry report was submitted, the impugned order by which the two punishments were inflicted was passed on 02.05.2013 and Corrigendum to the same was issued on 16.05.2013. Therefore, when the writ petition was filed on 19.02.2018, there was 4 years and 9 months delay. It is true that strict rules of limitation does not apply in writ jurisdiction, however, the delay must be explained and it should be reasonable. This principles of law has been established by catena of judgments passed by the Apex Court like in the case cited by the learned Government Advocate i.e. New Delhi Municipal Council vs- Pan Singh and Others. In fact, in this case, the petitioner did not even offer explanation for the delay. The only reason given by him is that he is a IV Grade employee and, therefore, not aware of the provisions of law. This is not a reasonable explanation as required by the settled principle of law. After all, ignorance of law cannot be accepted as an explanation for the delay. 17. Further, the petitioner as provided under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 has the right to appeal against the impugned order. This is not a reasonable explanation as required by the settled principle of law. After all, ignorance of law cannot be accepted as an explanation for the delay. 17. Further, the petitioner as provided under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 has the right to appeal against the impugned order. It is a settled principle of law that when a statute provides a provision for appeal, one who claims to be aggrieved will first exercise his right under that provision before coming to this Court under writ jurisdiction. Since that rights under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 has not been exercised the petitioner is barred from coming to this Court under writ jurisdiction. Therefore, as stated above, since the petitioner has failed to overcome the first hurdle, it would be for academic purpose only to discuss the other points raised by him which I do not feel necessary to do. 18. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed.