JUDGMENT : Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J. Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned AAG-4 over I.A. No. 1669/2018 whereby and whereunder, a prayer has been made on behalf of appellant to condone delay as provided under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and further, appeal be entertained which has been filed against order dated 17.01.2018 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-10th -cum-Authorized Officer, Court No.II, Vigilance Patna in Special Case No. 03/2015 arising out of Vigilance PS Case No. 1/13/SVU, Patna under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act, 1988. 2. Before coming to the main issue, it looks necessary to incorporate the intermediary event to the extent as necessary for the disposal of present interlocutory matter. The order dated 17.01.2018 passed under Section 15 of Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (henceforth "Act") was to be challenged under Cr. Writ which has already been preferred and placed vide Token No. 41023/2018 but was not pursued as, in identical case, Criminal Writ petition was converted into an appeal. That being so, it has been brought under Miscellaneous Appeal No. 395/2018 at the behest of appellant and the same has come up before the Bench and considering the relevant provision, more particularly, Section 17 of the Act. Vide order dated 24.05.2018, it was directed to convert the Miscellaneous Appeal as Criminal Appeal, consequent thereupon, instant appeal has been registered. It is further evident from the judgment impugned that on the following day of judgment, that means to say on 18.01.2018, application was filed for issuance of certified copy which was complied with by the learned lower court on 05.04.2018, after lapse of 2 months 13 days without any cogent reason whereupon it was ready to be delivered on 06.04.2018 on which date, it was received by the appellant. 3. The present appeal relates with an order under Section 15 of the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as an "Act") on a petition filed by the State in pursuance of Section 13 of the Act. Order happens to be appeal able under Section 17 of the Act. 4. After going through the Act, it is evident that it is bifurcated in two parts, first part deals with prosecution whereunder the appeal is provided under Section 9 of the Act and the second part (Chapter-III) deals with confiscation. Order happens to be appeal able under Section 17 of the Act. 4. After going through the Act, it is evident that it is bifurcated in two parts, first part deals with prosecution whereunder the appeal is provided under Section 9 of the Act and the second part (Chapter-III) deals with confiscation. After parallel scrutiny of the provisions of Section-9 whereunder, though there happens to be time limit of 30 days for filing an appeal, the appellate court has been vested with the power to condone the delay, if any, on account of filing of an appeal beyond the period of 30 days while no such provision has been prescribed under Section 17 of the Act. Considering the aforesaid eventuality, the matter has been heard at length. 5. It has been submitted on behalf of learned counsel of the appellant that though it happens to be Special Act having no scope left for applicability of Limitation Act, even then as provided under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the court is competent enough to entertain the issued and, condone the limitation for want of presence of non obstante clause. It has also been submitted that there happens to be no forbidding clause available under the Act encroaching upon applicability of Limitation Act and so, there would not be any kind of barrier in condoning the delay. In order to properly appreciate the issue in hand, learned counsel for the appellant referred Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act whereunder there happens to be specific bar in entertaining the objection relating to an award after the prescribed period whereas in the present Act, there happens to be no forbidding clause that appeal would not be entertained after specified period. Also relied upon (Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2011 (1) PLJR 325 ) and (M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 SCC 58 ). 6. Learned AAG-4, raised objection over legality of the submission made on behalf of appellant and submitted that first of all scheme of the Act is to be considered. The Special Act has been promulgated in order to meet the prevailing menace of corruption amongst the Government Officials by which, frustrating the scheme of the State, amassed the property disproportionate to known source of income and that is why the Act deals with, under two different headings. Prosecution as well as confiscation. The Special Act has been promulgated in order to meet the prevailing menace of corruption amongst the Government Officials by which, frustrating the scheme of the State, amassed the property disproportionate to known source of income and that is why the Act deals with, under two different headings. Prosecution as well as confiscation. Prosecution is infringement of fundamental right whereupon, every sort of opportunity is being given to a convict to challenge the judgment of conviction and sentence and for that, the appellate court has been enshrined with a power to condone delay in filing of an appeal even beyond the prescribed period of 30 days under the banner of natural justice while confiscation is not the fundamental right. It happens to be a constitutional right and for that, rigour has been prescribed not to allow the delinquent to frustrate the scheme who, dishonestly indulged in corruption accumulated property unknown to the known source of income. That happens to be the difference in between which the court has to see in the background of intention of the legislature. 7. That being so, there should not be condonation of delay as, it is not the intention of the legislature and further, it should not be in order to frustrate the scheme of the Act. Furthermore, also relied upon (Ramnandan Rai v. The District Judge, Sitamarhi & Ors, (1980) AIR Patna 180) (Birendra Kumar v. The State Election Commisson & Ors, (2004) 3 PLJR 313 ), ( Anil Kumar Jha son of late Tejnarayan Jha v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 PLJR 475 ) , (Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791 ), (Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, (2004) 4 SCC 252 ). 8. Heard the rival submissions. Gone through the record minutely. As disclosed hereinabove, there happens to be inordinate delay of two months and 13 days that means to say, total 78 days in supply of certified copy without having fault at the end of appellant. Section-12 of the Limitation Act deals with the situation prescribing deduction of the time which has been consumed during obtaining certified copy of the judgment. For better appreciation, the same is quoted below:- "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings. (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. For better appreciation, the same is quoted below:- "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings. (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment 1[***] shall also be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. Explanation. In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded." 9. In the aforesaid background two questions arose for consideration. The first one whether the appeal should be filed without the judgment/order and if not, the time so consumed in getting the copy of the judgment could be subject to adjustment. Section 17 does not specify the same but, as per High Court Rules, Chapter XII Rule-5 prescribes that memo of appeal should contain the judgment impugned. So, whenever an appeal has to be filed. It will have to accompany the judgment impugned because of the fact that there happens to be no provision for supply of free copy of judgment at once like CrPC to the convict, on account thereof, certified copy has to be obtained and the time consumed thereof, is to be adjusted irrespective of nature of litigation. 10. Apart from this, when Section 17 of the Act has been scrutinized properly, it is evident that the same happens to be silent on this score. 10. Apart from this, when Section 17 of the Act has been scrutinized properly, it is evident that the same happens to be silent on this score. Furthermore, as per Rule 14, it is evident that provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable to such an extent as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act which again could be seen dealing with the appellate power under Chapter-XXIX warranting the judgment impugned along with memo of appeal. None of the decisions having been cited at the end of the respective counsels deals with the situation. 11. Having conflicting views of the different High Courts over the issue whether time consumed in obtaining certified copy could be expunged or not, the matter sailed up to the Privy Council and in Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chattyar (a firm), (1928) AIR PC 103, the issue has been resolved permitting exclusion of the period having been consumed during course of obtaining certified copy. 12. Irrespective of the fact that there happens to be Special Law, silent over the issued has been subject to consideration before the Apex Court in the case of The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. M/s Madanlal Dan & Sons, Bareilly, (1977) AIR SC 523 wherein it has been held as follows:- "4. There can be no manner of doubt that the UP Sales Tax Act answers to the description of a special or local law. According to sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, reproduced above, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 12(2), inter alia, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. There is nothing in the U.P Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the application of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act for determining the period of limitation prescribed for revision application. The conclusion would, therefore, follow that the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act of 1963 can be relied upon in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision petition under section 10 of the UP Sales Tax Act. 5. **** 6. The matter indeed is not res integra. The conclusion would, therefore, follow that the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act of 1963 can be relied upon in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision petition under section 10 of the UP Sales Tax Act. 5. **** 6. The matter indeed is not res integra. In the case of J.N.Surty v. T.S. Chettyar, (1928) AIR PC 103, the Judicial Committee after .noticing the conflict in the decisions of the High Courts held that section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 applies even when by a rule of the High Court a memo- randum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the decree, Lord Phillimore speaking on behalf of the Judicial Committee observed: "Their Lordships have now to return to the grammatical construction of the Act, and they find plain words directing that the time requisite for obtaining the two documents is to be excluded from computation. Sect. 12 makes no reference to the Code of Civil Procedure or to any other Act. It does not say when the time is to be excluded, but simply enacts it as a positive direction. If, indeed, it could be shown that in some particular class of cases there could be no object in obtaining the two documents, an argument might be offered that no time could (1) 55 I.A. 161. be requisite for obtaining something not requisite. But this, is not so. The decree may be complicated, and it may be open to draw it up in two different ways, and the practitioner may well want to see its form before attacking it by his memorandum of appeal. As to the judgment, no doubt when the case does not come from up country, the practitioner will have heard it delivered, but he may not carry all the points of a long judgment in his memory, and as Sir John Edge says, the Legislature may not wish him to hurry to make a decision till he has well considered it." 7. Following the above decision, it was held by a Full Bench consisting of five Judges of the Lahore High Court in the case of The Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lahore v. The Official Liquidators, The Punjab Cotton Press Co. Following the above decision, it was held by a Full Bench consisting of five Judges of the Lahore High Court in the case of The Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lahore v. The Official Liquidators, The Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd, (1941) AIR Lahore 257 that even though under the Rules and Orders of the High Court no copy of the judgment is required to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal preferred under section 202 of the Indian Companies Act from an order of a single Judge, the provisions of section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act would be attracted. The provisions of section 12 were also held to govern an appeal under Letters Patent. 8. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Mt. Lalitkuari v. Mahaprasad N. Singh, (1947) AIR Patna 329 also held that the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act were applica- ble to Letters Patent appeals under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 9. The above decision of the Judicial Committee was followed by this Court in the case of Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. M/s. Best & Co, (1966) AIR SC 1713 10. Similar view was expressed by this Court in the case of S. A. Gaffoor v. Ayesha Beghum & Ors,1970 UJ(SC) 784. 11. It is plain that since 1928 when the Judicial Commit- tee decided the case of Surty, the view which has been consistently taken by the Courts in India is that the: provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act would apply even though the copy mentioned in that subsection is not required to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal. The same position should hold good in case of revision petitions ever since Limitation Act of'1963 came into force. 12. ***** 13. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaj Narain & Ors, (1968) 2 SCR 842 the appellant obtained three copies of the order appealed against by applying on three different dates for the copy. The same position should hold good in case of revision petitions ever since Limitation Act of'1963 came into force. 12. ***** 13. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaj Narain & Ors, (1968) 2 SCR 842 the appellant obtained three copies of the order appealed against by applying on three different dates for the copy. The appellant filed along with the memorandum of appeal that copy which had taken the maximum time for its preparation and sought to exclude such maximum time in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal, This Court, while holding the appeal to be within time, observed that the expression time requisite in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act cannot be understood as the time absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of the order and that what is deductible under section 12(2) is not the minimum time within which a copy of the order appealed against could have been obtained. If that be the position of law in a case where there was no allegation of the loss of any copy, a fortiori it would follow that where as in the present ease the copy served upon a party is lost and there is no alternative for that party except to apply for a fresh copy in order to be in a position to file revision petition, the time spent in obtaining that copy would necessarily have to be excluded under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 13. The order impugned would have been challenged by 16.02.2018 in terms of Section 17 of the Act within 30 days so prescribed. The application for obtaining certified copy was filed on the next day, that means to say, within the period of limitation and the same has been made available on 06.04.2018 consuming 78 days which has to be added. The appeal has been filed though under the banner of Miscellaneous Appeal on 07.05.2018, so adding the same, the appeal happens to be within time. 14. Consequent thereupon, there happens to be no delay in filing appeal on account thereof, there happens to be no question of condonation of delay. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1669/2018 is disposed of in terms thereof. List for admission.