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2018 DIGILAW 141 (GAU)

PARSHU RAM AGARWALLA v. STATE OF ASSAM

2018-01-25

MIR ALFAZ ALI

body2018
JUDGMENT/ORDER : Mir Alfaz Ali, J. Heard Mr. A.M. Bora, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. D. Das, learned Addl. P.P., Assam as well as Mr. N. N. Upadhaya, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. 2. This petition under section 482 CrPC, 1973 has been filed praying for quashing the FIR lodged by the private respondent No. 2 against the petitioner and the Tinsukia P.S. Case No. 742/2016 arising out of the said FIR. 3. The respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (SDJM), Sonari against the petitioner and the learned SDJM sent the complaint to police under section 156(3) CrPC, 1973 for registering a case and accordingly, the police registered Sonari P.S. Case No. 42/2016. However, the place of occurrence having fallen within the jurisdiction of Tinsukia, the FIR was forwarded to the Tinsukia Police Station and eventually Tinsukia police registered Tinsukia P.S. Case No. 742/2016 under Section 420/406/120B IPC. Assailing the said FIR and the police case, the petitioner has approached this court for quashment of the FIR and also the criminal case arising out of such FIR. 4. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. A.M. Bora submits that no offence was made out in the complaint/FIR and the learned Magistrate without applying judicial mind mechanically forwarded the complaint to the police for registering a case and therefore, the FIR and the criminal proceeding requires to be quashed. Further contention of the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner is that while sending the complaint to the police in the exercise of power under section 156(3) CrPC, 1973 learned Magistrate failed to take note of the facts that the complainant did not submit any affidavit nor he complied with the provision of section 154 CrPC, 1973. 5. Learned counsel Mr. N. N. Upadhyay, representing the private respondent contended that the petitioner conveyed false information to the Executive Engineer and acting on such information, the department did not release the money of the petitioner and thereby committed criminal breach of trust. 6. Law relating to quashment of complaint or FIR at the threshold is not res-integra. The Apex Court in a catena of decisions has laid down the principle and guidelines with regard to scope of interference by High Court in quashing a complaint or an FIR, in the exercise of power under section 482 CrPC, 1973. 6. Law relating to quashment of complaint or FIR at the threshold is not res-integra. The Apex Court in a catena of decisions has laid down the principle and guidelines with regard to scope of interference by High Court in quashing a complaint or an FIR, in the exercise of power under section 482 CrPC, 1973. In R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 , the Apex Court summarized three categories of cases, where the inherent power under section 482 CrPC, 1973 can and should be exercised for quashing a complaint or FIR. Firstly, where the allegation made in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute an offence, secondly, where manifestly there is a legal bar against the institution and continuance of the proceeding and thirdly where no legal evidence is adduced or evidence adduced clearly and manifestly fails to prove the charge. In the landmark judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 (suppl 1) SCC 335 also the Apex Court laid down various guidelines and principles with regard to the scope of interference with the criminal proceeding under section 482 CrPC, 1973. In Bhajanlal's (supra) case also, the Apex Court reiterated, that where the allegation made in the first information report or complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the High Court should exercise the inherent power to quash the FIR or complaint. Necessarily as a corollary to the above proposition, if the allegation made in the complaint/FIR taken in its face value and accepted in their entirety even prima facie make out any offence, quashing of the proceeding is not permissible. The Apex Court in Bhajanlal's (supra) case, in fact cautioned that inherent power to quash a criminal proceeding should be exercise sparingly and only in exceptional cases. 7. Keeping in view the above principles and guidelines for quashing a complaint or FIR at the threshold, let us have a look at the allegations made in the complaint/FIR in the instant case to see whether any criminal offence has been made out or not. 7. Keeping in view the above principles and guidelines for quashing a complaint or FIR at the threshold, let us have a look at the allegations made in the complaint/FIR in the instant case to see whether any criminal offence has been made out or not. The case of the complainant as alleged in the complaint, which was later on registered as an FIR, was that he was a Class-IA contractor under the PWD and other Government Departments. One Sri Brajanath Gogoi filed a Title Suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Tinsukia as well as Misc. Case being Misc. (J) Case No. 18/2012 and 19/12, which were contested by the petitioner and the learned Civil Judge dismissed the said Misc. Case. After dismissal of the Misc. (J) Case, the second respondents requested the Executive Engineer, PWD, Charaideo Rural Division for releasing the security money/earnest money. However, the Executive Engineer, PWD refused to release the said amount to the second respondent, on the pretext, that the District Judge stayed the order of the Civil Judge. The second respondent enquired in the office of the District Judge and came to know that no such stay order was passed. The second respondent again approached the Executive Engineer for releasing of the earnest money and the Executive Engineer, PWD inform the second respondent by letter dated 21.01.2014, that Parshuram Agarwalla, Govt. pleader informed him over telephone that the District Judge had stayed the order of injunction passed by the learned Civil Judge. The information given by the petitioner was misleading and due to such misleading and wrong information given by the petitioner, Parshuram Agarwalla, the Executive Engineer did not release the earnest money. It was further alleged that the petitioner with the malafide intention and with a view to defraud the complainant made a conspiracy against him by misleading the Executive Engineer, which has caused direct impact on the complainant financially and therefore the complainant/ respondent No. 2 lodged the complaint, which was eventually forwarded to police for registering case. 8. Perusal of the complaint makes it appear, that although the allegation of Section 120B IPC has been brought against the petitioner, the complaint was totally silent as to with whom the petitioner made the conspiracy. For criminal conspiracy, one of the basic ingredient is that there must be atleast two persons. 8. Perusal of the complaint makes it appear, that although the allegation of Section 120B IPC has been brought against the petitioner, the complaint was totally silent as to with whom the petitioner made the conspiracy. For criminal conspiracy, one of the basic ingredient is that there must be atleast two persons. In the instant case, complaint was lodged against the petitioner alone and the allegation was that the petitioner made a conspiracy against the second respondent by misleading the Executive Engineer. Therefore, the basic ingredient to constitute an offence of criminal conspiracy was totally absent in the complaint, inasmuch as, there is no allegation as to with whom the petitioner hatched the conspiracy. 9. For constituting an offence under Section 420 IPC, the basic ingredients are that deception of the complainant and fraudulent and dishonest inducement by the person deceiving, for delivery of property to any person or to consent that the property should retain. In the instant case, the complaint is totally vague and there was no averment as to how the petitioner deceived the respondent No. 2. There was also no allegation in the complaint that the petitioner deceived the complainant and fraudulently induced him to deliver the money or any property. 10. For the purpose of constituting an offence under Section 406 IPC, there must be two vital ingredients. Entrustment of property with the accused or with any domain over the property and misappropriation of such property, entrusted with. In the instant case, there was absolutely no allegation and not even any whisper in the complaint, that the petitioner was entrusted with any property or he misappropriated the same. Therefore, even if the entire averments made in the complaint is accepted to be true and remains uncontroverted, it does not make out any offence, not to speak of offence under Section 406, 420 or 120B. Though, the complaint did not make out any offence against the present petitioner, learned Magistrate mechanically forwarded the complaint to police for registering case and therefore, this appears to be a case of total non-application of mind by the learned Magistrate while exercising power under section 156(3) CrPC, 1973. 11. It is also evident that while forwarding the complaint to the police, learned Magistrate did not ascertain as to whether the complainant had complied with the provision of section 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC, 1973. 11. It is also evident that while forwarding the complaint to the police, learned Magistrate did not ascertain as to whether the complainant had complied with the provision of section 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC, 1973. Evidently, the complaint was also not accompanied by any affidavit. The Apex Court in Sakiri Basu v. State of U.P. reported in (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440 and Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287 provided that before invoking the provision of section 156(3) CrPC, 1973 there must be compliance of section 154 (1) and 154(3) CrPC, 1973 and the complaint should accompany an affidavit. While forwarding a complaint to police under section 156(3) CrPC, 1973 the Magistrate has to record the reasons indicating the necessity for sending the complaint to police under section 156(3) CrPC, 1973. But from the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it appears that the learned Trial Court acted like a post office and without applying his judicial mind sent the complaint to police for registering a case, although the complaint did not disclose any offence against the present petitioner. 12. When the complaint/FIR failed to make out any criminal offence, it would be travesty of justice to allow the instant criminal proceeding against the petitioner to continue. Thus, having considered the scope of interference by High Court for quashing a criminal proceeding at the threshold, in the exercise of power under section 482 CrPC, 1973 and the allegation made against the petitioner in the instant case, I have no hesitation to say that the complaint/FIR in the instant case was totally a vexatious one and allowing the instant criminal proceeding to continue will amounts to abuse of process of the court and therefore, the instant FIR and the criminal proceeding in Tinsukia P.S. Case No. 742/2016 under Section 420/406/120B IPC deserves to be quashed. Accordingly, the FIR and the Tinsukia P.S. Case No. 742/2016 arising out of such FIR are quashed. 13. The criminal petition accordingly stands allowed. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned court.