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2018 DIGILAW 141 (KER)

C. K. Balakrishnan, S/o Kuttappa Gupthan v. State Transport Authority, Thiruvananthapuram

2018-02-12

ANIL K.NARENDRAN

body2018
JUDGMENT : The petitioner, who is the registered owner of a stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-09/R-1819, which was being operated on the route Palakkad-Kadambazhipuram, is before this Court in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the 1st respondent State Transport Authority to add the period of non-use of that stage carriage, which was detained in the Armed Reserve Camp, Kallekkad for nearly three years, along with the 15 years life of that stage carriage, so that the period of non-use is added after the 15 years life span of that vehicle. The petitioner has submitted Ext.P5 representation dated 20.9.2017 before the 1st respondent State Transport Authority and Ext.P6 representation dated 20.9.2017 before the 2nd respondent State, the 3rd respondent Regional Transport Authority and the 4th respondent Secretary of that Authority for that purpose. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 3. As per Ext.P1 certificate of registration, the stage carriage owned by the petitioner is a 2005 model vehicle manufactured by M/s. Ashok Leyland Ltd. The date of delivery and the date of initial registration of the said vehicle are 9.6.2005 and 16.6.2005 respectively. While the petitioner was operating the said vehicle as a stage carriage on the route Palakkad-Kadambazhipuram it was seized by the Tahsildar, Ottapalam on 24.9.2014 and detained at the Armed Reserve Camp, Kallekkad for the period from 26.9.2014 till 15.9.2017 in connection with the revenue recovery proceedings initiated by the Bank from which the petitioner had availed an agricultural loan. 4. The recovery proceedings were under challenge before this Court in W.P.(C)No.34743 of 2014. As evident from Ext.P2 order dated 17.8.2017 of the Tahsildar, Ottapalam the vehicle was ordered to be released to the petitioner on remittance of Rs.20,000/- and as evident from Ext.P3 certificate dated 15.9.2017 of the Quarter Master, Armed Reserve Camp, Kallekkad the vehicle was released to the petitioner on 15.9.2017. As discernible from Ext.P4 representation dated 16.8.2017 made before the Regional Transport Officer, Palakkad the vehicle was released to the petitioner, on condition that he has to pay off the dues in monthly instalments. 5. As discernible from Ext.P4 representation dated 16.8.2017 made before the Regional Transport Officer, Palakkad the vehicle was released to the petitioner, on condition that he has to pay off the dues in monthly instalments. 5. Now, the request made by the petitioner in Ext.P5 and P6 representations is to add the period of non-use of his stage carriage for nearly three years, covered by Ext.P3 certificate dated 15.9.2017 of the Quarter Master, Armed Reserve Camp, Kallekkad along with the 15 years life of that stage carriage, so that the period of non-use is added after the 15 years life span of that vehicle. 6. Section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with grant of stage carriage permit. As per sub-section (1) of Section 72, subject to the provisions of Section 71, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 70, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. As per the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 72, no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application. Going by sub-section (2) of Section 72, the Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a stage carriage of a specified description and may, subject to any rule that may be made under the Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the conditions enumerated in clauses (i) to (xxiv). Clause (xxiv) of subsection (2) of Section 72 reads thus: “(xxiv) any other conditions which may be prescribed.” 7. In Subhash Chandra Gupta v. State of U.P. [ (1980) 2 SCC 324 ], the vires of clause (x) of sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which deals with grant of contract carriage permit was under challenge before the Apex Court. The provision under clause (x) of subsection (2) of Section 51 of the Old Act is pari materia with that under clause (xxiv) of sub-section (2) of Section 72 of the New Act, which deals with grant of stage carriage permit and clause (xiii) of sub-section (2) of Section 74 of that Act which deals with grant of contract carriage permit. The Apex Court held that sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Old Act is geared to public safety, not private profit and casts a solemn duty not to be deterred by any pressure except the pressure of social justice to Indian lives moving in buses, walking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killer - road accident - is to be awarded death sentence, Section 51 and like provisions must receive severe enforcement. Clause (x) of sub-section (2) of Section 51 authorises the impost of any condition, of course, having a nexus with the statutory purpose. The prescription that the bus shall be at least a seven years old model one is relevant to the condition of the vehicle and its passengers' comparative safety and comfort on chaotic highways. In the said decision the Apex Court has stated in categorical terms that, from the point of view of the human rights of road users, the condition regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty. Paras.3 and 4 of the said decision read thus; “3. Tersely put, the petitioner is the grantee of permits of ply mini buses as contract carriages and in the grant a condition has been fastened that the vehicle shall not be more than seven years old. Condition No.18, relating to Mini Buses Contract Carriage Permits, and the source of power, Section 51(2)(x) read thus: “That the vehicle covered by the permit shall be not more than four years old counted from the date of registration at any time during the validity of the permit.” “51(2) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a contract carriage permit, may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely:- (x) any other conditions which may be prescribed.” 'Four years' have been relaxed to seven years since September 23, 1978, the beneficiaries being the bus owners and the essential victims being the unknown causalities who have no 'poor lobby' power. The State must remember that it has responsibilities, not merely to minibus owners, but also to avoid the daily tragedies on the Indian highways under the lethal wheels of these whirling carriages. The State must remember that it has responsibilities, not merely to minibus owners, but also to avoid the daily tragedies on the Indian highways under the lethal wheels of these whirling carriages. Section 51(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to public safety, not private profit and casts a solemn duty not to be deterred by any pressure except the pressure of social justice to Indian lives moving in buses, walking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killer - road accident - is to be awarded death sentence, Section 51 and like provisions must receive severe enforcement. In this spirit - although backtracking from 4 - years old models to 7 - years old models - the State imposed Condition 18. This was challenged artfully but unsuccessfully before the High Court and is attacked before us as ultra vires Section 51 (2) of the Act. We will examine briefly the submission to reach the conclusion that more lexical legalism cannot sterilise the sensible humanism writ large on Section 51(2)(x). If Indian life is not ultra vires Indian law every condition to save life and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision. This perspective of social justice simplifies the problem and upholds the High Court. 4. Section 51(2)(x) authorises the impost of any condition, of course, having a nexus with the statutory purpose. It is undeniable that human safety is one such purpose. The State's neglect in this area of policing public transport is deplorable but when it does act by prescribing a condition the court cannot be persuaded into little legalism and harmful negativism. The short question is whether the prescription that the bus shall be at least a seven years old model one is relevant to the condition of the vehicle and its passengers' comparative safety and comfort on our chaotic highways. Obviously, it is. The older the model, the less the chances of the latest safety measures being built into the vehicle. Every new model incorporates new devices to reduce danger and promote comfort. Every new model assures its age to be young, fresh and strong, less likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less susceptible to wear and tear and mental fatigue leading to unexpected collapse. When we buy a car or any other machine why do we look for the latest model? Every new model assures its age to be young, fresh and strong, less likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less susceptible to wear and tear and mental fatigue leading to unexpected collapse. When we buy a car or any other machine why do we look for the latest model? Vintage vehicles are good for centenarian display of the curious and cannot but be mobile menaces on our notoriously neglected highways. We have no hesitation to hold, from the point of view of the human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty. (underline supplied) 8. In Subhash Chandra Gupta's case (supra) the next question considered by the Apex Court was as to whether the words 'specified description' appearing in sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which deals with grant of stage carriage permit, which is pari materia with subsection (2) of Section 72 of the New Act, includes year of make and particulars of model of the stage carriage. The Apex Court held that, the year of the make and the particulars of the model are part of the description. Para.5 of the said decision reads thus; “5. Two decisions - Masi Ullah v. State Tribunal Appellate [ AIR 1967 All 128 (129)] and In re Ramesh Chandra Tewari etc., Civil Misc. Writ No. 7317 of 1975 (All) (unreported) (Since Reported in 1978 TAC 439 (All).) were cited as striking a contrary note. The first deals with Section 48(3) of the Act and prescription of the model or year of the make was held ultra vires because, lexically read, it was held that the expression 'specified description' in Section 48(3) did not cover, according to dictionaries, the year of manufacture of the vehicle. We extract Black's Law Dictionary on 'description' to show how the model of a vehicle is obviously a facet of its description. 'Description' means:[p.532]. We extract Black's Law Dictionary on 'description' to show how the model of a vehicle is obviously a facet of its description. 'Description' means:[p.532]. “A delineation or account of a particular subject by the recital of its characteristic accidents and qualities.” So, dictionary versus dictionary leaves the matter at large, apart from the plain function of the court to gather the meaning, not under the dictatorship of dictionaries but guided by the statutory purpose without being deflected by logomachic exercises, the mischief to be countered and the public interest to be advanced. We are clear that a later model is a better safeguard and, more relevantly to the point, the year of the make and the particulars of the model are part of the description. (underline supplied) 9. K.M. Ismeth Ummer v. Regional Transport Authority [(2011) 15 SCC 288], in the context of subsection (2) of Section 72 of the of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the Apex Court held that the expression 'specified description' is very wide, which would also include fixing the age of the vehicle. The Apex Court held further that restricting the age of the vehicle for the grant of permit for a stage carriage is obviously in the public interest because old vehicles can cause accidents and inconvenience and, therefore, the authorities under the Act are perfectly justified in placing such a restriction for grant of the permit. Para.6 of the said decision reads thus; “6. Under Section 72(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the Regional Transport Authority may grant the permit for a stage carriage of a 'specified description'. The expression 'specified description' is very wide and, in our opinion, this would include fixing the age of the vehicle also. Restricting the age of the vehicle for the grant of permit for a stage carriage is obviously in the public interest because old vehicles can cause accidents and inconvenience and, therefore, the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are perfectly justified in placing such a restriction for grant of the permit.” (underline supplied) 10. Restricting the age of the vehicle for the grant of permit for a stage carriage is obviously in the public interest because old vehicles can cause accidents and inconvenience and, therefore, the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are perfectly justified in placing such a restriction for grant of the permit.” (underline supplied) 10. In Raghavan v. Regional Transport Officer, Kollam [ 2001 (2) KLT 209 ] the common issue under challenge before a Division Bench of this Court was the imposition of 'model condition' by the Regional Transport Authorities in the State to the effect that no permit will be granted, renewed, countersigned, varied or request for concurrence entertained in respect of stage carriages which are more than 15 years old as reckoned from the date of initial registration. Taking note of the fact that 'mechanical defect' is often posed as a reason for the accident and the age of the motor vehicle is also one of the contributing factors, the Division Bench repelled the challenge based on Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, by holding that fixation of the model of a stage carriage with reference to its age is only a reasonable restriction. Para.10 of the said decision reads thus; “10. In the statement of objects and reasons it is provided that the Act intended to take care of, among other things, 'concern for road safety standards, and pollution control measures'. When the issue is analysed from the point of public interest, we find substance in the contention raised by the learned Government Pleader. This Court cannot be oblivious of the alarming number of accidents involving private buses. In a recent study conducted by the National Transportation Planning and Research Centre, it is revealed that in the year 1999, there took place 6100 accidents involving private and mini buses, in which 607 persons died and 12021 were injured. Almost 17 accidents per day caused by private and mini buses in this small State necessarily calls for appropriate urgent preventive measures. 'Mechanical defect' is often posed as a reason for the accident. Certainly the age of the motor vehicle, as correctly understood by the R.T.A., is also one of the contributing factors. Almost 17 accidents per day caused by private and mini buses in this small State necessarily calls for appropriate urgent preventive measures. 'Mechanical defect' is often posed as a reason for the accident. Certainly the age of the motor vehicle, as correctly understood by the R.T.A., is also one of the contributing factors. From that point of view, we have no hesitation to hold that fixation of the model of a stage carriage with reference to its age is a reasonable restriction, thus defeating the challenge based on Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.” (underline supplied) 11. In Raghavan's case (supra) another question considered by the Division Bench was as to whether the expression 'specified description" in sub-section (2) of Section 72 of the Act would take in the model of the vehicle with reference to its age. The Division Bench held that the expression 'specified description' appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 72 of the Act has to be understood as taking in the model of the vehicle also with reference to its age. Hence the Regional Transport Authority acted within its jurisdiction in imposing a condition as to the age of the vehicle while granting the permit for a stage carriage, since safety and convenience of passengers who travel in a stage carriage apart from the roadworthiness of the stage carriage is clearly a relevant factor that has to weigh with the Regional Transport Authority while granting a permit. Para.19 of the said decision reads thus; “19. In the light of the above discussion, it has to be held that the expression 'specified description' appearing in Section 72(2) of the Act has to be understood as taking in the model of the vehicle also with reference to its age. Hence the R.T.A. acted within its jurisdiction in imposing a condition as to the age of the vehicle while granting the permit for a stage carriage, since safety and convenience of passengers who travel in a stage carriage apart from the roadworthiness of the stage carriage is clearly a relevant factor that has to weigh with the R.T.A. while granting a permit. For the reason that it is not specifically prescribed under the Rules, it cannot be held that the R.T.A. acted illegally in imposing such a restriction, since under Section 72(2) it is well within its powers to insist for a vehicle of a specified description. For the reason that it is not specifically prescribed under the Rules, it cannot be held that the R.T.A. acted illegally in imposing such a restriction, since under Section 72(2) it is well within its powers to insist for a vehicle of a specified description. Hence the contention that the R.T.A. acted ultra vires its powers under Section 72 of the Act cannot be countenanced.” (underline supplied) 12. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. As discernible from the statement of objects and reasons of Act 59 of 1988, the provisions under the amended Act are intended to take care of, among other things, the need for encouraging adoption of higher technology in automotive sector, concern for road safety standards, pollution-control measures, etc. 13. Sub-section (2) of Section 72 of the Act empowers the Regional Transport Authority to grant permit for a stage carriage of a 'specified description', subject to any one or more of the conditions enumerated there under and also a restriction regarding the age of the stage carriage. While granting permit for a stage carriage the Regional Transport Authority has to take into consideration the safety and convenience of passengers who travel in that stage carriage, apart from the roadworthiness of that vehicle. Since the age of a stage carriage is also one of the contributing factors for road accidents, in order to eliminate old stage carriages from the road in a phased manner, the Regional Transport Authorities imposed a condition that, every vehicle covered by a permit granted, renewed or countersigned shall be of not more than 15 years old, reckoned from the date of its initial registration. The restriction regarding the age of the stage carriage is obviously in public interest, because old vehicles can cause accidents and inconvenience. In such circumstances, the age of 15 years has to be reckoned from the date of initial registration of the stage carriage and the period of non-use of a stage carriage on account of its detention in connection with any recovery proceedings or litigations before a court of law cannot be excluded while calculating the age of the stage carriage, thereby adding the period of such non-use along with 15 years life of that vehicle. 14. 14. In such circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled for a writ of mandamus commanding the 1st respondent State Transport Authority to add the period of non-use of his stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-09/R-1819, which was detained in the Armed Reserve Camp, Kallekkad for nearly three years, along with 15 years life of that stage carriage. In the result, the writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.