JUDGMENT : A.K.RATH, J. This appeal is by the plaintiff. The suit was for declaration that schedule ‘A’ property is the joint family property of the plaintiff and defendant, the sale deeds dated 2.6.1933, 19.6.1934 and 1.7.1935 executed by Govinda Prusty in favour of Brahmananda Prusty-the defendant and his brother-Bishnu Charan Prusty and the sale deed dated 14.9.1938 executed by Raghunath Prusty in favour of the defendant are void. 2. The case of the plaintiff was that Mohani Prusty was the common ancestor of the parties. He had four sons, namely, Govinda, Ratha, Banchanidhi and Gouri. They were separated about fifty years back. In a family partition, Govinda got Rs.0.4.9 share. Govinda had three sons, namely, Krishna, Raghunath and Giridhari. Giridhari died issueless in the year 1943. His widow died in the year 1965. Krishna had two sons, namely, Brahmananda-the defendant and Bishnu. Bishnu died unmarried. Plaintiff is the son of Giridhari. Govinda was living jointly with his sons and grandsons. Govinda died during 1937-38. The plaintiff was born thereafter. Govinda was the karta of the family. He became invalid. Thereafter, his eldest son, Krishna, father of the defendant, was the de facto karta of the family. Taking advantage of his position as Manager of the joint family, Krishna managed to get the joint family property in respect of Lot nos.1, 2 & 3 of schedule ‘A’ property transferred in the name of his son Bramhananda by means of three registered sale deeds from Govinda on 2.6.1933, 16.6.1934 and 1.7.1935 respectively. Krishna duped his brother, Raghunath and obtained a fraudulent registered sale deed dated 14.9.1933 in respect of Lot no.4 land. There was no legal necessity. The sale deeds had not been acted upon. The same had not seen the light of the day till the defendant produced the deeds in the consolidation proceedings during the year 1976. Notwithstanding the alienations, the land had been treated as joint family property. The parties are still in joint possession thereof. In the consolidation proceedings, transfers under the sale deeds dated 2.6.1933, 1.7.1935 and 14.9.1938 respectively had been decided in favour of the defendant and the transfer in respect of other sale deed is still sub-judice. The matter went to the Consolidation Commissioner in Revision Case No.19 of 1979. The Consolidation Commissioner held that transactions were voidable and directed the plaintiff to seek relief in the Civil Court. The matter went to the Consolidation Commissioner in Revision Case No.19 of 1979. The Consolidation Commissioner held that transactions were voidable and directed the plaintiff to seek relief in the Civil Court. With this factual scenario, the suit was instituted seeking the relief mentioned supra. 3. The defendant filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendant was that Govinda was the karta of the family. To press his legal necessity, he sold the joint family property to different persons. The defendant was doing his business at Calcutta. Out of his income, he purchased Lot no.1 land from Govinda under registered sale deed dated 2.6.1933, Lot no.2 land from Govinda and Narendra Prusty (the son of Gouri and nephew of Govinda) under registered sale deed dated 24.6.1934 and Lot no.3 land from Govinda under registered sale deed dated 1.7.1935 for valid consideration. Govinda died in the year 1937. After his death his sons mutually partitioned the joint family property in three equal shares. Lot nos.1, 2 and 3 lands had not been included in the partition. The same are the self-acquired property of the defendant. After partition, Raghunath sold Lot no.4 land in favour of the defendant under registered sale deed dated 14.9.1933 for consideration. He is in possession of the said land. The land had been mutated in his name. The plaintiff filed an affidavit relinquishing his claim. The plaintiff was born after the death of Govinda. He is not competent to challenge the alienation made by Govinda. The suit is barred by limitation. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed seven issues. The parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their case. The learned trial court came to hold that the defendant purchased the suit land from his separate earnings. The sale deeds are genuine. The suit was barred by limitation. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The unsuccessful plaintiff filed T.A.No.1 of 1983 before the learned Additional District Judge, Jajpur, which was eventually dismissed. It is apt to state here that during pendency of this appeal, respondent no.1 died, whereafter his legal heirs had been substituted. 4. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The unsuccessful plaintiff filed T.A.No.1 of 1983 before the learned Additional District Judge, Jajpur, which was eventually dismissed. It is apt to state here that during pendency of this appeal, respondent no.1 died, whereafter his legal heirs had been substituted. 4. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether on the finding that the family continues to be joint and there was no legal necessity in support of Exts.2, 3 & 4, the sale deeds would give any title to the defendants for defeating the suit ? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation in view of the fact that when Govinda, common ancestor of the parties, had executed three sale deeds in the year 1933, 1934 and 1935 and Raghunath, son of Govinda, executed a sale deed in the year 1938 in favour of defendant ?” 5. Heard Mr.D.P.Mohanty along with Mrs.Minati Pal, learned Advocates on behalf of Mr.B.H.Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant and Mr.Baibaswata Panigrahi, learned Advocate on behalf of Mr.S.K.Padhi, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents. 6. Mr.D.P.Mohanty, learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the suit property is the joint family property of Govinda. Govinda had no legal necessity to alienate the suit land in favour of the defendant. Govinda became invalid in the later part of his life. Krishan, the eldest son of Govinda, was the de facto karta of the family. Taking advantage of his position, Krishna managed to execute three registered sale deeds on 2.6.1933, 16.6.1934 and 1.7.1935 respectively in favour of his son. There was no legal necessity for Govinda and Raghunath to alienate the suit land in favour of the defendant and his brother. No consideration was paid. The deeds were nominal. He further submitted that the deeds were produced by the defendant for the first time in the consolidation proceedings. The matter went to the Consolidation Commissioner in Revision Case No.19 of 1979. The Consolidation Commissioner held that the consolidation authorities had no power to set aside the sale deeds. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted the suit. He further submitted that under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding shall be excluded in due period of limitation for any suit. The Consolidation Commissioner held that the consolidation authorities had no power to set aside the sale deeds. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted the suit. He further submitted that under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding shall be excluded in due period of limitation for any suit. He relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble apex Court and various High Courts in the case of J.Kumaradasan Nair and another v. IRIC Sohan and others, AIR 2009 SC 1333 , Ramnarayan Singh v. Kubera Sahu, AIR 1962 Orissa 100, Suraj Nath Prosad Kedarnath v. Union of India, AIR 1975 Calcutta 203 and Parameswaran v. N.Ramchandran, AIR 1987 Kerala 37. 7. Per contra, Mr.Panigrahi, learned Advocate for the respondents submitted that the suit was grossly barred by limitation. Both the courts below concurrently held that the sale was for legal necessity. The sale deeds are genuine and valid. There is no perversity and illegality in the said findings. 8. The plaintiff had not described his age in the plaint. His evidence was recorded on 3.5.1982. He was 28 years old at that point of time. The suit was instituted in the year 1979. Thus he was born in the year 1951. He attained major in 1969. The period of limitation to set aside the sale deed is three years as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The sale deeds were executed on 2.6.1933, 19.6.1934, 1.7.1935 and 14.9.1938 respectively. The plaintiff rose from the deep slumber and instituted the suit in the year 1979. Thus, the suit was barred by limitation. 9. Reliance placed on Section 14 of the Limitation Act is totally misplaced. Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall come to play when the plaintiff has been prosecuting in another civil proceeding with due diligence. 10. The Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act enacted in the year 1972. The consolidation operation, where the suit land falls, started. Several objection cases were filed in the year 1976. Against the order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the matter went to the Consolidation Commissioner; whereafter the suit had been instituted. The plaintiff was not prosecuting the lis bona fide in any forum from 1972 till 1976. 11. The decisions relied upon by Mr.Mohanty, learned Advocate for the appellant, are distinguishable. Against the order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the matter went to the Consolidation Commissioner; whereafter the suit had been instituted. The plaintiff was not prosecuting the lis bona fide in any forum from 1972 till 1976. 11. The decisions relied upon by Mr.Mohanty, learned Advocate for the appellant, are distinguishable. In J.Kumaradasan Nair (supra) the apex Court held that the Court will not apply beneficent provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. There is no quarrel over the said proposition of law. In Ramnarayan Singh (supra), it was held that proceedings taken before the revenue court in good faith, the period spent shall be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In Parameswaran (supra), the suit was filed in a wrong Court. The grace period was excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In Suraj Nath Prosad Kedarnath (supra), it was held that in order to get a benefit of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the Court must be satisfied that the person acted in good faith and proceeded in with the case with due diligence. 12. Both the courts below concurrently held that the sale deeds are valid. There is no perversity or illegality in the findings of the courts below. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 13. In the wake of aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.