JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner-landlord assails the order dated 10/05/2017 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur whereby he has remanded the matter back to the learned Additional Civil Judge and Metropolitan Magistrate No.2, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur to adjudicate the matter afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord submits that the proceedings being continued by the respondent-tenant are clearly abuse of the process of the Court. He has invited this Court to chain of events which have taken place in the present case. 3. Initially, the petitioner, landlord of premise i.e. House No.302-A, Shanti Nagar-B, Near Gurjar Ki Thari, Gopal Pura By-pass, Jaipur, had let out the respondent-tenant her premises for Rs.8500/- per month. A rent agreement was also executed to the said effect on 10/04/2013. The agreement was for a period of eleven months with a provision to increase the rent by 5% thereafter. 4. It is submitted that the petitioner came to know of the respondent being a land grabber and having eighteen criminal cases pending against him and a news was published in this regard in the newspaper. The petitioner, therefore, asked the respondent for an advance decree of possession to be executed in her favour and therein she mentioned the rent as Rs.6900/- per month as per mutual agreement with purposes of water & light bill extra and taking note of the presence of both the parties and having accepted the affidavit and after taking on their identity proof submitted alongwith original application no.294/2014, a decree of possession was passed by the Rent Tribunal on 08/05/2014 under the Rent Control Act. Both the respondent-tenant and the petitioner-landlord had submitted their identity cards and were duly identified with their identity proved by the Rent Tribunal while passing the decree of possession. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord submits that after the advance decree has been passed when the rented premises was not vacated by the respondent-tenant, Execution Application was filed by the petitioner-landlord for execution of the decree of possession dated 08/05/2014. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord submits that after the advance decree has been passed when the rented premises was not vacated by the respondent-tenant, Execution Application was filed by the petitioner-landlord for execution of the decree of possession dated 08/05/2014. The respondent-tenant put in his appearance and submitted objections under Order 21 Rule 23 (2) CPC stating that he did not file a joint application and the rent agreed was not Rs.6900/- but originally it was Rs.8500/- per month which was increased to Rs.9000/- per month and therefore, the Rent Control Act was not applicable on account of the rent being more than 7000/- per month and therefore, the decree of possession and the order dated 08/05/2014 passed by the Rent Tribunal was obtained fraudulently by the petitioner-landlord. 6. The respondent-landlord also separately filed an appeal against the order passed by the Rent Tribunal dated 08/05/2014 but the Rent Appellate Tribunal dismissed his appeal on 23/05/2015, where-after the respondent-tenant filed a suit for declaration and setting aside the order dated 08/05/2014 before the Rent Tribunal which was rejected on 21/08/2015 on the ground that no cause of action arise to the respondent-tenant The application filed by the petitioner-landlord under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was allowed. An appeal was preferred against the order before the Rent Appellate Tribunal who rejected the appeal on 03/10/2015. Against the said order passed in appeal, SB Civil Writ Petition No.15231/2015 was preferred before this High Court wherein after notices were served on the petitioner-landlord and filing reply, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 23/03/2017 as respondent’s counsel prayed to file suit for declaration before competent court for which permission was granted by the Court. 7. A suit was filed by the respondent before the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.2, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act for declaring the eviction certificate dated 08/05/2014 as illegal. The petitioner filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC objecting to the maintainability of the suit. The application was allowed by the learned trial court and the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction on 27/04/2017. The petitioner filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC objecting to the maintainability of the suit. The application was allowed by the learned trial court and the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction on 27/04/2017. Against the said order passed by the learned trial court, an appeal was preferred to the Additional District Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur on 27/04/2017 and the order impugned dated 10/05/2017 has been set passed setting aside the order dated 27/04/2017 with further directions to the trial court to adjudicate the matter afresh on merits after providing opportunity of hearing on merits. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that upon remand, the trial court has also granted temporary injunction on 23/05/2017 restraining from operating upon the certificate and decree of possession dated 08/05/2014 till pendency of the suit. In such circumstances, the petitioner submits that she is in a situation that she can never get her house vacated from the respondent. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik and another Vs. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar and others: (2017) 5 SCC 496 wherein it has been held as under:- “12. This case indicates a blatant abuse of the process of the Court. The petitioners not only took the benefit of an order of the High Court granting them one year’s time to vacate the premises but obtained a further extension of a period of four months to vacate. The petitioners then filed a Review Petition before the High Court and moved another application, this time seeking an extension of five years to vacate the premises. The time of the High Court and, unfortunately, of this Court as well had to be devoted to a thoroughly frivolous proceeding. Learned counsel for the petitioners in fact sought to urge that as a result of the judgment of the City Civil Court, the petitioners have been deprived of establishing that their status as licensees fructified into a tenancy with effect from 1 February 1973. Quite apart from the fact that such a plea would not be open to the petitioners in the background of what has been observed earlier, we find even on merits that the submission requires only be stated to be rejected. Quite apart from the fact that such a plea would not be open to the petitioners in the background of what has been observed earlier, we find even on merits that the submission requires only be stated to be rejected. We have extracted in the earlier part of this judgment the specific finding of the Trial Court based on the admissions of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners that the premises were granted to them on the basis of a conducting agreement. Besides this, in the earlier proceeding that was instituted in the Small Causes Court, it was found that the premises have been granted under a conducting agreement and there was no relationship of licensor and licensee. That being the position, the petitioners would not acquire status as tenants with effect from 1 February 1973, there being no licence in their favour. 13. This Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth. 14. Courts across the legal system - this Court not being an exception – are choked with litigation. Frivolous and groundless filings constitute a serious menace to the administration of justice. They consume time and clog the infrastructure. Productive resources which should be deployed in the handling of genuine causes are dissipated in attending to cases filed only to benefit from delay, by prolonging dead issues and pursuing worthless causes. No litigant can have a vested interest in delay. Unfortunately, as the present case exemplifies, the process of dispensing justice is misused by the unscrupulous to the detriment of the legitimate. The present case is an illustration of how a simple issue has occupied the time of the courts and of how successive applications have been filed to prolong the inevitable. Unfortunately, as the present case exemplifies, the process of dispensing justice is misused by the unscrupulous to the detriment of the legitimate. The present case is an illustration of how a simple issue has occupied the time of the courts and of how successive applications have been filed to prolong the inevitable. The person in whose favour the balance of justice lies has in the process been left in the lurch by repeated attempts to revive a stale issue. This tendency can be curbed only if courts across the system adopt an institutional approach which penalizes such behavior. Liberal access to justice does not mean access to chaos and indiscipline. A strong message must be conveyed that courts of justice will not be allowed to be disrupted by litigative strategies designed to profit from the delays of the law. Unless remedial action is taken by all courts here and now our society will breed a legal culture based on evasion instead of abidance. It is the duty of every court to firmly deal with such situations. The imposition of exemplary costs is a necessary instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as well as to prevent the filing of frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts can set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the concerns of those who are in need of justice. Imposition of real time costs is also necessary to ensure that access to courts is available to citizens with genuine grievances. Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate causes simply by the weight of undeserving cases which flood the system. Such a situation cannot be allowed to come to pass. Hence it is not merely a matter of discretion but a duty and obligation cast upon all courts to ensure that the legal system is not exploited by those who use the forms of the law to defeat or delay justice. We commend all courts to deal with frivolous filings in the same manner.” 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit filed by the respondent under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act was not maintainable as Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act could be invoked only to cancel an instrument. We commend all courts to deal with frivolous filings in the same manner.” 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit filed by the respondent under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act was not maintainable as Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act could be invoked only to cancel an instrument. It is submitted that the certificate of possession was issued as a decree of the Court and the same could not be a subject matter of cancellation under the aforesaid provisions. The decree of the Rent Tribunal has already been upheld by the Rent Appellate Tribunal as well as by the High Court and in the circumstances, the order of remand passed by the appellate court was wholly uncalled for and unjustified. The appellate court has proceeded on presumptions and assumptions and has travelled beyond its jurisdiction in passing the order and this Court, therefore, ought to interfere with the same under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the original application, which was moved by the petitioner, was based on fraud. Since the rent was more than Rs.7000/- per month, the application for taking advance decree in terms of Section 8 of the Rent Control Act, 2001, was based on fraud and false averments. It is his submission that he the respondent was not present at the time when the application was moved. Counsel submits that under Section 8 of the Act of 2001, the precondition is that the rent should be less than Rs.7000/- per month whereas under the original agreement the rent was fixed at Rs.8500/- per month. In view thereof, the basis of the order dated 08/05/2014 was false and wrongful and therefore, the petitioner could not have got any benefit on the basis of the possession certificate dated 08/05/2014. He contends that liberty was granted by the Court and the trial court could not have held his suit to be not maintainable and thus the appellate court rightly remanded the matter back by setting aside the order dated 27/04/2017. 12. Having heard learned counsel for both the parties, this Court finds that the order dated 08/05/2014 was upheld in appeal by the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act. 12. Having heard learned counsel for both the parties, this Court finds that the order dated 08/05/2014 was upheld in appeal by the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act. The subsequent fresh proceedings initiated for quashing the order dated 08/05/2014 and declaring as nullity in law, was also dismissed in the independent proceedings taken up before the Rent Tribunal as well as before the Rent Appellate Tribunal and even in the High Court, the order passed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal remained undisturbed. Of-course, permission was granted to the respondent-tenant to avail remedy available under the law. Thereafter, he has again challenged the order dated 08/05/2014 in proceedings taken up under Section 31 of the Specific Performance Act before the trial court which was also rejected on the ground of jurisdiction. The appellate court has remanded the matter back by the impugned order and on remand, the trial court has stayed operation of certificate of possession and order dated 08/05/2014. The process which has been quoted above, as adopted by the respondent-tenant, clearly reveals the adventurism adopted by him for abusing the process of Court. 13. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, as quoted above, provides as under:- “When cancellation may be ordered:- (A) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjusted void or voidable; and the Court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (B) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the Court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.” 14. A look at the aforesaid provision shows that the same can be applied in cases relating to cancellation of an instrument but the same would not be applicable to a decree passed by a Court for which the certificate of possession has been issued. The suit was therefore not maintainable. A look at the aforesaid provision shows that the same can be applied in cases relating to cancellation of an instrument but the same would not be applicable to a decree passed by a Court for which the certificate of possession has been issued. The suit was therefore not maintainable. It cannot be said that merely because the counsel prayed for filing suit for declaration, the High Court had examined the facts to give liberty to the respondent to file a suit for cancellation under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Such a course adopted was, therefore, wholly illegal and the appellate court has fallen in error in remanding the matter. 15. The contention of the petitioner in regard to the respondent having eighteen cases of criminal nature including grabbing of land and property pending against him, which resulted in her asking to the respondent to move joint application as envisaged under Section 8-A of the Rent Control Act on the ground of original rent from Rs.8500/- per month to Rs.6900/- per month by excluding the charges for water and electricity supply, are found to be genuine and correct. While in the original rent agreement, there is no mention of separate charges for water and electricity bill, the same having specifically mentioned in the agreement which has been put up before the Rent Tribunal mentioning of monthly rent of Rs.6900/- Thus, it cannot be said that a fraud has been played. The basis on which the the impugned order of remand has been passed is thus erroneous and the learned appellate court, while remanding the matter, has failed to take notice of the tenant having continued to remain in tenancy for long even after expiry of the period of rent agreement. The facts of the present case are writ large and the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik and another Vs. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar and others (supra) are apt and wholly applicable in the facts of the present case too. Adopting of possible methods and even going to the extent of falsifying the orders passed by the courts drawn in his presence whereby the Court has notified and identified his presence in the order with the sole purpose to continue with the tenancy and grab the properties is clearly made out. Adopting of possible methods and even going to the extent of falsifying the orders passed by the courts drawn in his presence whereby the Court has notified and identified his presence in the order with the sole purpose to continue with the tenancy and grab the properties is clearly made out. The very purpose of the Rent Control Act, 2001 is to protect the landlords from such frivolous and unworthy tenants and Section 8 is provided for the said purpose. 16. In view of above, the impugned order dated 10/05/2017 and order dated 23/05/2017 cannot be held to be legal and justified and are accordingly quashed and set aside. 17. The suit filed under Section 31 is held to be not maintainable. The order dated 27/04/2017 is upheld and the respondents are directed to comply with the decree of possession dated 08/05/2014 and handover the possession to the petitioner within fifteen days. The writ petition is allowed with cost of Rs.25,000/- to be paid to the petitioner.